ex post facto clause in West Virginia

2020There is simply no “clear[] proof that the statutory scheme is so punitive in either purpose or effect as to negate the Legislature’s intention.” Hensler, 210 W.Va. at 531 , 558 S.E.2d at 331 , syl. pt. 2, in part.

2020There is simply no “clear[] proof that the statutory scheme is so punitive in either purpose or effect as to negate the Legislature’s intention.” Hensler, 210 W.Va. at 531 , 558 S.E.2d at 331 , syl. pt. 2, in part.

2014Additionally, the United States Supreme Court rejected a procedural due process challenge to a similar sex offender registration act in Connecticut Department of Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003), and rejected an ex post facto clause challenge in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).

2003Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003), concerned two offenders who were required to register for life under the Alaska Act, but challenged its application because they had been convicted before the passage of the act.

1998For the confined prisoner, parole—even with its legal *869 constraints—is a long step toward regaining lost freedom. * * * * * * "[A] repealer of parole eligibility previously available to imprisoned offenders would clearly present the serious question under the ex post facto clause ... of whether it imposed a `greater or more severe punishment than was prescribed by law at the time of the ... offense.'["] * * * * * * In Rodriguez [ v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 594 F.2d 170 (7th Cir.1979) ], the court emphasized that it was immaterial that the imprisoned offender might not have received parole at th

1998For the confined prisoner, parole — even with its legal constraints — is a long step toward regaining lost freedom. “[A] repealer of parole eligibility previously available to imprisoned offenders would clearly present the serious question under the ex post facto clause ... of whether it imposed a ‘greater or more severe punishment than was prescribed by law at the time of the ... offense.’[”] s¡s >¡< ❖ # # In Rodriguez [v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 594 F.2d 170 (7th Cir.1979) ], the court emphasized that it was immaterial that the imprisoned offender might not have received parole at the time of hi

1980See Marks v. U. S., supra ; U. S. v. Brown, supra .

1980See Marks v. U. S., supra; U. S. v. Brown, supra. The early classic definition of an ex post facto law was set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Calder v. Bull, 3 U. S. 386 , 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798): (1) Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action; (2) every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed; (3) every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) every law that alters the legal rule

2023Va. 420 , 525 S.E.2d 301 (1999). iii WALKER, Chief Justice: Petitioner Todd C. was convicted at trial of eight counts of sexual abuse of his four nieces. 1 He was sentenced to four concurrent terms of one to five years for violation of West Virginia Code § 61-8B-7 (sexual abuse in the first degree) that were to run consecutively with his four consecutive terms of incarceration for violation of West Virginia Code § 61-8D-5 (sexual abuse by a parent, guardian, custodian, or person in a position of trust). 2 In these consolidated appeals, Petitioner, for the first time, raises an ex post facto vi

2023Pt. 1, in part, State v. Myers, 204 W.Va. 449 , 513 S.E.2d 676 (1998)) (“[I]t is within the authority of this Court to ‘sua sponte, in the interest of justice, notice plain error.’”).

2023Pt. 1, in part, State v. Myers, 204 W.Va. 449 , 513 S.E.2d 676 (1998)) (“[I]t is within the authority of this Court to ‘sua sponte, in the interest of justice, notice plain error.’”).

2022Va. 583 , 509 S.E.2d 864 (1998), we held that [t]o pass constitutional muster under the ex post facto clause of the West Virginia Constitution, Article III, Section 4, the provisions of W.Va.Code, 62-12-13(a)(5) [1997] allowing up to 3 years between parole reviews for prisoners serving terms of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole must be applied on a case-by- case basis to prisoners whose offenses occurred at a time when the law prescribed annual parole reviews.

2021The dissent relies on Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000), in support of its position that the extension of Petitioner’s probation was an ex post facto violation.

2021As such, it would be an ex post facto violation to apply a law that increases the penalty for a violation of probation to a probationer who committed his or her crimes before the law became effective regardless of the date of the violation of probation. 68 So.3d at 409 n.2 (emphasis added).

2021Similarly, in John L. v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 261 , 91 P.3d 205 (2004), the Supreme Court of California considered an ex post facto challenge to an amended probation statute that had been applied to petitioners whose original crimes were committed prior to the statute being amended.

2021Similarly, in John L. v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 261 , 91 P.3d 205 (2004), the Supreme Court of California considered an ex post facto challenge to an amended probation statute that had been applied to petitioners whose original crimes were committed prior to the statute being amended.

2020Explaining that the DMV’s authority to revoke a person’s license to operate a motor vehicle is an “administrative remedy,” this Court declared that the “proceedings which take place pursuant to such statutory enactment are civil proceedings.” Id. at 814 , 392 S.E.2d at 705 .

2020Explaining that the DMV’s authority to revoke a person’s license to operate a motor vehicle is an “administrative remedy,” this Court declared that the “proceedings which take place pursuant to such statutory enactment are civil proceedings.” Id. at 814 , 392 S.E.2d at 705 .

2016The constitutional challenges in lames were predicated upon the cruel and unusual punishment clause as set forth - in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article III, section 5 of the West Virginia Constitution, the procedural due process clause and right to a jury trial set forth in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United , States Constitution and article III, section 10 of the West Virginia Constitution, and the double jeopardy clause as set forth in Amendment V to the United States Constitution and article III, section 5 of the West Virginia Constitution, See 227

2014Additionally, the United States Supreme Court rejected a procedural due process challenge to a similar sex offender registration act in Connecticut Department of Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003), and rejected an ex post facto clause challenge in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).

2006See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 45 , 110 S.Ct. 2715, 2720 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990)("[A] procedural change may constitute an ex post facto violation if it affect[s] matters of substance, by depriving a defendant of substantial protections with which the existing law surrounds the person accused of crime, or arbitrarily infringing upon substantial personal rights.")(Internal quotations and citations omitted); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293-294 , 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) ("Even though it may work to the disadvantage of a defendant, a procedural change is not ex po

2006See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 45 , 110 S.Ct. 2715, 2720 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990)("[A] procedural change may constitute an ex post facto violation if it affect[s] matters of substance, by depriving a defendant of substantial protections with which the existing law surrounds the person accused of crime, or arbitrarily infringing upon substantial personal rights.")(Internal quotations and citations omitted); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293-294 , 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) ("Even though it may work to the disadvantage of a defendant, a procedural change is not ex po

1998Collins v. Bedell, 194 W.Va. 390 , 460 S.E.2d 636 (1995): A procedural change in a criminal proceeding does not violate the ex post facto principle found in the W.Va.

1998Collins v. Bedell, 194 W.Va. 390 , 460 S.E.2d 636 (1995): A procedural change in a criminal proceeding does not violate the ex post facto principle found in the W.Va.

1998For example, in Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227 (4th Cir.1997) ( Roller II ), the majority of a three-judge panel, applying Morales , held that retroactive application of changes in South Carolina's parole laws did not violate the ex post facto clause.

1998For example, in Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227 (4th Cir.1997) (Roller II), the majority of a three-judge panel, applying Morales , held that retroactive application of changes in South Carolina’s parole laws did not violate the ex post facto clause.

1998Syllabus Point 3, Donley v. Bracken, 192 W.Va. 383 , 452 S.E.2d 699 (1994). *871 Based on the foregoing discussion, we determine that we can take an appropriately deferential approach to the challenged statute's constitutionality, act consistently with the Supreme Court's decision in Morales , and at the same time adhere to and reinforce our historically strict approach to constitutional ex post facto jurisprudence, by grounding our ruling in the instant case on the provisions of our state constitutional provision prohibiting ex post facto laws, Article III, Section 4, and by requiring reasona

1998Syllabus Point 3, Donley v. Bracken, 192 W.Va. 383 , 452 S.E.2d 699 (1994). *871 Based on the foregoing discussion, we determine that we can take an appropriately deferential approach to the challenged statute's constitutionality, act consistently with the Supreme Court's decision in Morales , and at the same time adhere to and reinforce our historically strict approach to constitutional ex post facto jurisprudence, by grounding our ruling in the instant case on the provisions of our state constitutional provision prohibiting ex post facto laws, Article III, Section 4, and by requiring reasona