second part test in Oregon

2017As to the second part of the test, “a petitioner must show that his or her trial counsel’s deficiency had a tendency to affect the verdict.” Short v. Hill, 195 Or App 723, 729 , 99 P3d 311 (2004), rev den, 338 Or 374 (2005). 4 On appeal, petitioner essentially renews the arguments he made to the post-conviction court.

2010As to the second part of the test, “a petitioner must show that his or her trial counsel’s deficiency had a tendency to affect the verdict.” Short v. Hill, 195 Or App 723, 729 , 99 P3d 311 (2004), rev den, 338 Or 374 (2005).

2017As to the second part of the test, “a petitioner must show that his or her trial counsel’s deficiency had a tendency to affect the verdict.” Short v. Hill, 195 Or App 723, 729 , 99 P3d 311 (2004), rev den, 338 Or 374 (2005). 4 On appeal, petitioner essentially renews the arguments he made to the post-conviction court.

2017As to the second part of the test, “a petitioner must show that his or her trial counsel’s deficiency had a tendency to affect the verdict.” Short v. Hill, 195 Or App 723, 729 , 99 P3d 311 (2004), rev den, 338 Or 374 (2005). 4 On appeal, petitioner essentially renews the arguments he made to the post-conviction court.

2011State v. Moore / Coen, 349 Or 371, 387-92 , 245 P3d 101 (2010); State v. Phillips, 217 Or App 93, 97-98 , 174 P3d 1032 (2007).

2011State v. Moore / Coen, 349 Or 371, 387-92 , 245 P3d 101 (2010); State v. Phillips, 217 Or App 93, 97-98 , 174 P3d 1032 (2007).

2011Stillman, 333 Or at 145 .

2005ORS 419A.004(20) defines a “reasonable time” as “a period of time that is reasonable given a child or ward’s emotional and developmental needs and ability to form and maintain lasting attachments.” That is a child-specific inquiry requiring us to look at “testimony in psychological and developmental terms regarding the particular child’s requirements.” Stillman, 333 Or at 146 .

2011State v. Moore / Coen, 349 Or 371, 387-92 , 245 P3d 101 (2010); State v. Phillips, 217 Or App 93, 97-98 , 174 P3d 1032 (2007).

2011State v. Moore / Coen, 349 Or 371, 387-92 , 245 P3d 101 (2010); State v. Phillips, 217 Or App 93, 97-98 , 174 P3d 1032 (2007).

2004Id.

2002Ward, 448 US at 249 .

2022That question “focuses on the nature of the par- ties’ obligations and expectations under the contract.” Estey, 324 Or at 377 .

2021Only if the answer to that first question is “yes” does the court proceed to the second part of the inquiry—assessing “the likelihood that that risk will be realized.” Id.

2018Ultimately, we conclude that the "specific and articulable" facts that the detectives identified in their testimony support a reasonable suspicion that defendant and Lando, both together and individually, "might pose an immediate threat of serious physical injury" to the police officers. **719 Having determined that the officer safety concerns that the state has identified were reasonable and are supported with specific and articulable facts in the record, we turn to the second part of the analysis described in Bates : Whether the actions taken by the officers, purportedly as safety precaution

2018Ultimately, we conclude that the "specific and articulable" facts that the detectives identified in their testimony support a reasonable suspicion that defendant and Lando, both together and individually, "might pose an immediate threat of serious physical injury" to the police officers. **719 Having determined that the officer safety concerns that the state has identified were reasonable and are supported with specific and articulable facts in the record, we turn to the second part of the analysis described in Bates : Whether the actions taken by the officers, purportedly as safety precaution

2015Plaintiffs concern here is addressed by the second part of the test of admissibility discussed above: “the proponent of the evidence must offer sufficient proof that the uncharged misconduct was committed and that [the person] committed it,” Johnson, 313 Or at 195 .

2015The Regular Division of this court determined that, under the second part of the test, “cases fall into two categories: those cases involving residences and those not involving residences.” Washington Co. Assessor II, 18 OTR at 418 .

2015For the second part of the test, the Regular Division of this court observed that in cases not involving residences, “so long as the use of the property related primarily to church business, the property was held exempt.” Washington Co. Assessor II, 18 OTR at 418 .

2014The Supreme Court explained in Glushko /Little that a defendant’s knowing failure to appear for a scheduled court hearing was relevant to the second part of that analysis, i.e., the reasonableness of the delay. 351 Or at 316 .

2014See, e.g., Coulson, 243 Or App at 265 (citing cases); id. at 272-73 (the defendant could not have consented to delay when he did not have notice that an indictment had been issued against him); State v. Bigelow, 197 Or App 441, 446 , 106 P3d 162 , rev den, 339 Or 544 (2005) (accepting state’s concession that the defendant neither caused nor consented to delay where the defendant “had no knowledge of the indictment or the outstanding warrant until she was arrested”).

2014See, e.g., Coulson, 243 Or App at 265 (citing cases); id. at 272-73 (the defendant could not have consented to delay when he did not have notice that an indictment had been issued against him); State v. Bigelow, 197 Or App 441, 446 , 106 P3d 162 , rev den, 339 Or 544 (2005) (accepting state’s concession that the defendant neither caused nor consented to delay where the defendant “had no knowledge of the indictment or the outstanding warrant until she was arrested”).

2007The methodology prescribed by ORS 133.693 and the Supreme Court's decisions under the statute — including Harp and State v. Keeney, 323 Or. 309, 317 , 918 P.2d 419 (1996) — is as follows: "[T]he suppression judge begins with the affidavit(s) and record, if any, upon which the magistrate issued the warrant.

2007The methodology prescribed by ORS 133.693 and the Supreme Court's decisions under the statute — including Harp and State v. Keeney, 323 Or. 309, 317 , 918 P.2d 419 (1996) — is as follows: "[T]he suppression judge begins with the affidavit(s) and record, if any, upon which the magistrate issued the warrant.

1997It is well established that employers have an interest in the consistent application of the rule and, therefore, may assert the rule of responsibility as a defense even when a claimant has chosen to prove actual causation. 3 Spurlock, 89 Or App at 464 -65 (citing Runft, 303 Or at 501-02 ).

1997It is well established that employers have an interest in the consistent application of the rule and, therefore, may assert the rule of responsibility as a defense even when a claimant has chosen to prove actual causation. 3 Spurlock, 89 Or App at 464 -65 (citing Runft, 303 Or at 501-02 ).

1996As the Supreme Court said in Hydraulic Servocontrols, 294 Or at 387 : “It is the defendant’s contacts with the forum state which make it reasonable for that state to extend the territorial limits of its power and exercise jurisdiction.

1992“A: No.” Further, defendants expected repayment only if the venture became a successful operation. 2 See Pepper v. Litton, 308 US 295, 306 , 60 S Ct 238 , 84 L Ed 281 (1939).

1992“A: No.” Further, defendants expected repayment only if the venture became a successful operation. 2 See Pepper v. Litton, 308 US 295, 306 , 60 S Ct 238 , 84 L Ed 281 (1939).

1989Following the rule established in United States v. Morgan, supra, section 636, adopted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub.

1981They rely on State v. Carlile, supra, 290 Or at 168 , for the proposition that some independent police corroboration is required when the informant is named and is criminally involved with the defendant.

1980First, we are impliedly overruling Kajundzich v. SIAC, 164 Or 510 , 102 P2d 924 (1940), and Graham v. SIAC, 164 Or 626 , 102 P2d 927 (1940).

1980First, we are impliedly overruling Kajundzich v. SIAC, 164 Or 510 , 102 P2d 924 (1940), and Graham v. SIAC, 164 Or 626 , 102 P2d 927 (1940).

1980First, we are impliedly overruling Kajundzich v. SIAC, 164 Or 510 , 102 P2d 924 (1940), and Graham v. SIAC, 164 Or 626 , 102 P2d 927 (1940).

1980First, we are impliedly overruling Kajundzich v. SIAC, 164 Or 510 , 102 P2d 924 (1940), and Graham v. SIAC, 164 Or 626 , 102 P2d 927 (1940).

1978Keeland v. Yamhill Co., 24 Or App 85, 89-90 , 545 P2d 137 (1976).

1978Keeland v. Yamhill Co., 24 Or App 85, 89-90 , 545 P2d 137 (1976).