ex post facto clause in Maryland

2006Two paramount protections provided by the ex post facto clause are the assurance “that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until *609 explicitly changed,” Booth v. State, 327 Md. 142, 174 , 608 A.2d 162, 177 (1992) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 , 101 S.Ct. 960 , 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981)), and to restrict “governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation.” Booth, supra, 327 Md. at 174 , 608 A.2d at 177 (quoting Weaver, supra, 450 U.S. at 29 , 101 S.Ct. 960 ).

2006Two paramount protections provided by the ex post facto clause are the assurance “that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until *609 explicitly changed,” Booth v. State, 327 Md. 142, 174 , 608 A.2d 162, 177 (1992) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 , 101 S.Ct. 960 , 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981)), and to restrict “governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation.” Booth, supra, 327 Md. at 174 , 608 A.2d at 177 (quoting Weaver, supra, 450 U.S. at 29 , 101 S.Ct. 960 ).

2013In other words, “Lajfter Collins , the focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of ‘disadvantage,’ ... but on whether any such change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable.” Morales, 514 U.S. at 506-07 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. 1597 .

2006The United States Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that “ ‘any retrospective law making parole hearings less accessible would effectively increase the [prisoner’s] sentence and violate the ex post facto clause,’ ” Id. (quoting Morales v. California Dep’t of Corr., 16 F.3d 1001 , 1004 (9th Cir.1994)), and held that Morales must be provided with the annual parole suitability hearings required by the law in effect when he committed his crime.

2006The Court cited Weaver v. Graham,, supra, where it considered whether the retroactive decrease in the amount of credits awarded as a result of an inmate’s good behavior violated the ex post facto clause. 15 The Court in Lynce noted that the new statute did not withdraw credits already awarded to the inmate in Weaver , but rather, it “curtailed] the availability of future credits [and] effectively postponed the date when he would become eligible for early release.” Lynce, supra 519 U.S. at 442 , 117 S.Ct. at 896 .

2006The Court cited Weaver v. Graham,, supra, where it considered whether the retroactive decrease in the amount of credits awarded as a result of an inmate’s good behavior violated the ex post facto clause. 15 The Court in Lynce noted that the new statute did not withdraw credits already awarded to the inmate in Weaver , but rather, it “curtailed] the availability of future credits [and] effectively postponed the date when he would become eligible for early release.” Lynce, supra 519 U.S. at 442 , 117 S.Ct. at 896 .

2019App. 44 , 45-47, 112 A.3d 522 (2015) (holding, based on Doe , 430 Md. 535 , 62 A.3d 123 , that retroactively increasing a pre-2010 registration period of ten years at the time of a plea to twenty-five years was an ex post facto violation); Connor v. State , 223 Md.

2019App. 44 , 45-47, 112 A.3d 522 (2015) (holding, based on Doe , 430 Md. 535 , 62 A.3d 123 , that retroactively increasing a pre-2010 registration period of ten years at the time of a plea to twenty-five years was an ex post facto violation); Connor v. State , 223 Md.

2006See Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70 , 46 S.Ct. 68, 68 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (noting that the ex post facto clause prohibits "any statute which ... makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed " (emphasis added)); Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall.

2006See Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70 , 46 S.Ct. 68, 68 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (noting that the ex post facto clause prohibits "any statute which ... makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed " (emphasis added)); Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall.

2013See Demby, 390 Md. at 593 n. 10, 890 A.2d at 318 n. 10 (emphasis and quotation omitted) (“To prevail in an ex post facto claim, [claimants] must first show that the law that they are challenging applies retroactively to conduct that was completed before the enactment of the law in question.... ”).

2013See Demby, 390 Md. at 593 n. 10, 890 A.2d at 318 n. 10 (emphasis and quotation omitted) (“To prevail in an ex post facto claim, [claimants] must first show that the law that they are challenging applies retroactively to conduct that was completed before the enactment of the law in question.... ”).

1992This Court held that Anderson’s commit ment was “the ‘disposition’ portion of the judgment in the criminal case,” so that the ex post facto clause was implicated. 310 Md. at 224-25, 528 A.2d at 908 .

1992This Court held that Anderson's commitment was "the `disposition' portion of the judgment in the criminal case," so that the ex post facto clause was implicated. 310 Md. at 224-25, 528 A.2d at 908 .

2023See State v. Raines, 383 Md. 1, 30 (2004) (holding Maryland statute permitting the DNA collection of persons whose commission of a qualifying crime 28 occurred prior to the effective date of the statute did not violate the ex post facto clause); 91 Opp.

2023See State v. Raines, 383 Md. 1, 30 (2004) (holding Maryland statute permitting the DNA collection of persons whose commission of a qualifying crime 28 occurred prior to the effective date of the statute did not violate the ex post facto clause); 91 Opp.

2006“There is ‘no absolute prohibition against retroactive application of a statute.’ ” Spielman v. State, 298 Md. 602, 607 , 471 A.2d 730, 733 (1984) (quoting State Commission on Human Relations v. Amecom Div., 278 Md. 120, 123 , 360 A.2d 1, 4 (1976)).

2006“There is ‘no absolute prohibition against retroactive application of a statute.’ ” Spielman v. State, 298 Md. 602, 607 , 471 A.2d 730, 733 (1984) (quoting State Commission on Human Relations v. Amecom Div., 278 Md. 120, 123 , 360 A.2d 1, 4 (1976)).

2006The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has noted the relevant factors to consider when determining whether actions of administrative agencies are exempt from scrutiny under the ex post facto clause: “When Congress has delegated to an agency the authority to make a rule instead of making the rule itself, the resulting administrative rule is an extension of the statute for purposes of the [C]lause.” Rodriguez v. United States Parole Comm’n, 594 F.2d 170, 173 (7th Cir.1979).

1990See also Rodriguez v. United States Parole Comm'n, 594 F.2d 170 (CA7 1979) (elimination of parole eligibility held an ex post facto violation).

2018In Lomax , this Court affirmed a circuit court's denial of habeas corpus relief and held that the Glendening policy did not violate the ex post facto clause. 356 Md. at 576 -77 , 741 A.2d 476 .

2018In Lomax , this Court affirmed a circuit court's denial of habeas corpus relief and held that the Glendening policy did not violate the ex post facto clause. 356 Md. at 576 -77 , 741 A.2d 476 .

2004The Booth opinion went on to point out that the change created by Ch. 296 was only a relatively minor change in trial sentencing procedure, and that “[cjhanges in trial ... procedure that had consequences far more disadvantageous to the defendant than the change in Maryland’s [capital sentencing statute] have been held not to offend the ex post facto clause[s],” citing, inter alia, Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990), and Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 , 97 S.Ct. 2290 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977).

2004The Booth opinion went on to point out that the change created by Ch. 296 was only a relatively minor change in trial sentencing procedure, and that “[cjhanges in trial ... procedure that had consequences far more disadvantageous to the defendant than the change in Maryland’s [capital sentencing statute] have been held not to offend the ex post facto clause[s],” citing, inter alia, Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990), and Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 , 97 S.Ct. 2290 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977).

2006In our discussion, we relied upon Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634 , 574 A.2d 898 (1990), cert. denied, Henneberry v. Sutton, 498 U.S. 950 , 111 S.Ct. 369 , 112 L.Ed.2d 331 (1990), where “we interpreted the ex post facto clause to prohibit the *601 retroactive application of a statute requiring the Governor to approve parole for inmates serving life sentences at the Patuxent Institution.

2006In our discussion, we relied upon Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634 , 574 A.2d 898 (1990), cert. denied, Henneberry v. Sutton, 498 U.S. 950 , 111 S.Ct. 369 , 112 L.Ed.2d 331 (1990), where “we interpreted the ex post facto clause to prohibit the *601 retroactive application of a statute requiring the Governor to approve parole for inmates serving life sentences at the Patuxent Institution.

2006If the provision “do[es] not have the force and effect of law” but simply announces how an agency is likely to exercise its discretion, “the ex post facto clause does not apply.” Id.

2005It is well settled that “any statute ... which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, ... is prohibited as ex post facto.” Id. (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70 , 46 S.Ct. 68 , 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925)). —Regulations as Laws— “[I]n the context of the ex post facto clause, the ‘concept of “law” ... is broader than a statute enacted by a legislative body, and may include some administrative regulations----’ ” Watkins, 377 Md. at 49 , 831 A.2d 1079 (quoting Lomax v. Warden, Maryland Corr.

2017See id. at 556 , 62 A.3d 123 ; Woods v. State, 315 Md. 591, 606-07 , 556 A.2d 236 (1989) (rejecting “the notion that a life sentence without the possibility of parole is, even relatively, the equivalent of death itself’).

2017See id. at 556 , 62 A.3d 123 ; Woods v. State, 315 Md. 591, 606-07 , 556 A.2d 236 (1989) (rejecting “the notion that a life sentence without the possibility of parole is, even relatively, the equivalent of death itself’).

2006The reason for applying the Clause to such legislative rules is straightforward: Congress “should not be allowed to do indirectly what it is forbidden to do directly.” Prater, 802 F.2d at 954 .

2003See Prater v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 802 F.2d 948, 954 (7th Cir.1986) (quoting Inglese v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 768 F.2d 932 , 936 (7th Cir.1985)).

2006Two paramount protections provided by the ex post facto clause are the assurance “that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until *609 explicitly changed,” Booth v. State, 327 Md. 142, 174 , 608 A.2d 162, 177 (1992) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 , 101 S.Ct. 960 , 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981)), and to restrict “governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation.” Booth, supra, 327 Md. at 174 , 608 A.2d at 177 (quoting Weaver, supra, 450 U.S. at 29 , 101 S.Ct. 960 ).

2006Two paramount protections provided by the ex post facto clause are the assurance “that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until *609 explicitly changed,” Booth v. State, 327 Md. 142, 174 , 608 A.2d 162, 177 (1992) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 , 101 S.Ct. 960 , 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981)), and to restrict “governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation.” Booth, supra, 327 Md. at 174 , 608 A.2d at 177 (quoting Weaver, supra, 450 U.S. at 29 , 101 S.Ct. 960 ).

2015Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1017 (Alaska 2008).