ex post facto clause in Kentucky

2016Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S, 282, 300-01, 97 S.Ct. 2290 , 53 L,Ed.2d 344 (1977) (refusing to consider a claim that parole ineligibility provisions added to a statute authorizing a life sentence amounted in that case to an ex post facto violation, because the claimant did not receive a life sen-tencé); Morales, 514 U.S. at 509 , 115 S.Ct. 1597 (reversing grant of habeas corpus, because statutory change allowing deferrals of parole reconsideration “create[d] only the most speculative, and attenuated possibility of producing the prohibited effect!,] [ie, increased punishment]... and such conjectu

2016Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S, 282, 300-01, 97 S.Ct. 2290 , 53 L,Ed.2d 344 (1977) (refusing to consider a claim that parole ineligibility provisions added to a statute authorizing a life sentence amounted in that case to an ex post facto violation, because the claimant did not receive a life sen-tencé); Morales, 514 U.S. at 509 , 115 S.Ct. 1597 (reversing grant of habeas corpus, because statutory change allowing deferrals of parole reconsideration “create[d] only the most speculative, and attenuated possibility of producing the prohibited effect!,] [ie, increased punishment]... and such conjectu

2016Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S, 282, 300-01, 97 S.Ct. 2290 , 53 L,Ed.2d 344 (1977) (refusing to consider a claim that parole ineligibility provisions added to a statute authorizing a life sentence amounted in that case to an ex post facto violation, because the claimant did not receive a life sen-tencé); Morales, 514 U.S. at 509 , 115 S.Ct. 1597 (reversing grant of habeas corpus, because statutory change allowing deferrals of parole reconsideration “create[d] only the most speculative, and attenuated possibility of producing the prohibited effect!,] [ie, increased punishment]... and such conjectu

2016Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S, 282, 300-01, 97 S.Ct. 2290 , 53 L,Ed.2d 344 (1977) (refusing to consider a claim that parole ineligibility provisions added to a statute authorizing a life sentence amounted in that case to an ex post facto violation, because the claimant did not receive a life sen-tencé); Morales, 514 U.S. at 509 , 115 S.Ct. 1597 (reversing grant of habeas corpus, because statutory change allowing deferrals of parole reconsideration “create[d] only the most speculative, and attenuated possibility of producing the prohibited effect!,] [ie, increased punishment]... and such conjectu

2016Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S, 282, 300-01, 97 S.Ct. 2290 , 53 L,Ed.2d 344 (1977) (refusing to consider a claim that parole ineligibility provisions added to a statute authorizing a life sentence amounted in that case to an ex post facto violation, because the claimant did not receive a life sen-tencé); Morales, 514 U.S. at 509 , 115 S.Ct. 1597 (reversing grant of habeas corpus, because statutory change allowing deferrals of parole reconsideration “create[d] only the most speculative, and attenuated possibility of producing the prohibited effect!,] [ie, increased punishment]... and such conjectu

2016Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S, 282, 300-01, 97 S.Ct. 2290 , 53 L,Ed.2d 344 (1977) (refusing to consider a claim that parole ineligibility provisions added to a statute authorizing a life sentence amounted in that case to an ex post facto violation, because the claimant did not receive a life sen-tencé); Morales, 514 U.S. at 509 , 115 S.Ct. 1597 (reversing grant of habeas corpus, because statutory change allowing deferrals of parole reconsideration “create[d] only the most speculative, and attenuated possibility of producing the prohibited effect!,] [ie, increased punishment]... and such conjectu

2016Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S, 282, 300-01, 97 S.Ct. 2290 , 53 L,Ed.2d 344 (1977) (refusing to consider a claim that parole ineligibility provisions added to a statute authorizing a life sentence amounted in that case to an ex post facto violation, because the claimant did not receive a life sen-tencé); Morales, 514 U.S. at 509 , 115 S.Ct. 1597 (reversing grant of habeas corpus, because statutory change allowing deferrals of parole reconsideration “create[d] only the most speculative, and attenuated possibility of producing the prohibited effect!,] [ie, increased punishment]... and such conjectu

2016Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 300-01 (1977) (refusing to consider a claim that parole ineligibility provisions added to a statute authorizing a life sentence amounted in that case to an ex post facto violation, because the claimant did not receive a life sentence); Morales, 514 U.S. at 509 (reversing grant of habeas corpus, because statutory change allowing deferrals of parole reconsideration "create[d] only the most speculative and attenuated possibility of producing the prohibited effect[,] [i.e, increased punishment]... and such conjectural effects are insufficient" to establish a viola

2009As this Court explained in Martin v. Chandler, the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed confusion surrounding the second prong of the ex post facto inquiry; that is, whether the change in law increases the punishment for a crime. 122 S.W.3d 540 (Ky.2003).

2009As this Court explained in Martin v. Chandler, the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed confusion surrounding the second prong of the ex post facto inquiry; that is, whether the change in law increases the punishment for a crime. 122 S.W.3d 540 (Ky.2003).

2024To the contrary, 501 KAR 1:030 § 3(2)(b) explicitly permits, without limitations, the Board to “order a serve-out on a sentence.”[5] And we have held that even applying a 2003 version of that administrative regulation (which expressly permitted the Board to issue a serve-out mandate) to an inmate who was sentenced in 1983 (when the regulation did not expressly permit the Board to issue a serve-out) was not an ex post facto violation because the serve-out was not an “enhancement of punishment” or an “elongation” of the inmate’s sentence so “the retroactive application of this revised regulation

2022To the contrary, 501 KAR 1:030 §3(2)(b) explicitly permits, without limitations, the Board to “order a serve-out on a sentence.” And we have held that even applying a 2003 version of that administrative regulation (which expressly permitted the Board to issue a serve-out mandate) to an inmate who was sentenced in 1983 (when the regulation did not expressly permit the Board to issue a serve-out) was not an ex post facto violation because the serve-out was not an “enhancement of punishment” or an “elongation” of the inmate’s sentence so “the retroactive application of this revised regulation doe

2016We note, however, that any vestigial claim remaining under the Due Process Clause would share the ex post facto claim's lack of ripeness. 19 (quoting Gamer v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 250 (2000), which in turn quotes California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509 (1995)).

2016We note, however, that any vestigial claim remaining under the Due Process Clause would share the ex post facto claim's lack of ripeness. 19 (quoting Gamer v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 250 (2000), which in turn quotes California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509 (1995)).

2014Under the interpretation of the ex post facto clause announced in Collins , judicial review is more focused on legislation that has to do with “the definition of crimes, defenses, or punishments!.]” Id. at 51 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 . .

2014Under the interpretation of the ex post facto clause announced in Collins , judicial review is more focused on legislation that has to do with “the definition of crimes, defenses, or punishments!.]” Id. at 51 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 . .

2003Compare Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 , 117 S.Ct. 891 , 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997) (finding an ex post facto violation where Florida rearrested an inmate and returned him to custody after retroactively canceling "provisional credits” that had been credited towards the inmate’s sentence and resulted in his release from custody). .

2003Compare Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 , 117 S.Ct. 891 , 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997) (finding an ex post facto violation where Florida rearrested an inmate and returned him to custody after retroactively canceling "provisional credits” that had been credited towards the inmate’s sentence and resulted in his release from custody). .

2003The conviction referred to in that section is the subsequent one, not the first." (emphasis added)); Lattimore v. Corrections Cabinet, Ky.App., 790 S.W.2d 238, 240 (1990) (rejecting Appellant's Ex Post Facto claim and holding that "KRS 533.060(2) has no application to appellant’s first sentence for armed robbery committed in 1973.

2002However, Hyatt is not able to satisfy the second prong of the ex post facto test set out in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 , 101 S.Ct. 960 , 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981), or Lattimore v. Corrections Cabinet, Ky.App., 790 S.W.2d 238 (1990).

1987Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 232 , 2 S.Ct. 443, 452 , 27 L.Ed. 506 (1883).

1987Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 232 , 2 S.Ct. 443, 452 , 27 L.Ed. 506 (1883).

2021Cmty Hosp. v. Gregg, 815 S.W.2d 320 (Texas App. 1991) (amendment to peer review privilege statute was procedural). 35 KRS 311.377(2). 36Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 45 (1980) (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)). 37 Raikes, 984 S.W.2d at 468-69 . 10 abandon our bedrock rules of statutory interpretation.

2021Statutes creating evidentiary privileges necessitate strict construction because they violate the fundamental principle that “the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence.”36 We accordingly consider broad claims of privilege with careful scrutiny.37 This critical approach, however, does not force us to tried after its enactment because the amendment was procedural); People v. Dolph- Hostetter, 664 N.W.2d 254, 261 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the application of the amended marital communications privilege did not violate the ex post facto clause because it was procedural); State

2021Cmty Hosp. v. Gregg, 815 S.W.2d 320 (Texas App. 1991) (amendment to peer review privilege statute was procedural). 35 KRS 311.377(2). 36Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 45 (1980) (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)). 37 Raikes, 984 S.W.2d at 468-69 . 10 abandon our bedrock rules of statutory interpretation.

2014Clair violated the Ex Post Facto clause); id. at 577-78 (Keller, J., dissenting) (arguing that Thompson was correct).