ex post facto violation in Mississippi

2023Therefore, a person “convicted should be sentenced pursuant to the statute existing on the date of his offense to avoid an ex post facto problem.” Cozart, 226 So. 3d at 578-79 (¶14) (quoting Johnston v. State, 618 So. 2d 90, 94 (Miss. 1993)). ¶12.

2017Next, we determined that “a sentence of life without parole is ameliorative (and thus did not pose an ex post facto problem) in that it provides a punishment less harsh than death.” Id.; see also Johnston v. State, 618 So.2d 90, 95 (Miss. 1993) (this Court held that the application of an amended statute wás not an ex post facto violation because the changes were ameliorative and procedural.) Because Barnett was found guilty of capital murder and faced the possibility of execution, receiving life without parole amounted to alternative relief to abate the severest of sentences.

1997Moore v. Molpus, 578 So.2d 624, 643 (Miss. 1991), "[w]e take it as an article of faith and law that ex post facto laws are bad practice." The United States Supreme Court further has explained the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution as providing assurance that legislative enactments "give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed" and to "restrict ... governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation." Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 , 101 S.Ct. 960, 964 , 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981)(fo

1997As this Court stated in Moore v. Molpus, 578 So.2d 624, 643 (Miss. 1991), "[w]e take it as an article of faith and law that ex post facto laws are bad practice." The United States Supreme Court has explained the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution as providing assurance that legislative enactments "give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed" and to "restrict ... governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation." Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 , 101 S.Ct. 960, 964 , 67 L.Ed

2018In Collins v. Youngblood , 497 U.S. 37 , 43, 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990), the United States Supreme Court held that "[l]egislatures may not retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts." However, "an ex post facto claim may be waived through a negotiated guilty plea." Knight v. State , 192 So.3d 360 , 364 (¶ 13) (Miss.

2018In Collins v. Youngblood , 497 U.S. 37 , 43, 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990), the United States Supreme Court held that "[l]egislatures may not retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts." However, "an ex post facto claim may be waived through a negotiated guilty plea." Knight v. State , 192 So.3d 360 , 364 (¶ 13) (Miss.

2014“An ex post facto law is one which creates a new offense or changes the punishment, to the detriment of the accused, after the commission of a crime.” Gray v. State, 13 So.3d 283, 286 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2009) (quoting Bell v. State, 726 So.2d 93, 94 (¶ 7) (Miss.1998)).

1999This Court in Bell v. State, 726 So.2d 93, 95 (Miss.1998), remanded this case to the lower court to determine the limited issue of whether Bell knowingly waived his ex post facto rights when he pled guilty to armed robbery as an habitual offender. ¶ 7.

1998While an ex post facto claim is procedurally barred if it is not raised in the trial court, Butler v. State, 608 So.2d 314, 321 (Miss.1992), here the defense did raise an ex post facto claim in its motion for new trial.

1994While an ex post facto claim is procedurally barred if it is not raised in the trial court, Butler v. State, 608 So. 2d 314, 321 (Miss. 1992), here the defense did raise an ex post facto claim in its motion for new trial.

2008However, in Morales, 514 U.S. at 506 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. 1597 , the Supreme Court held that when examining whether an ex post facto violation occurs, the focus of the inquiry is not on whether a legislative change merely produces some sort of ambiguous “disadvantage,” as some previous decisions, specifically Lindsey, Miller, and Weaver , had implied. 4 The Supreme *289 Court stated that “the focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of ‘disadvantage,’ nor ... on whether an amendment affects a prisoner’s ‘opportunity to take advantage of

2008However, in Morales, 514 U.S. at 506 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. 1597 , the Supreme Court held that when examining whether an ex post facto violation occurs, the focus of the inquiry is not on whether a legislative change merely produces some sort of ambiguous “disadvantage,” as some previous decisions, specifically Lindsey, Miller, and Weaver , had implied. 4 The Supreme *289 Court stated that “the focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of ‘disadvantage,’ nor ... on whether an amendment affects a prisoner’s ‘opportunity to take advantage of

2005The Mississippi Supreme Court held that "administrative correction of a prior misinterpretation of parole laws as applied to the appellant did not violate the ex post facto clause of the United States or Mississippi Constitutions." Id. at 622 (citations omitted).

2004The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that an "administrative correction of a prior misinterpretation of parole laws as applied to the appellant did not violate the ex post facto clause of the United States or Mississippi Constitutions." Taylor, 365 So.2d at 622 .

2023Therefore, we review the question of whether the circuit court’s application of the statute constituted an ex post facto violation under the de novo standard and “will only reverse for an erroneous interpretation or application of law.” Cozart, 226 So. 3d at 577 (¶9) (citing Rice v. Merkich, 34 So. 3d 555, 557 (¶7) (Miss. 2010)).

2017Accordingly, we review the question of whether the circuit court’s prescribed sentence constituted an ex post facto violation under the de novo standard and “will only reverse for án erroneous interpretation or application of law.” Rice v. Merkich, 34 So.3d 555, 557 (Miss. 2010).

2015Gray v. State, 13 So.3d 283, 286 (¶ 5) (Miss.Ct.App.2008).

2014“An ex post facto law is one which creates a new offense or changes the punishment, to the detriment of the accused, after the commission of a crime.” Gray v. State, 13 So.3d 283, 286 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2009) (quoting Bell v. State, 726 So.2d 93, 94 (¶ 7) (Miss.1998)).

2001In Tubwell v. Anderson, 776 So.2d 654, 660 (Miss.2000), this Court examined the United States Supreme Court's holdings regarding the ex post facto clause: The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Ex Post Facto clause is "aimed at laws that `retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.'" California Dep't of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 , 115 S.Ct. 1597 , 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995) (quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990)).

1998In Tubwell v. Anderson, 776 So.2d 654, 660 (Miss. 2000), this Court examined the United States Supreme Court's holdings regarding the ex post facto clause: The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Ex Post Facto clause is "aimed at laws that 'retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.' " California Dep't of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 , 115 S.Ct. 1597 , 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995) (quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990)).

2001Johnston v. State, 618 So.2d 90, 94 (Miss.1993); Porter v. State, 749 So.2d 250, 260 (Miss.Ct.App.1999).

1998Johnston v. State, 618 So.2d 90, 94 (Miss.1993); Porter v. State, 749 So.2d 250, 260 (Miss.

1998Cf. Watts v. State, 492 So.2d 1281, 1291 (Miss.1986)(finding that defendant was procedurally barred from raising issue on appeal, since it was not listed as grounds in his motion for j.n.o.v. or a new trial); Colburn v. State, 431 So.2d 1111, 1113-14 (Miss.1983)(noting that because there was no mention of constitutionality of statute in the motion for new trial, the appellant was procedurally barred from presenting it for the first time on appeal). ¶ 32.

1994Cf. Watts v. State, 492 So. 2d 1281, 1291 (Miss. 1986)(finding that defendant was procedurally barred from raising issue on appeal, since it was not listed as grounds in his motion for j.n.o.v. or a new trial); Colburn v. State, 431 So. 2d 1111, 1113-14 (Miss. 1983)(noting that because there was no mention of constitutionality of statute in the motion for new trial, the appellant was procedurally barred from presenting it for the first time on appeal). ¶30.

1998Cf. Watts v. State, 492 So.2d 1281, 1291 (Miss.1986)(finding that defendant was procedurally barred from raising issue on appeal, since it was not listed as grounds in his motion for j.n.o.v. or a new trial); Colburn v. State, 431 So.2d 1111, 1113-14 (Miss.1983)(noting that because there was no mention of constitutionality of statute in the motion for new trial, the appellant was procedurally barred from presenting it for the first time on appeal). ¶ 32.

1994Cf. Watts v. State, 492 So. 2d 1281, 1291 (Miss. 1986)(finding that defendant was procedurally barred from raising issue on appeal, since it was not listed as grounds in his motion for j.n.o.v. or a new trial); Colburn v. State, 431 So. 2d 1111, 1113-14 (Miss. 1983)(noting that because there was no mention of constitutionality of statute in the motion for new trial, the appellant was procedurally barred from presenting it for the first time on appeal). ¶30.

1997"It is axiomatic that statutes of limitations may not be made retroactive to the prejudice of a party." Perkins v. State, 487 So.2d 791, 792 (Miss. 1986).

1993"It is axiomatic that statutes of limitations may not be made retroactive to the prejudice of a party." Perkins v. State, 487 So. 2d 791, 792 (Miss. 1986). ¶19.

1996"In other words, the mere presence of some discretion ... before ... the change in law does not in and of itself foreclose an ex post facto claim." Jones v. Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles, 59 F.3d 1145, 1149 (11th Cir.1995) (footnote omitted) (citing Miller, 482 U.S. at 432-33 , 107 S.Ct. at 2452-53 ).

1995"In other words, the mere presence of some discretion . . . before . . . the change in law does not in and of itself foreclose an ex post facto claim." Jones v. Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles, 59 F.3d 1145, 1149 (11th Cir. 1995) (footnote omitted) (citing Miller, 482 U.S. at 432-33 ).

2023In Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981), the United States Supreme Court stated the purpose of the ex post facto clause is to assure that legislative acts “give fair warning of 5 their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed.” Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28-29 .

2023In Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981), the United States Supreme Court stated the purpose of the ex post facto clause is to assure that legislative acts “give fair warning of 5 their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed.” Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28-29 .

2001A statute may violate the Ex Post Facto clause "even if it alters punitive conditions outside the sentence ... [or where it] substantially alters the consequences attached to a crime already completed, and therefore changes `the quantum of punishment.'" Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 32-33 (citation omitted) (quoting Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293-94 , 97 S.Ct. 2290 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977)).

2001A statute may violate the Ex Post Facto clause "even if it alters punitive conditions outside the sentence ... [or where it] substantially alters the consequences attached to a crime already completed, and therefore changes `the quantum of punishment.'" Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 32-33 (citation omitted) (quoting Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293-94 , 97 S.Ct. 2290 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977)).

1998Also, in Hill v. State, 659 So.2d 547 (Miss.1994), this Court, in reviewing the question of retroactive application of statutory amendments under an ex post facto analysis, held that when a substantive right is the subject, the State does not violate the ex post facto principle so long as its subsequent legislation doesn't impede the right.

1998Also, in Hill v. State, 659 So.2d 547 (Miss.1994), this Court, in reviewing the question of retroactive application of statutory amendments under an ex post facto analysis, held that when a substantive right is the subject, the State does not violate the ex post facto principle so long as its subsequent legislation doesn't impede the right.

2008In Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 426-27 , 107 S.Ct. 2446 , 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987), the Supreme Court addressed an ex post facto challenge regarding the Florida Legislature’s enactment of legislation *288 that had the effect of increasing the presumptive sentencing range for the petitioner’s crime after its commission but before the petitioner was sentenced.

2008In Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 426-27 , 107 S.Ct. 2446 , 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987), the Supreme Court addressed an ex post facto challenge regarding the Florida Legislature’s enactment of legislation *288 that had the effect of increasing the presumptive sentencing range for the petitioner’s crime after its commission but before the petitioner was sentenced.

2014The Supreme Court’s decisions in Lynce and Weaver turned on the fact that the petitioners in those cases were entitled to an opportunity for parole when their conduct 20 Lynce, 519 U.S. at 436 . 21 Id. at 445 (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 32 ). 22 Lynce, 519 U.S. at 442 (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 32 ). 23 Lynce, 519 U.S. at 439-47 . 24 Lynce, 519 U.S. at 442 (citing Weaver, 450 U.S. at 36 ). 8 occurred, but lost that opportunity altogether through the statutory amendments.25 The Court showed that this fact was key to its decision by distinguishing California Department of Corrections v. Moral

2014The Supreme Court’s decisions in Lynce and Weaver turned on the fact that the petitioners in those cases were entitled to an opportunity for parole when their conduct 20 Lynce, 519 U.S. at 436 . 21 Id. at 445 (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 32 ). 22 Lynce, 519 U.S. at 442 (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 32 ). 23 Lynce, 519 U.S. at 439-47 . 24 Lynce, 519 U.S. at 442 (citing Weaver, 450 U.S. at 36 ). 8 occurred, but lost that opportunity altogether through the statutory amendments.25 The Court showed that this fact was key to its decision by distinguishing California Department of Corrections v. Moral

2013Although Barnett, again like Conley, had raised the ex post facto violation in his motion for new trial, we held “that even then it was not timely — given that the verdict had already been returned.” Id.

1999Barnett v. State, 725 So.2d 797, 802 (Miss.1998); Butler v. State, 608 So.2d 314, 321 (Miss.1992). ¶ 36.

2009Id. at 672 .

2008In Puckett v. Abels, 684 So.2d 671 (Miss.1996), the Mississippi Supreme Court addressed whether Mississippi Code Annotated section 47-5-138, which required that an inmate serve eighty-five percent of his or her sentence before being eligible for parole, applied to prisoners convicted before, but sentenced after, the new law’s effective date without constituting an ex post facto violation.

2007Christmas v. State, 700 So.2d 262, 265 (Miss.1997) (holding that any "law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the offender" is an ex post facto violation).

2001Christmas, 700 So.2d at 265 .

1999The Mississippi Supreme Court cited Taylor v. Mississippi State Probation and Parole Board, 365 So.2d 621, 622 (Miss.1978) to support its conclusion that “administrative correction of a prior misinterpretation of parole laws ... did not violate the ex post facto clause of the United States or Mississippi Constitutions.” Tiller, 440 So.2d at 1005 (quoting Taylor, 365 So.2d at 622 ).

1986As to the ex post facto claim, this issue was answered and dismissed by Tiller v. State, 440 So.2d 1001, 1004-1005 (Miss. 1983), therefore we only address the claim of ineffective advice of counsel issue.