second part test in Utah

2026“Prejudice exists when there is a reasonable probability that the case would have had a different outcome had trial counsel not performed deficiently.” State v. Whytock, 2020 UT App 107, ¶ 28 , 469 P.3d 1150 .

2026“Prejudice exists when there is a reasonable probability that the case would have had a different outcome had trial counsel not performed deficiently.” State v. Whytock, 2020 UT App 107, ¶ 28 , 469 P.3d 1150 .

2025But because they disagree about how the two factors should be weighted with the other two factors in the overall analysis, we discuss all four. 11 STATE v. HINTZE Opinion of the Court ¶45 In the second part of the inquiry, courts examine “the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 .

2024This delay clearly exceeds one year and thus qualifies for a further Barker analysis. ¶16 The second part of this inquiry requires us to examine the “extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 .

2018Relevance Under Rule 402 ¶ 42 "The second part of the analysis requires the court to determine whether the offered evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, which excludes all evidence that is not relevant." State v. Decorso , 1999 UT 57 , ¶ 22, 993 P.2d 837 , abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton , 2017 UT 9 , 391 P.3d 1016 .

2018Relevance Under Rule 402 ¶ 42 "The second part of the analysis requires the court to determine whether the offered evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, which excludes all evidence that is not relevant." State v. Decorso , 1999 UT 57 , ¶ 22, 993 P.2d 837 , abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton , 2017 UT 9 , 391 P.3d 1016 .

2003The court reversed the probate court’s decision granting guardianship to a non-parent, finding error in its conclusion that the mother’s “parental rights were still suspended by circumstances and in proceeding with the second part of the analysis relating to the best interests of the children.” Id. ¶ 16 The Montana Supreme Court, adopting the reasoning in Copenhaver, held that a mother’s parental rights were not terminated or suspended when she “appeared in [the] action, withdrew her consent to the temporary guardianship, and filed a petition to terminate the temporary guardianship.” In re D.T

2003The court reversed the probate court's decision granting guardianship to a non-parent, finding error in its conclusion that the mother's "parental rights were still suspended by circumstances and in proceeding with the second part of the analysis relating to the best interests of the children." Id. ¶ 16 The Montana Supreme Court, adopting the reasoning in Copenhaver , held that a mother's parental rights were not terminated or suspended when she "appeared in [the] action, withdrew her consent to the temporary guardianship, and filed a petition to *1288 terminate the temporary guardianship." In

1993It is in applying the second part of the test that the sentencing authority may rely on leniency to refuse to impose the death penalty, "[e]ven in the face of overwhelming aggravating evidence ...." Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 , [261-62] 108 S.Ct. 1792, 1800 , 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988) (Marshall, J., concurring).

1993It is in applying the second part of the test that the sentencing authority may rely on leniency to refuse to impose the death penalty, "[e]ven in the face of overwhelming aggravating evidence ...." Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 , [261-62] 108 S.Ct. 1792, 1800 , 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988) (Marshall, J., concurring).

2026And while “the ultimate question is not whether there was a possible strategic reason for [the attorney’s] conduct, but instead whether that conduct was objectively reasonable,” id., “[i]f it appears [that the attorney’s] 20240045-CA 27 2026 UT App 44 State v. Gaines actions could have been intended to further a reasonable strategy, a defendant has necessarily failed to show unreasonable performance,” State v. Ray, 2020 UT 12, ¶ 34 , 469 P.3d 871 . ¶68 The second part of the test requires Gaines to show that he was prejudiced by Counsel’s performance.

2024“This step should not be conflated or combined with the second part of the analysis, which involves a determination as to whether the course of conduct would cause a reasonable person fear or emotional distress.” Anderson, 2023 UT App 48, ¶ 26 .

2024And while “the ultimate question is not whether there was a possible strategic 20200091-CA 29 2024 UT App 74 State v. Gourdin reason for counsel’s conduct, but instead whether that conduct was objectively reasonable,” see id., “[i]f it appears counsel’s actions could have been intended to further a reasonable strategy, a defendant has necessarily failed to show unreasonable performance,” Ray, 2020 UT 12, ¶ 34 . ¶57 The second part of the test requires Gourdin to show that he was prejudiced by Trial Counsel’s deficient performance.

2024And while “the ultimate question is not whether there was a possible strategic 20200091-CA 29 2024 UT App 74 State v. Gourdin reason for counsel’s conduct, but instead whether that conduct was objectively reasonable,” see id., “[i]f it appears counsel’s actions could have been intended to further a reasonable strategy, a defendant has necessarily failed to show unreasonable performance,” Ray, 2020 UT 12, ¶ 34 . ¶57 The second part of the test requires Gourdin to show that he was prejudiced by Trial Counsel’s deficient performance.

2023To the extent that the district court did not consider the April 15 incident an act because it was not threatening in nature, the court erred in its interpretation of the stalking statute. 20220522-CA 17 2023 UT App 147 Richins v. Weldon the parties that were involved in the events,” and they appeared to be separated by “a short period of time.” ¶51 Weldon argues that the district court erred in its conclusion that these separate conversations constituted a course of conduct because all the statements about which the witnesses testified were “made in the heat of the moment,” “occurred in the s

2023To the extent that the district court did not consider the April 15 incident an act because it was not threatening in nature, the court erred in its interpretation of the stalking statute. 20220522-CA 17 2023 UT App 147 Richins v. Weldon the parties that were involved in the events,” and they appeared to be separated by “a short period of time.” ¶51 Weldon argues that the district court erred in its conclusion that these separate conversations constituted a course of conduct because all the statements about which the witnesses testified were “made in the heat of the moment,” “occurred in the s

2023To the extent that the district court did not consider the April 15 incident an act because it was not threatening in nature, the court erred in its interpretation of the stalking statute. 20220522-CA 17 2023 UT App 147 Richins v. Weldon the parties that were involved in the events,” and they appeared to be separated by “a short period of time.” ¶51 Weldon argues that the district court erred in its conclusion that these separate conversations constituted a course of conduct because all the statements about which the witnesses testified were “made in the heat of the moment,” “occurred in the s

2022The assessment of what is in a child’s best interest is, by definition, “a wide-ranging inquiry that asks a court to weigh the 20210353-CA 20210354-CA 17 2022 UT App 114 In re A.H. entirety of the circumstances” surrounding a child’s situation, including “the physical, intellectual, social, moral, and educational training and general welfare and happiness of the child.” See In re J.M., 2020 UT App 52, ¶¶ 35, 37 , 463 P.3d 66 (quotation simplified).

2022In this case, the court found that at least two such statutory grounds were present—abandonment and past neglect—and Father does not challenge the court’s findings in that regard. 20210706-CA 11 2022 UT App 116 In re J.J.W. ¶25 But Father does challenge the court’s determination with regard to the second part of the test: that termination of his parental rights was in Child’s best interest.

2020Instead, “the ultimate question is always whether, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s acts or omissions were objectively unreasonable.” Id. ¶20 “In evaluating prejudice under the second part of the test, we assess whether there exists a reasonable probability that the case would have had a different outcome had trial counsel not performed deficiently.” Florez, 2020 UT App 76, ¶ 43 .

2020In that situation, the court must still “ask whether, in light of all the circumstances, the attorney 20180131-CA 14 2020 UT App 69 State v. Martinez performed in an objectively reasonable manner.” Ray, 2020 UT 12, ¶ 34 (quotation simplified); see also id. ¶ 36 (stating that, even after concluding that “there was no strategic reason” for counsel’s actions, “the deficiency analysis was not at an end,” because “a reviewing court must always base its deficiency determination on the ultimate question of whether counsel’s act or omission fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” (quotatio

2020It is unnecessary “to address both components of the inquiry” if we determine that Delgado has made “an insufficient showing on one.” Id. (quotation simplified); accord Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 . ¶26 In evaluating prejudice under the second part of the test, we assess whether there exists a reasonable probability that the case would have had a different outcome if trial counsel had not performed deficiently.

2018Relevance Under Rule 402 ¶ 42 "The second part of the analysis requires the court to determine whether the offered evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, which excludes all evidence that is not relevant." State v. Decorso , 1999 UT 57 , ¶ 22, 993 P.2d 837 , abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton , 2017 UT 9 , 391 P.3d 1016 .

2018Relevance Under Rule 402 ¶ 42 "The second part of the analysis requires the court to determine whether the offered evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, which excludes all evidence that is not relevant." State v. Decorso , 1999 UT 57 , ¶ 22, 993 P.2d 837 , abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton , 2017 UT 9 , 391 P.3d 1016 .

2017Given the theory's prevalence in the workers' compensation jurisprudence of not only Utah but throughout the country, I am not convinced that the "cumulative trauma" theory of injury by accident was originally erroneous. ¶ 61 The second part of the test focuses our analysis on "how firmly the precedent has become established in the law since it was handed down." Eldridge , 2015 UT 21 , ¶ 22, 345 P.3d 553 .

2017Given the theory's prevalence in the workers' compensation jurisprudence of not only Utah but throughout the country, I am not convinced that the "cumulative trauma" theory of injury by accident was originally erroneous. ¶ 61 The second part of the test focuses our analysis on "how firmly the precedent has become established in the law since it was handed down." Eldridge , 2015 UT 21 , ¶ 22, 345 P.3d 553 .