ex post facto clause in Florida

2001See McKnight v. State, 769 So.2d 1039 (Fla.2000) (holding that a defendant has the right both to present evidence to prove that the defendant does not qualify for sentencing under the Act, and to challenge the State’s evidence regarding the defendant’s eligibility for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender); Grant v. State, 770 So.2d 655 (Fla.2000) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge to the Act and holding that the Act does not violate the single subject rule for legislation, nor does it violate principles of equal protection or subject defendants sentenced under it to double jeopardy);

2001See McKnight v. State, 769 So.2d 1039 (Fla.2000) (holding that a defendant has the right both to present evidence to prove that the defendant does not qualify for sentencing under the Act and to challenge the State’s evidence regarding the defendant’s eligibility for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender); Grant v. State, 770 So.2d 655 (Fla.2000) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge to the Act and holding that the Act neither violates neither the single subject rule for legislation nor equal protection principles, nor does it subject defendants properly sentenced under it to double jeopa

2001See McKnight v. State, 769 So.2d 1039 (Fla.2000) (holding that a defendant has the right both to present evidence to prove that the defendant does not qualify for sentencing under the Act, and to challenge the State’s evidence regarding the defendant’s eligibility for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender); Grant v. State, 770 So.2d 655 (Fla.2000) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge to the Act and holding that the Act does not violate the single subject rule for legislation, nor does it violate principles of equal protection or subject defendants sentenced under it to double jeopardy);

2001See McKnight v. State, 769 So.2d 1039 (Fla.2000) (holding that a defendant has the right both to present evidence to prove that the defendant does not qualify for sentencing under the Act and to challenge the State’s evidence regarding the defendant’s eligibility for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender); Grant v. State, 770 So.2d 655 (Fla.2000) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge to the Act and holding that the Act neither violates neither the single subject rule for legislation nor equal protection principles, nor does it subject defendants properly sentenced under it to double jeopa

2008"In evaluating whether a law violates the ex post facto clause, a two-prong test must be applied: (1) whether the law is retrospective in its effect; and (2) whether the law alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable." Gwong v. Singletary, 683 So.2d 109, 112 (Fla.1996); see also Lynce v. Mathis, *1037 519 U.S. 433, 441 , 117 S.Ct. 891 , 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997); Goad, 845 So.2d at 882 (noting law violates ex post facto clauses of U.S. and Florida Constitutions when it increases punishment for criminal offense after crime has been committed).

2007See Gwong v. Singletary, 683 So.2d 109 (Fla.1996) (test for statutory scrutiny under the ex post facto clause is whether the law is retrospective in effect and whether it alters the elements of the crime or increases the potential punishment).

2001See McKnight v. State, 769 So.2d 1039 (Fla.2000) (holding that a defendant has the right both to present evidence to prove that the defendant does not qualify for sentencing under the Act, and to challenge the State’s evidence regarding the defendant’s eligibility for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender); Grant v. State, 770 So.2d 655 (Fla.2000) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge to the Act and holding that the Act does not violate the single subject rule for legislation, nor does it violate principles of equal protection or subject defendants sentenced under it to double jeopardy);

2001See McKnight v. State, 769 So.2d 1039 (Fla.2000) (holding that a defendant has the right both to present evidence to prove that the defendant does not qualify for sentencing under the Act and to challenge the State’s evidence regarding the defendant’s eligibility for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender); Grant v. State, 770 So.2d 655 (Fla.2000) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge to the Act and holding that the Act neither violates neither the single subject rule for legislation nor equal protection principles, nor does it subject defendants properly sentenced under it to double jeopa

2014See Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 , 117 S.Ct. 891 , 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997). 1 In Lynce , the Supreme Court reviewed whether the cancellation of previously awarded provisional credits for certain classes of offenders violated the ex post facto clause of the federal constitution.

2014See Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 , 117 S.Ct. 891 , 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997). 1 In Lynce , the Supreme Court reviewed whether the cancellation of previously awarded provisional credits for certain classes of offenders violated the ex post facto clause of the federal constitution.

2001See McKnight v. State, 769 So.2d 1039 (Fla.2000) (holding that a defendant has the right both to present evidence to prove that the defendant does not qualify for sentencing under the Act, and to challenge the State’s evidence regarding the defendant’s eligibility for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender); Grant v. State, 770 So.2d 655 (Fla.2000) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge to the Act and holding that the Act does not violate the single subject rule for legislation, nor does it violate principles of equal protection or subject defendants sentenced under it to double jeopardy);

2001See McKnight v. State, 769 So.2d 1039 (Fla.2000) (holding that a defendant has the right both to present evidence to prove that the defendant does not qualify for sentencing under the Act and to challenge the State’s evidence regarding the defendant’s eligibility for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender); Grant v. State, 770 So.2d 655 (Fla.2000) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge to the Act and holding that the Act neither violates neither the single subject rule for legislation nor equal protection principles, nor does it subject defendants properly sentenced under it to double jeopa

2015“A law which is merely procedural and does not add to the quantum of punishment ... cannot violate the ex post facto clause even if it is applied retrospectively.” Id. at 1176 , citing Weaver v. Graham[ 450 U.S. 24 , 101 S.Ct. 960 , 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) ].

2015“A law which is merely procedural and does not add to the quantum of punishment ... cannot violate the ex post facto clause even if it is applied retrospectively.” Id. at 1176 , citing Weaver v. Graham[ 450 U.S. 24 , 101 S.Ct. 960 , 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) ].

2008See also Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 445-46 , 117 S.Ct. 891 , 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997); Cal. Dep't of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509 , 115 S.Ct. 1597 , 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 , 101 S.Ct. 960 , 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (noting that increase in the punishment for a crime that runs afoul of the ex post facto clause may result not only from statutes that govern initial sentencing but also from statutes that govern parole or early release). .

2008See also Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 445-46 , 117 S.Ct. 891 , 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997); Cal. Dep't of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509 , 115 S.Ct. 1597 , 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 , 101 S.Ct. 960 , 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (noting that increase in the punishment for a crime that runs afoul of the ex post facto clause may result not only from statutes that govern initial sentencing but also from statutes that govern parole or early release). .

2026In Peugh, the United States Supreme Court explained that to determine whether there is an ex post facto violation, the relevant inquiry is “whether a given change in law presents a ‘sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.’ ” 569 U.S. at 539 (quoting Garner - 32 - v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 250 (2000)); see also Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 424-25 (1987) (addressing an ex post facto claim pertaining to sentencing guideline changes in Florida).

2026In Peugh, the United States Supreme Court explained that to determine whether there is an ex post facto violation, the relevant inquiry is “whether a given change in law presents a ‘sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.’ ” 569 U.S. at 539 (quoting Garner - 32 - v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 250 (2000)); see also Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 424-25 (1987) (addressing an ex post facto claim pertaining to sentencing guideline changes in Florida).

2007In Waldrup v. Dugger, 562 So.2d 687 (Fla.1990), an inmate petitioned the Florida Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the Department was retroactively applying the 1983 amendments to Florida's gain-time statute to deprive him of an earlier release from prison in violation of the ex post facto clause.

2006In one of the cases cited in the concurring opinion, *1142 on which petitioner relies, Waldrup v. Dugger, 562 So.2d 687 (Fla.1990), the Florida Supreme Court held that an amendment to a statute which resulted in a decrease in incentive gain time for prisoners could not be constitutionally applied retroactively because it would be an ex post facto violation.

2024Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293–94; see also Collins, 497 U.S. at 45 (explaining that a procedural change may constitute an ex post facto violation only if it “affect[s] matters of substance”).

2016I, § 10, Fla. Const. The ex post facto doctrine prohibits a state from “retroactively altering] the definition of crimes or increasing] the punishment for criminal acts.” Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990).

2000See Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 , 117 S.Ct. 891 , 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997); *925 Dugger v. Williams, 593 So.2d 180 (Fla. 1991).

1997As our supreme court recognized in Dugger v. Williams, 593 So.2d 180, 181 (Fla.1991): [I]t is too simplistic to say that an ex post facto violation can occur only with regard to substantive law, not procedural law.

2005See also Krischer v. Faris, 838 So.2d 600 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (holding that a plea agreement in a criminal case has no bearing on a subsequent statutorily imposed involuntary civil commitment for control, care, and treatment); Simmons v. State, 753 So.2d 762 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (stating that reporting and notification requirements of the Sexual Predator Act are regulatory and procedural in nature and, consequently, do not violate the ex post facto clause); see also Gonzalez v. State, 869 So.2d 1231 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding section 943.325 constitutional).

2002He claims that the application of the notice provisions of the 1997 Act unjustly subjected him to a more wide spread dissemination of his designation as a sexual predator, and as such amounted to an ex post facto violation. [2] We disagree. *1266 "In evaluating whether a law violates the ex post facto clause, a two-prong test must be applied: (1) whether the law is retrospective in its effect; and (2) whether the law alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable." Simmons v. State 753 So.2d 762, 763 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), citing Arnold v. State

2000See Walker v. State, 718 So.2d 217, 218 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ("The sexual predator designation `is neither a sentence nor a punishment but simply a status resulting from the conviction of certain crimes.'") (quoting Fletcher v. State, 699 So.2d 346, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)); Ortega v. State, 712 So.2d 833, 834 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (holding application of successor statute regarding registration of sexual predator was regulatory and not an ex post facto violation); State, Dep't of Corrections v. Goad, 754 So.2d 95, 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (discussing standard for determining whether a statute viol

2000See Walker v. State, 718 So.2d 217, 218 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ("The sexual predator designation `is neither a sentence nor a punishment but simply a status resulting from the conviction of certain crimes.'") (quoting Fletcher v. State, 699 So.2d 346, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)); Ortega v. State, 712 So.2d 833, 834 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (holding application of successor statute regarding registration of sexual predator was regulatory and not an ex post facto violation); State, Dep't of Corrections v. Goad, 754 So.2d 95, 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (discussing standard for determining whether a statute viol

2024Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293–94; see also Collins, 497 U.S. at 45 (explaining that a procedural change may constitute an ex post facto violation only if it “affect[s] matters of substance”).

2016The court -7- likened the situation to that in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977), in which the United States Supreme Court determined that Florida’s newly enacted death sentencing law, passed in response to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), did not constitute an ex post facto violation when it was applied to capital defendants who had not yet been sentenced because it “simply altered the methods employed in determining whether the death penalty was imposed.” Perry, 192 So. 3d at 75 (quoting Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293-94 ).

2006See Gonzalez v. State, 808 So.2d 1265 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (quoting Fletcher v. State, 699 So.2d 346, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)); Walker v. State, 718 So.2d 217, 218 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); see also Freeland v. State, 832 So.2d 923 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (holding that the registration and reporting requirements of the Sexual Predator Act are "regulatory and procedural in nature and do not violate the ex post facto clause.").

2002See also Westerheide v. State, 831 So.2d 93, 102-04 (Fla.2002) (holding that the Jimmy Ryce Act is not punitive in nature and does not violate ex post facto clause); Gonzalez v. State, 808 So.2d 1265 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (holding that the reporting requirements as well as the notification requirements of Florida's Sexual Predator Act are regulatory and procedural in nature and do not violate the ex post facto clause); Rickman v. State, 714 So.2d 538 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (holding that registration requirement of Florida's Sexual Predator Act is procedural and regulatory in nature and does not cons

1986In Signorelli v. State, 491 So.2d 349 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), we cited Yost v. State, 489 So.2d 131 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) and held that application of section 27.3455 to a crime occurring prior to the effective date of the statute constituted a violation of the ex post facto clause.

1986We agree with Yost v. State, 489 So.2d 131 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), that to apply that statute in such case would constitute a violation of the ex post facto clause.

2000Our decision here is supported, as well, by the ex post facto analysis in State v. Yost, 507 So.2d 1099, 1101 (Fla.1987).

1987The recent decision in State v. Yost, 507 So.2d 1099 (Fla. 1987) held that the retroactive application of the penalty provisions of § 27.3455, Fla. Stat. (1985), which provide that the grant of accrued gain time is conditioned upon payment of the assessed costs (or performance of the community service), is a violation of the ex post facto clause of the United *1342 States and Florida Constitutions.

2015“A law which is merely procedural and does not add to the quantum of punishment ... cannot violate the ex post facto clause even if it is applied retrospectively.” Id. at 1176 , citing Weaver v. Graham[ 450 U.S. 24 , 101 S.Ct. 960 , 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) ].

1999In considering the earlier version of Florida's parole release guidelines, the court in Paschal v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1173, 1175-76 (11th Cir.1984), summarized the following guideposts for considering an ex post facto challenge: The Supreme Court has held that three critical elements must be present to establish an ex post facto clause violation: the statute must be a penal or criminal law, retrospective, and disadvantageous to the offender because it may impose greater punishment.

2011See Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 400-02 , 57 S.Ct. 797 , 81 L.Ed. 1182 (1937) (finding an ex post facto violation where law changing discretionary maximum of fifteen years to mandatory fifteen-year sentence was applied to crimes committed before the law’s effective date).

2011See Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 400-02 , 57 S.Ct. 797 , 81 L.Ed. 1182 (1937) (finding an ex post facto violation where law changing discretionary maximum of fifteen years to mandatory fifteen-year sentence was applied to crimes committed before the law’s effective date).

1986On motion for rehearing and suggestion to certify the instant cause to the Florida Supreme Court, the state points out that subsequent to the release of our opinion in this case, the Florida Supreme Court released its opinion in State v. Jackson, 478 So.2d 1054 (Fla.1985) in which the court agreed with the state’s argument “that the presumptive sentence established by the guidelines does not change the statutory limits of the sentence imposed for a particular offense,'” and held “that a modification in the sentencing guidelines procedure, which changes how a probation violation should be count

1986As did the courts in Wilkerson v. State, 480 So.2d 213 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) and Carter v. State, 483 So.2d 740 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), we certify to the Supreme Court of Florida that this decision passes upon the following question of great public importance: Whether all sentencing guidelines amendments are to be considered procedural in nature so that guidelines as most recently amended shall be applied at the time of sentencing without regard to the ex post facto doctrine.

2024Id. at 1145 ; see also Carinda v. State, 734 So. 2d 514, 515 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (holding trial court erred by giving standard jury instruction on principals amended after commission of offense, but error was harmless).

2001Compare Hooper v. State, 703 So.2d 1143, 1144-45 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (finding that giving the jury the amended principals instruction where the defendant committed his offense before the amended instruction took effect was an ex post facto violation, although such violation was harmless), review denied, 717 So.2d 538 (Fla.1998), with Larman v. State, 724 So.2d 1230, 1230-32 (Fla. 5th DCA) (finding that giving the amended principals instruction where the defendant committed his offense before the amended instruction took effect would not constitute an ex post facto violation because the amended

2014See Gomez, 733 So.2d at 504 .

1999Weekly S33 , ___ So.2d ___, 1998 WL 892663 (Fla. Dec. 24, 1998) (holding that "the substitution of the Control Release Program by the State for the statutory overcrowding programs in effect at the time of the petitioners' offenses improperly curtailed the availability of future credits" and thus, under Lynce, was an ex post facto violation).