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22 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Collins v. Youngbloodgreen2 sentences2007See also Collins v. Youngblood, supra, 497 U. S. at 42 , limiting the types of legislative acts which implicate the ex post facto clause of the U. S. Constitution to the first four listed above, and Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U. S. 433, 441 (117 SC 891, 137 LE2d 63) (1997) (“To fall within the ex post facto prohibition [of the U. S. Constitution], a law must be retrospective . . . and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime. . . .”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2004See also Collins v. Youngblood, supra, 497 U. S. at 42 , limiting the types of legislative acts which implicate the ex post facto clause of the U. S. Constitution to the first four listed above, and Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U. S. 433, 441 (117 SC 891, 137 LE2d 63) (1997) (“To fall within the ex post facto prohibition [of the U. S. Constitution], a law must be retrospective . . . and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime. . . .”) (citation and punctuation omitted). | 3 | 3 |
Lynce v. Mathisgreen2 sentences2007See also Collins v. Youngblood, supra, 497 U. S. at 42 , limiting the types of legislative acts which implicate the ex post facto clause of the U. S. Constitution to the first four listed above, and Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U. S. 433, 441 (117 SC 891, 137 LE2d 63) (1997) (“To fall within the ex post facto prohibition [of the U. S. Constitution], a law must be retrospective . . . and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime. . . .”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2004See also Collins v. Youngblood, supra, 497 U. S. at 42 , limiting the types of legislative acts which implicate the ex post facto clause of the U. S. Constitution to the first four listed above, and Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U. S. 433, 441 (117 SC 891, 137 LE2d 63) (1997) (“To fall within the ex post facto prohibition [of the U. S. Constitution], a law must be retrospective . . . and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime. . . .”) (citation and punctuation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Smith v. Doegreen2 sentences2018See, e.g., id. ; Smith v. Doe , 538 U. S. 84 , 99 (II) (B), 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) ; United States v. Ambert , 561 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2009). 2018See, e.g., id. ; Smith v. Doe , 538 U. S. 84 , 99 (II) (B), 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) ; United States v. Ambert , 561 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2009). | 1 | 2 |
Thompson v. Stategreen2 sentences2006Yates v. State, 263 Ga.App. 29 (2), 587 S.E.2d 180 (2003) ("Where a crime is committed on a certain date, the penalty which attached to the crime on that date is the penalty exacted by our law.") See also Thompson v. State, 278 Ga. 394, 395 , 603 S.E.2d 233 (2004) ("The ex post facto doctrine forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated. [Cit.].") [2] As noted earlier, § 17-10-7(e) has been in force at the time of every case in which the application of the general recidivist statute versus the specific recidivist sentencing scheme has been debated, and it 2006Yates v. State, 263 Ga.App. 29 (2), 587 S.E.2d 180 (2003) ("Where a crime is committed on a certain date, the penalty which attached to the crime on that date is the penalty exacted by our law.") See also Thompson v. State, 278 Ga. 394, 395 , 603 S.E.2d 233 (2004) ("The ex post facto doctrine forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated. [Cit.].") [2] As noted earlier, § 17-10-7(e) has been in force at the time of every case in which the application of the general recidivist statute versus the specific recidivist sentencing scheme has been debated, and it | 1 | 2 |
Atlanta Independent School System v. Lanegreen2 sentences2015The Supreme Court “has exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving construction of the Constitution of the State of Georgia and of the United States and all cases in which the constitutionality of a law, ordinance, or constitutional provision has been called into question.” Atlanta Independent School System v. Lane, 266 Ga. 657, 657 (1) ( 469 SE2d 22 ) (1996) (citing Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. 2015The Supreme Court “has exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving construction of the Constitution of the State of Georgia and of the United States and all cases in which the constitutionality of a law, ordinance, or constitutional provision has been called into question.” Atlanta Independent School System v. Lane, 266 Ga. 657, 657 (1) ( 469 SE2d 22 ) (1996) (citing Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. | 1 | 2 |
Rainer v. Stategreen1 sentence2018See, e.g., id. ; Smith v. Doe , 538 U. S. 84 , 99 (II) (B), 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) ; United States v. Ambert , 561 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2009). | 1 | 1 |
Postell v. Humphreygreen2 sentences2007Postell v. Humphrey, 278 Ga. 651, 653 ( 604 SE2d 517 ) (2004). 2007Postell v. Humphrey, 278 Ga. 651, 653 ( 604 SE2d 517 ) (2004). | 1 | 1 |
Barner v. Stategreen2 sentences2007“The exercise of peremptory strikes has long been recognized as a procedure created to assist litigants in obtaining a fair and impartial jury and not an independent substantive right.” Barner v. State, 263 Ga. 365, 367 (4) ( 434 SE2d 484 ) (1993) (upholding against an ex post facto challenge a statute reducing the number of peremptory strikes given criminal defendants from 20 to 12). 2007“The exercise of peremptory strikes has long been recognized as a procedure created to assist litigants in obtaining a fair and impartial jury and not an independent substantive right.” Barner v. State, 263 Ga. 365, 367 (4) ( 434 SE2d 484 ) (1993) (upholding against an ex post facto challenge a statute reducing the number of peremptory strikes given criminal defendants from 20 to 12). | 1 | 1 |
Bailey v. Stategreen2 sentences2006See Bailey v. Slate, 210 Ga. 52, 54 ( 77 SE2d 511 ) (1953); Abu-Khdeir v. T. 2006See Bailey v. Slate, 210 Ga. 52, 54 ( 77 SE2d 511 ) (1953); Abu-Khdeir v. T. | 1 | 1 |
Mims v. Stategreen2 sentences2006See cases cited infra. [3] The majority's passing reference at the close of its opinion to Mims v. State, 225 Ga.App. 331 (2), 484 S.E.2d 37 (1997), is without force in this case. 2006See cases cited infra. [3] The majority's passing reference at the close of its opinion to Mims v. State, 225 Ga.App. 331 (2), 484 S.E.2d 37 (1997), is without force in this case. | 1 | 1 |
Yates v. Stategreen2 sentences2006Yates v. State, 263 Ga.App. 29 (2), 587 S.E.2d 180 (2003) ("Where a crime is committed on a certain date, the penalty which attached to the crime on that date is the penalty exacted by our law.") See also Thompson v. State, 278 Ga. 394, 395 , 603 S.E.2d 233 (2004) ("The ex post facto doctrine forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated. [Cit.].") [2] As noted earlier, § 17-10-7(e) has been in force at the time of every case in which the application of the general recidivist statute versus the specific recidivist sentencing scheme has been debated, and it 2006Yates v. State, 263 Ga.App. 29 (2), 587 S.E.2d 180 (2003) ("Where a crime is committed on a certain date, the penalty which attached to the crime on that date is the penalty exacted by our law.") See also Thompson v. State, 278 Ga. 394, 395 , 603 S.E.2d 233 (2004) ("The ex post facto doctrine forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated. [Cit.].") [2] As noted earlier, § 17-10-7(e) has been in force at the time of every case in which the application of the general recidivist statute versus the specific recidivist sentencing scheme has been debated, and it | 1 | 1 |
Carmell v. Texasgreen1 sentence2005In 2000, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Carmell v. Texas, 529 U. S. 513, 551 (IX) (120 SC 1620, 146 LE2d 577) (2000), holding that the ex post facto clause of the Federal Constitution “applies to ‘every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender.’ [Cit.]” Thereafter, Vargas petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus and, among his other claims, asserted that the Carmell decision stood for the proposition that allowing the two witnesses t | 1 | 1 |
Lindsey v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2004The ex post facto doctrine “ ‘forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated.’ ” California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U. S. 499, 505 (115 SC 1597, 131 LE2d 588) (1995) (quoting Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U. S. 397, 401 (57 SC 797, 81 LE 1182) (1937)). | 1 | 1 |
California Department of Corrections v. Moralesgreen1 sentence2004The ex post facto doctrine “ ‘forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated.’ ” California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U. S. 499, 505 (115 SC 1597, 131 LE2d 588) (1995) (quoting Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U. S. 397, 401 (57 SC 797, 81 LE 1182) (1937)). | 1 | 1 |
Cannon v. Stategreen2 sentences2000Love v. State, 271 Ga. 398, 399 (1), 517 S.E.2d 53 (1999). "[T]he prohibition of ex post facto laws applies only to substantive, but not procedural, rights. [Cits.]" Cannon v. State, 246 Ga. 754, 755 (1), 272 S.E.2d 709 (1980). 2000Love v. State, 271 Ga. 398, 399 (1), 517 S.E.2d 53 (1999). "[T]he prohibition of ex post facto laws applies only to substantive, but not procedural, rights. [Cits.]" Cannon v. State, 246 Ga. 754, 755 (1), 272 S.E.2d 709 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
Love v. Stategreen2 sentences2000Love v. State, 271 Ga. 398, 399 (1), 517 S.E.2d 53 (1999). "[T]he prohibition of ex post facto laws applies only to substantive, but not procedural, rights. [Cits.]" Cannon v. State, 246 Ga. 754, 755 (1), 272 S.E.2d 709 (1980). 2000Love v. State, 271 Ga. 398, 399 (1), 517 S.E.2d 53 (1999). "[T]he prohibition of ex post facto laws applies only to substantive, but not procedural, rights. [Cits.]" Cannon v. State, 246 Ga. 754, 755 (1), 272 S.E.2d 709 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Nolengreen2 sentences1998Nolen v. State, 234 Ga. App. 291, 292 ( 508 SE2d 733 ) (1998) (physical precedent only). 1998Nolen v. State, 234 Ga. App. 291, 292 ( 508 SE2d 733 ) (1998) (physical precedent only). | 1 | 1 |
Logan v. Stategreen2 sentences1997“The rule with respect to the ex post facto clause is that any law enacted after the offense was committed which inflicts greater punishment or alters the situation of the accused is ex post facto.” Logan v. State, 212 Ga. App. 734, 736 (1) (b) ( 442 SE2d 883 ) (1994). 1997“The rule with respect to the ex post facto clause is that any law enacted after the offense was committed which inflicts greater punishment or alters the situation of the accused is ex post facto.” Logan v. State, 212 Ga. App. 734, 736 (1) (b) ( 442 SE2d 883 ) (1994). | 1 | 1 |
DeWoody v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence1992See generally Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U. S. 37 (110 SC 2715, 111 LE2d 30); compare De Woody v. Superior Court, 87 Cal. Rptr. 210 (CA CA). | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. Missourigreen2 sentences1974In Todd, supra, the court relied on and quoted approvingly from People v. Ward, 50 Cal. 2d 702 ( 328 P2d 777 , 76 ALR2d 911); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343 (18 SC 620, 42 LE 1061) and Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U. S. 380, 387 (18 SC 922, 43 LE 204), all of which were criminal cases dealing with the issue of whether an Act which is procedural in nature violates the ex post facto rule when applied to a previously committed offense. *277 These cases hold that there is no violation unless it results in the infliction of greater punishment for the crime or "alters the situation of the accused to h 1974In Todd, supra, the court relied on and quoted approvingly from People v. Ward, 50 Cal. 2d 702 ( 328 P2d 777 , 76 ALR2d 911); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343 (18 SC 620, 42 LE 1061) and Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U. S. 380, 387 (18 SC 922, 43 LE 204), all of which were criminal cases dealing with the issue of whether an Act which is procedural in nature violates the ex post facto rule when applied to a previously committed offense. *277 These cases hold that there is no violation unless it results in the infliction of greater punishment for the crime or "alters the situation of the accused to h | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Ambert
green
2 sentences2018See, e.g., id. ; Smith v. Doe , 538 U. S. 84 , 99 (II) (B), 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) ; United States v. Ambert , 561 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2009). 2018See, e.g., id.; Smith v. Doe, 538 U. S. 84, 99 (II) (B) ( 123 SCt 1140 , 155 LE2d 164) (2003); United States v. Ambert, 561 F3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2009). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Hamm v. Ray
green
2 sentences2009(Citation omitted.) Hamm v. Ray, 272 Ga. 659 (1) ( 531 SE2d 91 ) (2000). 2009(Citation omitted.) Hamm v. Ray, 272 Ga. 659 (1) ( 531 SE2d 91 ) (2000). | 2 | 2004–2009 |
Todd v. State
green
2 sentences1974Our Supreme Court, in Todd v. State, 228 Ga. 746 ( 187 SE2d 831 ), after an excellent research of the problem raised, held that the change was procedural only and application of the new procedure did not violate the ex post facto principle. 1974Our Supreme Court, in Todd v. State, 228 Ga. 746 ( 187 SE2d 831 ), after an excellent research of the problem raised, held that the change was procedural only and application of the new procedure did not violate the ex post facto principle. | 2 | 1974–1994 |
Thompson v. Utah
red
2 sentences1974In Todd, supra, the court relied on and quoted approvingly from People v. Ward, 50 Cal. 2d 702 ( 328 P2d 777 , 76 ALR2d 911); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343 (18 SC 620, 42 LE 1061) and Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U. S. 380, 387 (18 SC 922, 43 LE 204), all of which were criminal cases dealing with the issue of whether an Act which is procedural in nature violates the ex post facto rule when applied to a previously committed offense. *277 These cases hold that there is no violation unless it results in the infliction of greater punishment for the crime or "alters the situation of the accused to h 1974In Todd, supra, the court relied on and quoted approvingly from People v. Ward, 50 Cal. 2d 702 ( 328 P2d 777 , 76 ALR2d 911); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343 (18 SC 620, 42 LE 1061) and Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U. S. 380, 387 (18 SC 922, 43 LE 204), all of which were criminal cases dealing with the issue of whether an Act which is procedural in nature violates the ex post facto rule when applied to a previously committed offense. | 2 | 1972–1974 |
Johnson v. State
green
2 sentences2009Johnson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 401 ( 636 SE2d 124 ) (2006) (Johnson II). 2 In this appeal, Johnson asserts that his sentence was void because (1) the trial court erred in sentencing him on both the convictions for rape and aggravated assault, which he contends merged as a matter of fact and law; (2) the 20-year sentence on the charge of cruelty to children violated the ex post facto doctrine and exceeded the statutory limits in effect at the time of the offense; (3) the trial court erred in ordering that his sentence for possession of a knife during the commission of a felony should run consec 2009Johnson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 401 ( 636 SE2d 124 ) (2006) (Johnson II). 2 In this appeal, Johnson asserts that his sentence was void because (1) the trial court erred in sentencing him on both the convictions for rape and aggravated assault, which he contends merged as a matter of fact and law; (2) the 20-year sentence on the charge of cruelty to children violated the ex post facto doctrine and exceeded the statutory limits in effect at the time of the offense; (3) the trial court erred in ordering that his sentence for possession of a knife during the commission of a felony should run consec | 1 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Ward
green
2 sentences1974In Todd, supra, the court relied on and quoted approvingly from People v. Ward, 50 Cal. 2d 702 ( 328 P2d 777 , 76 ALR2d 911); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343 (18 SC 620, 42 LE 1061) and Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U. S. 380, 387 (18 SC 922, 43 LE 204), all of which were criminal cases dealing with the issue of whether an Act which is procedural in nature violates the ex post facto rule when applied to a previously committed offense. *277 These cases hold that there is no violation unless it results in the infliction of greater punishment for the crime or "alters the situation of the accused to h 1974In Todd, supra, the court relied on and quoted approvingly from People v. Ward, 50 Cal. 2d 702 ( 328 P2d 777 , 76 ALR2d 911); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343 (18 SC 620, 42 LE 1061) and Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U. S. 380, 387 (18 SC 922, 43 LE 204), all of which were criminal cases dealing with the issue of whether an Act which is procedural in nature violates the ex post facto rule when applied to a previously committed offense. *277 These cases hold that there is no violation unless it results in the infliction of greater punishment for the crime or "alters the situation of the accused to h | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.