ex post facto clause (Rhode Island) · Go Syfert
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ex post facto clause in Rhode Island

26 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1917–2022 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (32)

CaseFollowedCited
Maurice R. Lerner v. Matthew Gill, Etc.green
ca1 · 1985 · cited in 4 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 1986–2011
2 sentences

2011We further held that “the ex post facto clause is not implicated when the department changes its procedures to conform to the mandates of the statute” and that “the ex post facto clause does not give a prisoner a vested right to a favorable, but erroneous, interpretation of the law.” Leach, 689 A.2d at 397 (quoting Lerner v. Gill, 751 F.2d 450, 457 (1st Cir.1985)).

1997Unfortunately for the inmate-applicants, our interpretation was less generous than that of the department, but “the ex post facto clause does not give a prisoner a vested right to a favorable, but erroneous, interpretation of the law.” Lerner, 751 F.2d at 457 (citing Mileham v. Simmons, 588 F.2d 1279, 1280 (9th Cir.1979)).

24
Skawinski v. Stategreen
ri · 1988 · cited in 4 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 1991–1998
2 sentences

1998A critical element for a law to be considered in violation of the ex post facto clause is that the law "must disadvantage the offender affected by it." In re Skawinski, 538 A.2d 1006 , 1009 (R.I. 1988).

1997We have noted that “the ex post facto clause applies only to laws that work substantive, rather than procedural changes.” Skawinski v. State, 538 A.2d 1006, 1009 (R.I.1988).

24
Lerner v. Gillgreen
ri · 1983 · cited in 3 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 1991–2009
2 sentences

2009Webb v. Cianci, 591 A.2d 1193, 1214-15 (R.I.1991) (quoting Lerner v. Gill, 463 A.2d 1352, 1356 (R.I.1983)). [9] In his brief, defendant concedes that "it is likewise clear that where a statute of limitations is extended prior to the then-not-yet-time-barred action, no violation of the ex post facto clause occurs." See Fiorenzano, 690 A.2d at 861 ("When, as here, a statute of limitations is extended prior to the barring of an action, no violation of the ex post facto clause occurs."); see also Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 616-17, 632-33 , 123 S.Ct. 2446 , 156 L.Ed.2d 544 (2003) (holding

2001Lerner v. Gill, 463 A.2d 1352, 1356-57 (R.I.1983), pet. for writ of habeas corpus granted, 580 F.Supp. 1056 (D.R.I.1984), rev'd, 751 F.2d 450 (1st.

23
State v. Germanegreen
ri · 2009 · cited in 2 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2018–2022
2 sentences

2022This is the current state of the law. 13 In State v. Gibson, 182 A.3d 540 (R.I. 2018), in response to the defendant’s ex post facto challenge to the registration act’s amendments, which extended the duration of his duty to register, this Court made clear that, although the duty to register “follows as a consequence of a criminal conviction, sexual offender registration and notification is a civil regulatory process.” Gibson, 182 A.3d at 554 (quoting State v. Germane, 971 A.2d 555, 593 (R.I. 2009)).

2018Likewise, we have "held that a violation of the ex post facto clause occurs when there is a 'retrospective application of law that disadvantages an offender by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.' " State v. Pereira , 973 A.2d 19 , 32 (R.I. 2009) (quoting Town of West Warwick v. Local 1104, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, CLC , 745 A.2d 786 , 788 (R.I. 2000) ). 17 "It is black letter law that the ex post facto clause in both our state and federal constitutions only prohibit retroactive penal legislation." State v. Germane

22
State v. Desjarlaisgreen
ri · 1999 · cited in 2 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2000–2009
2 sentences

2009This Court has held that a violation of the ex post facto clause occurs when there is a "retrospective application of law that disadvantages an offender `by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.'" Town of West Warwick v. Local 1104, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, CLC, 745 A.2d 786, 788 (R.I. 2000) (quoting State v. Desjarlais, 731 A.2d 716, 717-18 (R.I.1999)). [8] *33 Here, Pereira argues that the Legislature "doubled" the "quantum of punishment" for the offense for which he was convicted and that therefore his prosecution

2009This Court has held that a violation of the ex post facto clause occurs when there is a “retrospective application of law that disadvantages an offender ‘by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.’ ” Town of West Warwick v. Local 1104, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, CLC, 745 A.2d 786, 788 (R.I.2000) (quoting State v. Desjarlais, 731 A.2d 716, 717-18 (R.I.1999)). 8 Here, Pereira argues that the Legislature “doubled” the “quantum of punishment” for the offense for which he was convicted and that therefore his prosecution under

22
Dobbert v. Floridagreen
scotus · 1977 · cited in 2 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 1986–1988
2 sentences

1986Earlier in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 , 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344, 356 (1977), the Supreme Court observed that “[e]ven though [a procedural change] may work to the disadvantage of a defendant, [such a change] is not ex post facto.” A procedural change, although retrospective in application, has been held not to be violative of the ex post facto bar if it does “not increase the punishment nor change the ingredients of the offense or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt.” Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 , 29 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 960 , 964 n. 12, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 , 23 n. 1

1986Earlier in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 , 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344, 356 (1977), the Supreme Court observed that “[e]ven though [a procedural change] may work to the disadvantage of a defendant, [such a change] is not ex post facto.” A procedural change, although retrospective in application, has been held not to be violative of the ex post facto bar if it does “not increase the punishment nor change the ingredients of the offense or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt.” Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 , 29 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 960 , 964 n. 12, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 , 23 n. 1

22
Collins v. Youngbloodgreen
scotus · 1990 · cited in 5 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2000–2018
2 sentences

2018CONST. art. 1, § 12. 16 As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the ex post facto clause "is aimed at laws that 'retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.' " California Department of Corrections v. Morales , 514 U.S. 499 , 504, 115 S.Ct. 1597 , 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995) (quoting Collins v. Youngblood , 497 U.S. 37 , 43, 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990) ).

2018CONST. art. 1, § 12. 16 As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the ex post facto clause "is aimed at laws that 'retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.' " California Department of Corrections v. Morales , 514 U.S. 499 , 504, 115 S.Ct. 1597 , 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995) (quoting Collins v. Youngblood , 497 U.S. 37 , 43, 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990) ).

15
Town of West Warwick v. Local 1104, International Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, CLCgreen
ri · 2000 · cited in 3 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2009–2018
2 sentences

2018Likewise, we have "held that a violation of the ex post facto clause occurs when there is a 'retrospective application of law that disadvantages an offender by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.' " State v. Pereira , 973 A.2d 19 , 32 (R.I. 2009) (quoting Town of West Warwick v. Local 1104, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, CLC , 745 A.2d 786 , 788 (R.I. 2000) ). 17 "It is black letter law that the ex post facto clause in both our state and federal constitutions only prohibit retroactive penal legislation." State v. Germane

2018Likewise, we have "held that a violation of the ex post facto clause occurs when there is a 'retrospective application of law that disadvantages an offender by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.' " State v. Pereira , 973 A.2d 19 , 32 (R.I. 2009) (quoting Town of West Warwick v. Local 1104, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, CLC , 745 A.2d 786 , 788 (R.I. 2000) ). 17 "It is black letter law that the ex post facto clause in both our state and federal constitutions only prohibit retroactive penal legislation." State v. Germane

13
State v. Figueroagreen
ri · 1994 · cited in 3 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 1998–2000
2 sentences

2000Id.; (see also Collins v. Youngblood , 497 U.S. 37 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990); State v. Figueroa , 639 A.2d 495 , 499 (R.I. 1994); ("It is black letter law that the ex post facto clause in both our state and federal constitutions only prohibit retroactive penal legislation.")).

2000See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990); State v. Figueroa, 639 A.2d 495, 499 (R.I.1994).

13
Smith v. Doegreen
scotus · 2003 · cited in 2 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2005–2018
2 sentences

2005See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) (Holding that there is no violation of the ex post facto clause where the challenged sex offender registration act is determined to be nonpunitive and part of a remedial civil regulatory scheme); see also, e.g., Maureen -S. Hopbell, Comment, Balancing the Protection of Children Against the Protection of Constitutional Rights: The Past, Present and Future of Megan’s Law, 42 Duq.

2005See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) (Holding that there is no violation of the ex post facto clause where the challenged sex offender registration act is determined to be nonpunitive and part of a remedial civil regulatory scheme); see also, e.g., Maureen -S. Hopbell, Comment, Balancing the Protection of Children Against the Protection of Constitutional Rights: The Past, Present and Future of Megan’s Law, 42 Duq.

12
State v. Pelzgreen
ri · 2001 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
1 sentence

2018See State v. Pelz , 765 A.2d 824 , 830-31 (R.I. 2001).

11
Mastracchio v. Superior Courtgreen
ri · 1964 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
2 sentences

2011Lastly, in Barber , we declined to address the applicant’s alleged equal protection claim because we held that the law had “long since been determined contrary to his contention!)]” Barber, 682 A.2d at 910 (citing Mastracchio v. Superior Court, 98 R.I. 111, 112-13 , 200 A.2d 10, 11 (1964)).

2011Lastly, in Barber , we declined to address the applicant’s alleged equal protection claim because we held that the law had “long since been determined contrary to his contention!)]” Barber, 682 A.2d at 910 (citing Mastracchio v. Superior Court, 98 R.I. 111, 112-13 , 200 A.2d 10, 11 (1964)).

11
Rogers v. Tennesseegreen
scotus · 2001 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
2 sentences

2011The Court has further explained the Bouie theory of vagueness by emphasizing that "a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime." Rogers v. Tennessee , 532 U.S. 451 , *Page 18 457 (2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Bouie , 378 U.S. at 350 ); see also Rogers , 532 U.S. at 459-60 (listing the cases interpreting Bouie , all of which are criminal); State v. DeWitt , 557 A.2d 845 , 848 (R.I. 1989) (interpreting Bouie 's "fair warning" requirement as qualifying the application of the ex post facto clause).

2011The Court has further explained the Bouie theory of vagueness by emphasizing that "a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime." Rogers v. Tennessee , 532 U.S. 451 , *Page 18 457 (2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Bouie , 378 U.S. at 350 ); see also Rogers , 532 U.S. at 459-60 (listing the cases interpreting Bouie , all of which are criminal); State v. DeWitt , 557 A.2d 845 , 848 (R.I. 1989) (interpreting Bouie 's "fair warning" requirement as qualifying the application of the ex post facto clause).

11
Stogner v. Californiagreen
scotus · 2003 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
2 sentences

2009In his brief, defendant concedes that "it is likewise clear that where a statute of limitations is extended prior to the then-nol-yet-time-barred action, no violation of the ex post facto clause occurs.” See Fiorenzano, 690 A.2d at 861 ("When, as here, a statute of limitations is extended prior to the barring of an action, no violation of the ex post facto clause occurs.”); see also Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 616-17, 632-33 , 123 S.Ct. 2446 , 156 L.Ed.2d 544 (2003) (holding ex post facto clause prohibits legislature from reviving time-barred criminal cases but not disturbing state co

2009In his brief, defendant concedes that "it is likewise clear that where a statute of limitations is extended prior to the then-nol-yet-time-barred action, no violation of the ex post facto clause occurs.” See Fiorenzano, 690 A.2d at 861 ("When, as here, a statute of limitations is extended prior to the barring of an action, no violation of the ex post facto clause occurs.”); see also Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 616-17, 632-33 , 123 S.Ct. 2446 , 156 L.Ed.2d 544 (2003) (holding ex post facto clause prohibits legislature from reviving time-barred criminal cases but not disturbing state co

11
Lindsey v. Washingtongreen
scotus · 1937 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
2 sentences

2009This Court has held that a violation of the ex post facto clause occurs when there is a “retrospective application of law that disadvantages an offender ‘by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.’ ” Town of West Warwick v. Local 1104, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, CLC, 745 A.2d 786, 788 (R.I.2000) (quoting State v. Desjarlais, 731 A.2d 716, 717-18 (R.I.1999)). 8 Here, Pereira argues that the Legislature “doubled” the “quantum of punishment” for the offense for which he was convicted and that therefore his prosecution under

2009This Court has held that a violation of the ex post facto clause occurs when there is a “retrospective application of law that disadvantages an offender ‘by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.’ ” Town of West Warwick v. Local 1104, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, CLC, 745 A.2d 786, 788 (R.I.2000) (quoting State v. Desjarlais, 731 A.2d 716, 717-18 (R.I.1999)). 8 Here, Pereira argues that the Legislature “doubled” the “quantum of punishment” for the offense for which he was convicted and that therefore his prosecution under

11
State v. Fiorenzanogreen
ri · 1997 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
2 sentences

2009Webb v. Cianci, 591 A.2d 1193, 1214-15 (R.I.1991) (quoting Lerner v. Gill, 463 A.2d 1352, 1356 (R.I.1983)). [9] In his brief, defendant concedes that "it is likewise clear that where a statute of limitations is extended prior to the then-not-yet-time-barred action, no violation of the ex post facto clause occurs." See Fiorenzano, 690 A.2d at 861 ("When, as here, a statute of limitations is extended prior to the barring of an action, no violation of the ex post facto clause occurs."); see also Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 616-17, 632-33 , 123 S.Ct. 2446 , 156 L.Ed.2d 544 (2003) (holding

2009In his brief, defendant concedes that "it is likewise clear that where a statute of limitations is extended prior to the then-nol-yet-time-barred action, no violation of the ex post facto clause occurs.” See Fiorenzano, 690 A.2d at 861 ("When, as here, a statute of limitations is extended prior to the barring of an action, no violation of the ex post facto clause occurs.”); see also Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 616-17, 632-33 , 123 S.Ct. 2446 , 156 L.Ed.2d 544 (2003) (holding ex post facto clause prohibits legislature from reviving time-barred criminal cases but not disturbing state co

11
State Ex Rel. Webb v. Ciancigreen
ri · 1991 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
1 sentence

2009Webb v. Cianci, 591 A.2d 1193, 1214-15 (R.I.1991) (quoting Lerner v. Gill, 463 A.2d 1352, 1356 (R.I.1983)). [9] In his brief, defendant concedes that "it is likewise clear that where a statute of limitations is extended prior to the then-not-yet-time-barred action, no violation of the ex post facto clause occurs." See Fiorenzano, 690 A.2d at 861 ("When, as here, a statute of limitations is extended prior to the barring of an action, no violation of the ex post facto clause occurs."); see also Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 616-17, 632-33 , 123 S.Ct. 2446 , 156 L.Ed.2d 544 (2003) (holding

11
State v. . Broadwaygreen
nc · 1911 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
2 sentences

2009See State v. Broadway, 157 N.C. 598 , 72 S.E. 987, 987-88 (1911) (holding amendment to a statute increasing the criminal penalty operated prospectively only, otherwise it would violate the ex post facto clause; therefore, prosecutions under old statute remained viable).

2009See State v. Broadway, 157 N.C. 598 , 72 S.E. 987, 987-88 (1911) (holding amendment to a statute increasing the criminal penalty operated prospectively only, otherwise it would violate the ex post facto clause; therefore, prosecutions under old statute remained viable).

11
Lynce v. Mathisgreen
scotus · 1997 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
11
United States v. Del Ray Keith Chandlergreen
ca8 · 1995 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
11
Spunt v. Oak Hill Nursing Home, Inc.green
ri · 1986 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
11
Grenemyer v. Guntergreen
cod · 1991 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
11
Twomey v. Carlton House of Providence, Inc.green
ri · 1974 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
11
Kelly v. Marcantoniogreen
ri · 1996 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
11
Mileham v. Simmonsgreen
ca9 · 1979 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
11
People v. Russogreen
mich · 1992 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
11
United States v. Ingrid Josefina Bodregreen
ca1 · 1991 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
11
Hopt v. People of Territory of Utahgreen
scotus · 1884 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 1986–1986
11
United States v. Emerson Moltgreen
ca7 · 1985 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 1986–1986
11
Rooney v. North Dakotagreen
· 1905 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983
11
United States v. William Ernest Rossgreen
ca2 · 1972 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983
11
United States v. Ralph De Simonegreen
ca2 · 1972 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (1)

CaseNegativeCited
State v. Mullengreen
ri · 1999 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
2 sentences

2009But see State v. Mullen, 740 A.2d 783, 786 (R.I.1999) (holding state cannot prosecute defendant under old sodomy statute when Legislature amended statute with manifest intent to decriminalize such activity between consenting adults).

2009But see State v. Mullen, 740 A.2d 783, 786 (R.I.1999) (holding state cannot prosecute defendant under old sodomy statute when Legislature amended statute with manifest intent to decriminalize such activity between consenting adults).

11

Also cited on this issue (23)

CaseCitedYears
California Department of Corrections v. Morales green
scotus · 1995
2 sentences

2018CONST. art. 1, § 12. 16 As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the ex post facto clause "is aimed at laws that 'retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.' " California Department of Corrections v. Morales , 514 U.S. 499 , 504, 115 S.Ct. 1597 , 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995) (quoting Collins v. Youngblood , 497 U.S. 37 , 43, 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990) ).

2018CONST. art. 1, § 12. 16 As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the ex post facto clause "is aimed at laws that 'retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.' " California Department of Corrections v. Morales , 514 U.S. 499 , 504, 115 S.Ct. 1597 , 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995) (quoting Collins v. Youngblood , 497 U.S. 37 , 43, 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990) ).

31999–2018
Ross v. Oregon green
scotus · 1913
2 sentences

1983In Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150 , 33 S.Ct. 220 , 57 L.Ed. 458 (1913), the plaintiff argued that the judicial construction of a statute that had been in effect at the time his acts took place, but had not previously been construed, constituted an ex post facto violation.

1983In Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150 , 33 S.Ct. 220 , 57 L.Ed. 458 (1913), the plaintiff argued that the judicial construction of a statute that had been in effect at the time his acts took place, but had not previously been construed, constituted an ex post facto violation.

31917–1989
Bouie v. City of Columbia green
scotus · 1964
2 sentences

2011The Court has further explained the Bouie theory of vagueness by emphasizing that "a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime." Rogers v. Tennessee , 532 U.S. 451 , *Page 18 457 (2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Bouie , 378 U.S. at 350 ); see also Rogers , 532 U.S. at 459-60 (listing the cases interpreting Bouie , all of which are criminal); State v. DeWitt , 557 A.2d 845 , 848 (R.I. 1989) (interpreting Bouie 's "fair warning" requirement as qualifying the application of the ex post facto clause).

1989The Supreme Court qualified the application of the ex post facto clause upon the courts to “retroactive judicial expansion of narrow and precise statutory language.” Id. at 352 , 84 S.Ct. at 1702 , 12 L.Ed.2d at 899 .

21989–2011
Leach v. Vose green
ri · 1997
2 sentences

2011We further held that “the ex post facto clause is not implicated when the department changes its procedures to conform to the mandates of the statute” and that “the ex post facto clause does not give a prisoner a vested right to a favorable, but erroneous, interpretation of the law.” Leach, 689 A.2d at 397 (quoting Lerner v. Gill, 751 F.2d 450, 457 (1st Cir.1985)).

2010Specifically, the ex post facto clause “is not implicated when the [DOC] changes its procedures to conform to the mandates of [§ 42-56-24].” Leach, 689 A.2d at 397 .

22010–2011
Weaver v. Graham green
scotus · 1981
2 sentences

1986Earlier in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 , 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344, 356 (1977), the Supreme Court observed that “[e]ven though [a procedural change] may work to the disadvantage of a defendant, [such a change] is not ex post facto.” A procedural change, although retrospective in application, has been held not to be violative of the ex post facto bar if it does “not increase the punishment nor change the ingredients of the offense or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt.” Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 , 29 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 960 , 964 n. 12, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 , 23 n. 1

1986Earlier in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 , 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344, 356 (1977), the Supreme Court observed that “[e]ven though [a procedural change] may work to the disadvantage of a defendant, [such a change] is not ex post facto.” A procedural change, although retrospective in application, has been held not to be violative of the ex post facto bar if it does “not increase the punishment nor change the ingredients of the offense or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt.” Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 , 29 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 960 , 964 n. 12, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 , 23 n. 1

21983–1986
Calder v. Bull green
scotus · 1798
2 sentences

1986Long ago in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 , 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798), Mr. Justice Chase, in categorizing the actions proscribed by the ex post facto clause, included: “Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in *576 order to convict the offender.” Id. at 390, 1 L.Ed. at 650 .

1986Long ago in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 , 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798), Mr. Justice Chase, in categorizing the actions proscribed by the ex post facto clause, included: “Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in *576 order to convict the offender.” Id. at 390, 1 L.Ed. at 650 .

21983–1986
State v. Frederick Gibson Frederick Gibson v. State of Rhode Island green
ri · 2018
2 sentences

2022This is the current state of the law. 13 In State v. Gibson, 182 A.3d 540 (R.I. 2018), in response to the defendant’s ex post facto challenge to the registration act’s amendments, which extended the duration of his duty to register, this Court made clear that, although the duty to register “follows as a consequence of a criminal conviction, sexual offender registration and notification is a civil regulatory process.” Gibson, 182 A.3d at 554 (quoting State v. Germane, 971 A.2d 555, 593 (R.I. 2009)).

2022This is the current state of the law. 13 In State v. Gibson, 182 A.3d 540 (R.I. 2018), in response to the defendant’s ex post facto challenge to the registration act’s amendments, which extended the duration of his duty to register, this Court made clear that, although the duty to register “follows as a consequence of a criminal conviction, sexual offender registration and notification is a civil regulatory process.” Gibson, 182 A.3d at 554 (quoting State v. Germane, 971 A.2d 555, 593 (R.I. 2009)).

12022–2022
State v. Pereira green
ri · 2009
2 sentences

2018Likewise, we have "held that a violation of the ex post facto clause occurs when there is a 'retrospective application of law that disadvantages an offender by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.' " State v. Pereira , 973 A.2d 19 , 32 (R.I. 2009) (quoting Town of West Warwick v. Local 1104, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, CLC , 745 A.2d 786 , 788 (R.I. 2000) ). 17 "It is black letter law that the ex post facto clause in both our state and federal constitutions only prohibit retroactive penal legislation." State v. Germane

2018Likewise, we have "held that a violation of the ex post facto clause occurs when there is a 'retrospective application of law that disadvantages an offender by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.' " State v. Pereira , 973 A.2d 19 , 32 (R.I. 2009) (quoting Town of West Warwick v. Local 1104, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, CLC , 745 A.2d 786 , 788 (R.I. 2000) ). 17 "It is black letter law that the ex post facto clause in both our state and federal constitutions only prohibit retroactive penal legislation." State v. Germane

12018–2018
Morrissey v. Brewer green
scotus · 1972
1 sentence

2018We take no position on the merits of that contention at this time. -5- The United States Supreme Court in Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489 , set forth what is minimally necessary to comply with the requirements of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution in the context of parole revocation.

12018–2018
State v. DeWitt green
ri · 1989
1 sentence

2011The Court has further explained the Bouie theory of vagueness by emphasizing that "a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime." Rogers v. Tennessee , 532 U.S. 451 , *Page 18 457 (2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Bouie , 378 U.S. at 350 ); see also Rogers , 532 U.S. at 459-60 (listing the cases interpreting Bouie , all of which are criminal); State v. DeWitt , 557 A.2d 845 , 848 (R.I. 1989) (interpreting Bouie 's "fair warning" requirement as qualifying the application of the ex post facto clause).

12011–2011
Barber v. Vose green
ri · 1996
1 sentence

2011Lastly, in Barber , we declined to address the applicant’s alleged equal protection claim because we held that the law had “long since been determined contrary to his contention!)]” Barber, 682 A.2d at 910 (citing Mastracchio v. Superior Court, 98 R.I. 111, 112-13 , 200 A.2d 10, 11 (1964)).

12011–2011
Lerner v. Gill yellow
rid · 1984
12001–2001
James Dominique v. William Weld green
ca1 · 1996
11999–1999
Frank E. Marley, Jr. v. Thornton Wright, Jr., David M. Harbour, Kim Fowler, and Richard L. Hull green
ca10 · 1992
11997–1997
Dennis Reed Grenemyer v. Frank Gunter Gale A. Norton, Attorney General of the State of Colorado neutral
ca10 · 1992
11997–1997
Robert Breest v. Raymond Helgemoe, Etc. green
ca1 · 1978
11989–1989
Miller v. Florida green
scotus · 1987
11988–1988
State v. Borges green
ri · 1986
11987–1987
Beazell v. Ohio green
scotus · 1925
11986–1986
Wade v. State green
texcrimapp · 1978
11986–1986
People v. Anderson green
ill · 1973
11986–1986
In Re Advisory Opinion to the Governor green
ri · 1980
11983–1983
Geraghty v. United States Parole Commission green
ca3 · 1978
11983–1983

Statutes the citing opinions construe

RI § R.I. Gen. Laws § 13-8-14 (4) RI § R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-9 (3) RI § R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37.1-10 (3) RI § R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37.1-18 (3) RI § R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37.1-2 (3) RI § R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37.1-3 (3) RI § R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37.1-4 (3) RI § R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-8 (3) RI § R.I. Gen. Laws § 13-8-14.1 (3) RI § R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-56-24 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 372 (1958–2025) PA 355 (1950–2026) FL 245 (1982–2026) OH 219 (1993–2024) TX 166 (1971–2026) IL 135 (1974–2025) WA 112 (1989–2024) IN 107 (1974–2026) CT 91 (1981–2025) LA 70 (1978–2025) MO 61 (1988–2024) NY 61 (1939–2023) OR 60 (1980–2026) MS 58 (1976–2023) NJ 56 (1978–2026) TN 54 (1993–2025) KS 50 (1987–2026) MI 46 (1942–2026) SC 46 (1989–2023) AZ 43 (1976–2025) NC 42 (1980–2020) IA 40 (1979–2025) KY 29 (1983–2024) AR 29 (1987–2026) MA 29 (1980–2025) WV 27 (1980–2025) WI 27 (1994–2023) RI 26 (1917–2022) MD 25 (1980–2023) DE 23 (1985–2023) OK 23 (1980–2025) CO 22 (1990–2025) GA 22 (1972–2018) AL 21 (1981–2025) AK 21 (1986–2026) MT 20 (1979–2026) NE 17 (1983–2026) VT 17 (2008–2024) ID 17 (1979–2022) DC 17 (1972–2023) NV 16 (1977–2018) MN 15 (1985–2026) HI 15 (1994–2025) VA 14 (1984–2025) ME 14 (1984–2026) SD 11 (1993–2022) ND 10 (1980–2010) UT 10 (1983–2024) NM 9 (2004–2016) WY 7 (1895–2021) NH 6 (1974–2008) PR 4 (1949–1961)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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