50 Kansas opinions name it 3 courts 1987–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Doe v. Stategreen2 sentences2016See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1015-16 (Alaska 2008). 2016See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1015-16 (Alaska 2008). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Myersgreen2 sentences2016Even Myers, 260 Kan. at 681 , appears to assume offender registration is rationally connected to public safety, and the Alaska state case that held post-Smith changes to the Alaska act were an ex post facto violation admits registration, at least as to sex offenders, advances a nonpunitive public safety purpose. 2016Even Myers, 260 Kan. at 681 , appears to assume offender registration is rationally connected to public safety, and the Alaska state case that held post-Smith changes to the Alaska act were an ex post facto violation admits registration, at least as to sex offenders, advances a nonpunitive public safety purpose. | 1 | 6 |
Stansbury v. Hannigangreen2 sentences2016We have further stated: “Although we have sometimes described the requirement of alteration in definition or increase in punishment in shorthand as mere ‘ “disadvantage” ’ to a criminal defendant, see State v. Chamberlain, 280 Kan. 241, 247 , 120 P.3d 319 (2005) (quoting Stansbury v. Hannigan, 265 Kan. 404, 412 , 960 P.2d 227 , cert. denied 525 U.S. 1060 [1998]), we have emphasized drat the crucial ‘question in evaluating an ex post facto claim is whether the [new] law changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date.’ Prine, 297 Kan. at 470 (citing Weaver [v. Graham] 2016We have further stated: “Although we have sometimes described the requirement of alteration in definition or increase in punishment in shorthand as mere ‘ “disadvantage” ’ to a criminal defendant, see State v. Chamberlain, 280 Kan. 241, 247 , 120 P.3d 319 (2005) (quoting Stansbury v. Hannigan, 265 Kan. 404, 412 , 960 P.2d 227 , cert. denied 525 U.S. 1060 [1998]), we have emphasized drat the crucial ‘question in evaluating an ex post facto claim is whether the [new] law changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date.’ Prine, 297 Kan. at 470 (citing Weaver [v. Graham] | 1 | 5 |
Miller v. Floridagreen2 sentences2005App. 2d 342, 344 , 744 P.2d 143 (1987), which followed Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 , 96 L. 2005App. 2d 342, 344 , 744 P.2d 143 (1987), which followed Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 , 96 L. | 1 | 4 |
State v. LaMunyongreen2 sentences2000See State v. LaMunyon, 259 Kan. 54, 65 , 911 P.2d 151 (1996) (“An ex post facto violation occurs when a new law is retroactively applied to events that occurred before its enactment and the new law disadvantages the offender affected by it.”). 2000See State v. LaMunyon, 259 Kan. 54, 65 , 911 P.2d 151 (1996) (“An ex post facto violation occurs when a new law is retroactively applied to events that occurred before its enactment and the new law disadvantages the offender affected by it.”). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Andersongreen2 sentences2012Regarding the first element in the ex post facto analysis — i.e., whether the law in question was retrospective — the panel in Anderson appeared to decide without analysis that because the district court applied the law retrospectively that the statute was intended to apply retrospectively. 12 Kan. 2005The Nunn court also made an ex post facto analysis that adopted State v. Anderson, 12 Kan. | 1 | 2 |
Garner v. Nelsongreen2 sentences2002The Court of Appeals applied tire reasoning in Stansbury and Bankes to find an ex post facto violation in the application of a regulation concerning the earning, withholding, and forfeiting of good time credits that was amended after the petitioner committed his crime. 25 Kan. 2000In Garner v. Nelson, 25 Kan. | 1 | 2 |
Tonge v. Werholtzgreen1 sentence2022Facing an ex post facto challenge, the Kansas Supreme Court held no violation occurred because "[c]hanging the method of collecting disciplinary restitution is a change in procedure and has no effect on the underlying disciplinary infractions or the amount of restitution ordered." 279 Kan. at 489, 490 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Barnesgreen2 sentences2017See Sims, 306 Kan. at 622 ("Since Keel construed the statute regarding person/nonperson classifications that was in effect at the time Sims committed his aggravated battery offense, the 2016 statute is not being retroactively applied to him."); Collier, 306 Kan. at 525 ("Keel's rationale also makes it unnecessary to address Collier's argument that K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-6108[d] and [e] violate the Ex Post Facto Clause . . . ."); see generally State v. Barnes, 278 Kan. 121, 129 , 92 P.3d 578 (2004) ("The Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution forbids legislative enactments which i 2017See Sims, 306 Kan. at 622 ("Since Keel construed the statute regarding person/nonperson classifications that was in effect at the time Sims committed his aggravated battery offense, the 2016 statute is not being retroactively applied to him."); Collier, 306 Kan. at 525 ("Keel's rationale also makes it unnecessary to address Collier's argument that K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-6108[d] and [e] violate the Ex Post Facto Clause . . . ."); see generally State v. Barnes, 278 Kan. 121, 129 , 92 P.3d 578 (2004) ("The Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution forbids legislative enactments which i | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. Thompsonred1 sentence2016To be clear, this Petersen-Beard opinion does not change the result for the Ex Post Facto defendants, i.e., John Doe in Doe v. Thompson, 304 Kan. at 291; Joseph M. | 1 | 1 |
Byrnes v. Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervisiongreen2 sentences2011United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that changes to either parole or supervised release could violate ex post facto principles); In re Stanworth, 33 Cal. 3d 176, 188 , 187 Cal. Rptr. 783 , 654 P.2d 1311 (1982) (holding that a change in the standards used to determine the length of a parole term violated the ex post facto clause); Byrnes v. Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 134 Or. 2011App. 296, 300 , 894 P.2d 1252 (1995) (“Because parole is a component of a sentence, no law that increases the term of parole may be applied to a convicted person to the person’s detriment if the law was adopted after the date on which the person committed the underlying crime.”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Stuart Jeffrey Paskowgreen1 sentence2011United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that changes to either parole or supervised release could violate ex post facto principles); In re Stanworth, 33 Cal. 3d 176, 188 , 187 Cal. Rptr. 783 , 654 P.2d 1311 (1982) (holding that a change in the standards used to determine the length of a parole term violated the ex post facto clause); Byrnes v. Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 134 Or. | 1 | 1 |
| Kansas Wheat Growers Ass'n v. Windhorstgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Woodburygreen | 1 | 1 |
McLean v. Stategreen1 sentence2010For example, in McLean v. State, 854 So.2d 796, 802-03 (Fla.App.2003), the court, in rejecting the appellant's argument that a rule of evidence relaxing the manner in which evidence concerning prior child sexual abuse was admissible at trial for child sexual abuse charge constituted an ex post facto violation, stated: "In this case, [the appellant] can argue only that the law altered the rules of evidence in a manner that permitted a conviction with less or different testimony. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Armstronggreen2 sentences2010See State v. Armstrong, 238 Kan. 559, 566 , 712 P.2d 1258 (1986) (because ordinarily the criminal statute in effect at the time the criminal offense was committed is controlling, trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss prosecution for 1983 and 1984 indecent liberties with a child because of statutory changes effective later in 1984 which were to defendant’s advantage). 2010See State v. Armstrong, 238 Kan. 559, 566 , 712 P.2d 1258 (1986) (because ordinarily the criminal statute in effect at the time the criminal offense was committed is controlling, trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss prosecution for 1983 and 1984 indecent liberties with a child because of statutory changes effective later in 1984 which were to defendant’s advantage). | 1 | 1 |
| Taylor v. Rhode Islandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Roark v. Gravesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bankes v. Simmonsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| California Department of Corrections v. Moralesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bouie v. City of Columbiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Snyder v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Noblegreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Elrodgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Weaver v. Graham
green
2 sentences2016We have further stated: “Although we have sometimes described the requirement of alteration in definition or increase in punishment in shorthand as mere ‘ “disadvantage” ’ to a criminal defendant, see State v. Chamberlain, 280 Kan. 241, 247 , 120 P.3d 319 (2005) (quoting Stansbury v. Hannigan, 265 Kan. 404, 412 , 960 P.2d 227 , cert. denied 525 U.S. 1060 [1998]), we have emphasized drat the crucial ‘question in evaluating an ex post facto claim is whether the [new] law changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date.’ Prine, 297 Kan. at 470 (citing Weaver [v. Graham] 2016We have further stated: “Although we have sometimes described the requirement of alteration in definition or increase in punishment in shorthand as mere ‘ “disadvantage” ’ to a criminal defendant, see State v. Chamberlain, 280 Kan. 241, 247 , 120 P.3d 319 (2005) (quoting Stansbury v. Hannigan, 265 Kan. 404, 412 , 960 P.2d 227 , cert. denied 525 U.S. 1060 [1998]), we have emphasized drat the crucial ‘question in evaluating an ex post facto claim is whether the [new] law changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date.’ Prine, 297 Kan. at 470 (citing Weaver [v. Graham] | 10 | 1987–2016 |
State v. Todd
green
2 sentences2017But he acknowledges the Ex Post Facto Clause challenge was rejected in State v. Todd, 299 Kan. 263, 278-79 , 323 P.3d 829 (2014). 2017But he acknowledges the Ex Post Facto Clause challenge was rejected in State v. Todd, 299 Kan. 263, 278-79 , 323 P.3d 829 (2014). | 6 | 2016–2022 |
State v. Armbrust
green
2 sentences2017In State v. Armbrust, 274 Kan. 1089 , 59 P.3d 1000 (2002), three defendants raised an ex post facto challenge to KORA, alleging that the 1999 amendments to KORA altering the failure to timely verify their addresses from a misdemeanor to a felony violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. 2017In State v. Armbrust, 274 Kan. 1089 , 59 P.3d 1000 (2002), three defendants raised an ex post facto challenge to KORA, alleging that the 1999 amendments to KORA altering the failure to timely verify their addresses from a misdemeanor to a felony violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. | 5 | 2004–2017 |
Brown v. United States
green
2 sentences2016We have further stated: “Although we have sometimes described the requirement of alteration in definition or increase in punishment in shorthand as mere ‘ “disadvantage” ’ to a criminal defendant, see State v. Chamberlain, 280 Kan. 241, 247 , 120 P.3d 319 (2005) (quoting Stansbury v. Hannigan, 265 Kan. 404, 412 , 960 P.2d 227 , cert. denied 525 U.S. 1060 [1998]), we have emphasized drat the crucial ‘question in evaluating an ex post facto claim is whether the [new] law changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date.’ Prine, 297 Kan. at 470 (citing Weaver [v. Graham] 2016We have further stated: "Although we have sometimes described the requirement of alteration in definition or increase in punishment in shorthand as mere '"disadvantage'" to a criminal defendant, see State v. Chamberlain, 280 Kan. 241, 247 , 120 P.3d 319 (2005) (quoting Stansbury v. Hannigan, 265 Kan. 404, 412 , 960 P.2d 227 , cert. denied 525 U.S. 1060 [1998]), we have emphasized that the crucial 'question in evaluating an ex post facto claim is whether the [new] law changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date.' Prine, 297 Kan. at 470 (citing Weaver [v. Graham], | 4 | 2000–2016 |
Beazell v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2022Instead, to be unconstitutional under the Clause, the statute must disadvantage the defendant in one of the three ways recognized in Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70 , 46 S. Ct. 68 , 70 L. 2022Instead, to be unconstitutional under the Clause, the statute must disadvantage the defendant in one of the three ways recognized in Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70 , 46 S. Ct. 68 , 70 L. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Smith v. Doe
green
2 sentences2016If the legislature intended to punish, the ex post facto violation is established and no inquiry into the effects of the act is required. 538 U.S. at 92-93 . 2016If the legislature intended to punish, the ex post facto violation is established and no inquiry into the effects of the act is required. 538 U.S. at 92-93 . | 2 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Prine
green
2 sentences2016We have further stated: “Although we have sometimes described the requirement of alteration in definition or increase in punishment in shorthand as mere ‘ “disadvantage” ’ to a criminal defendant, see State v. Chamberlain, 280 Kan. 241, 247 , 120 P.3d 319 (2005) (quoting Stansbury v. Hannigan, 265 Kan. 404, 412 , 960 P.2d 227 , cert. denied 525 U.S. 1060 [1998]), we have emphasized drat the crucial ‘question in evaluating an ex post facto claim is whether the [new] law changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date.’ Prine, 297 Kan. at 470 (citing Weaver [v. Graham] 2016We have further stated: "Although we have sometimes described the requirement of alteration in definition or increase in punishment in shorthand as mere '"disadvantage'" to a criminal defendant, see State v. Chamberlain, 280 Kan. 241, 247 , 120 P.3d 319 (2005) (quoting Stansbury v. Hannigan, 265 Kan. 404, 412 , 960 P.2d 227 , cert. denied 525 U.S. 1060 [1998]), we have emphasized that the crucial 'question in evaluating an ex post facto claim is whether the [new] law changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date.' Prine, 297 Kan. at 470 (citing Weaver [v. Graham], | 2 | 2014–2016 |
State v. Chamberlain
green
2 sentences2016We have further stated: “Although we have sometimes described the requirement of alteration in definition or increase in punishment in shorthand as mere ‘ “disadvantage” ’ to a criminal defendant, see State v. Chamberlain, 280 Kan. 241, 247 , 120 P.3d 319 (2005) (quoting Stansbury v. Hannigan, 265 Kan. 404, 412 , 960 P.2d 227 , cert. denied 525 U.S. 1060 [1998]), we have emphasized drat the crucial ‘question in evaluating an ex post facto claim is whether the [new] law changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date.’ Prine, 297 Kan. at 470 (citing Weaver [v. Graham] 2016We have further stated: “Although we have sometimes described the requirement of alteration in definition or increase in punishment in shorthand as mere ‘ “disadvantage” ’ to a criminal defendant, see State v. Chamberlain, 280 Kan. 241, 247 , 120 P.3d 319 (2005) (quoting Stansbury v. Hannigan, 265 Kan. 404, 412 , 960 P.2d 227 , cert. denied 525 U.S. 1060 [1998]), we have emphasized drat the crucial ‘question in evaluating an ex post facto claim is whether the [new] law changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date.’ Prine, 297 Kan. at 470 (citing Weaver [v. Graham] | 2 | 2014–2016 |
Stogner v. California
green
2 sentences2007The Supreme Court “conclude[d] that a law enacted after expiration of a previously applicable limitations period violates the Ex Post Facto clause when it is applied to revive a previously time-barred prosecution.” 539 U.S. at 632-33 . 2004The Court found that this legislation as applied to Stogner constituted an ex post facto violation and stated: “We conclude that a law enacted after expiration of a previously applicable limitations period violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when it is applied to revive a previously time-barred prosecution.” 539 U.S. at 632-33 . | 2 | 2004–2007 |
State v. Davidson
green
1 sentence2026State v. Davidson, 314 Kan. 88 , 93-94, 495 P.3d 9 (2021). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Soto
green
2 sentences2017We paraphrase his complaints as follows: (1) Pursuant to Alleyne and State v. Soto, 299 Kan. 102, 124 , 322 P.3d 334 (2014), his hard 50 life sentence was the product of unconstitutional judicial fact-finding; (2) his collateral attack on his sentence should be considered as his third motion under K.S.A. 60-1507, which should be allowed under the exceptional circumstances and manifest injustice exceptions for successive and untimely motions; (3) the ex post facto clause would preclude a hard 50 resentencing; and (4) the finding of aggravating factors should not be reviewed for harmless error. 2017We paraphrase his complaints as follows: (1) Pursuant to Alleyne and State v. Soto, 299 Kan. 102, 124 , 322 P.3d 334 (2014), his hard 50 life sentence was the product of unconstitutional judicial fact-finding; (2) his collateral attack on his sentence should be considered as his third motion under K.S.A. 60-1507, which should be allowed under the exceptional circumstances and manifest injustice exceptions for successive and untimely motions; (3) the ex post facto clause would preclude a hard 50 resentencing; and (4) the finding of aggravating factors should not be reviewed for harmless error. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Hudson v. United States
green
2 sentences2016The first inquiry under intent is whether “ ‘the legislature, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other.’ ” Smith, 538 U.S. at 93 (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 , 118 S. Ct. 488 , 139 L. 2016The first inquiry under intent is whether “ ‘the legislature, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other.’ ” Smith, 538 U.S. at 93 (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 , 118 S. Ct. 488 , 139 L. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Kansas v. Hendricks
green
2 sentences2016Although it was the first time the high court had considered the precise issue, the Supreme Court applied its well-established framework of (1) determining whether the legislature’s intention was to enact a “a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive” and, if so, (2) “examining] whether the statutory scheme is “ ‘so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the States] intention” to deem it “civil.”’” 538 U.S. at 92 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 , 117 S. Ct. 2072 , 138 L. 2016Although it was the first time the high court had considered the precise issue, the Supreme Court applied its well-established framework of (1) determining whether the legislature’s intention was to enact a “a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive” and, if so, (2) “examining] whether the statutory scheme is “ ‘so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the States] intention” to deem it “civil.”’” 538 U.S. at 92 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 , 117 S. Ct. 2072 , 138 L. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Buser
green
1 sentence2016Buser in State v. Buser, 304 Kan. 181 ; and Promise Delon Redmond in State v. Redmond, 304 Kan at 283. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
In Re Stanworth
green
2 sentences2011United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that changes to either parole or supervised release could violate ex post facto principles); In re Stanworth, 33 Cal. 3d 176, 188 , 187 Cal. Rptr. 783 , 654 P.2d 1311 (1982) (holding that a change in the standards used to determine the length of a parole term violated the ex post facto clause); Byrnes v. Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 134 Or. 2011United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that changes to either parole or supervised release could violate ex post facto principles); In re Stanworth, 33 Cal. 3d 176, 188 , 187 Cal. Rptr. 783 , 654 P.2d 1311 (1982) (holding that a change in the standards used to determine the length of a parole term violated the ex post facto clause); Byrnes v. Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 134 Or. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Tyree
neutral
2 sentences2010We have long recognized that it is a “fundamental rule for sentencing . . . that the person convicted of a crime is sentenced in accordance with the sentencing provisions in effect at the time the crime was committed.” State v. Overton, 279 Kan. 547, 561 , 112 P.3d 244 (2005); State v. Woodbury, 132 Kan. 22, 35 , 294 P. 928 (1931) (“It has long been settled that the penalty imposed must be under the law as it stood when the offense was committed.”); State v. Tyree, 70 Kan. 203, 207 , 78 P. 525 (1904) *560 (holding that sentencing the defendant to a later sentencing scheme enacted after he comm 2010We have long recognized that it is a “fundamental rule for sentencing . . . that the person convicted of a crime is sentenced in accordance with the sentencing provisions in effect at the time the crime was committed.” State v. Overton, 279 Kan. 547, 561 , 112 P.3d 244 (2005); State v. Woodbury, 132 Kan. 22, 35 , 294 P. 928 (1931) (“It has long been settled that the penalty imposed must be under the law as it stood when the offense was committed.”); State v. Tyree, 70 Kan. 203, 207 , 78 P. 525 (1904) *560 (holding that sentencing the defendant to a later sentencing scheme enacted after he comm | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| James v. State green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Overton green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Kesterson v. State neutral | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Anderson v. Bruce green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| New York v. Yonkers Board of Education green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| United States v. Richard Alan Brady, Frank Pontillo, Also Known as Franky Steel, Robert Montano, Michael Dematteo and John Pate green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Wishteyah v. Kansas Parole Board neutral | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| People v. Logan green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| State v. Lueker green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Florida, Department of HRS Ex Rel. Petit v. Breeden green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| James Dominique v. William Weld green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Payne v. Kansas Parole Board green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. Ward green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Rowe v. Burton green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. Campbell green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. Fierro green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Doe v. Poritz green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| United States v. James Harold Underwood green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| United States v. Anthony Mondaine green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Calder v. Bull green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Gilmore v. Kansas Parole Board green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Dobbert v. Florida green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| State v. Hodgson green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| State v. Hodgson green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.