ex post facto clause in Connecticut

2024To establish a cognizable claim under the ex post facto clause, therefore, a habeas petitioner need only make a colorable showing that the new law creates a genuine risk that he or she will be incarcerated longer under that new law than under the old law.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Perez v. Commissioner of Correction, 326 Conn. 357, 375 , 163 A.3d 597 (2017).

2024To establish a cognizable claim under the ex post facto clause, therefore, a habeas petitioner need only make a colorable showing that the new law creates a genuine risk that he or she will be incarcerated longer under that new law than under the old law.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Perez v. Commissioner of Correction, 326 Conn. 357, 375 , 163 A.3d 597 (2017).

2018The seminal case, from which the terms "speculative" and "attenuated" derive for the purpose of evaluating the scope of the ex post facto clause, is California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales , supra, 514 U.S. at 508 -509 , 115 S.Ct. 1597 .

2018The seminal case, from which the terms "speculative" and "attenuated" derive for the purpose of evaluating the scope of the ex post facto clause, is California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales , supra, 514 U.S. at 508 -509 , 115 S.Ct. 1597 .

2024The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which held that the retroactive application of the change in the law was necessarily an ex post facto violation, and remanded the case for consideration of the relevant question of ‘‘whether the amended Georgia [r]ule creates a significant risk of prolonging [the inmate’s] incarceration.’’ Id., 251 .

2017In reaching its conclusion that retroactive application of this change was permissible, the court explained that "the focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of 'disadvantage,' nor ... on whether an amendment affects a prisoner's 'opportunity to take advantage of provisions for early release' ... but on whether any such change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable." (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted.) Id., at 506-507 n.3, 115 S.Ct. 1597 ; see also Garner v. Jones , 529 U

2001It also stated in effect that additional incarceration is punishment per se. ". . . although some `effects', for instance, prolonged incarceration in a correctional facility may in and of themselves be sufficient to render a sanction punitive for purposes of the ex post facto inquiry regardless of the legislature's intent. . . ." Id. 1279 .

2001It also stated in effect that additional incarceration is punishment per se. ". . . although some "effects', for instance, prolonged incarceration in a correctional facility may in and of themselves be sufficient to render a sanction punitive for purposes of the ex post facto inquiry regardless of the legislature's intent . . ." Id. 1279 .

2021In other words, the clause forbids the application of any new punitive mea- sure to a crime already consummated, to the detriment or material disadvantage of the wrongdoer.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Breton v. Commissioner of Correction, 330 Conn. 462, 470 , 196 A.3d 789 (2018). ‘‘To establish a cognizable claim under the ex post facto clause, therefore, a habeas petitioner need only make a colorable showing that the new law creates a genuine risk that he or she will be incarcerated longer under that new law than under the old law.’’ Johnson v. Commissioner of Corr

2021In other words, the clause forbids the application of any new punitive mea- sure to a crime already consummated, to the detriment or material disadvantage of the wrongdoer.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Breton v. Commissioner of Correction, 330 Conn. 462, 470 , 196 A.3d 789 (2018). ‘‘To establish a cognizable claim under the ex post facto clause, therefore, a habeas petitioner need only make a colorable showing that the new law creates a genuine risk that he or she will be incarcerated longer under that new law than under the old law.’’ Johnson v. Commissioner of Corr

2016The statute does not therefore implicate the ex post facto clause. 10 See Collins v. Youngblood, supra, 497 U.S. at 41 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 .

2016The statute does not therefore implicate the ex post facto clause. 10 See Collins v. Youngblood, supra, 497 U.S. at 41 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 .

2024If an inmate has not earned sufficient risk reduction credit at the time the commissioner or the commissioner’s designee orders the loss of all or a portion of earned credit, such loss shall be deducted from any credit earned by such inmate in the future.’’ 5 In Breton v. Commissioner of Correction, 330 Conn. 462 , 196 A.3d 789 (2018), our Supreme Court agreed with the claim of the petitioner in that case that the retroactive application to him of a 2013 amendment to General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 54-125a violated the ex post facto clause.

2024If an inmate has not earned sufficient risk reduction credit at the time the commissioner or the commissioner’s designee orders the loss of all or a portion of earned credit, such loss shall be deducted from any credit earned by such inmate in the future.’’ 5 In Breton v. Commissioner of Correction, 330 Conn. 462 , 196 A.3d 789 (2018), our Supreme Court agreed with the claim of the petitioner in that case that the retroactive application to him of a 2013 amendment to General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 54-125a violated the ex post facto clause.

2024Held that the petitioner could not prevail on her claim that the application to her of the administrative directive violated the ex post facto clause of the United States constitu- tion as, pursuant to Rios v. Commissioner of Correction ( 224 Conn. App. 350 ), the administrative directive in question did not constitute a law within the meaning of the ex post facto clause and, thus, she could not establish an ex post facto violation.

2024Held that the petitioner could not prevail on her claim that the application to her of the administrative directive violated the ex post facto clause of the United States constitu- tion as, pursuant to Rios v. Commissioner of Correction ( 224 Conn. App. 350 ), the administrative directive in question did not constitute a law within the meaning of the ex post facto clause and, thus, she could not establish an ex post facto violation.

2021See Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 , 68 S. Ct. 1256 , 92 L.

2021See Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 , 68 S. Ct. 1256 , 92 L.

2021As the United States Supreme Court explained in [Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 658 , 94 S. Ct. 2532 , 41 L.

2021As the United States Supreme Court explained in [Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 658 , 94 S. Ct. 2532 , 41 L.

2015As explained by the United States Supreme Court, laws that impose a greater punishment after the commission of a crime than annexed to the crime at the time of its commission run afoul of the ex post facto prohibition because such laws implicate the central concerns of the ex post facto clause: ‘‘the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was con- summated.’’ Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 30 , 101 S. Ct. 960 , 67 L.

2015As explained by the United States Supreme Court, laws that impose a greater punishment after the commission of a crime than annexed to the crime at the time of its commission run afoul of the ex post facto prohibition because such laws implicate the central concerns of the ex post facto clause: ‘‘the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was con- summated.’’ Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 30 , 101 S. Ct. 960 , 67 L.

2006Id., 829 . 5 Our Supreme Court distinguished Johnson , premised on an ex post facto violation, from Vincenzo v. Warden, 26 Conn. App. 132 , 599 A.2d 31 (1991), in which this court addressed the liberty interests of prisoners under the due process clause.

2006Id., 829 . 5 Our Supreme Court distinguished Johnson , premised on an ex post facto violation, from Vincenzo v. Warden, 26 Conn. App. 132 , 599 A.2d 31 (1991), in which this court addressed the liberty interests of prisoners under the due process clause.

2017Notably, in concluding that the habeas court had jurisdiction over the petitioner's ex post facto claim, the court relied on the fact that the provision enacted after the petitioner committed his criminal offense, and that resulted in his initial release on parole, was "essentially the same" as the provision in effect at the time of his offense, differing only in the percentage of prison capacity that triggered the award, and, therefore, the fact that the petitioner was awarded credit based on the statute in effect at the time of his sentencing, rather than the statute in effect at the time of

2017Notably, in concluding that the habeas court had jurisdiction over the petitioner's ex post facto claim, the court relied on the fact that the provision enacted after the petitioner committed his criminal offense, and that resulted in his initial release on parole, was "essentially the same" as the provision in effect at the time of his offense, differing only in the percentage of prison capacity that triggered the award, and, therefore, the fact that the petitioner was awarded credit based on the statute in effect at the time of his sentencing, rather than the statute in effect at the time of

2024The court described four categories of laws that violate the ex post facto clause: (1) ‘‘[e]very law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action’’; (2) ‘‘[e]very law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed’’; (3) ‘‘[e]very law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed’’; and (4) ‘‘[e]very law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time

2024The court described four categories of laws that violate the ex post facto clause: (1) ‘‘[e]very law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action’’; (2) ‘‘[e]very law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed’’; (3) ‘‘[e]very law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed’’; and (4) ‘‘[e]very law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time

2024The court described four categories of laws that violate the ex post facto clause: (1) ‘‘[e]very law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action’’; (2) ‘‘[e]very law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed’’; (3) ‘‘[e]very law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed’’; and (4) ‘‘[e]very law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time

2024The court described four categories of laws that violate the ex post facto clause: (1) ‘‘[e]very law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action’’; (2) ‘‘[e]very law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed’’; (3) ‘‘[e]very law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed’’; and (4) ‘‘[e]very law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time

2003In State v. Holloway, 144 Conn. 295 , 130 A.2d 562 (1957), the court rejected the contention that an enhanced sentence for a third time offender, under a statute enacted in 1955 and based on convictions in 1947 and 1952, constituted a violation of the ex post facto clause.

2003In State v. Holloway, 144 Conn. 295 , 130 A.2d 562 (1957), the court rejected the contention that an enhanced sentence for a third time offender, under a statute enacted in 1955 and based on convictions in 1947 and 1952, constituted a violation of the ex post facto clause.

2007Id., 50-51 .

2007Id., 50-51 . [4] General Statutes § 53a-30 (a) provides in relevant part: "When imposing sentence of probation or conditional discharge, the court may, as a condition of the sentence, order that the defendant . . . (17) satisfy any other conditions reasonably related to the defendant's rehabilitation. . . ." [5] Pribyson testified at the August 2, 2006, hearing that he was finishing his fifth year of supervising a sex offender caseload and that he had handled sixty to eighty sex offender cases.

2002Moreover, the ex post facto clause prohibits a state from enforcing a law that "imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment [than] that [which was] then prescribed. . . ." Cummings v. Missouri , 71 U.S. 277 , 325-26 , 18 L.Ed. 356 (1867), accord Weaver v. Graham , 450 U.S. 24 , 28 , 101 S.Ct. 960 , 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981); Payne v. Fairfield Hills Hospital , 215 Conn. 675 , 683 , 578 A.2d 1025 (1990).

2002Moreover, the ex post facto clause prohibits a state from enforcing a law that "imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment [than] that [which was] then prescribed. . . ." Cummings v. Missouri , 71 U.S. 277 , 325-26 , 18 L.Ed. 356 (1867), accord Weaver v. Graham , 450 U.S. 24 , 28 , 101 S.Ct. 960 , 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981); Payne v. Fairfield Hills Hospital , 215 Conn. 675 , 683 , 578 A.2d 1025 (1990).

2024The court described four categories of laws that violate the ex post facto clause: (1) ‘‘[e]very law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action’’; (2) ‘‘[e]very law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed’’; (3) ‘‘[e]very law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed’’; and (4) ‘‘[e]very law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time

2024The court described four categories of laws that violate the ex post facto clause: (1) ‘‘[e]very law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action’’; (2) ‘‘[e]very law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed’’; (3) ‘‘[e]very law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed’’; and (4) ‘‘[e]very law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time