second part test in Kansas

2021Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L.

2021Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L.

2024"In other words, if the first part of Kansas's two-part inquiry asks whether the defendant had knowledge of a broadly described dangerous condition, the second part of that inquiry must ask whether the defendant recklessly disregarded or was indifferent to the same broadly described risk." Wagner, 586 F.3d at 1245 . 22 D.

2024"In other words, if the first part of Kansas's two-part inquiry asks whether the defendant had knowledge of a broadly described dangerous condition, the second part of that inquiry must ask whether the defendant recklessly disregarded or was indifferent to the same broadly described risk; conversely, if the first part of the test targets the narrow, specific risk that caused the particular accident at issue and asks if the defendant was aware or should have been aware of that particular specific risk, then the second part of the analysis to be consistent must ask if the defendant was indiffere

2005First, we consider whether the statute `conveys a sufficiently definite warning' of the proscribed conduct `when measured by common understanding and practice.' [Citation omitted.] Next, we consider `whether the [statute] adequately guards against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.' [Citations omitted.] The second part of the test embodies the `requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.' [Citation omitted.] "As the United States Supreme Court explained in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 , 33 L.

2005First, we consider whether the statute `conveys a sufficiently definite warning' of the proscribed conduct `when measured by common understanding and practice.' [Citation omitted.] Next, we consider `whether the [statute] adequately guards against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.' [Citations omitted.] The second part of the test embodies the `requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.' [Citation omitted.] "As the United States Supreme Court explained in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 , 33 L.

2024The same-elements test, however, "is merely a rule of construction that courts use to divine legislative intent." Hensley, 298 Kan. at 435 ; see also Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 504 .

2024The second part of the test is objective "and requires a showing that a reasonable person in [the defendant's] circumstances would have perceived the use of deadly force in self-defense as necessary." Qualls, 309 Kan. at 557 (quoting McCullough, 293 Kan. at 975 ).

2024The second part of the test is objective and "requires a showing that a reasonable person in the defendant's circumstances would have perceived the use of deadly force in defense of self was necessary." 301 Kan. at 594 .

2020The second part of that test ordinarily would require him to show a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different but for the attorneys' performance. 293 Kan. at 725-26 .

2018And in State v. Mossman , 294 Kan. 901 , 281 P.3d 153 (2012), we observed: " 'In accordance with the constitutional design, "the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains [the Court's] responsibility." [Citation omitted.] The judicial exercise of independent judgment requires consideration of the culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment in question. [Citations omitted.] In this inquiry the Court also considers whether the challenged sentencing practice serves legitimate penological goals. [Citations om

2018And in State v. Mossman , 294 Kan. 901 , 281 P.3d 153 (2012), we observed: " 'In accordance with the constitutional design, "the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains [the Court's] responsibility." [Citation omitted.] The judicial exercise of independent judgment requires consideration of the culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment in question. [Citations omitted.] In this inquiry the Court also considers whether the challenged sentencing practice serves legitimate penological goals. [Citations om

2018And in State v. Mossman , 294 Kan. 901 , 281 P.3d 153 (2012), we observed: " 'In accordance with the constitutional design, "the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains [the Court's] responsibility." [Citation omitted.] The judicial exercise of independent judgment requires consideration of the culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment in question. [Citations omitted.] In this inquiry the Court also considers whether the challenged sentencing practice serves legitimate penological goals. [Citations om

2018And in State v. Mossman , 294 Kan. 901 , 281 P.3d 153 (2012), we observed: " 'In accordance with the constitutional design, "the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains [the Court's] responsibility." [Citation omitted.] The judicial exercise of independent judgment requires consideration of the culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment in question. [Citations omitted.] In this inquiry the Court also considers whether the challenged sentencing practice serves legitimate penological goals. [Citations om

2018Then, in *129 exercising our independent judgment under the second part of the test, we opined as follows: "As to the second-prong of the test, we explained in Williams that 'community consensus is entitled to great weight but it is not determinative.' 298 Kan. at 1087, 319 P.3d 528 .

2017If the conduct involves an element of judgment or choice and there is no mandatory regulation or policy requiring a particular course of action, the court moves to the second part of the test to determine if the conduct at issue was the land of discretionary function that the exception was designed to cover. 486 U.S. at 536 .

2017The discretionary function exception is designed to prevent “judicial “second-guessing”’” and therefore “protects only governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy.” 486 U.S. at 536 -37 (quoting United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 , 104 S. Ct. 2755 , 81 L.

2017The discretionary function exception is designed to prevent “judicial “second-guessing”’” and therefore “protects only governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy.” 486 U.S. at 536 -37 (quoting United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 , 104 S. Ct. 2755 , 81 L.

2017The discretionary function exception is designed to prevent “judicial “second-guessing”’” and therefore “protects only governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy.” 486 U.S. at 536 -37 (quoting United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 , 104 S. Ct. 2755 , 81 L.

2016Applying the second part of the test, the court determined that “Robust statutory guaranties ... provide substantial protection against an erroneous deprivation of liberty.” 180 Wash. 2d at 321 .

2016Applying the second part of the test, the court determined that "Robust statutory guaranties . . . provide substantial protection against an erroneous deprivation of liberty." 180 Wash. 2d at 321 .

2015Salary’s statement, “I do want a lawyer,” is an unambiguous statement that “ ‘ “can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.” ’ ” See 276 Kan. at 945 ; contra Davis, 512 U.S. at 462 (defendant’s remark, “ ‘Maybe I should talk to a lawyer,’ ” not a clear invocation of right to counsel).

2015In considering whether the second part of the rule has been satisfied, the court may look at “[t]he timing as well as die content and context of a reference to counsel [to] help determine whedier there has been an unambiguous assertion of the right to have the assistance of an attorney in dealing with a custodial interrogation by law enforcement officers.” State v. Appleby, 289 Kan. 1017, 1051 , 221 P.3d 525 (2009).

2015In considering whether the second part of the rule has been satisfied, the court may look at “[t]he timing as well as die content and context of a reference to counsel [to] help determine whedier there has been an unambiguous assertion of the right to have the assistance of an attorney in dealing with a custodial interrogation by law enforcement officers.” State v. Appleby, 289 Kan. 1017, 1051 , 221 P.3d 525 (2009).

2013Because the statute’s language is ambiguous, we “employ canons of construction, legislative history, or other background considerations to divine the legislature’s intent and construe the statute accordingly. [Citation omitted.]” Stewart Title of the Midwest v. Reece & Nichols Realtors, 294 Kan. 553, 564-65 , 276 P.3d 188 (2012).

2013Because the statute’s language is ambiguous, we “employ canons of construction, legislative history, or other background considerations to divine the legislature’s intent and construe the statute accordingly. [Citation omitted.]” Stewart Title of the Midwest v. Reece & Nichols Realtors, 294 Kan. 553, 564-65 , 276 P.3d 188 (2012).

2012Cf. Lemuz, 261 Kan. 936 , Syl. ¶ 4; Bonin v. Vannaman, 261 Kan. 199 , Syl. ¶ 11, 929 P.2d 754 (1996).

2012Cf. Lemuz, 261 Kan. 936 , Syl. ¶ 4; Bonin v. Vannaman, 261 Kan. 199 , Syl. ¶ 11, 929 P.2d 754 (1996).

2012Cf. Lemuz, 261 Kan. 936 , Syl. ¶ 4; Bonin v. Vannaman, 261 Kan. 199 , Syl. ¶ 11, 929 P.2d 754 (1996).

2010Even if a party shows that a statute, ordinance, or regulation was designed to protect a specific group of people rather than to protect the general public, the court must also "review legislative history in order to determine whether a private right of action was intended." Pullen, 278 Kan. 183 , Syl. ¶ 4, 92 P.3d 584 .

2010Even if a party shows that a statute, ordinance, or regulation was designed to protect a specific group of people rather than to protect the general public, the court must also "review legislative history in order to determine whether a private right of action was intended." Pullen, 278 Kan. 183 , Syl. ¶ 4, 92 P.3d 584 .

2008By including in the policy exclusion an objective test for the second part of the inquiry, an insurer attempts to reasonably limit a hazard where a professional or entity is subjectively aware of an error, seeks new or additional liability insurance, and later tries to disingenuously convince a court the insured was subjectively unaware of the legal implications of the error. 458 F.3d at 240-41 .

2007State v. Rupnick, 280 Kan. 720, 737 , 125 P.3d 541 (2005).

2007State v. Rupnick, 280 Kan. 720, 737 , 125 P.3d 541 (2005).

2003The second part of the test embodies the “ ‘ “requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.” ’ ” Boyles v. City of Topeka, 271 Kan. 69, 86 , 21 P.3d 974 (2001) (Allegrucci, J., dissenting) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 , 75 L.

2003The second part of the test embodies the “ ‘ “requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.” ’ ” Boyles v. City of Topeka, 271 Kan. 69, 86 , 21 P.3d 974 (2001) (Allegrucci, J., dissenting) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 , 75 L.