43 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Noblegreen2 sentences2018Our supreme court first noted that retroactive application of the statute "violates the ex post facto clause only if it is a 'law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.' " Id. at 174 , 829 P.2d at 1220 (quoting Calder v. Bull , 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 , 390, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798) ). 2018Our supreme court first noted that retroactive application of the statute "violates the ex post facto clause only if it is a 'law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.' " Id. at 174 , 829 P.2d at 1220 (quoting Calder v. Bull , 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 , 390, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798) ). | 5 | 11 |
State v. Ringgreen2 sentences2013The trial court denied Medina’s motion to use the prior statute instead of § 13-752(G). ¶ 69 “The ex post facto doctrine prohibits a state from ‘retroactively altering] the definition of crimes or increasing] the punishment for criminal acts.’ ” Ring III, 204 Ariz. at 545 ¶ 16, 65 P.3d at 926 (alterations in original) (quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990)). 2013The trial court denied Medina’s motion to use the prior statute instead of § 13-752(G). ¶ 69 “The ex post facto doctrine prohibits a state from ‘retroactively altering] the definition of crimes or increasing] the punishment for criminal acts.’ ” Ring III, 204 Ariz. at 545 ¶ 16, 65 P.3d at 926 (alterations in original) (quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990)). | 5 | 6 |
Weaver v. Grahamgreen2 sentences2007See State v. Noble, 171 Ariz. 171, 174 , 829 P.2d 1217, 1220 (1992) (“[A] primary purpose of the ex post facto clause [is] ‘to assure that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and *15 permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed.’”), quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 , 101 S.Ct. 960, 964 , 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981); State v. Powers, 200 Ariz. 123, ¶ 8 , 23 P.3d 668, 671 (App.2001) (judicial expansion of statutory language can violate defendant’s due process right to fair warning of proscribed conduct); see also A.R.S. § 13-101(2) (public policy of st 2007See State v. Noble, 171 Ariz. 171, 174 , 829 P.2d 1217, 1220 (1992) (“[A] primary purpose of the ex post facto clause [is] ‘to assure that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and *15 permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed.’”), quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 , 101 S.Ct. 960, 964 , 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981); State v. Powers, 200 Ariz. 123, ¶ 8 , 23 P.3d 668, 671 (App.2001) (judicial expansion of statutory language can violate defendant’s due process right to fair warning of proscribed conduct); see also A.R.S. § 13-101(2) (public policy of st | 2 | 6 |
Arizona Department of Public Safety v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2022Safety v. Superior Court, 190 Ariz. 490, 494 (App. 1997) (requiring a retroactive application for an ex post facto violation). 2010Falcone, 190 Ariz. at 494 , 949 P.2d at 987 . ¶ 9 When evaluating the punitive or regulatory character of a law, a court first looks to the legislative intent behind it. | 2 | 3 |
State of Arizona v. Powersgreen2 sentences2007See State v. Noble, 171 Ariz. 171, 174 , 829 P.2d 1217, 1220 (1992) (“[A] primary purpose of the ex post facto clause [is] ‘to assure that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and *15 permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed.’”), quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 , 101 S.Ct. 960, 964 , 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981); State v. Powers, 200 Ariz. 123, ¶ 8 , 23 P.3d 668, 671 (App.2001) (judicial expansion of statutory language can violate defendant’s due process right to fair warning of proscribed conduct); see also A.R.S. § 13-101(2) (public policy of st 2007See State v. Noble, 171 Ariz. 171, 174 , 829 P.2d 1217, 1220 (1992) (“[A] primary purpose of the ex post facto clause [is] ‘to assure that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and *15 permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed.’”), quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 , 101 S.Ct. 960, 964 , 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981); State v. Powers, 200 Ariz. 123, ¶ 8 , 23 P.3d 668, 671 (App.2001) (judicial expansion of statutory language can violate defendant’s due process right to fair warning of proscribed conduct); see also A.R.S. § 13-101(2) (public policy of st | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Hallgreen2 sentences1992In one case, for example, the Court expressed the view that the Calder categories are not exclusive, quoting a jury instruction providing that “an ex post facto law is one which, in its operation, makes that criminal which was not so at the time the action was performed, or which increases the punishment, or, in short, which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage.” Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 228-29 , 2 S.Ct. 443, 449 , 27 L.Ed. 506 (1883) (quoting United States v. Hall, 26 F.Cas. 84, 86 (C.C.D.Pa.1809) (No. 15,285), aff'd, 10 1991For instance, in Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 , 2 S.Ct. 443 , 27 L.Ed. 506 (1883), the Court defined an ex post facto law as one which "[i]n relation to that offense, or its consequences, alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage." Id. at 228-29 , 2 S.Ct. at 449 , 27 L.Ed. at 511 ( quoting United States v. Hall, 26 F.Cas. 84, 86 (D.Pa. 1809)). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Mendivilgreen2 sentences1984See also, Marshall v. Garrison, 659 F.2d 440 (4th Cir.1981), where the ex post facto clause was applied to the federal youth corrections act, and State v. Mendivil, 122 Ariz. 6 , 592 P.2d 1272 (App. 1979), where it *174 was held that, even though the primary purpose of probation is rehabilitation, the retroactive application of a jurisdictional increase in length of probation violated the ex post facto clause. 1984See also, Marshall v. Garrison, 659 F.2d 440 (4th Cir.1981), where the ex post facto clause was applied to the federal youth corrections act, and State v. Mendivil, 122 Ariz. 6 , 592 P.2d 1272 (App. 1979), where it *174 was held that, even though the primary purpose of probation is rehabilitation, the retroactive application of a jurisdictional increase in length of probation violated the ex post facto clause. | 2 | 2 |
John S. Marshall v. W. L. Garrison, Warden, Maurice Sigler, Chairman, U.S. Parole Commissiongreen2 sentences1984See also, Marshall v. Garrison, 659 F.2d 440 (4th Cir.1981), where the ex post facto clause was applied to the federal youth corrections act, and State v. Mendivil, 122 Ariz. 6 , 592 P.2d 1272 (App.1979), where it was held that, even though the primary purpose of probation is rehabilitation, the retroactive application of a jurisdictional increase in length of probation violated the ex post facto clause. 1984See also, Marshall v. Garrison, 659 F.2d 440 (4th Cir.1981), where the ex post facto clause was applied to the federal youth corrections act, and State v. Mendivil, 122 Ariz. 6 , 592 P.2d 1272 (App. 1979), where it *174 was held that, even though the primary purpose of probation is rehabilitation, the retroactive application of a jurisdictional increase in length of probation violated the ex post facto clause. | 2 | 2 |
Calder v. Bullgreen2 sentences2020See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 , 531 & n.4 (1954) (stating that the ex post facto bar only applies to criminal laws, not civil regulatory laws); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798) (same); id. at 399 (Iredell, J., concurring) (same). ¶79 But our dissenting colleague is wrong to conclude that simply because Smith and Noble applied the intent/effects test in the ex post facto context, the test does not apply to other constitutional contexts, including the Sixth Amendment. 2020See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 , 531 & n.4 (1954) (stating that the ex post facto bar only applies to criminal laws, not civil regulatory laws); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798) (same); id. at 399 (Iredell, J., concurring) (same). ¶79 But our dissenting colleague is wrong to conclude that simply because Smith and Noble applied the intent/effects test in the ex post facto context, the test does not apply to other constitutional contexts, including the Sixth Amendment. | 1 | 9 |
Collins v. Youngbloodgreen2 sentences2013The trial court denied Medina’s motion to use the prior statute instead of § 13-752(G). ¶ 69 “The ex post facto doctrine prohibits a state from ‘retroactively altering] the definition of crimes or increasing] the punishment for criminal acts.’ ” Ring III, 204 Ariz. at 545 ¶ 16, 65 P.3d at 926 (alterations in original) (quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990)). 2013The trial court denied Medina’s motion to use the prior statute instead of § 13-752(G). ¶ 69 “The ex post facto doctrine prohibits a state from ‘retroactively altering] the definition of crimes or increasing] the punishment for criminal acts.’ ” Ring III, 204 Ariz. at 545 ¶ 16, 65 P.3d at 926 (alterations in original) (quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 , 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990)). | 1 | 7 |
Duncan v. Missourigreen2 sentences2003Hence, the changes to the state's capital sentencing procedures do not resemble the type of after-the-fact legislative evil contemplated by contemporary understandings of the ex post facto doctrine. ¶ 24 Even a procedural change amounts to an ex post facto violation, however, when it affects "matters of substance, by depriving a defendant of substantial protections with which the existing law surrounds the person accused of crime, or arbitrarily infringing upon substantial personal rights." Collins, 497 U.S. at 45 , 110 S.Ct. at 2720 (quoting Beazell, 269 U.S. at 171 , 46 S.Ct. at 69 ; Malloy 2003Hence, the changes to the state's capital sentencing procedures do not resemble the type of after-the-fact legislative evil contemplated by contemporary understandings of the ex post facto doctrine. ¶ 24 Even a procedural change amounts to an ex post facto violation, however, when it affects "matters of substance, by depriving a defendant of substantial protections with which the existing law surrounds the person accused of crime, or arbitrarily infringing upon substantial personal rights." Collins, 497 U.S. at 45 , 110 S.Ct. at 2720 (quoting Beazell, 269 U.S. at 171 , 46 S.Ct. at 69 ; Malloy | 1 | 4 |
Smith v. Doegreen2 sentences2018Because it undermines the community's sense of security, there is public injury as well. 433 U.S. 584 , 597-98, 97 S.Ct. 2861 , 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977) (emphasis added) (quoting Lisa Brodyaga et al., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Rape and Its Victims: A Report for Citizens Health Facilities, and Criminal Justice Agencies (1975) ). ¶ 44 Unsurprisingly, then, the Supreme Court has recognized that sexual crimes justify distinctive legislative treatment in the confinement context. ¶ 45 In Smith v. Doe , 538 U.S. 84 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003), the Court upheld a state's sex-offender registry 2018Because it undermines the community's sense of security, there is public injury as well. 433 U.S. 584 , 597-98, 97 S.Ct. 2861 , 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977) (emphasis added) (quoting Lisa Brodyaga et al., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Rape and Its Victims: A Report for Citizens Health Facilities, and Criminal Justice Agencies (1975) ). ¶ 44 Unsurprisingly, then, the Supreme Court has recognized that sexual crimes justify distinctive legislative treatment in the confinement context. ¶ 45 In Smith v. Doe , 538 U.S. 84 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003), the Court upheld a state's sex-offender registry | 1 | 3 |
Lindsey v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2018Although a distinct provision of the Constitution, the Ex Post Facto Clause is closely related to substantive due process because it likewise "forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated." Kansas v. Hendricks , 521 U.S. 346 , 370, 117 S.Ct. 2072 , 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (quoting Lindsey v. Washington , 301 U.S. 397 , 401, 57 S.Ct. 797 , 81 L.Ed. 1182 (1937) ). 2018Although a distinct provision of the Constitution, the Ex Post Facto Clause is closely related to substantive due process because it likewise "forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated." Kansas v. Hendricks , 521 U.S. 346 , 370, 117 S.Ct. 2072 , 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (quoting Lindsey v. Washington , 301 U.S. 397 , 401, 57 S.Ct. 797 , 81 L.Ed. 1182 (1937) ). | 1 | 2 |
Kring v. Missourired2 sentences1992In one case, for example, the Court expressed the view that the Calder categories are not exclusive, quoting a jury instruction providing that “an ex post facto law is one which, in its operation, makes that criminal which was not so at the time the action was performed, or which increases the punishment, or, in short, which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage.” Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 228-29 , 2 S.Ct. 443, 449 , 27 L.Ed. 506 (1883) (quoting United States v. Hall, 26 F.Cas. 84, 86 (C.C.D.Pa.1809) (No. 15,285), aff'd, 10 1992In one case, for example, the Court expressed the view that the Calder categories are not exclusive, quoting a jury instruction providing that “an ex post facto law is one which, in its operation, makes that criminal which was not so at the time the action was performed, or which increases the punishment, or, in short, which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage.” Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 228-29 , 2 S.Ct. 443, 449 , 27 L.Ed. 506 (1883) (quoting United States v. Hall, 26 F.Cas. 84, 86 (C.C.D.Pa.1809) (No. 15,285), aff'd, 10 | 1 | 2 |
State v. Cociogreen2 sentences1992The application of § 13-3821 to Noble and McCuin violates the ex post facto clause only if it is a “law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.” Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390 ; see also State v. Cocio, 147 Ariz. 277, 284 , 709 P.2d 1336, 1343 (1985) (“the Arizona Legislature may not enact a law which imposes any additional or increased penalty for a crime after its commission”). 1992The application of § 13-3821 to Noble and McCuin violates the ex post facto clause only if it is a “law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.” Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390 ; see also State v. Cocio, 147 Ariz. 277, 284 , 709 P.2d 1336, 1343 (1985) (“the Arizona Legislature may not enact a law which imposes any additional or increased penalty for a crime after its commission”). | 1 | 2 |
Galvan v. Pressgreen1 sentence2020See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 , 531 & n.4 (1954) (stating that the ex post facto bar only applies to criminal laws, not civil regulatory laws); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798) (same); id. at 399 (Iredell, J., concurring) (same). ¶79 But our dissenting colleague is wrong to conclude that simply because Smith and Noble applied the intent/effects test in the ex post facto context, the test does not apply to other constitutional contexts, including the Sixth Amendment. | 1 | 1 |
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinezgreen1 sentence2020To the contrary, the test has its “earlier origins in cases under the Sixth and Eighth Amendments,” and has been applied “in various constitutional contexts.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 ; see also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 , 168–69 nn.22–29 (1963) (listing cases using the intent/effects test in various constitutional contexts). ¶80 Thus, for example, the Supreme Court applied the intent/effects test in the Sixth Amendment context in Mendoza-Martinez. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Newtongreen1 sentence2016He claims that A.R.S. § 13-719 violates the ex post facto doctrine because the statute “takes away the vested right to a hearing to be absolutely discharged from parole, instead requiring defendants to remain on parole for the remainder of their lives.” “A basic principle of criminal law requires that an offender be sentenced under the laws in effect at the time he committed the offense for which he is being sentenced.” State v. Newton, 200 Ariz. 1, 2, ¶ 3 (2001). | 1 | 1 |
State of Arizona v. Ronnie Roy Veragreen2 sentences2016See State v. Vera, 235 Ariz. 571 , 576 ¶¶ 21–22, 334 P.3d 754, 759 (App. 2014) (concluding that H.B. 2593 is not impermissibly retroactive and does not impermissibly infringe “on the role of the judiciary”). ¶7 Regarding Nouan’s ex post facto argument, Nouan claims that A.R.S. § 13–716 violates the ex post facto doctrine because the statute “takes away the vested right to a hearing to be absolutely discharged from parole, instead requiring defendants to remain on parole for the remainder of their lives.” However, before the statute’s effective date, Nouan had no substantive right to parole eli 2016See State v. Vera, 235 Ariz. 571 , 576 ¶¶ 21–22, 334 P.3d 754, 759 (App. 2014) (concluding that H.B. 2593 is not impermissibly retroactive and does not impermissibly infringe “on the role of the judiciary”). ¶7 Regarding Nouan’s ex post facto argument, Nouan claims that A.R.S. § 13–716 violates the ex post facto doctrine because the statute “takes away the vested right to a hearing to be absolutely discharged from parole, instead requiring defendants to remain on parole for the remainder of their lives.” However, before the statute’s effective date, Nouan had no substantive right to parole eli | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Shane B.green | 1 | 1 |
| Huckaby v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Freeman v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bragangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Eldredgegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Carpenter v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Pandeligreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Beckermangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Herbert O. JENSEN, Appellant, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Appelleegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jones v. Hecklergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tom Wiley v. Otis R. Bowen, Secretary, H.H.Sgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Andrew Curtis CALDWELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appelleegreen | 1 | 1 |
| cluster 754538green | 1 | 1 |
| Graham v. Bowengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Casalvera v. Commissioner of Social Securitygreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Stuart Jeffrey Paskowgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Alston v. Robinsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Yellowmexicangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Staatzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Flemming v. Nestorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Michael L. Love v. C. J. Fitzharris, Warden, California State Prison, San Quentin, and the People of the State of Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2010San Carlos was the first Arizona case to rely on Klein in separation of powers jurisprudence. 193 Ariz. at 210, ¶ 33, 972 P.2d at 194 . 2010San Carlos was the first Arizona ease to rely on Klein in separation of powers jurisprudence. 193 Ariz. at 210, ¶ 33, 972 P.2d at 194 . | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Dobbert v. Florida
green
2 sentences2003Instead, the Court concluded, the statutory change between the two sentencing methods was “clearly procedural,” and “[t]he new statute simply altered the methods employed in determining whether the death penalty was to be imposed; there was no change in the quantum of punishment attached to the crime.” Id. at 293-94 , 97 S.Ct. at 2298 . ¶ 21 The Supreme Court also rejected an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge in Collins v. Youngblood, a non-death penalty ease. 2003Instead, the Court concluded, the statutory change between the two sentencing methods was "clearly procedural," and "[t]he new statute simply altered the methods employed in determining whether the death penalty was to be imposed; there was no change in the quantum of punishment attached to the crime." Id. at 293-94 , 97 S.Ct. at 2298 . ¶ 21 The Supreme Court also rejected an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge in Collins v. Youngblood , a non-death penalty case. | 2 | 2003–2005 |
Beazell v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2003Instead, the Court concluded, the statutory change between the two sentencing methods was "clearly procedural," and "[t]he new statute simply altered the methods employed in determining whether the death penalty was to be imposed; there was no change in the quantum of punishment attached to the crime." Id. at 293-94 , 97 S.Ct. at 2298 . ¶ 21 The Supreme Court also rejected an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge in Collins v. Youngblood , a non-death penalty case. 2003Hence, the changes to the state's capital sentencing procedures do not resemble the type of after-the-fact legislative evil contemplated by contemporary understandings of the ex post facto doctrine. ¶ 24 Even a procedural change amounts to an ex post facto violation, however, when it affects "matters of substance, by depriving a defendant of substantial protections with which the existing law surrounds the person accused of crime, or arbitrarily infringing upon substantial personal rights." Collins, 497 U.S. at 45 , 110 S.Ct. at 2720 (quoting Beazell, 269 U.S. at 171 , 46 S.Ct. at 69 ; Malloy | 2 | 1992–2003 |
De Veau v. Braisted
green
2 sentences1996We must look to “whether the legislative aim was to punish [an] individual for past activity, or whether the restriction of the individual comes about as a relevant incident to a regulation of a present situation.” De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 , 80 S.Ct. 1146, 1155 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960). 1996We must look to “whether the legislative aim was to punish [an] individual for past activity, or whether the restriction of the individual comes about as a relevant incident to a regulation of a present situation.” De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 , 80 S.Ct. 1146, 1155 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960). | 2 | 1991–1996 |
Thompson v. Utah
red
2 sentences1995For example, the Collins Court specifically overruled Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 , 18 S.Ct. 620 , 42 L.Ed. 1061 (1898), stating that a retroactive change “reducing the size of juries in criminal cases from 12 persons to 8 ...” would not affect the ex post facto clause. 1995For example, the Collins Court specifically overruled Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 , 18 S.Ct. 620 , 42 L.Ed. 1061 (1898), stating that a retroactive change “reducing the size of juries in criminal cases from 12 persons to 8 ...” would not affect the ex post facto clause. | 2 | 1991–1995 |
State v. Noble
green
2 sentences1991Recently, in State v. Noble, 167 Ariz. 440 , 808 P.2d 325 (App. 1990), a different panel of this court held that such a requirement violates the ex post facto clause of the Arizona Constitution. 1991Recently, in State v. Noble, 167 Ariz. 440 , 808 P.2d 325 (App. 1990), a different panel of this court held that such a requirement violates the ex post facto clause of the Arizona Constitution. | 2 | 1991–1992 |
Kansas v. Hendricks
green
2 sentences2018Although a distinct provision of the Constitution, the Ex Post Facto Clause is closely related to substantive due process because it likewise "forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated." Kansas v. Hendricks , 521 U.S. 346 , 370, 117 S.Ct. 2072 , 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (quoting Lindsey v. Washington , 301 U.S. 397 , 401, 57 S.Ct. 797 , 81 L.Ed. 1182 (1937) ). 2018Although a distinct provision of the Constitution, the Ex Post Facto Clause is closely related to substantive due process because it likewise "forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated." Kansas v. Hendricks , 521 U.S. 346 , 370, 117 S.Ct. 2072 , 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (quoting Lindsey v. Washington , 301 U.S. 397 , 401, 57 S.Ct. 797 , 81 L.Ed. 1182 (1937) ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Coker v. Georgia
green
2 sentences2018Because it undermines the community's sense of security, there is public injury as well. 433 U.S. 584 , 597-98, 97 S.Ct. 2861 , 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977) (emphasis added) (quoting Lisa Brodyaga et al., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Rape and Its Victims: A Report for Citizens Health Facilities, and Criminal Justice Agencies (1975) ). ¶ 44 Unsurprisingly, then, the Supreme Court has recognized that sexual crimes justify distinctive legislative treatment in the confinement context. ¶ 45 In Smith v. Doe , 538 U.S. 84 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003), the Court upheld a state's sex-offender registry 2018Because it undermines the community's sense of security, there is public injury as well. 433 U.S. 584 , 597-98, 97 S.Ct. 2861 , 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977) (emphasis added) (quoting Lisa Brodyaga et al., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Rape and Its Victims: A Report for Citizens Health Facilities, and Criminal Justice Agencies (1975) ). ¶ 44 Unsurprisingly, then, the Supreme Court has recognized that sexual crimes justify distinctive legislative treatment in the confinement context. ¶ 45 In Smith v. Doe , 538 U.S. 84 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003), the Court upheld a state's sex-offender registry | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Henry
green
2 sentences2014Laws that inflict further punishment cannot be applied retroactively without violating the ex post facto clauses, but a law that is only regulatory in nature “will withstand an ex post facto challenge.” Henry, 224 Ariz. 164, ¶ 8 , 228 P.3d at 903 . ¶ 11 When evaluating whether to characterize a law as punitive or “a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive,” we look first to the legislature’s intent. 2014Laws that inflict further punishment cannot be applied retroactively without violating the ex post facto clauses, but a law that is only regulatory in nature “will withstand an ex post facto challenge.” Henry, 224 Ariz. 164, ¶ 8 , 228 P.3d at 903 . ¶ 11 When evaluating whether to characterize a law as punitive or “a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive,” we look first to the legislature’s intent. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Clevenger
green
1 sentence2011Dolph-Hostetter, 664 N.W.2d at 260-61 ; Palmer v. Clarke, 408 F.3d 423 , 431 (8th Cir.2005) (upholding the Nebraska Supreme Court’s determination that retroactive application of an amendment to Nebraska’s marital communications privilege was not a violation of federal ex post facto prohibition); State v. Bragan, 920 S.W.2d 227, 241 (Tenn.Cr.App.1995) (holding “laws which change rules of procedure but which do not affect any substantial right of a defendant are not ex post facto laws,” including an amendment to the marital communications privilege); Freeman v. State, 786 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.App. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
cluster 790284
green
1 sentence2011Dolph-Hostetter, 664 N.W.2d at 260-61 ; Palmer v. Clarke, 408 F.3d 423 , 431 (8th Cir.2005) (upholding the Nebraska Supreme Court’s determination that retroactive application of an amendment to Nebraska’s marital communications privilege was not a violation of federal ex post facto prohibition); State v. Bragan, 920 S.W.2d 227, 241 (Tenn.Cr.App.1995) (holding “laws which change rules of procedure but which do not affect any substantial right of a defendant are not ex post facto laws,” including an amendment to the marital communications privilege); Freeman v. State, 786 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.App. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| People v. Dolph-Hostetter green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Stogner v. California green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Malloy v. South Carolina green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Mark v. Caldwell green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Jensen v. Heckler green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Saucedo v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| The United States v. Hall and Worth green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Hamilton green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. McCuin green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Matter of Appeal in Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| John J. Rodriguez v. United States Parole Commission and Metropolitan Correctional Center, Robert Elsea, Warden green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Frank v. Mangum green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| State v. Steelman green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| John Henry Knapp, Arizona State Prison Inmate No. 33659, and All Inmates of the Arizona State Prison Similarly Situated v. Harold Cardwell green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| State v. Watson green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Ludwin v. Cambridge Mutual Fire Insurance green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Hampton v. Wyrick green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Knapp v. Cardwell green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Fitzharris v. Love green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Cooley v. Endictor green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Enders v. Esquire Theaters of America, Inc. green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| State v. Deddens green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.