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46 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2023 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jernigan v. Stategreen2 sentences2022See Risher, 393 S.C. at 204, 712 S.E.2d at 431 ("A decision of the ALC should be upheld . . . if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record."); Sanders, 379 S.C. at 417 , 665 S.E.2d at 234 (defining "substantial evidence" as "evidence from which reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion" as the ALC); Jernigan v. State, 340 S.C. 256, 261 , 531 S.E.2d 507, 509 (2000) ("An ex post facto violation occurs when a change in the law retroactively . . . increases the punishment for a crime."); Cooper, 377 S.C. at 501 , 661 S.E.2d at 112-13 (holding the parole board's consideration of 2022See Risher, 393 S.C. at 204, 712 S.E.2d at 431 ("A decision of the ALC should be upheld . . . if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record."); Sanders, 379 S.C. at 417 , 665 S.E.2d at 234 (defining "substantial evidence" as "evidence from which reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion" as the ALC); Jernigan v. State, 340 S.C. 256, 261 , 531 S.E.2d 507, 509 (2000) ("An ex post facto violation occurs when a change in the law retroactively . . . increases the punishment for a crime."); Cooper, 377 S.C. at 501 , 661 S.E.2d at 112-13 (holding the parole board's consideration of | 9 | 12 |
Al-Shabazz v. Stategreen2 sentences2008See Elmore v. State, 305 S.C. 456 , 409 S.E.2d 397 (1991) (stating the law existing at the time of the offense, not at the time of sentencing, determines whether an ex post facto violation has occurred), overruled on other grounds by Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354 , 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). 2008See Elmore v. State, 305 S.C. 456 , 409 S.E.2d 397 (1991) (stating the law existing at the time of the offense, not at the time of sentencing, determines whether an ex post facto violation has occurred), overruled on other grounds by Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354 , 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). | 4 | 5 |
State v. Huiettgreen2 sentences2010Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 , 3 Dall. 386 , 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798). “[I]n order for the ex post facto clause to be applicable, the statute or the provision in question must be criminal or penal in purpose and nature.” Huiett , 302 S.C. at *619 172, 394 S.E.2d at 487 . 2009A change in the law does not run afoul of the ex post facto clause if it only affects a mode of procedure and does not alter “substantial personal rights.” Huiett, 302 S.C. at 171 , 394 S.E.2d at 487 (quoting Miller, 482 U.S. at 430 , 107 S.Ct. 2446 ). | 3 | 6 |
Barton v. South Carolina Department of Probation Parole & Pardon Servicesgreen2 sentences2023Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 404 S.C. 395, 419 , 745 S.E.2d 110, 123 (2013) (reviewing a parole denial for an alleged ex post facto violation); see generally Furtick v. S.C. 2023Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 404 S.C. 395, 419 , 745 S.E.2d 110, 123 (2013) (reviewing a parole denial for an alleged ex post facto violation); see generally Furtick v. S.C. | 3 | 4 |
Elmore v. Stategreen2 sentences2008See Elmore v. State, 305 S.C. 456 , 409 S.E.2d 397 (1991) (stating the law existing at the time of the offense, not at the time of sentencing, determines whether an ex post facto violation has occurred), overruled on other grounds by Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354 , 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). 2008See Elmore v. State, 305 S.C. 456 , 409 S.E.2d 397 (1991) (stating the law existing at the time of the offense, not at the time of sentencing, determines whether an ex post facto violation has occurred), overruled on other grounds by Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354 , 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). | 3 | 4 |
Sanders v. S.C. Department of Correctionsgreen2 sentences2022See Risher, 393 S.C. at 204, 712 S.E.2d at 431 ("A decision of the ALC should be upheld . . . if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record."); Sanders, 379 S.C. at 417 , 665 S.E.2d at 234 (defining "substantial evidence" as "evidence from which reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion" as the ALC); Jernigan v. State, 340 S.C. 256, 261 , 531 S.E.2d 507, 509 (2000) ("An ex post facto violation occurs when a change in the law retroactively . . . increases the punishment for a crime."); Cooper, 377 S.C. at 501 , 661 S.E.2d at 112-13 (holding the parole board's consideration of 2022See Risher, 393 S.C. at 204, 712 S.E.2d at 431 ("A decision of the ALC should be upheld . . . if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record."); Sanders, 379 S.C. at 417 , 665 S.E.2d at 234 (defining "substantial evidence" as "evidence from which reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion" as the ALC); Jernigan v. State, 340 S.C. 256, 261 , 531 S.E.2d 507, 509 (2000) ("An ex post facto violation occurs when a change in the law retroactively . . . increases the punishment for a crime."); Cooper, 377 S.C. at 501 , 661 S.E.2d at 112-13 (holding the parole board's consideration of | 3 | 3 |
Furtick v. South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole & Pardon Servicesgreen2 sentences2023Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 352 S.C. 594, 598 , 576 S.E.2d 146, 149 (2003) (reviewing an appeal from the Board's decision finding Furtick ineligible for parole because an inmate has a liberty interest in gaining access to the Board and a permanent denial of eligibility implicates a liberty interest requiring due process); Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354 , 376–77, 527 S.E.2d 742, 754 (2000) (finding the ALC has the authority to review non-collateral and administrative agency decisions); cf. Allen v. S.C. 2023Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 352 S.C. 594, 598 , 576 S.E.2d 146, 149 (2003) (reviewing an appeal from the Board's decision finding Furtick ineligible for parole because an inmate has a liberty interest in gaining access to the Board and a permanent denial of eligibility implicates a liberty interest requiring due process); Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354 , 376–77, 527 S.E.2d 742, 754 (2000) (finding the ALC has the authority to review non-collateral and administrative agency decisions); cf. Allen v. S.C. | 2 | 2 |
Cooper v. South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole & Pardon Servicesgreen2 sentences2022See Risher, 393 S.C. at 204, 712 S.E.2d at 431 ("A decision of the ALC should be upheld . . . if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record."); Sanders, 379 S.C. at 417 , 665 S.E.2d at 234 (defining "substantial evidence" as "evidence from which reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion" as the ALC); Jernigan v. State, 340 S.C. 256, 261 , 531 S.E.2d 507, 509 (2000) ("An ex post facto violation occurs when a change in the law retroactively . . . increases the punishment for a crime."); Cooper, 377 S.C. at 501 , 661 S.E.2d at 112-13 (holding the parole board's consideration of 2022See Risher, 393 S.C. at 204, 712 S.E.2d at 431 ("A decision of the ALC should be upheld . . . if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record."); Sanders, 379 S.C. at 417 , 665 S.E.2d at 234 (defining "substantial evidence" as "evidence from which reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion" as the ALC); Jernigan v. State, 340 S.C. 256, 261 , 531 S.E.2d 507, 509 (2000) ("An ex post facto violation occurs when a change in the law retroactively . . . increases the punishment for a crime."); Cooper, 377 S.C. at 501 , 661 S.E.2d at 112-13 (holding the parole board's consideration of | 2 | 2 |
Phillips v. Stategreen2 sentences2013We reject her additional claims pursuant to Rule 220, SCACR, and the following authorities: Connecticut v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (rejecting sex offender’s due process argument requesting a hearing on his current level of dangerousness, and stating those "who assert a right to a hearing under the Due Process Clause must show that the facts they seek to establish in the hearing are relevant to the statutory scheme”); Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge where sex offender registration and monitoring requirements are civil in nature); Phillips v. State, 331 S 2013We reject her additional claims pursuant to Rule 220, SCACR, and the following authorities: Connecticut v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (rejecting sex offender’s due process argument requesting a hearing on his current level of dangerousness, and stating those "who assert a right to a hearing under the Due Process Clause must show that the facts they seek to establish in the hearing are relevant to the statutory scheme”); Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge where sex offender registration and monitoring requirements are civil in nature); Phillips v. State, 331 S | 2 | 2 |
Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc.green2 sentences2009No. 15 at 39, 43) (holding the savings clause accompanying the enacting legislation did not preclude application of section 17-23-175 to cases tried after the date of its enactment because section 17-23-175 did not repeal or amend any existing law); Id. at 45 (finding the application of section 17-23-175 does not constitute an ex post facto violation because the statute deals with evidentiary matters, which are not penal in nature); Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc. , 335 S.C. 598, 613 , 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (providing an appellate court need not address additional issues if 2009No. 15 at 39, 43) (holding the savings clause accompanying the enacting legislation did not preclude application of section 17-23-175 to cases tried after the date of its enactment because section 17-23-175 did not repeal or amend any existing law); Id. at 45 (finding the application of section 17-23-175 does not constitute an ex post facto violation because the statute deals with evidentiary matters, which are not penal in nature); Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc. , 335 S.C. 598, 613 , 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (providing an appellate court need not address additional issues if | 2 | 2 |
White v. Butlergreen2 sentences2010See Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380 , 18 S.Ct. 922 , 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (holding a law admitting previously inadmissible handwriting samples did not violate ex post facto clause); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 , 4 S.Ct. 202 , 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (holding admission of convicted felon’s testimony, which was inadmissible at the time the crime was committed, did not violate ex post facto clause). 2009See Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 386-87 , 18 S.Ct. 922 , 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (finding application of law admitting previously inadmissible handwriting samples did not violate ex post facto clause); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 589 , 4 S.Ct. 202 , 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (holding admission of convicted felon’s testimony, inadmissible at the time homicide was committed, did not violate ex post facto clause). | 2 | 2 |
Thompson v. Missourigreen2 sentences2010See Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380 , 18 S.Ct. 922 , 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (holding a law admitting previously inadmissible handwriting samples did not violate ex post facto clause); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 , 4 S.Ct. 202 , 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (holding admission of convicted felon’s testimony, which was inadmissible at the time the crime was committed, did not violate ex post facto clause). 2010See Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380 , 18 S.Ct. 922 , 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (holding a law admitting previously inadmissible handwriting samples did not violate ex post facto clause); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 , 4 S.Ct. 202 , 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (holding admission of convicted felon’s testimony, which was inadmissible at the time the crime was committed, did not violate ex post facto clause). | 2 | 2 |
Miller v. Floridagreen2 sentences2009The purpose of an ex post facto clause is to prevent lawmakers from passing “arbitrary or vindictive legislation.” Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 429 , 107 S.Ct. 2446 , 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987) (citations omitted). 2009The purpose of an ex post facto clause is to prevent lawmakers from passing “arbitrary or vindictive legislation.” Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 429 , 107 S.Ct. 2446 , 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987) (citations omitted). | 1 | 6 |
California Department of Corrections v. Moralesgreen2 sentences2017Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 385 S.C. 476, 479 , 685 S.E.2d 175, 177 (2009) (stating if the parole board "clearly states in its order denying parole that it considered the factors outlined in section 24-21-640 [of the South Carolina Code] and the fifteen factors published in [its parole form] . . . the decision will constitute a routine denial of parole and the ALC will have limited authority to review the decision to determine whether the Board followed proper procedure"); Jernigan v. State, 340 S.C. 256, 261 , 531 S.E.2d 507, 509 (2000) ("An ex post facto violation occurs when a c 2017Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 385 S.C. 476, 479 , 685 S.E.2d 175, 177 (2009) (stating if the parole board "clearly states in its order denying parole that it considered the factors outlined in section 24-21-640 [of the South Carolina Code] and the fifteen factors published in [its parole form] . . . the decision will constitute a routine denial of parole and the ALC will have limited authority to review the decision to determine whether the Board followed proper procedure"); Jernigan v. State, 340 S.C. 256, 261 , 531 S.E.2d 507, 509 (2000) ("An ex post facto violation occurs when a c | 1 | 3 |
State v. Wallsgreen2 sentences2017We stated, “For the ex post facto clause to be applicable, the statute or the provision in question must be criminal or penal in purpose and nature.” 348 S.C. at 30 , 558 S.E.2d at 526 . 2017We stated, “For the ex post facto clause to be applicable, the statute or the provision in question must be criminal or penal in purpose and nature.” 348 S.C. at 30 , 558 S.E.2d at 526 . | 1 | 3 |
State v. STAHLNECKERgreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 413 S.C. 212 , 776 S.E.2d 76 (2015) (holding section 17-23-175 did not violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment); State v. Whitner, 399 S.C. 547 , 732 S.E.2d 861 (2012) (holding section 17-23-175 “is a valid legislative enactment,” and does not permit improper bolstering); State v. Stahlnecker, 386 S.C. 609 , 690 S.E.2d 565 (2010) (holding section 17-23-175 merely authorizes the introduction of new evidence and "does not alter substantial personal rights”; therefore, it does not violate ex post facto laws); State v. Bryant, 382 S.C. 505 , 675 S.E.2d 2016See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 413 S.C. 212 , 776 S.E.2d 76 (2015) (holding section 17-23-175 did not violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment); State v. Whitner, 399 S.C. 547 , 732 S.E.2d 861 (2012) (holding section 17-23-175 “is a valid legislative enactment,” and does not permit improper bolstering); State v. Stahlnecker, 386 S.C. 609 , 690 S.E.2d 565 (2010) (holding section 17-23-175 merely authorizes the introduction of new evidence and "does not alter substantial personal rights”; therefore, it does not violate ex post facto laws); State v. Bryant, 382 S.C. 505 , 675 S.E.2d | 1 | 2 |
Kansas v. Hendricksgreen2 sentences2002Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 , 117 S.Ct. 2072 , 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997). 2002Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 , 117 S.Ct. 2072 , 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997). | 1 | 2 |
James v. South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole & Pardon Servicesgreen2 sentences2022Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 376 S.C. 392, 398 , 656 S.E.2d 399, 403 (Ct. App. 2008) ("[B]ecause [the parole applicant] remains subject to biannual parole reviews, as was the law in 1978, there is no ex post facto violation in this case. 2022Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 376 S.C. 392, 398 , 656 S.E.2d 399, 403 (Ct. App. 2008) ("[B]ecause [the parole applicant] remains subject to biannual parole reviews, as was the law in 1978, there is no ex post facto violation in this case. | 1 | 1 |
Risher v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPT. OF HEALTHgreen2 sentences2022See Risher, 393 S.C. at 204, 712 S.E.2d at 431 ("A decision of the ALC should be upheld . . . if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record."); Sanders, 379 S.C. at 417 , 665 S.E.2d at 234 (defining "substantial evidence" as "evidence from which reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion" as the ALC); Jernigan v. State, 340 S.C. 256, 261 , 531 S.E.2d 507, 509 (2000) ("An ex post facto violation occurs when a change in the law retroactively . . . increases the punishment for a crime."); Cooper, 377 S.C. at 501 , 661 S.E.2d at 112-13 (holding the parole board's consideration of 2022See Risher, 393 S.C. at 204, 712 S.E.2d at 431 ("A decision of the ALC should be upheld . . . if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record."); Sanders, 379 S.C. at 417 , 665 S.E.2d at 234 (defining "substantial evidence" as "evidence from which reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion" as the ALC); Jernigan v. State, 340 S.C. 256, 261 , 531 S.E.2d 507, 509 (2000) ("An ex post facto violation occurs when a change in the law retroactively . . . increases the punishment for a crime."); Cooper, 377 S.C. at 501 , 661 S.E.2d at 112-13 (holding the parole board's consideration of | 1 | 1 |
Compton v. South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole & Pardon Servicesgreen2 sentences2017Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 385 S.C. 476, 479 , 685 S.E.2d 175, 177 (2009) (stating if the parole board "clearly states in its order denying parole that it considered the factors outlined in section 24-21-640 [of the South Carolina Code] and the fifteen factors published in [its parole form] . . . the decision will constitute a routine denial of parole and the ALC will have limited authority to review the decision to determine whether the Board followed proper procedure"); Jernigan v. State, 340 S.C. 256, 261 , 531 S.E.2d 507, 509 (2000) ("An ex post facto violation occurs when a c 2017Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 385 S.C. 476, 479 , 685 S.E.2d 175, 177 (2009) (stating if the parole board "clearly states in its order denying parole that it considered the factors outlined in section 24-21-640 [of the South Carolina Code] and the fifteen factors published in [its parole form] . . . the decision will constitute a routine denial of parole and the ALC will have limited authority to review the decision to determine whether the Board followed proper procedure"); Jernigan v. State, 340 S.C. 256, 261 , 531 S.E.2d 507, 509 (2000) ("An ex post facto violation occurs when a c | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. South Carolina Department of Health & Environmental Controlgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Andersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Gastergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v. Walsh, Acting Commissioner, Maine Department of Human Servicesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Florida v. Jimenogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Grant v. South Carolina Coastal Councilgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Curtis v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Glendening v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Villalon v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hall v. Vargasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sullivan v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re the Care & Treatment of Matthewsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Guadagno v. Wallack Ader Levithan Associatesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Williams v. Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lambrix v. Floridagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Doe v. Patakigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lynce v. Mathisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hinson v. Coultergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Flemming v. Nestor
green
2 sentences2002State v. Huiett, 302 S.C. 169 , 394 S.E.2d 486 (1990) (citing Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 , 80 S.Ct. 1367 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960)). 2002State v. Huiett, 302 S.C. 169 , 394 S.E.2d 486 (1990) (citing Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 , 80 S.Ct. 1367 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960)). | 4 | 1990–2002 |
State v. Dabney
green
2 sentences2003In Phillips v. State, under very similar factual circumstances, this Court held “[i]t is not a violation of the ex post facto clause for the legislature to enhance punishment for a later offense based on a prior conviction, even though the enhancement provision was not in effect at the time of the prior offense.” 331 S.C. 482, 484 , 504 S.E.2d 111, 112 (1998) (citing State v. Dabney, 301 S.C. 271 , 391 S.E.2d 563 (1990)). 2003In Phillips v. State, under very similar factual circumstances, this Court held “[i]t is not a violation of the ex post facto clause for the legislature to enhance punishment for a later offense based on a prior conviction, even though the enhancement provision was not in effect at the time of the prior offense.” 331 S.C. 482, 484 , 504 S.E.2d 111, 112 (1998) (citing State v. Dabney, 301 S.C. 271 , 391 S.E.2d 563 (1990)). | 3 | 1998–2003 |
Smith v. Doe
green
2 sentences2013We reject her additional claims pursuant to Rule 220, SCACR, and the following authorities: Connecticut v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (rejecting sex offender’s due process argument requesting a hearing on his current level of dangerousness, and stating those "who assert a right to a hearing under the Due Process Clause must show that the facts they seek to establish in the hearing are relevant to the statutory scheme”); Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge where sex offender registration and monitoring requirements are civil in nature); Phillips v. State, 331 S 2013We reject her additional claims pursuant to Rule 220, SCACR, and the following authorities: Connecticut v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (rejecting sex offender’s due process argument requesting a hearing on his current level of dangerousness, and stating those "who assert a right to a hearing under the Due Process Clause must show that the facts they seek to establish in the hearing are relevant to the statutory scheme”); Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge where sex offender registration and monitoring requirements are civil in nature); Phillips v. State, 331 S | 2 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Collins
green
2 sentences2011Cf. State v. Collins, 329 S.C. 23 , 28 n. 4, 495 S.E.2d 202 , 205 n. 4 (1998) (recognizing that although the ex post facto clause itself does not apply to actions of the judicial branch, judicial decisions applied retroactively can violate the Due Process Clause and that an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, “operates precisely like an ex post facto law”). 2011Cf. State v. Collins, 329 S.C. 23 , 28 n. 4, 495 S.E.2d 202 , 205 n. 4 (1998) (recognizing that although the ex post facto clause itself does not apply to actions of the judicial branch, judicial decisions applied retroactively can violate the Due Process Clause and that an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, “operates precisely like an ex post facto law”). | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Canal Insurance v. Caldwell
green
2 sentences2011Further, ALC Rules 5 and 29(C) contemplate service of an ALC decision by the ALC via the United States Postal Service and not by a party via electronic mail. 4 White relies on the opinions in Ackerman v. 3-V Chemical, Inc., 349 S.C. 212 , 562 S.E.2d 613 (2002), and Canal Insurance Co. v. Caldwell, 338 S.C. 1 , 524 S.E.2d 416 (Ct.App.1999), in support of his assertion that service of the decision by DHEC’s counsel was a proper substitute for service by the ALC. 2011Further, ALC Rules 5 and 29(C) contemplate service of an ALC decision by the ALC via the United States Postal Service and not by a party via electronic mail. 4 White relies on the opinions in Ackerman v. 3-V Chemical, Inc., 349 S.C. 212 , 562 S.E.2d 613 (2002), and Canal Insurance Co. v. Caldwell, 338 S.C. 1 , 524 S.E.2d 416 (Ct.App.1999), in support of his assertion that service of the decision by DHEC’s counsel was a proper substitute for service by the ALC. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Ackerman v. 3-V CHEMICAL, INC.
green
2 sentences2011Further, ALC Rules 5 and 29(C) contemplate service of an ALC decision by the ALC via the United States Postal Service and not by a party via electronic mail. 4 White relies on the opinions in Ackerman v. 3-V Chemical, Inc., 349 S.C. 212 , 562 S.E.2d 613 (2002), and Canal Insurance Co. v. Caldwell, 338 S.C. 1 , 524 S.E.2d 416 (Ct.App.1999), in support of his assertion that service of the decision by DHEC’s counsel was a proper substitute for service by the ALC. 2011Further, ALC Rules 5 and 29(C) contemplate service of an ALC decision by the ALC via the United States Postal Service and not by a party via electronic mail. 4 White relies on the opinions in Ackerman v. 3-V Chemical, Inc., 349 S.C. 212 , 562 S.E.2d 613 (2002), and Canal Insurance Co. v. Caldwell, 338 S.C. 1 , 524 S.E.2d 416 (Ct.App.1999), in support of his assertion that service of the decision by DHEC’s counsel was a proper substitute for service by the ALC. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Calder v. Bull
green
2 sentences2010Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 , 3 Dall. 386 , 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798). “[I]n order for the ex post facto clause to be applicable, the statute or the provision in question must be criminal or penal in purpose and nature.” Huiett , 302 S.C. at *619 172, 394 S.E.2d at 487 . 2010Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 , 3 Dall. 386 , 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798). “[I]n order for the ex post facto clause to be applicable, the statute or the provision in question must be criminal or penal in purpose and nature.” Huiett , 302 S.C. at *619 172, 394 S.E.2d at 487 . | 2 | 2009–2010 |
Hopt v. People of Territory of Utah
green
2 sentences2010See Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380 , 18 S.Ct. 922 , 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (holding a law admitting previously inadmissible handwriting samples did not violate ex post facto clause); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 , 4 S.Ct. 202 , 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (holding admission of convicted felon’s testimony, which was inadmissible at the time the crime was committed, did not violate ex post facto clause). 2010See Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380 , 18 S.Ct. 922 , 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898) (holding a law admitting previously inadmissible handwriting samples did not violate ex post facto clause); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 , 4 S.Ct. 202 , 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (holding admission of convicted felon’s testimony, which was inadmissible at the time the crime was committed, did not violate ex post facto clause). | 2 | 2009–2010 |
Weaver v. Graham
green
2 sentences2009An ex post facto clause also ensures that legislative enactments “give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed.” Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 , 101 S.Ct. 960 , 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981). 2009An ex post facto clause also ensures that legislative enactments “give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed.” Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 , 101 S.Ct. 960 , 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981). | 2 | 1989–2009 |
State v. Matthews
green
2 sentences1989We rejected this contention recently in State v. Matthews , 296 S.C. 379 , 373 S.E. (2d) 587 (1988). 1989We rejected this contention recently in State v. Matthews , 296 S.C. 379 , 373 S.E. (2d) 587 (1988). | 2 | 1989–1989 |
| Hendrix v. Taylor green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Whitner green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Bryant green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Alston v. Robinson green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Doe v. Bredesen green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Steele v. Benjamin green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Seling v. Young green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Jones v. Murray green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| In Re the Treatment & Care of Luckabaugh green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Colacurcio v. City of Kent green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| cluster 746284 green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Arthur Cutshall, Plaintiff-Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Don Sundquist, Govenor of the State of Tennessee, Defendant-Appellant/cross-Appellee green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Good v. United States green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| State v. Burdette green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Cunningham v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Roller v. Gunn green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Farris v. State neutral | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Peloquin v. State green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Coombs v. United States green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Hunt v. United States green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Gunter v. State green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Gryger v. Burke green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.