second part test in Maine

2012We have held that Maine’s interest in the litigation, however, “must be beyond mere citizenry ... such as ... the location of witnesses and creditors within its border.” Connelly v. Doucette, 2006 ME 124, ¶ 8 , 909 A.2d 221 (alterations in original) (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 8] The second part of the test concerns the defendant’s contacts, which “are present when the defendant purposefully directs his or her activities at Maine residents or creates continuing obligations between himself or herself and the residents of Maine.” Estate of Hoch, 2011 ME 24, ¶ 27 , 16 A.3d 137 (quotation marks

2012We have held that Maine’s interest in the litigation, however, “must be beyond mere citizenry ... such as ... the location of witnesses and creditors within its border.” Connelly v. Doucette, 2006 ME 124, ¶ 8 , 909 A.2d 221 (alterations in original) (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 8] The second part of the test concerns the defendant’s contacts, which “are present when the defendant purposefully directs his or her activities at Maine residents or creates continuing obligations between himself or herself and the residents of Maine.” Estate of Hoch, 2011 ME 24, ¶ 27 , 16 A.3d 137 (quotation marks

2008Reasonable Anticipation of Litigation in Maine [¶ 24] The second part of the analysis, whether the employer by its conduct reasonably could have anticipated liti *911 gation in Maine, requires an assessment of whether the foreign corporation has sufficient contacts with the forum State to “make it reasonable ... to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there.” Harriman, 518 A.2d at 1037 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 , 66 S.Ct. 154 ).

2008Reasonable Anticipation of Litigation in Maine [¶ 24] The second part of the analysis, whether the employer by its conduct reasonably could have anticipated liti *911 gation in Maine, requires an assessment of whether the foreign corporation has sufficient contacts with the forum State to “make it reasonable ... to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there.” Harriman, 518 A.2d at 1037 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 , 66 S.Ct. 154 ).

2008Reasonable Anticipation of Litigation in Maine [¶ 24] The second part of the analysis, whether the employer by its conduct reasonably could have anticipated liti *911 gation in Maine, requires an assessment of whether the foreign corporation has sufficient contacts with the forum State to “make it reasonable ... to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there.” Harriman, 518 A.2d at 1037 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 , 66 S.Ct. 154 ).

1993For a foreign corporation to be subject to Maine’s jurisdiction, “due process demands that the corporation have sufficient contacts with [Maine] to ‘make it reasonable ... to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought [here].' ” Harriman, 518 A.2d at 1037 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 , 66 S.Ct. 154, 158 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)).

2021Evid. 401-403; Fournier, 2019 ME 28, ¶ 18 , 203 A.3d 801 ; State v. Boobar, 637 A.2d 1162 , 1172 6We first summarized the test as having two parts, with the requirement of a preliminary admissibility determination, in State v. Mitchell, 2010 ME 73, ¶ 25 , 4 A.3d 478 .

2021Evid. 404(b), see State v. Bridges, 2003 ME 103, ¶¶ 38, 42 , 829 A.2d 247 .6 In the absence of admissible evidence that the defendant is prepared to offer, “a defendant cannot be allowed to use his trial to conduct an investigation that he hopes will convert what amounts to speculation into a connection between the other person and the crime.” Fournier, 2019 ME 28, ¶ 18 , 203 A.3d 801 (quotation marks omitted). [¶21] The second part of the test amounts to a “specific application” of “well-established rules of evidence [that] permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is out

2021Because there is no dispute that witnesses could have provided otherwise admissible testimony about the facts proffered by Daly, our analysis is focused on the second part of the test for admitting alternative-suspect evidence—whether Daly’s proffered evidence established “a reasonable connection between the alternative suspect and the crime.” Jaime, 2015 ME 22, ¶ 34 , 111 A.3d 1050 (quotation marks omitted).

2021Because there is no dispute that witnesses could have provided otherwise admissible testimony about the facts proffered by Daly, our analysis is focused on the second part of the test for admitting alternative-suspect evidence—whether Daly’s proffered evidence established “a reasonable connection between the alternative suspect and the crime.” Jaime, 2015 ME 22, ¶ 34 , 111 A.3d 1050 (quotation marks omitted).

2021Evid. 401-403; Fournier, 2019 ME 28, ¶ 18 , 203 A.3d 801 ; State v. Boobar, 637 A.2d 1162 , 1172 6We first summarized the test as having two parts, with the requirement of a preliminary admissibility determination, in State v. Mitchell, 2010 ME 73, ¶ 25 , 4 A.3d 478 .

2021Evid. 401-403; Fournier, 2019 ME 28, ¶ 18 , 203 A.3d 801 ; State v. Boobar, 637 A.2d 1162 , 1172 6We first summarized the test as having two parts, with the requirement of a preliminary admissibility determination, in State v. Mitchell, 2010 ME 73, ¶ 25 , 4 A.3d 478 .

2021Evid. 401-403; Fournier, 2019 ME 28, ¶ 18 , 203 A.3d 801 ; State v. Boobar, 637 A.2d 1162 , 1172 6We first summarized the test as having two parts, with the requirement of a preliminary admissibility determination, in State v. Mitchell, 2010 ME 73, ¶ 25 , 4 A.3d 478 .

2021Evid. 401-403; Fournier, 2019 ME 28, ¶ 18 , 203 A.3d 801 ; State v. Boobar, 637 A.2d 1162 , 1172 6We first summarized the test as having two parts, with the requirement of a preliminary admissibility determination, in State v. Mitchell, 2010 ME 73, ¶ 25 , 4 A.3d 478 .

2021Evid. 404(b), see State v. Bridges, 2003 ME 103, ¶¶ 38, 42 , 829 A.2d 247 .6 In the absence of admissible evidence that the defendant is prepared to offer, “a defendant cannot be allowed to use his trial to conduct an investigation that he hopes will convert what amounts to speculation into a connection between the other person and the crime.” Fournier, 2019 ME 28, ¶ 18 , 203 A.3d 801 (quotation marks omitted). [¶21] The second part of the test amounts to a “specific application” of “well-established rules of evidence [that] permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is out

2018Because we conclude that Copan’s assertion of patent infringement was not objectively baseless, we do not reach the second part of the analysis, and therefore Puritan’s state law claim fails to avoid federal preemption. [¶27] Our determination that federal patent law preempts Puritan’s claim in this case does not mean that Maine’s statute is preempted as a whole.15 See Hunter Douglas, 153 F.3d at 1335 (citing Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 480 U.S. at 580-81 ).

2018Because we conclude that Copan's assertion of patent infringement was not objectively baseless, we do not reach the second part of the analysis, and therefore Puritan's state law claim fails to avoid federal preemption. [¶ 27] Our determination that federal patent law preempts Puritan's claim in this case does not mean that Maine's statute is preempted as a whole. 15 See Hunter Douglas , 153 F.3d at 1335 (citing Cal. Coastal Comm'n , 480 U.S. at 580 -81 , 107 S.Ct. 1419 ).

2018Because we conclude that Copan's assertion of patent infringement was not objectively baseless, we do not reach the second part of the analysis, and therefore Puritan's state law claim fails to avoid federal preemption. [¶ 27] Our determination that federal patent law preempts Puritan's claim in this case does not mean that Maine's statute is preempted as a whole. 15 See Hunter Douglas , 153 F.3d at 1335 (citing Cal. Coastal Comm'n , 480 U.S. at 580 -81 , 107 S.Ct. 1419 ).

2018Because we conclude that Copan's assertion of patent infringement was not objectively baseless, we do not reach the second part of the analysis, and therefore Puritan's state law claim fails to avoid federal preemption. [¶ 27] Our determination that federal patent law preempts Puritan's claim in this case does not mean that Maine's statute is preempted as a whole. 15 See Hunter Douglas , 153 F.3d at 1335 (citing Cal. Coastal Comm'n , 480 U.S. at 580 -81 , 107 S.Ct. 1419 ).

2017A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 695 .

2015The second part of this principle relates to the rights of the owners of the lots so received by reference to a plan, or "[i]n this State a grant of land bounded on a highway carries the fee to the centre of it, if there be no words to show a contrary intent." The case notes that, "a grant of land bounded on a street, the soil of which belonged to the grantor, though it did not convey the fee in the street by the terms of the grant, yet the grantee acquired a right of way on the street by implication or estoppel." Sutherland v. Jackson, 32 Me. 80 (1850).

2012We have held that Maine’s interest in the litigation, however, “must be beyond mere citizenry ... such as ... the location of witnesses and creditors within its border.” Connelly v. Doucette, 2006 ME 124, ¶ 8 , 909 A.2d 221 (alterations in original) (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 8] The second part of the test concerns the defendant’s contacts, which “are present when the defendant purposefully directs his or her activities at Maine residents or creates continuing obligations between himself or herself and the residents of Maine.” Estate of Hoch, 2011 ME 24, ¶ 27 , 16 A.3d 137 (quotation marks

2012We have held that Maine’s interest in the litigation, however, “must be beyond mere citizenry ... such as ... the location of witnesses and creditors within its border.” Connelly v. Doucette, 2006 ME 124, ¶ 8 , 909 A.2d 221 (alterations in original) (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 8] The second part of the test concerns the defendant’s contacts, which “are present when the defendant purposefully directs his or her activities at Maine residents or creates continuing obligations between himself or herself and the residents of Maine.” Estate of Hoch, 2011 ME 24, ¶ 27 , 16 A.3d 137 (quotation marks

1996With regard to the application of the second part of the test, we adopted the interpretation of the language set forth in Pope v. Jackson, 65 Me. 162, 165 (1876), that “[i]t is not the mere fastening that is so much to be regarded, as the nature of the thing, its adaptation to the uses and purposes for which and to which the building is erected or appropriated.” Bangor-Hydro Electric, 226 A.2d at 376 .

1995Given the state of the law, as set forth above, reasonable public officials would have known that restrictions on Lyons’s expressive activity had to be content neutral, narrowly tailored, and allow for ample alternate channels of communication. 4 Regan, 468 U.S. at 648 , 104 S.Ct. at 3266 ; White House Vigil for the ERA Comm., 746 F.2d at 1526-27 ; United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 , 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678 , 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968).

1995Given the state of the law, as set forth above, reasonable public officials would have known that restrictions on Lyons’s expressive activity had to be content neutral, narrowly tailored, and allow for ample alternate channels of communication. 4 Regan, 468 U.S. at 648 , 104 S.Ct. at 3266 ; White House Vigil for the ERA Comm., 746 F.2d at 1526-27 ; United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 , 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678 , 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968).

1995Given the state of the law, as set forth above, reasonable public officials would have known that restrictions on Lyons's expressive activity had to be content neutral, narrowly tailored, and allow for ample alternate channels of communication. [4] Regan, 468 U.S. at 648 , 104 S.Ct. at 3266 ; White House Vigil for the ERA Comm., 746 F.2d at 1526-27 ; United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 , 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678 , 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968).

1995Given the state of the law, as set forth above, reasonable public officials would have known that restrictions on Lyons’s expressive activity had to be content neutral, narrowly tailored, and allow for ample alternate channels of communication. 4 Regan, 468 U.S. at 648 , 104 S.Ct. at 3266 ; White House Vigil for the ERA Comm., 746 F.2d at 1526-27 ; United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 , 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678 , 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968).

1995Given the state of the law, as set forth above, reasonable public officials would have known that restrictions on Lyons’s expressive activity had to be content neutral, narrowly tailored, and allow for ample alternate channels of communication. 4 Regan, 468 U.S. at 648 , 104 S.Ct. at 3266 ; White House Vigil for the ERA Comm., 746 F.2d at 1526-27 ; United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 , 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678 , 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968).

1995Given the state of the law, as set forth above, reasonable public officials would have known that restrictions on Lyons’s expressive activity had to be content neutral, narrowly tailored, and allow for ample alternate channels of communication. 4 Regan, 468 U.S. at 648 , 104 S.Ct. at 3266 ; White House Vigil for the ERA Comm., 746 F.2d at 1526-27 ; United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 , 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678 , 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968).