13 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Borghesigreen1 sentence2026See id. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Pittsgreen2 sentences2018Id. at ¶ 39, 307 P.3d at 1082 . ¶11 Another well-established exception to the warrant requirement is the plain view doctrine, which provides that police officers “are not required to close their eyes to any evidence that they plainly see while conducting otherwise legitimate searches.” People v. Gothard, 185 P.3d 180, 183 (Colo. 2008) (quoting People v. Pitts, 13 P.3d 1218, 1222 (Colo. 2000)). 2018Id. at ¶ 39, 307 P.3d at 1082 . ¶11 Another well-established exception to the warrant requirement is the plain view doctrine, which provides that police officers "are not required to close their eyes to any evidence that they plainly see *277 while conducting otherwise legitimate searches." People v. Gothard , 185 P.3d 180 , 183 (Colo. 2008) (quoting People v. Pitts , 13 P.3d 1218 , 1222 (Colo. 2000) ). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gothardgreen2 sentences2018Id. at ¶ 39, 307 P.3d at 1082 . ¶11 Another well-established exception to the warrant requirement is the plain view doctrine, which provides that police officers “are not required to close their eyes to any evidence that they plainly see while conducting otherwise legitimate searches.” People v. Gothard, 185 P.3d 180, 183 (Colo. 2008) (quoting People v. Pitts, 13 P.3d 1218, 1222 (Colo. 2000)). 2018Id. at ¶ 39, 307 P.3d at 1082 . ¶11 Another well-established exception to the warrant requirement is the plain view doctrine, which provides that police officers "are not required to close their eyes to any evidence that they plainly see *277 while conducting otherwise legitimate searches." People v. Gothard , 185 P.3d 180 , 183 (Colo. 2008) (quoting People v. Pitts , 13 P.3d 1218 , 1222 (Colo. 2000) ). | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. DeWittgreen1 sentence2011See In re Estate of DeWitt, 54 P.3d 849, 854 (Colo.2002). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Steadgreen1 sentence2002Hudson v. United States, supra; Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 , 83 S.Ct. 554 , 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963); In re Cardwell, 50 P.3d 897 , (Colo.2002); see People v. Stead, 66 P.3d 117 (Colo.App.2002). | 1 | 1 |
People in Interest of Dveiringreen1 sentence1988See Dveirin, 755 P.2d at 1211 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bernal v. People
green
1 sentence2020Id. at 192 . ¶ 75 The trial court found, with record support, that the lineup was impermissibly suggestive, so we proceed to the second part of the test and review whether the identification was nonetheless reliable. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Brunsting
green
2 sentences2018Id. at ¶ 39, 307 P.3d at 1082 . ¶11 Another well-established exception to the warrant requirement is the plain view doctrine, which provides that police officers “are not required to close their eyes to any evidence that they plainly see while conducting otherwise legitimate searches.” People v. Gothard, 185 P.3d 180, 183 (Colo. 2008) (quoting People v. Pitts, 13 P.3d 1218, 1222 (Colo. 2000)). 2018Id. at ¶ 39, 307 P.3d at 1082 . ¶11 Another well-established exception to the warrant requirement is the plain view doctrine, which provides that police officers "are not required to close their eyes to any evidence that they plainly see *277 while conducting otherwise legitimate searches." People v. Gothard , 185 P.3d 180 , 183 (Colo. 2008) (quoting People v. Pitts , 13 P.3d 1218 , 1222 (Colo. 2000) ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Williams
green
1 sentence2004Such a determination turns on the second part of the analysis under People v. Williams, supra, concerning the factual components of each prosecution and the evidence in support thereof. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez
green
2 sentences2002Hudson v. United States, supra; Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 , 83 S.Ct. 554 , 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963); In re Cardwell, 50 P.3d 897 , (Colo.2002); see People v. Stead, 66 P.3d 117 (Colo.App.2002). 2002Hudson v. United States, supra; Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 , 83 S.Ct. 554 , 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963); In re Cardwell, 50 P.3d 897 , (Colo.2002); see People v. Stead, 66 P.3d 117 (Colo.App.2002). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
In Re Cardwell
green
1 sentence2002Hudson v. United States, supra; Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 , 83 S.Ct. 554 , 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963); In re Cardwell, 50 P.3d 897 , (Colo.2002); see People v. Stead, 66 P.3d 117 (Colo.App.2002). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Pickett v. Brown
green
2 sentences1990The Court then applied the second part of the test and concluded that “the 2-year statute of limitations was not substantially related to Tennessee’s asserted interest in preventing stale and fraudulent claims.” Id. 1990Pickett, 462 U.S. at 15 , 103 S.Ct. at 2207 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Dailey
green
2 sentences1988The second part of the test set forth in People v. Dailey, 639 P.2d 1068 (Colo.1982), requires that the defendant set forth with specificity the precise statements in the affidavit which are being challenged. 1988The second part of the test set forth in People v. Dailey, 639 P.2d 1068 (Colo.1982), requires that the defendant set forth with specificity the precise statements in the affidavit which are being challenged. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commerciales, S. A. v. Rogers
green
2 sentences1987In Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 , 78 S.Ct. 1087, 1095 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1255 (1958), the Court stated: Rule 37 should not be construed to authorize dismissal of this complaint because of petitioner’s noncompliance with a pretrial production order when it has been established that failure to comply has been due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of petitioner. . 1987In Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 , 78 S.Ct. 1087, 1095 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1255 (1958), the Court stated: Rule 37 should not be construed to authorize dismissal of this complaint because of petitioner’s noncompliance with a pretrial production order when it has been established that failure to comply has been due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of petitioner. . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Lemon v. Kurtzman
red
2 sentences1986Political divisiveness was first identified as relevant to entanglement analysis in Lemon. 403 U.S. at 622-624 , 91 S.Ct. at 2115-2116 . 1986Political divisiveness was first identified as relevant to entanglement analysis in Lemon. 403 U.S. at 622-624 , 91 S.Ct. at 2115-2116 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Conrad v. City & County of Denver
green
1 sentence1985Id.; Conrad, 656 P.2d at 668 ; Cloverleaf Kennel Club, 620 P.2d at 1056-57 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Cloverleaf Kennel Club, Inc. v. Colorado Racing Commission
green
1 sentence1985Id.; Conrad, 656 P.2d at 668 ; Cloverleaf Kennel Club, 620 P.2d at 1056-57 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
People v. Ward
green
2 sentences1973People v. Ward, 181 Colo. 246 , 508 P.2d 1257 (1973); and People v. Peschong, supra. As to the second part of the test, i.e., the reliability of the informant, we held in People v. Ward, supra, that the affidavit there related sufficient facts to permit a finding by the issuing judge that the informant was reliable. 1973People v. Ward, 181 Colo. 246 , 508 P.2d 1257 (1973); and People v. Peschong, supra. As to the second part of the test, i.e., the reliability of the informant, we held in People v. Ward, supra, that the affidavit there related sufficient facts to permit a finding by the issuing judge that the informant was reliable. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.