ex post facto clause in Washington

1999While prior case law had previously suggested a "disadvantageous" law would violate the ex post facto clause, this perspective has been narrowly limited: "`[T]he sole determination of whether a law is "disadvantageous" is whether the law alters the standard of punishment which existed under prior law.'" Hennings, 129 Wash.2d at 525 , 919 P.2d 580 (quoting Ward, 123 Wash.2d at 498 , 869 P.2d 1062 ).

1999While prior case law had previously suggested a “disadvantageous” law would violate the ex post facto clause, this perspective has been narrowly limited: “ ‘[T]he sole determination of whether a law is “disadvantageous” is whether the law alters the standard of punishment which existed under prior law.’ ” Hennings, 129 Wn.2d at 525 (quoting Ward, 123 Wn.2d at 498 ).

2010Retroactive application of a statute may violate the ex post facto doctrine, id. at 507, 198 P.3d 1021 (citing State v. Schmidt, 143 Wash.2d 658, 672-73 , 23 P.3d 462 (2001)), or affect vested rights and violate due process, id. (citing State v. Varga, 151 Wash.2d 179, 195 , 86 P.3d 139 (2004)).

2010"The retroactive application of laws may violate the ex post facto doctrine, affect vested rights and violate due process, or affect other judicial functions." Hale, 165 Wash.2d at 507 , 198 P.3d 1021 (citations omitted) (citing Schmidt, 143 Wash.2d at 672-73 , 23 P.3d 462 ; Varga, 151 Wash.2d at 195 , 86 P.3d 139 ).

2018The ex post facto clause "prohibits the State from enacting laws that retroactively increase the punishment associated with a crime after its commission." In re Personal Restraint of Dyer, 164 Wn.2d 274, 292 , 189 P.3d 759 (2008)(citing State v. Pillatos, 159 Wn.2d 459, 475 , 150 P.3d 1130 (2007)).

2010Pillatos, 159 Wash.2d at 470-71 , 150 P.3d 1130 . ¶ 25 Moreover, the validity of exceptional sentences before the 2005 amendments is not an issue in analyzing whether a later statute violates ex post facto principles; notice that certain conduct was illegal and carried certain consequences is all that is required to defeat an ex post facto claim.

2010Retroactive application of a statute may violate the ex post facto doctrine, id. at 507, 198 P.3d 1021 (citing State v. Schmidt, 143 Wash.2d 658, 672-73 , 23 P.3d 462 (2001)), or affect vested rights and violate due process, id. (citing State v. Varga, 151 Wash.2d 179, 195 , 86 P.3d 139 (2004)).

2010Retroactive application of a statute may violate the ex post facto doctrine, id. at 507, 198 P.3d 1021 (citing State v. Schmidt, 143 Wash.2d 658, 672-73 , 23 P.3d 462 (2001)), or affect vested rights and violate due process, id. (citing State v. Varga, 151 Wash.2d 179, 195 , 86 P.3d 139 (2004)).

2019“The ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions prohibit the state from enacting any law which imposes punishment for an act which was not punishable when committed, or which increases the quantum of punishment for the offense after the crime was committed.” State v. Hennings, 129 Wn.2d 512, 524-25 , 919 P.2d 580 (1996) (citing U.S. Const. art.

1999While prior case law had previously suggested a "disadvantageous" law would violate the ex post facto clause, this perspective has been narrowly limited: "`[T]he sole determination of whether a law is "disadvantageous" is whether the law alters the standard of punishment which existed under prior law.'" Hennings, 129 Wash.2d at 525 , 919 P.2d 580 (quoting Ward, 123 Wash.2d at 498 , 869 P.2d 1062 ).

2016State v. Hodgson, 108 Wn.2d 662, 668-69 , 740 P.2d 848 (1987).

2016State v. Hodgson, 108 Wn.2d 662, 668-69 , 740 P.2d 848 (1987).

2005The State relies on State v. Shultz, 138 Wn.2d 638 , 980 P.2d 1265 (1999), where we addressed an ex post facto challenge to amendments to former RCW 9.94A.142 that extended trial courts’jurisdiction over restitution orders.

2005The State relies on State v. Shultz, 138 Wash.2d 638 , 980 P.2d 1265 (1999), where we addressed an ex post facto challenge to amendments to former RCW 9.94A.142 that extended trial courts' jurisdiction over restitution orders.

2003A law may survive an ex post facto challenge if it is merely procedural (i.e., “changes in the procedures by which a criminal case is adjudicated, as opposed to changes in the substantive law of crimes,” Collins, 497 U.S. at 45 , that have no effect on “matters of substance,” Beazell, 269 U.S. at 171 ).

2003Forbis does not argue that the provision in our state's constitution is more protective of defendants than the provision in the United States Constitution. [2] A law may survive an ex post facto challenge if it is merely procedural (i.e., "changes in the procedures by which a criminal case is adjudicated, as opposed to changes in the substantive law of crimes," Collins, 497 U.S. at 45 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 that have no effect on "matters of substance," Beazell, 269 U.S. at 171 , 46 S.Ct. 68 ).

2018But unlike the Alaska law, the Washington statute requires individuals who lack a fixed residence to "report weekly, in person, to the sheriff of the county where he or she is registered."19 When discussing whether the Alaska statute constituted an affirmative disability or restraint, the Supreme Court relied in part on the fact that the Alaska statute did not require updates to be made in person.2° In State v. Boyd, this court considered the transient registration requirements and determined "while undoubtedly the transient registration requirements are burdensome, this does not necessarily m

2018But unlike the Alaska law, the Washington statute requires individuals who lack a fixed residence to "report weekly, in person, to the sheriff of the county where he or she is registered."19 When discussing whether the Alaska statute constituted an affirmative disability or restraint, the Supreme Court relied in part on the fact that the Alaska statute did not require updates to be made in person.2° In State v. Boyd, this court considered the transient registration requirements and determined "while undoubtedly the transient registration requirements are burdensome, this does not necessarily m

2010Retroactive application of a statute may violate the ex post facto doctrine, id. at 507, 198 P.3d 1021 (citing State v. Schmidt, 143 Wash.2d 658, 672-73 , 23 P.3d 462 (2001)), or affect vested rights and violate due process, id. (citing State v. Varga, 151 Wash.2d 179, 195 , 86 P.3d 139 (2004)).

2010"The retroactive application of laws may violate the ex post facto doctrine, affect vested rights and violate due process, or affect other judicial functions." Hale, 165 Wash.2d at 507 , 198 P.3d 1021 (citations omitted) (citing Schmidt, 143 Wash.2d at 672-73 , 23 P.3d 462 ; Varga, 151 Wash.2d at 195 , 86 P.3d 139 ).

2010Retroactive application of a statute may violate the ex post facto doctrine, id. at 507, 198 P.3d 1021 (citing State v. Schmidt, 143 Wash.2d 658, 672-73 , 23 P.3d 462 (2001)), or affect vested rights and violate due process, id. (citing State v. Varga, 151 Wash.2d 179, 195 , 86 P.3d 139 (2004)).

2010"The retroactive application of laws may violate the ex post facto doctrine, affect vested rights and violate due process, or affect other judicial functions." Hale, 165 Wash.2d at 507 , 198 P.3d 1021 (citations omitted) (citing Schmidt, 143 Wash.2d at 672-73 , 23 P.3d 462 ; Varga, 151 Wash.2d at 195 , 86 P.3d 139 ).

2005The State relies on State v. Shultz, 138 Wn.2d 638 , 980 P.2d 1265 (1999), where we addressed an ex post facto challenge to amendments to former RCW 9.94A.142 that extended trial courts’jurisdiction over restitution orders.

2005The State relies on State v. Shultz, 138 Wash.2d 638 , 980 P.2d 1265 (1999), where we addressed an ex post facto challenge to amendments to former RCW 9.94A.142 that extended trial courts' jurisdiction over restitution orders.

2003Andrew Preuett challenges his sentence for vehicular homicide, arguing that the 24-month *1107 sentence enhancement added due to a deferred driving under the influence of alcohol prosecution violates due process, the ex post facto clause, and the Supreme Court's decision in State v. Cruz, 139 Wash.2d 186 , 985 P.2d 384 (1999).

2003Per Curiam Andrew Preuett challenges his sentence for vehicular homicide, arguing that the 24-month sentence enhancement added due to a deferred driving under the influence of alcohol prosecution violates due process, the ex post facto clause, and the Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Cruz, 139 Wn.2d 186 , 985 P.2d 384 (1999).

2000Young, 122 Wn.2d at 18 .

2000Young, 122 Wash.2d at 18 , 857 P.2d 989 .

2000Cruz, 139 Wn.2d at 198 (citing State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175 , 713 P.2d 719 , 718 P.2d 796 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930 (1986); Williams, 111 Wn.2d at 362-63 ; State v. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d 652 , 921 P.2d 473 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1201 (1997)).

2000Cruz, 139 Wn.2d at 198 (citing State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175 , 713 P.2d 719 , 718 P.2d 796 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930 (1986); Williams, 111 Wn.2d at 362-63 ; State v. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d 652 , 921 P.2d 473 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1201 (1997)).

2000Cruz, 139 Wn.2d at 198 (citing State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175 , 713 P.2d 719 , 718 P.2d 796 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930 (1986); Williams, 111 Wn.2d at 362-63 ; State v. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d 652 , 921 P.2d 473 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1201 (1997)).

2000Cruz, 139 Wash.2d at 198 , 985 P.2d 384 (citing State v. Ammons, 105 Wash.2d 175 , 713 P.2d 719 , 718 P.2d 796 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930 , 107 S.Ct. 398 , 93 L.Ed.2d 351 (1986); Williams, 111 Wash.2d at 362-63 , 759 P.2d 436 ; State v. Manussier, 129 Wash.2d 652 , 921 P.2d 473 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1201 , 117 S.Ct. 1563 , 137 L.Ed.2d 709 (1997)).

2001A criminal law violates the ex post facto clause when it punishes "for an act which was not punishable when committed, or which increases the quantum of punishment after the offense was committed." Schmidt, 143 Wash.2d at 672-73 , 23 P.3d 462 . [34] RCW 9.94A.120(9)(a). [35] RCW 9.94A.120(9)(b). [36] See Laws of 1988, ch. 153, § 2; Laws of 1990, ch. 3, § 705. [37] See Aho, 137 Wash.2d at 742 , 975 P.2d 512 . [38] State v. Parker, 132 Wash.2d 182, 191-92 , 937 P.2d 575 (1997) (where jury not asked to determine when offenses committed, and statute spanned charging period, application of standard

2000If frivolous, the court of appeals shall dismiss the petition on its own motion without first requiring the state to respond to the petition. [5] This court stated "the United States Supreme Court explained that the ex post facto prohibition applies to the legislative branch, and thus judicial decisions which are applied retroactively may raise due process concerns, but do not fall within the ex post facto clause itself." Aho, 137 Wash.2d at 742 , 975 P.2d 512 ; Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 , 97 S.Ct. 990 , 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977) ("[t]he Ex Post Facto Clause is a limitation upon th

2013There, the defendant filed a motion under CrR 7.8(b) in King County Superior Court, asserting the same 2007 statute violated the ex post facto clause.7 The court agreed with the defendant and ordered the DOC to release him.8 On appeal, the DOC made a similar jurisdictional argument to the one it now advances in Holmes' case, that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to consider the defendant's motion because under CrR 7.8, a superior court does not have "the power to grant post conviction relief."9 The DOC argued the defendant must seek such relief in a personal restraint petition under RAP

2012App. 471 , 228 P.3d 24 (2009), and held that applying the amendment to offenders whose crimes predate its effective date violates the ex post facto clause.