second part test in Maryland

2025This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the [petitioner] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at - 14 - 687.

2023GANT Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), allows police, without a warrant, to “search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” When the State relies on the second part of the exception—where it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest—the police may search the glove compartment after a defendant has been arrested for stolen tags because it is reasonable to

2023In White v. State, 248 Md.

2021Id. at 400–01. 15 After determining that the anonymous tip was sufficiently reliable, the Supreme Court proceeded to the second part of the analysis under Terry—whether, at the time of the stop, the officer had a reasonable belief that the criminal activity was ongoing—explaining that “[e]ven a reliable tip will justify an investigative stop only if it creates reasonable suspicion that ‘criminal activity may be afoot.’” Id. at 401 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 ).

2021The Court explained that it must “therefore determine whether the 911 caller’s report of being run off the roadway created reasonable suspicion of an ongoing crime such as drunk driving as opposed to an isolated episode of past recklessness.” Id.

2021Id. at 400–01. 15 After determining that the anonymous tip was sufficiently reliable, the Supreme Court proceeded to the second part of the analysis under Terry—whether, at the time of the stop, the officer had a reasonable belief that the criminal activity was ongoing—explaining that “[e]ven a reliable tip will justify an investigative stop only if it creates reasonable suspicion that ‘criminal activity may be afoot.’” Id. at 401 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 ).

2021Id. at 400–01. 15 After determining that the anonymous tip was sufficiently reliable, the Supreme Court proceeded to the second part of the analysis under Terry—whether, at the time of the stop, the officer had a reasonable belief that the criminal activity was ongoing—explaining that “[e]ven a reliable tip will justify an investigative stop only if it creates reasonable suspicion that ‘criminal activity may be afoot.’” Id. at 401 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 ).

2020John Deere, supra, 406 Md. at 145–46.

2019As we have noted, of the two criteria to determine whether an action is quasi-judicial, the fact-finding process is "the most weighty criterion[.]" id. at 333 , 144 A.3d at 659 (quoting Overpak , 395 Md. at 33 , 909 A.2d at 245 ).

2019As we have noted, of the two criteria to determine whether an action is quasi-judicial, the fact-finding process is "the most weighty criterion[.]" id. at 333 , 144 A.3d at 659 (quoting Overpak , 395 Md. at 33 , 909 A.2d at 245 ).

2003Ins., 111 Md.App. 546, 560-61 , 683 A.2d 179 (1996).

2003Ins., 111 Md.App. 546, 560-61 , 683 A.2d 179 (1996).

2001In Brown, 357 Md. at 367-68 , 744 A.2d at 60-61 , in finding that the second part of the test was satisfied, we stated that: The lead poisoning injury alleged here is within the range of reasonable anticipation and probability____ Under these circumstances, we hold that a jury could find that a reason ably prudent landlord would realize, after receiving notice, that flaking, loose or peeling paint presents an unsafe or dangerous condition and thus would investigate and correct the condition.

2001In Brown, 357 Md. at 367-68 , 744 A.2d at 60-61 , in finding that the second part of the test was satisfied, we stated that: The lead poisoning injury alleged here is within the range of reasonable anticipation and probability____ Under these circumstances, we hold that a jury could find that a reason ably prudent landlord would realize, after receiving notice, that flaking, loose or peeling paint presents an unsafe or dangerous condition and thus would investigate and correct the condition.

2001In Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661 , 645 A.2d 1147 (1994), we stated that: Based on the evidence presented, however, the jury in the instant case could have found that Scoken [27] received actual notice of peeling paint on the premises and also, because of Chodak’s knowledge about older homes often containing lead-based paint, knew or had reason to know that the peeling paint in this house was lead-based.

2001In Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661 , 645 A.2d 1147 (1994), we stated that: Based on the evidence presented, however, the jury in the instant case could have found that Scoken [27] received actual notice of peeling paint on the premises and also, because of Chodak’s knowledge about older homes often containing lead-based paint, knew or had reason to know that the peeling paint in this house was lead-based.

1998The express holding of One 1958 Plymouth Sedan had been that the exclusionary rule is applicable to forfeiture proceedings SUCH AS THE ONE INVOLVED HERE. 380 U.S. at 702 , 85 S.Ct. at 1251 (Emphasis supplied).

1996Evaluating the list of considerations set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 , 83 S.Ct. 554, 567-68 , 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963), the Court found that only one of the *202 factors—“whether or not the proscribed behavior is already a crime”—even remotely supported the proposition that the forfeiture was a criminal penalty. 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 365 , 104 S.Ct. at 1104 .

1996Evaluating the list of considerations set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 , 83 S.Ct. 554, 567-68 , 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963), the Court found that only one of the *202 factors—“whether or not the proscribed behavior is already a crime”—even remotely supported the proposition that the forfeiture was a criminal penalty. 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 365 , 104 S.Ct. at 1104 .

1996With regard to the second part of the analysis, the Court held that “ ‘[o]nly the clearest proof that the purpose and effect of the forfeiture are punitive will suffice to override Congress’ manifest preference for a civil sanction.” Id. at 365 , 104 S.Ct. at 1106 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 , 2641—42, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980)).

1996With regard to the second part of the analysis, the Court held that “ ‘[o]nly the clearest proof that the purpose and effect of the forfeiture are punitive will suffice to override Congress’ manifest preference for a civil sanction.” Id. at 365 , 104 S.Ct. at 1106 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 , 2641—42, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980)).

1996With regard to the second part of the analysis, the Court held that “ ‘[o]nly the clearest proof that the purpose and effect of the forfeiture are punitive will suffice to override Congress’ manifest preference for a civil sanction.” Id. at 365 , 104 S.Ct. at 1106 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 , 2641—42, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980)).

1996With regard to the second part of the analysis, the Court held that “ ‘[o]nly the clearest proof that the purpose and effect of the forfeiture are punitive will suffice to override Congress’ manifest preference for a civil sanction.” Id. at 365 , 104 S.Ct. at 1106 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 , 2641—42, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980)).

1988Xerox, 290 Md. at 145 , 428 A.2d at 1218-1219 .

1988Xerox, 290 Md. at 145 , 428 A.2d at 1218-1219 .