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23 Delaware opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2023 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Delaware courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Helman v. Stategreen2 sentences2022Feb. 8, 2011) (concluding that retroactive application of a Section 4121 provision requiring Tier III sex offenders to wear GPS monitoring bracelets while on probation did not violate the ex post facto clause); Smith v. State, 919 A.2d 539, 541 (Del. 2006) (holding that retroactive application of Tier III assignment did not violate the ex post facto clause); Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058, 1075-78 (Del. 2001) (ruling that the notification provisions of Section 4121 were not punitive and did not violate the ex post facto clause). 8 Sanders, 1995 WL 264532 , at *1 (describing how Sanders grabbed 2022C. §§ 4120 and 4121 are not punitive in nature and, thus, the retroactive application of those requirements does not implicate the ex post facto clause.”7 This Court recently applied that holding in Getz v. State.8 In Getz, as here, the appellant was convicted of first-degree rape before the enactment of the sex- offender-registration laws; the Court rejected Getz’s argument that requiring him to register as a Tier III sex offender while on parole violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.9 (6) Crump attempts to avoid these precedents by arguing that the sex- offender | 2 | 4 |
Weaver v. Grahamgreen2 sentences2022See also Smith v. State, 919 A.2d 539, 541 (Del. 2006) (holding that retroactive application of Tier III assignment did not violate the ex post facto clause); Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058, 1075-78 (Del. 2001) (ruling that the notification provisions of Section 4121 were not punitive and did not violate the ex post facto clause). 3 450 U.S. 24 (1981). 3 disadvantage the offender affected by it.”4 Getz misreads this language to mean there is an ex post facto violation when a non-punitive law disadvantages an affected offender. 2022See also Smith v. State, 919 A.2d 539, 541 (Del. 2006) (holding that retroactive application of Tier III assignment did not violate the ex post facto clause); Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058, 1075-78 (Del. 2001) (ruling that the notification provisions of Section 4121 were not punitive and did not violate the ex post facto clause). 3 450 U.S. 24 (1981). 3 disadvantage the offender affected by it.”4 Getz misreads this language to mean there is an ex post facto violation when a non-punitive law disadvantages an affected offender. | 2 | 3 |
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences2022See also Smith v. State, 919 A.2d 539, 541 (Del. 2006) (holding that retroactive application of Tier III assignment did not violate the ex post facto clause); Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058, 1075-78 (Del. 2001) (ruling that the notification provisions of Section 4121 were not punitive and did not violate the ex post facto clause). 3 450 U.S. 24 (1981). 3 disadvantage the offender affected by it.”4 Getz misreads this language to mean there is an ex post facto violation when a non-punitive law disadvantages an affected offender. 2022Feb. 8, 2011) (concluding that retroactive application of a Section 4121 provision requiring Tier III sex offenders to wear GPS monitoring bracelets while on probation did not violate the ex post facto clause); Smith v. State, 919 A.2d 539, 541 (Del. 2006) (holding that retroactive application of Tier III assignment did not violate the ex post facto clause); Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058, 1075-78 (Del. 2001) (ruling that the notification provisions of Section 4121 were not punitive and did not violate the ex post facto clause). 8 Sanders, 1995 WL 264532 , at *1 (describing how Sanders grabbed | 2 | 3 |
Collins v. Youngbloodgreen2 sentences2021Oct. 17, 2017) (“The State concedes it was an ex post facto violation to apply the 2016 sentencing amendment to a 2015 offense . . . and that the law in effect at the time of the crime controls the sentence . . . .” (first omission in original) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 27 Collins, 497 U.S. at 50 (internal quotation marks omitted). 10 “reasonable” belief amendment of the justification defense violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution.28 To the extent a justification defense is fairly raised by the evidence, the jury in the Defendant’s trial will be c 2017The trial judge relied on two prior violent felonies_aggravated menacing and second degree robbery_in making the habitual-offender determination 2 Under the prohibition against ex post facto laws in Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution, “[l]egislatures may not retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.” Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 (1990). 3 Appellee ’s Ans. | 2 | 3 |
Butcher v. Stategreen2 sentences2022The Court has explained the controlling analysis and principles thusly: The ex post facto clause prohibits the retroactive application of a law that “changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.” An ex post facto application of a law is one that “imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed.” The critical question in evaluating an ex post facto claim “is whether the law changes the legal consequences of acts committed before its eff 2022C. § 1448(e)(1)c. 9 Butcher v. State, 171 A.3d 537, 543 (Del. 2017). 3 enhanced sentence imposed on a persistent offender is not to be viewed as an additional penalty for the earlier crimes but as a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because it is a repetitive one.”10 Thus, this Court has held, “statutes enhancing penalties for later offenses do not violate the ex post facto clause, even where, as here, the predicate offenses occurred before the enactment of the statute.”11 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Affirm is GRANTED a | 2 | 2 |
Hassett v. Stategreen2 sentences2022C. §§ 4120 and 4121 are not punitive in nature and, thus, the retroactive application of those requirements does not implicate the ex post facto clause.”2 Getz argues that Hassett was wrongly decided because the Court only considered whether the sex offender requirements were punitive, not whether those requirements were disadvantageous to the affected offender as required by the United States Supreme Court in Weaver v. Graham.3 In Weaver, the Supreme Court stated that “two critical elements must be present for a criminal or penal law to be ex post facto: it must be retrospective, that is, it 2022C. §§ 4120 and 4121 are not punitive in nature and, thus, the retroactive application of those requirements does not implicate the ex post facto clause.”7 This Court recently applied that holding in Getz v. State.8 In Getz, as here, the appellant was convicted of first-degree rape before the enactment of the sex- offender-registration laws; the Court rejected Getz’s argument that requiring him to register as a Tier III sex offender while on parole violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.9 (6) Crump attempts to avoid these precedents by arguing that the sex- offender | 2 | 2 |
State v. Cohengreen2 sentences2003Cf. State v. Cohen, 604 A.2d 846 (Del.1992). 2. 1996As he concedes, this claim was previously adjudicated, and resolved against him, in State v. Cohen, Del.Supr., 604 A2d 846, 862-855 (1992). | 1 | 5 |
Sammons v. Stategreen2 sentences2023Sammons v. State, 68 A.3d 192, 195-96 (Del. 2013) (the Court can rely on and otherwise facially valid prior felony conviction “without regard to the details of the specific conduct that resulted in [the prior] conviction”); Hall v. State, 2010 WL 4156348 , at *1 (Del. 2023Sammons v. State, 68 A.3d 192, 195-96 (Del. 2013) (the Court can rely on and otherwise facially valid prior felony conviction “without regard to the details of the specific conduct that resulted in [the prior] conviction”); Hall v. State, 2010 WL 4156348 , at *1 (Del. | 1 | 1 |
Cummings v. Missourigreen1 sentence2022A sex offender’s knowing or reckless violation of Section 4120 or 4121 is a new crime subject to punishment, not additional punishment for a previous crime. 4 Id. at 29 (citations omitted). 5 Id. at 28 (quoting Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 325-26 (1866) (emphasis added)). | 1 | 1 |
Chambers v. Stategreen2 sentences2022CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4201(c) (2016) (listing Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance and Trafficking in Cocaine as violent felonies). -6- The United States Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of recidivist statutes, explaining that “[a]n enhanced sentence imposed on a persistent offender . . . ‘is not to be viewed as [an] additional penalty for the earlier crimes’ but as a ‘stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because [it is] a repetitive one.’” Thus, statutes enhancing penalties for later offenses do not violate th 2022CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4201(c) (2016) (listing Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance and Trafficking in Cocaine as violent felonies). -6- The United States Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of recidivist statutes, explaining that “[a]n enhanced sentence imposed on a persistent offender . . . ‘is not to be viewed as [an] additional penalty for the earlier crimes’ but as a ‘stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because [it is] a repetitive one.’” Thus, statutes enhancing penalties for later offenses do not violate th | 1 | 1 |
DiStefano v. Watsongreen2 sentences2021Aug. 13, 1987)). 31 Id. 32 Distefano, 566 A.2d at 5 (internal citations omitted). 33 Fatir unsuccessfully brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court of Delaware for alleged ex post facto clause violations as to the denial of furloughs to class A felons.33 There, the Court found the claim failed because it “do[es] not fall under the provisions of the ex post facto…clause.” 8 14. 2021Aug. 13, 1987)). 31 Id. 32 Distefano, 566 A.2d at 5 (internal citations omitted). 33 Fatir unsuccessfully brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court of Delaware for alleged ex post facto clause violations as to the denial of furloughs to class A felons.33 There, the Court found the claim failed because it “do[es] not fall under the provisions of the ex post facto…clause.” 8 14. | 1 | 1 |
Mayes v. Stategreen1 sentence2019Jan. 22, 2008) (concluding that the trial court’s reconfiguration of a suspended sentence to provide for drug treatment instead of home confinement was not tantamount to an increase in sentence and thus was not illegal). 7 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 845 (Del. 1992). 8 Weber v. State, 655 A.2d 1219, 1221 (Del. 1995). 4 | 1 | 1 |
Weber v. Stategreen1 sentence2019Jan. 22, 2008) (concluding that the trial court’s reconfiguration of a suspended sentence to provide for drug treatment instead of home confinement was not tantamount to an increase in sentence and thus was not illegal). 7 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 845 (Del. 1992). 8 Weber v. State, 655 A.2d 1219, 1221 (Del. 1995). 4 | 1 | 1 |
Dawson v. Stategreen2 sentences1994Accord Dawson v. State, Del.Supr., 637 A.2d 57, 66 (1994). 10 Ferguson has failed to demonstrate plain error. 11 Ex Post Facto and Due Process Death Penalty Statute Amendments Ferguson’s next argument on appeal is that the Superior Court violated both the ex post facto clause of the federal Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when the amended Delaware death penalty statute was applied to Ferguson’s pre-enactment offenses. 1994Accord Dawson v. State, Del.Supr., 637 A.2d 57, 66 (1994). [10] Ferguson has failed to demonstrate plain error. [11] Ex Post Facto and Due Process Death Penalty Statute Amendments Ferguson's next argument on appeal is that the Superior Court violated both the ex post facto clause of the federal Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when the amended Delaware death penalty statute was applied to Ferguson's pre-enactment offenses. | 1 | 1 |
Dobbert v. Floridagreen2 sentences1991See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 , 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344 , reh’g denied, 434 U.S. 882 , 98 S.Ct. 246 , 54 L.Ed.2d 166 (1977); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171 , 46 S.Ct. 68, 69 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925). 1991See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 , 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344 , reh’g denied, 434 U.S. 882 , 98 S.Ct. 246 , 54 L.Ed.2d 166 (1977); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171 , 46 S.Ct. 68, 69 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925). | 1 | 1 |
Dawkins v. Nabisco, Inc.green1 sentence1991See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 , 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344 , reh’g denied, 434 U.S. 882 , 98 S.Ct. 246 , 54 L.Ed.2d 166 (1977); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171 , 46 S.Ct. 68, 69 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925). | 1 | 1 |
WINSETT v. McGINNESgreen2 sentences1989See Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F.2d 996 (3rd Cir.1980). 1989See Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F.2d 996 (3rd Cir.1980). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Delaware. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Walsh v. State
green
2 sentences2016But he does argue that his burglary in the second degree conviction did not constitute a “violent felony.” (9) As our supreme court noted on direct appeal, Walsh’s attorney agreed that his New York burglary conviction constituted a violent felony. ‘6 Walsh v. Smre, 2016 WL 3751911, at *3 . 17 See id. (holding that Walsh’s “sentences do not violate the Ex Post Facto clause.”). _5_ Counsel agreed for good reason. 2016But he does argue that his burglary in the second degree conviction did not constitute a “violent felony.” (9) As our supreme court noted on direct appeal, Walsh’s attorney agreed that his New York burglary conviction constituted a violent felony. ‘6 Walsh v. Smre, 2016 WL 3751911, at *3 . 17 See id. (holding that Walsh’s “sentences do not violate the Ex Post Facto clause.”). _5_ Counsel agreed for good reason. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Hoennicke v. State
green
1 sentence2015C. § 205(e) (2003). 11 Id. 12 13 A.3d 744 (Del. 2010). 13 Id. at 745. 7 July 15, 1992 to permit “prosecution of delineated sexual offenses after the expiration of the five year general limitation period if the prosecution commenced within 2 years of the initial disclosure of misconduct to an appropriate law enforcement agency.”14 Based upon this 1992 amendment, prosecution of the appellant was not time-barred at the time of the 2003 amendment because the victim had not yet reported the crime to any law enforcement agency. 15 We concluded that the unlimited statute of limitations period as appl | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Hudson v. United States
green
2 sentences2001The case of Hudson v. U.S., 522 U.S. 93 , 118 S.Ct. 488 , 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997), appears to supply an instructive Ex Post Facto analysis. 18 The Hudson case *1077 post-dates E.B. v. Verniero and several other of the cases discussed by the parties. 2001The case of Hudson v. U.S., 522 U.S. 93 , 118 S.Ct. 488 , 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997), appears to supply an instructive Ex Post Facto analysis. 18 The Hudson case *1077 post-dates E.B. v. Verniero and several other of the cases discussed by the parties. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Kring v. Missouri
red
2 sentences1992There, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected an ex post facto claim and overruled the longstanding cases of Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 , 2 S.Ct. 443 , 27 L.Ed. 506 (1883), and Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 , 18 S.Ct. 620 , 42 L.Ed. 1061 (1898). 1992There, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected an ex post facto claim and overruled the longstanding cases of Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 , 2 S.Ct. 443 , 27 L.Ed. 506 (1883), and Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 , 18 S.Ct. 620 , 42 L.Ed. 1061 (1898). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Thompson v. Utah
red
2 sentences1992There, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected an ex post facto claim and overruled the longstanding cases of Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 , 2 S.Ct. 443 , 27 L.Ed. 506 (1883), and Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 , 18 S.Ct. 620 , 42 L.Ed. 1061 (1898). 1992There, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected an ex post facto claim and overruled the longstanding cases of Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 , 2 S.Ct. 443 , 27 L.Ed. 506 (1883), and Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 , 18 S.Ct. 620 , 42 L.Ed. 1061 (1898). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Beazell v. Ohio
green
2 sentences1991See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 , 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344 , reh’g denied, 434 U.S. 882 , 98 S.Ct. 246 , 54 L.Ed.2d 166 (1977); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171 , 46 S.Ct. 68, 69 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925). 1991See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 , 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344 , reh’g denied, 434 U.S. 882 , 98 S.Ct. 246 , 54 L.Ed.2d 166 (1977); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171 , 46 S.Ct. 68, 69 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
De Veau v. Braisted
green
2 sentences1989We find that the proper ex post facto analysis, in a case raising the distinction between a punitive provision and a regulatory one, is not whether the enactment is a statute as opposed to a regulation, but rather "whether the legislative aim was to punish [the offender] for past activity, or whether the restriction ... comes about as a relevant incident to the regulation of a present situation.” DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 , 80 S.Ct. 1146, 1155 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960). .Stewart and DiStefano have abandoned their procedural due process argument. 1989We find that the proper ex post facto analysis, in a case raising the distinction between a punitive provision and a regulatory one, is not whether the enactment is a statute as opposed to a regulation, but rather "whether the legislative aim was to punish [the offender] for past activity, or whether the restriction ... comes about as a relevant incident to the regulation of a present situation.” DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 , 80 S.Ct. 1146, 1155 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960). .Stewart and DiStefano have abandoned their procedural due process argument. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Richard Dyke v. Larry R. Meachum
green
2 sentences1989Dyke v. Meachum, 785 F.2d 267 (10th Cir.1986). 1989Dyke v. Meachum, 785 F.2d 267 (10th Cir.1986). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Gryger v. Burke
green
2 sentences1985Gryger v. Burke 334 U.S. 728 , 68 S.Ct. 1256 , 92 L.Ed. 1683 (1948). 4 Defendant suggests that he might not have elected first-offender status following his initial charge, if he had then known that a second offense would result in incarceration. 1985Gryger v. Burke 334 U.S. 728 , 68 S.Ct. 1256 , 92 L.Ed. 1683 (1948). 4 Defendant suggests that he might not have elected first-offender status following his initial charge, if he had then known that a second offense would result in incarceration. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.