ex post facto clause in Louisiana

2018State v. Williams , 00-1725 (La. 11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790 ; State ex rel.

2018State v. Williams , 00-1725 (La. 11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790 ; State ex rel.

2014Although the United States Supreme Court, in Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990), tightened the focus of the ex post facto inquiry, neither Collins nor its progeny has called into question the conclusion reached in Weaver v. Graham that retroactive application of a law reducing the number of good time credits an inmate is eligible to receive violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.

2014Although the United States Supreme Court, in Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990), tightened the focus of the ex post facto inquiry, neither Collins nor its progeny has called into question the conclusion reached in Weaver v. Graham that retroactive application of a law reducing the number of good time credits an inmate is eligible to receive violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.

2020In State v. Jones, 12-788 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/23/13) , 165 So.3d 74 (unpublished), writ granted, 13-2039 (La.2/28/14), 134 So.3d 1164 , a decision handed down after Miller but prior 12 to State v. Tate, 12–2763 (La.11/5/13), 130 So.3d 829 , 841–44, cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2663 , 189 L.Ed.2d 214 (2014) (applying La.

2019This Court reasoned that the Louisiana Supreme Court, in State v. Jones , 2013-2039 (La. 2/28/14), 134 So.3d 1164 , ordered implementation of Miller through the application of La.

2019Olivieri , 2000-0172 (La. 2/21/01), 779 So.2d 735 , cert. denied , 533 U.S. 936 , 121 S.Ct. 2566 , 150 L.Ed.2d 730 (2001), the Louisiana Supreme Court considered an ex post facto challenge to the sex offender registration provisions.

2015Olivieri v. State, 00-0172 (La.2/21/01), 779 So.2d 735 , cert. denied, 533 U.S. 936 , 121 S.Ct. 2566 , 150 L.Ed.2d 730 (2001), and Smith v. State, 10-1140 (La.1/24/12), 84 So.3d 487 , the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the registration and community notification requirements of the sex offender registration statute do not violate the ex post facto clause on the ground that the |astatute’s requirements are remedial rather than punitive' in nature. ' However, the questions presented in those cases are not' at issue in the case at bar.

2019Olivieri , 2000-0172 (La. 2/21/01), 779 So.2d 735 , cert. denied , 533 U.S. 936 , 121 S.Ct. 2566 , 150 L.Ed.2d 730 (2001), the Louisiana Supreme Court considered an ex post facto challenge to the sex offender registration provisions.

2015Olivieri v. State, 00-0172 (La.2/21/01), 779 So.2d 735 , cert. denied, 533 U.S. 936 , 121 S.Ct. 2566 , 150 L.Ed.2d 730 (2001), and Smith v. State, 10-1140 (La.1/24/12), 84 So.3d 487 , the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the registration and community notification requirements of the sex offender registration statute do not violate the ex post facto clause on the ground that the |astatute’s requirements are remedial rather than punitive' in nature. ' However, the questions presented in those cases are not' at issue in the case at bar.

2019Olivieri , 2000-0172 (La. 2/21/01), 779 So.2d 735 , cert. denied , 533 U.S. 936 , 121 S.Ct. 2566 , 150 L.Ed.2d 730 (2001), the Louisiana Supreme Court considered an ex post facto challenge to the sex offender registration provisions.

2015Olivieri v. State, 00-0172 (La.2/21/01), 779 So.2d 735 , cert. denied, 533 U.S. 936 , 121 S.Ct. 2566 , 150 L.Ed.2d 730 (2001), and Smith v. State, 10-1140 (La.1/24/12), 84 So.3d 487 , the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the registration and community notification requirements of the sex offender registration statute do not violate the ex post facto clause on the ground that the |astatute’s requirements are remedial rather than punitive' in nature. ' However, the questions presented in those cases are not' at issue in the case at bar.

2015In addition, the Louisiana Supreme Court has also found that “the period of time a sex offender is obligated to register may be extended during the time of his original registration period without violating the ex post facto clause.” Smith v. State, 2010-1140, p. 15 (La.1/24/12), 84 So.3d 487, 497 .

2015Olivieri v. State, 00-0172 (La.2/21/01), 779 So.2d 735 , cert. denied, 533 U.S. 936 , 121 S.Ct. 2566 , 150 L.Ed.2d 730 (2001), and Smith v. State, 10-1140 (La.1/24/12), 84 So.3d 487 , the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the registration and community notification requirements of the sex offender registration statute do not violate the ex post facto clause on the ground that the |astatute’s requirements are remedial rather than punitive' in nature. ' However, the questions presented in those cases are not' at issue in the case at bar.

2006In State v. Everett, 00-2998 (La.5/14/02) 816 So.2d 1272 , the Court stated that the focus of the ex post facto inquiry is whether a new law redefines criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which the crime is punishable.

2003We conclude nothing in Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10 and § 24 has an ex post facto effect on respondents’ case. 10 In State v. Everett, 00-2998 (La.5/14/02), 816 So.2d 1272 , this court explained the focus of the ex post facto analysis is whether the | mew law redefines conduct or increases the penalty by which the conduct is punishable: Art.

2020In State v. Jones, 12-788 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/23/13) , 165 So.3d 74 (unpublished), writ granted, 13-2039 (La.2/28/14), 134 So.3d 1164 , a decision handed down after Miller but prior 12 to State v. Tate, 12–2763 (La.11/5/13), 130 So.3d 829 , 841–44, cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2663 , 189 L.Ed.2d 214 (2014) (applying La.

2018In State v. Jones , 12-788 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/23/13) , 165 So.3d 74 (unpublished), writ granted , 13-2039 (La. 2/28/14), 134 So.3d 1164 , a decision handed down after Miller but prior to State v. Tate , 12-2763 (La. 11/5/13), 130 So.3d 829 , 841-44, cert. denied , --- U.S. ---, 134 S.Ct. 2663 , 189 L.Ed.2d 214 (2014) (applying La.

2020In State v. Jones, 12-788 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/23/13) , 165 So.3d 74 (unpublished), writ granted, 13-2039 (La.2/28/14), 134 So.3d 1164 , a decision handed down after Miller but prior 12 to State v. Tate, 12–2763 (La.11/5/13), 130 So.3d 829 , 841–44, cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2663 , 189 L.Ed.2d 214 (2014) (applying La.

2018In State v. Jones , 12-788 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/23/13) , 165 So.3d 74 (unpublished), writ granted , 13-2039 (La. 2/28/14), 134 So.3d 1164 , a decision handed down after Miller but prior to State v. Tate , 12-2763 (La. 11/5/13), 130 So.3d 829 , 841-44, cert. denied , --- U.S. ---, 134 S.Ct. 2663 , 189 L.Ed.2d 214 (2014) (applying La.

2020In State v. Jones, 12-788 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/23/13) , 165 So.3d 74 (unpublished), writ granted, 13-2039 (La.2/28/14), 134 So.3d 1164 , a decision handed down after Miller but prior 12 to State v. Tate, 12–2763 (La.11/5/13), 130 So.3d 829 , 841–44, cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2663 , 189 L.Ed.2d 214 (2014) (applying La.

2018In State v. Jones , 12-788 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/23/13) , 165 So.3d 74 (unpublished), writ granted , 13-2039 (La. 2/28/14), 134 So.3d 1164 , a decision handed down after Miller but prior to State v. Tate , 12-2763 (La. 11/5/13), 130 So.3d 829 , 841-44, cert. denied , --- U.S. ---, 134 S.Ct. 2663 , 189 L.Ed.2d 214 (2014) (applying La.

2020In State v. Jones, 12-788 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/23/13) , 165 So.3d 74 (unpublished), writ granted, 13-2039 (La.2/28/14), 134 So.3d 1164 , a decision handed down after Miller but prior 12 to State v. Tate, 12–2763 (La.11/5/13), 130 So.3d 829 , 841–44, cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2663 , 189 L.Ed.2d 214 (2014) (applying La.

2018In State v. Jones , 12-788 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/23/13) , 165 So.3d 74 (unpublished), writ granted , 13-2039 (La. 2/28/14), 134 So.3d 1164 , a decision handed down after Miller but prior to State v. Tate , 12-2763 (La. 11/5/13), 130 So.3d 829 , 841-44, cert. denied , --- U.S. ---, 134 S.Ct. 2663 , 189 L.Ed.2d 214 (2014) (applying La.

2001The court held that, applying the ten-year cleansing period, which was enacted after defendant's prior offenses, to link prior offenses would violate the ex post facto clause. [1] The defendant also cites State v. Rolen, 95-0347 (La.9/15/95), 662 So.2d 446 , 447 in support of his position.

1999As the supreme court stated in State v. Rolen, 95-347, p. 5 (La.9/15/95); 662 So.2d 446 , 449: "Cleansing periods are, however, purely statutory rules constituting self-imposed restraints on the state's plenary power to define and punish crimes.

2014While prior to Collins, the ex post facto inquiry centered on whether retroactive application of a law “disadvantaged the offender affected by it,” the Collins Court refined this analysis, focusing on two important brands of “disadvantage.” As the post-Collins Supreme Court explained in Lynce, To fall within the ex post facto prohibition, a law must be retrospective-that is, “it must apply to events occurring before its enactment”-and it “must disadvantage the offender affected by it,” [Weaver, 450 U.S.] at 29, 101 S.Ct., at 964 , by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing th

2014While prior to Collins , the ex post facto inquiry centered on whether retroactive application of a -law “disadvantaged the offender affected by it,” the Collins Court refined this analysis, focusing on two important brands of “disadvantage.” As the post-Collins Supreme Court explained in Lynce, To fall within the ex post facto prohibition, a law must be retrospective — that is, “it must apply to events occurring before its enactment” — and it “must disadvantage the offender affected by it,” [Weaver, 450 U.S.] at 29, 101 S.Ct., at 964 , by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increas

2001See Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 , 46 S.Ct. 68 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (holding that the former law afforded jointly indicted defendants separate trials as a matter of right, but the new law only afforded separate trials subject to the trial judge's discretion; held, no ex post facto violation because the law did not affect a substantial right of the accused); Kring, 107 U.S. 221 , 2 S.Ct. 443 , 27 L.Ed. 506 (1883) (holding that a law in effect at the time of the offense provided that on a charge of first-degree murder a guilty plea of second-degree murder acquitted the defendant of first-degre

2001See Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 , 46 S.Ct. 68 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (holding that the former law afforded jointly indicted defendants separate trials as a matter of right, but the new law only afforded separate trials subject to the trial judge's discretion; held, no ex post facto violation because the law did not affect a substantial right of the accused); Kring, 107 U.S. 221 , 2 S.Ct. 443 , 27 L.Ed. 506 (1883) (holding that a law in effect at the time of the offense provided that on a charge of first-degree murder a guilty plea of second-degree murder acquitted the defendant of first-degre

2001Collins, 497 U.S. at 45-46 , 110 S.Ct. at 2720 -2721 [citing, among other cases, Beazell, 269 U.S. at 171 , 46 S.Ct. at 69 , and Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382-383 , 14 S.Ct. 570, 571-572 , 38 L.Ed. 485 (1894)].

2001Collins, 497 U.S. at 45-46 , 110 S.Ct. at 2720 -2721 [citing, among other cases, Beazell, 269 U.S. at 171 , 46 S.Ct. at 69 , and Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382-383 , 14 S.Ct. 570, 571-572 , 38 L.Ed. 485 (1894)].

2019He suggests that if the 2018 amendment applies to his case, he will "be stripped of a right - that existed starting November 1, 2017 - to argue for a sentence other than his natural life in jail." However, in State v. Holloway , 15-1233, p. 7 (La. 10/19/16), 217 So.3d 343 , 348, the supreme court explained the following regarding the definition of an ex post facto law: A law which "does not punish as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; nor make more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission; nor deprive one charged with crime of any defense avai

2019He suggests that if the 2018 amendment applies to his case, he will "be stripped of a right - that existed starting November 1, 2017 - to argue for a sentence other than his natural life in jail." However, in State v. Holloway , 15-1233, p. 7 (La. 10/19/16), 217 So.3d 343 , 348, the supreme court explained the following regarding the definition of an ex post facto law: A law which "does not punish as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; nor make more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission; nor deprive one charged with crime of any defense avai

2018Additionally, the Defendant's claims regarding Louisiana's response to Miller , 567 U.S. 460 , 132 S.Ct. 2455 , were addressed in our discussion of assignments of error numbers one, two, and three and also lack merit.

2018Additionally, the Defendant's claims regarding Louisiana's response to Miller , 567 U.S. 460 , 132 S.Ct. 2455 , were addressed in our discussion of assignments of error numbers one, two, and three and also lack merit.

2018State v. Sugasti , 01-3407 (La. 6/21/02), 820 So.2d 518 .

2018State v. Sugasti , 01-3407 (La. 6/21/02), 820 So.2d 518 .

2018App. 2 Cir. 5/17/17), 222 So.3d 903 , 907, the Second Circuit addressed the defendant's ex post facto claim regarding resentencing at a Miller hearing: The law in effect at the time of the crime determines the penalty to be suffered by the criminal.

2018In Calhoun , 222 So.3d at 907 , the second circuit addressed the defendant's ex post facto claim regarding resentencing at a Miller hearing: The law in effect at the time of the crime determines the penalty to be suffered by the criminal.

2012Most recently, in State v. Golston, 10-2804 (La.7/1/11), 67 So.3d 452 , this court upheld the provisions of La.Rev.Stat. 15:560-560.6, governing Sex Offender Assessment Panels (SOAP), against a variety of constitutional challenges.

2012Most recently, in State v. Golston, 10-2804 (La.7/1/11), 67 So.3d 452 , this court upheld the provisions of La.Rev.Stat. 15:560-560.6, governing Sex Offender Assessment Panels (SOAP), against a variety of constitutional challenges.

2009Defendant notes that he is aware that the legislature enacted Article 412.2 in response to Kennedy, 803 So.2d 916 , and of this court's decision in Willis, 915 So.2d 365 , which found that Article 412.2 does not violate the ex post facto clause.

2007State v. Willis, 05-218 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/05) , 915 So.2d 365 , writ denied, 06-186 (La.6/23/06), 930 So.2d 973 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 668 , 166 L.Ed.2d 514 (U.S.11/27/06).

1997In Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990), the Court narrowed the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause's application and returned to the traditional understanding of the Ex Post Facto clause as set forth in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 3 Dall. 386 , 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798).

1997In Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990), the Court narrowed the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause's application and returned to the traditional understanding of the Ex Post Facto clause as set forth in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 3 Dall. 386 , 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798).

2001At that time, the Court overruled Kring, supra, and Thompson, 170 U.S. at 351 , 18 S.Ct. 620 (1898) (a case which held *743 that a change in Utah law which reduced the size of criminal juries from twelve to eight persons deprived the defendant of a substantial right involved in his liberty and violated the ex post facto clause, stating that the test is whether the retroactive application "alters the situation to [the defendant's] disadvantage.").

2001At that time, the Court overruled Kring, supra, and Thompson, 170 U.S. at 351 , 18 S.Ct. 620 (1898) (a case which held *743 that a change in Utah law which reduced the size of criminal juries from twelve to eight persons deprived the defendant of a substantial right involved in his liberty and violated the ex post facto clause, stating that the test is whether the retroactive application "alters the situation to [the defendant's] disadvantage.").

1999In State v. Brinson, 97-1471 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/3/97) , 699 So.2d 510 , writ denied, 97-2452 (La.4/9/98); 717 So.2d 1137 , the fourth circuit held that the cleansing period of La.

1997Furthermore, in State v. Brinson, 97-1471 (La.App. 4th Cir. 9/3/97), 699 So.2d 510 , we recently held that the cleansing period in effect at the time of the latest offense controlled for purposes of LSA-R.S. 15:529.1 and the application of the current cleansing period did not violate the Ex Post Facto clause.