26 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1917–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Maurice R. Lerner v. Matthew Gill, Etc.green2 sentences2011We further held that “the ex post facto clause is not implicated when the department changes its procedures to conform to the mandates of the statute” and that “the ex post facto clause does not give a prisoner a vested right to a favorable, but erroneous, interpretation of the law.” Leach, 689 A.2d at 397 (quoting Lerner v. Gill, 751 F.2d 450, 457 (1st Cir.1985)). 1997Unfortunately for the inmate-applicants, our interpretation was less generous than that of the department, but “the ex post facto clause does not give a prisoner a vested right to a favorable, but erroneous, interpretation of the law.” Lerner, 751 F.2d at 457 (citing Mileham v. Simmons, 588 F.2d 1279, 1280 (9th Cir.1979)). | 2 | 4 |
Skawinski v. Stategreen2 sentences1998A critical element for a law to be considered in violation of the ex post facto clause is that the law "must disadvantage the offender affected by it." In re Skawinski, 538 A.2d 1006 , 1009 (R.I. 1988). 1997We have noted that “the ex post facto clause applies only to laws that work substantive, rather than procedural changes.” Skawinski v. State, 538 A.2d 1006, 1009 (R.I.1988). | 2 | 4 |
Lerner v. Gillgreen2 sentences2009Webb v. Cianci, 591 A.2d 1193, 1214-15 (R.I.1991) (quoting Lerner v. Gill, 463 A.2d 1352, 1356 (R.I.1983)). [9] In his brief, defendant concedes that "it is likewise clear that where a statute of limitations is extended prior to the then-not-yet-time-barred action, no violation of the ex post facto clause occurs." See Fiorenzano, 690 A.2d at 861 ("When, as here, a statute of limitations is extended prior to the barring of an action, no violation of the ex post facto clause occurs."); see also Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 616-17, 632-33 , 123 S.Ct. 2446 , 156 L.Ed.2d 544 (2003) (holding 2001Lerner v. Gill, 463 A.2d 1352, 1356-57 (R.I.1983), pet. for writ of habeas corpus granted, 580 F.Supp. 1056 (D.R.I.1984), rev'd, 751 F.2d 450 (1st. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Germanegreen2 sentences2022This is the current state of the law. 13 In State v. Gibson, 182 A.3d 540 (R.I. 2018), in response to the defendant’s ex post facto challenge to the registration act’s amendments, which extended the duration of his duty to register, this Court made clear that, although the duty to register “follows as a consequence of a criminal conviction, sexual offender registration and notification is a civil regulatory process.” Gibson, 182 A.3d at 554 (quoting State v. Germane, 971 A.2d 555, 593 (R.I. 2009)). 2018Likewise, we have "held that a violation of the ex post facto clause occurs when there is a 'retrospective application of law that disadvantages an offender by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.' " State v. Pereira , 973 A.2d 19 , 32 (R.I. 2009) (quoting Town of West Warwick v. Local 1104, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, CLC , 745 A.2d 786 , 788 (R.I. 2000) ). 17 "It is black letter law that the ex post facto clause in both our state and federal constitutions only prohibit retroactive penal legislation." State v. Germane | 2 | 2 |
State v. Desjarlaisgreen2 sentences2009This Court has held that a violation of the ex post facto clause occurs when there is a "retrospective application of law that disadvantages an offender `by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.'" Town of West Warwick v. Local 1104, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, CLC, 745 A.2d 786, 788 (R.I. 2000) (quoting State v. Desjarlais, 731 A.2d 716, 717-18 (R.I.1999)). [8] *33 Here, Pereira argues that the Legislature "doubled" the "quantum of punishment" for the offense for which he was convicted and that therefore his prosecution 2009This Court has held that a violation of the ex post facto clause occurs when there is a “retrospective application of law that disadvantages an offender ‘by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.’ ” Town of West Warwick v. Local 1104, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, CLC, 745 A.2d 786, 788 (R.I.2000) (quoting State v. Desjarlais, 731 A.2d 716, 717-18 (R.I.1999)). 8 Here, Pereira argues that the Legislature “doubled” the “quantum of punishment” for the offense for which he was convicted and that therefore his prosecution under | 2 | 2 |
Dobbert v. Floridagreen2 sentences1986Earlier in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 , 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344, 356 (1977), the Supreme Court observed that “[e]ven though [a procedural change] may work to the disadvantage of a defendant, [such a change] is not ex post facto.” A procedural change, although retrospective in application, has been held not to be violative of the ex post facto bar if it does “not increase the punishment nor change the ingredients of the offense or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt.” Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 , 29 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 960 , 964 n. 12, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 , 23 n. 1 1986Earlier in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 , 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344, 356 (1977), the Supreme Court observed that “[e]ven though [a procedural change] may work to the disadvantage of a defendant, [such a change] is not ex post facto.” A procedural change, although retrospective in application, has been held not to be violative of the ex post facto bar if it does “not increase the punishment nor change the ingredients of the offense or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt.” Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 , 29 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 960 , 964 n. 12, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 , 23 n. 1 | 2 | 2 |
Collins v. Youngbloodgreen2 sentences2018CONST. art. 1, § 12. 16 As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the ex post facto clause "is aimed at laws that 'retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.' " California Department of Corrections v. Morales , 514 U.S. 499 , 504, 115 S.Ct. 1597 , 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995) (quoting Collins v. Youngblood , 497 U.S. 37 , 43, 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990) ). 2018CONST. art. 1, § 12. 16 As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the ex post facto clause "is aimed at laws that 'retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.' " California Department of Corrections v. Morales , 514 U.S. 499 , 504, 115 S.Ct. 1597 , 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995) (quoting Collins v. Youngblood , 497 U.S. 37 , 43, 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990) ). | 1 | 5 |
Town of West Warwick v. Local 1104, International Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, CLCgreen2 sentences2018Likewise, we have "held that a violation of the ex post facto clause occurs when there is a 'retrospective application of law that disadvantages an offender by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.' " State v. Pereira , 973 A.2d 19 , 32 (R.I. 2009) (quoting Town of West Warwick v. Local 1104, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, CLC , 745 A.2d 786 , 788 (R.I. 2000) ). 17 "It is black letter law that the ex post facto clause in both our state and federal constitutions only prohibit retroactive penal legislation." State v. Germane 2018Likewise, we have "held that a violation of the ex post facto clause occurs when there is a 'retrospective application of law that disadvantages an offender by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.' " State v. Pereira , 973 A.2d 19 , 32 (R.I. 2009) (quoting Town of West Warwick v. Local 1104, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, CLC , 745 A.2d 786 , 788 (R.I. 2000) ). 17 "It is black letter law that the ex post facto clause in both our state and federal constitutions only prohibit retroactive penal legislation." State v. Germane | 1 | 3 |
State v. Figueroagreen2 sentences2000Id.; (see also Collins v. Youngblood , 497 U.S. 37 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990); State v. Figueroa , 639 A.2d 495 , 499 (R.I. 1994); ("It is black letter law that the ex post facto clause in both our state and federal constitutions only prohibit retroactive penal legislation.")). 2000See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990); State v. Figueroa, 639 A.2d 495, 499 (R.I.1994). | 1 | 3 |
Smith v. Doegreen2 sentences2005See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) (Holding that there is no violation of the ex post facto clause where the challenged sex offender registration act is determined to be nonpunitive and part of a remedial civil regulatory scheme); see also, e.g., Maureen -S. Hopbell, Comment, Balancing the Protection of Children Against the Protection of Constitutional Rights: The Past, Present and Future of Megan’s Law, 42 Duq. 2005See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) (Holding that there is no violation of the ex post facto clause where the challenged sex offender registration act is determined to be nonpunitive and part of a remedial civil regulatory scheme); see also, e.g., Maureen -S. Hopbell, Comment, Balancing the Protection of Children Against the Protection of Constitutional Rights: The Past, Present and Future of Megan’s Law, 42 Duq. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Pelzgreen1 sentence2018See State v. Pelz , 765 A.2d 824 , 830-31 (R.I. 2001). | 1 | 1 |
Mastracchio v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2011Lastly, in Barber , we declined to address the applicant’s alleged equal protection claim because we held that the law had “long since been determined contrary to his contention!)]” Barber, 682 A.2d at 910 (citing Mastracchio v. Superior Court, 98 R.I. 111, 112-13 , 200 A.2d 10, 11 (1964)). 2011Lastly, in Barber , we declined to address the applicant’s alleged equal protection claim because we held that the law had “long since been determined contrary to his contention!)]” Barber, 682 A.2d at 910 (citing Mastracchio v. Superior Court, 98 R.I. 111, 112-13 , 200 A.2d 10, 11 (1964)). | 1 | 1 |
Rogers v. Tennesseegreen2 sentences2011The Court has further explained the Bouie theory of vagueness by emphasizing that "a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime." Rogers v. Tennessee , 532 U.S. 451 , *Page 18 457 (2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Bouie , 378 U.S. at 350 ); see also Rogers , 532 U.S. at 459-60 (listing the cases interpreting Bouie , all of which are criminal); State v. DeWitt , 557 A.2d 845 , 848 (R.I. 1989) (interpreting Bouie 's "fair warning" requirement as qualifying the application of the ex post facto clause). 2011The Court has further explained the Bouie theory of vagueness by emphasizing that "a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime." Rogers v. Tennessee , 532 U.S. 451 , *Page 18 457 (2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Bouie , 378 U.S. at 350 ); see also Rogers , 532 U.S. at 459-60 (listing the cases interpreting Bouie , all of which are criminal); State v. DeWitt , 557 A.2d 845 , 848 (R.I. 1989) (interpreting Bouie 's "fair warning" requirement as qualifying the application of the ex post facto clause). | 1 | 1 |
Stogner v. Californiagreen2 sentences2009In his brief, defendant concedes that "it is likewise clear that where a statute of limitations is extended prior to the then-nol-yet-time-barred action, no violation of the ex post facto clause occurs.” See Fiorenzano, 690 A.2d at 861 ("When, as here, a statute of limitations is extended prior to the barring of an action, no violation of the ex post facto clause occurs.”); see also Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 616-17, 632-33 , 123 S.Ct. 2446 , 156 L.Ed.2d 544 (2003) (holding ex post facto clause prohibits legislature from reviving time-barred criminal cases but not disturbing state co 2009In his brief, defendant concedes that "it is likewise clear that where a statute of limitations is extended prior to the then-nol-yet-time-barred action, no violation of the ex post facto clause occurs.” See Fiorenzano, 690 A.2d at 861 ("When, as here, a statute of limitations is extended prior to the barring of an action, no violation of the ex post facto clause occurs.”); see also Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 616-17, 632-33 , 123 S.Ct. 2446 , 156 L.Ed.2d 544 (2003) (holding ex post facto clause prohibits legislature from reviving time-barred criminal cases but not disturbing state co | 1 | 1 |
Lindsey v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2009This Court has held that a violation of the ex post facto clause occurs when there is a “retrospective application of law that disadvantages an offender ‘by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.’ ” Town of West Warwick v. Local 1104, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, CLC, 745 A.2d 786, 788 (R.I.2000) (quoting State v. Desjarlais, 731 A.2d 716, 717-18 (R.I.1999)). 8 Here, Pereira argues that the Legislature “doubled” the “quantum of punishment” for the offense for which he was convicted and that therefore his prosecution under 2009This Court has held that a violation of the ex post facto clause occurs when there is a “retrospective application of law that disadvantages an offender ‘by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.’ ” Town of West Warwick v. Local 1104, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, CLC, 745 A.2d 786, 788 (R.I.2000) (quoting State v. Desjarlais, 731 A.2d 716, 717-18 (R.I.1999)). 8 Here, Pereira argues that the Legislature “doubled” the “quantum of punishment” for the offense for which he was convicted and that therefore his prosecution under | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fiorenzanogreen2 sentences2009Webb v. Cianci, 591 A.2d 1193, 1214-15 (R.I.1991) (quoting Lerner v. Gill, 463 A.2d 1352, 1356 (R.I.1983)). [9] In his brief, defendant concedes that "it is likewise clear that where a statute of limitations is extended prior to the then-not-yet-time-barred action, no violation of the ex post facto clause occurs." See Fiorenzano, 690 A.2d at 861 ("When, as here, a statute of limitations is extended prior to the barring of an action, no violation of the ex post facto clause occurs."); see also Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 616-17, 632-33 , 123 S.Ct. 2446 , 156 L.Ed.2d 544 (2003) (holding 2009In his brief, defendant concedes that "it is likewise clear that where a statute of limitations is extended prior to the then-nol-yet-time-barred action, no violation of the ex post facto clause occurs.” See Fiorenzano, 690 A.2d at 861 ("When, as here, a statute of limitations is extended prior to the barring of an action, no violation of the ex post facto clause occurs.”); see also Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 616-17, 632-33 , 123 S.Ct. 2446 , 156 L.Ed.2d 544 (2003) (holding ex post facto clause prohibits legislature from reviving time-barred criminal cases but not disturbing state co | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Webb v. Ciancigreen1 sentence2009Webb v. Cianci, 591 A.2d 1193, 1214-15 (R.I.1991) (quoting Lerner v. Gill, 463 A.2d 1352, 1356 (R.I.1983)). [9] In his brief, defendant concedes that "it is likewise clear that where a statute of limitations is extended prior to the then-not-yet-time-barred action, no violation of the ex post facto clause occurs." See Fiorenzano, 690 A.2d at 861 ("When, as here, a statute of limitations is extended prior to the barring of an action, no violation of the ex post facto clause occurs."); see also Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 616-17, 632-33 , 123 S.Ct. 2446 , 156 L.Ed.2d 544 (2003) (holding | 1 | 1 |
State v. . Broadwaygreen2 sentences2009See State v. Broadway, 157 N.C. 598 , 72 S.E. 987, 987-88 (1911) (holding amendment to a statute increasing the criminal penalty operated prospectively only, otherwise it would violate the ex post facto clause; therefore, prosecutions under old statute remained viable). 2009See State v. Broadway, 157 N.C. 598 , 72 S.E. 987, 987-88 (1911) (holding amendment to a statute increasing the criminal penalty operated prospectively only, otherwise it would violate the ex post facto clause; therefore, prosecutions under old statute remained viable). | 1 | 1 |
| Lynce v. Mathisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Del Ray Keith Chandlergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Spunt v. Oak Hill Nursing Home, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Grenemyer v. Guntergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Twomey v. Carlton House of Providence, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Kelly v. Marcantoniogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mileham v. Simmonsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Russogreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Ingrid Josefina Bodregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hopt v. People of Territory of Utahgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Emerson Moltgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rooney v. North Dakotagreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. William Ernest Rossgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Ralph De Simonegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Mullengreen2 sentences2009But see State v. Mullen, 740 A.2d 783, 786 (R.I.1999) (holding state cannot prosecute defendant under old sodomy statute when Legislature amended statute with manifest intent to decriminalize such activity between consenting adults). 2009But see State v. Mullen, 740 A.2d 783, 786 (R.I.1999) (holding state cannot prosecute defendant under old sodomy statute when Legislature amended statute with manifest intent to decriminalize such activity between consenting adults). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
California Department of Corrections v. Morales
green
2 sentences2018CONST. art. 1, § 12. 16 As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the ex post facto clause "is aimed at laws that 'retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.' " California Department of Corrections v. Morales , 514 U.S. 499 , 504, 115 S.Ct. 1597 , 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995) (quoting Collins v. Youngblood , 497 U.S. 37 , 43, 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990) ). 2018CONST. art. 1, § 12. 16 As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the ex post facto clause "is aimed at laws that 'retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.' " California Department of Corrections v. Morales , 514 U.S. 499 , 504, 115 S.Ct. 1597 , 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995) (quoting Collins v. Youngblood , 497 U.S. 37 , 43, 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990) ). | 3 | 1999–2018 |
Ross v. Oregon
green
2 sentences1983In Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150 , 33 S.Ct. 220 , 57 L.Ed. 458 (1913), the plaintiff argued that the judicial construction of a statute that had been in effect at the time his acts took place, but had not previously been construed, constituted an ex post facto violation. 1983In Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150 , 33 S.Ct. 220 , 57 L.Ed. 458 (1913), the plaintiff argued that the judicial construction of a statute that had been in effect at the time his acts took place, but had not previously been construed, constituted an ex post facto violation. | 3 | 1917–1989 |
Bouie v. City of Columbia
green
2 sentences2011The Court has further explained the Bouie theory of vagueness by emphasizing that "a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime." Rogers v. Tennessee , 532 U.S. 451 , *Page 18 457 (2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Bouie , 378 U.S. at 350 ); see also Rogers , 532 U.S. at 459-60 (listing the cases interpreting Bouie , all of which are criminal); State v. DeWitt , 557 A.2d 845 , 848 (R.I. 1989) (interpreting Bouie 's "fair warning" requirement as qualifying the application of the ex post facto clause). 1989The Supreme Court qualified the application of the ex post facto clause upon the courts to “retroactive judicial expansion of narrow and precise statutory language.” Id. at 352 , 84 S.Ct. at 1702 , 12 L.Ed.2d at 899 . | 2 | 1989–2011 |
Leach v. Vose
green
2 sentences2011We further held that “the ex post facto clause is not implicated when the department changes its procedures to conform to the mandates of the statute” and that “the ex post facto clause does not give a prisoner a vested right to a favorable, but erroneous, interpretation of the law.” Leach, 689 A.2d at 397 (quoting Lerner v. Gill, 751 F.2d 450, 457 (1st Cir.1985)). 2010Specifically, the ex post facto clause “is not implicated when the [DOC] changes its procedures to conform to the mandates of [§ 42-56-24].” Leach, 689 A.2d at 397 . | 2 | 2010–2011 |
Weaver v. Graham
green
2 sentences1986Earlier in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 , 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344, 356 (1977), the Supreme Court observed that “[e]ven though [a procedural change] may work to the disadvantage of a defendant, [such a change] is not ex post facto.” A procedural change, although retrospective in application, has been held not to be violative of the ex post facto bar if it does “not increase the punishment nor change the ingredients of the offense or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt.” Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 , 29 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 960 , 964 n. 12, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 , 23 n. 1 1986Earlier in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 , 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344, 356 (1977), the Supreme Court observed that “[e]ven though [a procedural change] may work to the disadvantage of a defendant, [such a change] is not ex post facto.” A procedural change, although retrospective in application, has been held not to be violative of the ex post facto bar if it does “not increase the punishment nor change the ingredients of the offense or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt.” Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 , 29 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 960 , 964 n. 12, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 , 23 n. 1 | 2 | 1983–1986 |
Calder v. Bull
green
2 sentences1986Long ago in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 , 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798), Mr. Justice Chase, in categorizing the actions proscribed by the ex post facto clause, included: “Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in *576 order to convict the offender.” Id. at 390, 1 L.Ed. at 650 . 1986Long ago in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 , 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798), Mr. Justice Chase, in categorizing the actions proscribed by the ex post facto clause, included: “Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in *576 order to convict the offender.” Id. at 390, 1 L.Ed. at 650 . | 2 | 1983–1986 |
State v. Frederick Gibson Frederick Gibson v. State of Rhode Island
green
2 sentences2022This is the current state of the law. 13 In State v. Gibson, 182 A.3d 540 (R.I. 2018), in response to the defendant’s ex post facto challenge to the registration act’s amendments, which extended the duration of his duty to register, this Court made clear that, although the duty to register “follows as a consequence of a criminal conviction, sexual offender registration and notification is a civil regulatory process.” Gibson, 182 A.3d at 554 (quoting State v. Germane, 971 A.2d 555, 593 (R.I. 2009)). 2022This is the current state of the law. 13 In State v. Gibson, 182 A.3d 540 (R.I. 2018), in response to the defendant’s ex post facto challenge to the registration act’s amendments, which extended the duration of his duty to register, this Court made clear that, although the duty to register “follows as a consequence of a criminal conviction, sexual offender registration and notification is a civil regulatory process.” Gibson, 182 A.3d at 554 (quoting State v. Germane, 971 A.2d 555, 593 (R.I. 2009)). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Pereira
green
2 sentences2018Likewise, we have "held that a violation of the ex post facto clause occurs when there is a 'retrospective application of law that disadvantages an offender by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.' " State v. Pereira , 973 A.2d 19 , 32 (R.I. 2009) (quoting Town of West Warwick v. Local 1104, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, CLC , 745 A.2d 786 , 788 (R.I. 2000) ). 17 "It is black letter law that the ex post facto clause in both our state and federal constitutions only prohibit retroactive penal legislation." State v. Germane 2018Likewise, we have "held that a violation of the ex post facto clause occurs when there is a 'retrospective application of law that disadvantages an offender by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.' " State v. Pereira , 973 A.2d 19 , 32 (R.I. 2009) (quoting Town of West Warwick v. Local 1104, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, CLC , 745 A.2d 786 , 788 (R.I. 2000) ). 17 "It is black letter law that the ex post facto clause in both our state and federal constitutions only prohibit retroactive penal legislation." State v. Germane | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Morrissey v. Brewer
green
1 sentence2018We take no position on the merits of that contention at this time. -5- The United States Supreme Court in Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489 , set forth what is minimally necessary to comply with the requirements of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution in the context of parole revocation. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. DeWitt
green
1 sentence2011The Court has further explained the Bouie theory of vagueness by emphasizing that "a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime." Rogers v. Tennessee , 532 U.S. 451 , *Page 18 457 (2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Bouie , 378 U.S. at 350 ); see also Rogers , 532 U.S. at 459-60 (listing the cases interpreting Bouie , all of which are criminal); State v. DeWitt , 557 A.2d 845 , 848 (R.I. 1989) (interpreting Bouie 's "fair warning" requirement as qualifying the application of the ex post facto clause). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Barber v. Vose
green
1 sentence2011Lastly, in Barber , we declined to address the applicant’s alleged equal protection claim because we held that the law had “long since been determined contrary to his contention!)]” Barber, 682 A.2d at 910 (citing Mastracchio v. Superior Court, 98 R.I. 111, 112-13 , 200 A.2d 10, 11 (1964)). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Lerner v. Gill yellow | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| James Dominique v. William Weld green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Frank E. Marley, Jr. v. Thornton Wright, Jr., David M. Harbour, Kim Fowler, and Richard L. Hull green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Dennis Reed Grenemyer v. Frank Gunter Gale A. Norton, Attorney General of the State of Colorado neutral | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Robert Breest v. Raymond Helgemoe, Etc. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Miller v. Florida green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| State v. Borges green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Beazell v. Ohio green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Wade v. State green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| People v. Anderson green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| In Re Advisory Opinion to the Governor green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Geraghty v. United States Parole Commission green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.