second part test in Michigan

2014Even if defendants had satisfied the first part of the federal test for disproportionality, however, they have also failed to satisfy the second part of the test, which compares the life-without-parole sentence defendants seek to invalidate “with the sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.” Id.

2014Even if defendants had satisfied the first part of the federal test for disproportionality, however, they have also failed to satisfy the second part of the test, which compares the life-without-parole sentence defendants seek to invalidate “with the sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.” Id.

2021We note that this Court has upheld the imposition of the 25-year mandatory minimum sentence for the offense of sexual penetration of a preteen victim by an adult, “[e]ven when there is no palpable physical injury or overtly coercive act . . . .” Benton, 294 Mich App at 206 . -5- goal, our proportionality review of [the defendant’s] sentence must take that goal into account. [The defendant’s] sentence is justified by the State’s public-safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons, and amply supported by his own long, serious criminal record. [The defendant] has been convict

2019In order to validly waive the right against compelled self-incrimination, the defendant need only have a “very basic understanding of those rights . . . .” People v Eliason, 300 Mich App 293, 304 ; 833 NW2d 357 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2019In order to validly waive the right against compelled self-incrimination, the defendant need only have a “very basic understanding of those rights . . . .” People v Eliason, 300 Mich App 293, 304 ; 833 NW2d 357 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2019Monaco, 317 Mich App at 749 .

2019Accordingly, we consider the second part of the inquiry set forth in Tanner as to whether Perez’s waiver was made with “full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Tanner, 496 Mich at 209 .

2015Jordan, 275 Mich App at 667 .

2014In determining “whether an act has the purpose or effect of being punitive, courts consider seven factors noted in Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US 144, 168-169 ; 83 S Ct 554 ; 9 L Ed 2d 644 (1963).” Earl, 495 Mich at 43-44 .

2014In determining “whether an act has the purpose or effect of being punitive, courts consider seven factors noted in Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US 144, 168-169 ; 83 S Ct 554 ; 9 L Ed 2d 644 (1963).” Earl, 495 Mich at 43-44 .

2014In determining “whether an act has the purpose or effect of being punitive, courts consider seven factors noted in Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US 144, 168-169 ; 83 S Ct 554 ; 9 L Ed 2d 644 (1963).” Earl, 495 Mich at 43-44 .

2000See People v Perry, 218 Mich App 520, 542 ; 554 NW2d 362 (1996), aff’d on other grounds 460 Mich 55 ; 594 NW2d 477 (1999).

2000See People v Perry, 218 Mich App 520, 542 ; 554 NW2d 362 (1996), aff’d on other grounds 460 Mich 55 ; 594 NW2d 477 (1999).

1993In determining whether the effect rises to the level of impairment that justifies an injunction by the court, the following factors should be considered: "(1) whether the natural resource involved is rare, unique, endangered, or has historical significance, (2) whether the resource is easily replaceable (for example, by replanting trees or restocking fish), (3) whether the proposed action will have any significant consequential effect on other natural resources (for example, whether wildlife will be lost if its habitat is impaired or destroyed), and (4) whether the direct or consequential impa

1993In determining whether the effect rises to the level of impairment that justifies an injunction by the court, the following factors should be considered: "(1) whether the natural resource involved is rare, unique, endangered, or has historical significance, (2) whether the resource is easily replaceable (for example, by replanting trees or restocking fish), (3) whether the proposed action will have any significant consequential effect on other natural resources (for example, whether wildlife will be lost if its habitat is impaired or destroyed), and (4) whether the direct or consequential impa

1993In determining whether the effect rises to the level of impairment that justifies an injunction by the court, the following factors should be considered: "(1) whether the natural resource involved is rare, unique, endangered, or has historical significance, (2) whether the resource is easily replaceable (for example, by replanting trees or restocking fish), (3) whether the proposed action will have any significant consequential effect on other natural resources (for example, whether wildlife will be lost if its habitat is impaired or destroyed), and (4) whether the direct or consequential impa

1993In determining whether the effect rises to the level of impairment that justifies an injunction by the court, the following factors should be considered: "(1) whether the natural resource involved is rare, unique, endangered, or has historical significance, (2) whether the resource is easily replaceable (for example, by replanting trees or restocking fish), (3) whether the proposed action will have any significant consequential effect on other natural resources (for example, whether wildlife will be lost if its habitat is impaired or destroyed), and (4) whether the direct or consequential impa

1990As we read the opinion, Engelman primarily concerned the second part of the test of People v Golochowicz, 413 Mich 298 ; 319 NW2d 518 (1982), for admissibility of other acts evidence under MRE 404(b); whereas our decision focused on the third part of the Golochowicz test.

1990As we read the opinion, Engelman primarily concerned the second part of the test of People v Golochowicz, 413 Mich 298 ; 319 NW2d 518 (1982), for admissibility of other acts evidence under MRE 404(b); whereas our decision focused on the third part of the Golochowicz test.

1982Nieves, supra, 616-617 .

1982(Citations omitted.) The Benmark criteria were approved by the Supreme Court in Kailimai v Firestone Tire & Rubber Co, 398 Mich 230, 232 ; 247 NW2d 295 (1976), and again, more recently, in Willett, supra. There can be no doubt that the first prong of the Benmark test is satisfied in the instant case.

1982(Citations omitted.) The Benmark criteria were approved by the Supreme Court in Kailimai v Firestone Tire & Rubber Co, 398 Mich 230, 232 ; 247 NW2d 295 (1976), and again, more recently, in Willett, supra. There can be no doubt that the first prong of the Benmark test is satisfied in the instant case.

1982In Benmark v Steffen, 9 Mich App 416 ; 157 NW2d 468 (1968), this Court adopted the following criteria for determining whether, in the case of the grant of a new trial, there has been a proper exercise of discretion: "It is suggested that the most logical way to test the trial court’s decision is to inquire, first, whether the reasons assigned by the court for granting a new trial are legally recognized ones. * * * The second part of the test is whether the reasons assigned by the trial court are supported by any reasonable interpretation of the record.” Benmark, supra, 422 .

1982In Benmark v Steffen, 9 Mich App 416 ; 157 NW2d 468 (1968), this Court adopted the following criteria for determining whether, in the case of the grant of a new trial, there has been a proper exercise of discretion: "It is suggested that the most logical way to test the trial court’s decision is to inquire, first, whether the reasons assigned by the court for granting a new trial are legally recognized ones. * * * The second part of the test is whether the reasons assigned by the trial court are supported by any reasonable interpretation of the record.” Benmark, supra, 422 .

1982(Citations omitted.) The Benmark criteria were approved by the Supreme Court in Kailimai v Firestone Tire & Rubber Co, 398 Mich 230, 232 ; 247 NW2d 295 (1976), and again, more recently, in Willett, supra. There can be no doubt that the first prong of the Benmark test is satisfied in the instant case.

1982(Citations omitted.) The Benmark criteria were approved by the Supreme Court in Kailimai v Firestone Tire & Rubber Co, 398 Mich 230, 232 ; 247 NW2d 295 (1976), and again, more recently, in Willett, supra .

1980Robinson, supra. We find no reasonable possibility that the error complained of might have contributed to the conviction, i.e., that it helped to convince an otherwise undecided juror of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

1977McCray v Illinois, supra. The second part of the test, whether the officers "should have known” about the separate apartments, poses a more difficult problem.

1975The reasoning in People v Roderick Walker, supra , is particularly persuasive.

1975The reasoning in People v Roderick Walker, supra, is particularly persuasive.