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18 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Krisco Corp.green2 sentences2014“Usually, the second part of the test, i.e., whether the asserted expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable, is the most disputed.” Briggs, 756 A.2d at 741 (quoting Commonwealth v. Krisco Corp., 421 Mass. 37 , 653 N.E.2d 579, 582 (1995)). 2014“Usually, the second part of the test, i.e., whether the asserted expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable, is the most disputed.” Briggs, 756 A.2d at 741 (quoting Commonwealth v. Krisco Corp., 421 Mass. 37 , 653 N.E.2d 579, 582 (1995)). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Hazardgreen2 sentences2004See Hazard, 797 A.2d at 464 ; Brennan, 764 A.2d at 173 . 2002See Hazard, 797 A.2d at 464 ; Brennan, 764 A.2d at 173 . | 2 | 2 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2005Under the second part of the test, “[prejudice exists if there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ). 2005Under the second part of the test, “[prejudice exists if there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Casasgreen1 sentence2014When deciding whether the expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable, “no single factor invariably will be determinative.” Quinlan, 921 A.2d at 109 (quoting State v. Casas, 900 A.2d 1120, 1129-30 (R.I.2006)); see Rakas, 439 U.S. at 152 , 99 S.Ct. 421 . | 1 | 1 |
Rakas v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2014When deciding whether the expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable, “no single factor invariably will be determinative.” Quinlan, 921 A.2d at 109 (quoting State v. Casas, 900 A.2d 1120, 1129-30 (R.I.2006)); see Rakas, 439 U.S. at 152 , 99 S.Ct. 421 . 2014When deciding whether the expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable, “no single factor invariably will be determinative.” Quinlan, 921 A.2d at 109 (quoting State v. Casas, 900 A.2d 1120, 1129-30 (R.I.2006)); see Rakas, 439 U.S. at 152 , 99 S.Ct. 421 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Parkergreen1 sentence2008Assessing whether Melusky’s identification of defendant was independently reliable requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances, and, in particular, “the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.” State v. Parker, 472 A.2d 1206, 1209 (R.I.1984) (quoting Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199 , 93 S.Ct. 375 ). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Thorntongreen1 sentence2006See State v. Thornton, 800 A.2d 1016, 1026-31 (R.I.2002). | 1 | 1 |
Roberts v. Willsgreen2 sentences1984Roberts v. Wills, 108 R.I. 586, 588 , 277 A.2d 754, 757 (1971); Barbato v. Epstein, 97 R.I. at 193 , 196 A.2d at 837 . 1984Roberts v. Wills, 108 R.I. 586, 588 , 277 A.2d 754, 757 (1971); Barbato v. Epstein, 97 R.I. at 193 , 196 A.2d at 837 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
DiPetrillo v. Dow Chemical Co.
green
2 sentences2007In addressing the second part of the inquiry, the trial justice evaluates "the relevance of the proffered testimony in assisting the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in evidence." DiPetrillo , 729 A.2d at 689 . 2006In addressing the second part of the inquiry, the trial justice evaluates "the relevance of the proffered testimony in assisting the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in evidence." DiPetrillo, 729 A.2d at 689 . | 3 | 2005–2007 |
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences1999Id. 1995Id. | 3 | 1988–1999 |
In Re MacKenzie C.
green
2 sentences2007To be admissible, the expert opinion must be "sufficiently tied to the facts of the case [such] that it will aid the [fact-finder] in resolving a factual dispute." In re Mackenzie C. , 877 A.2d at 684 (quoting Owens , 838 A.2d at 891 n. 3). 2006To be admissible, the expert opinion must be "sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the [fact-finder] in resolving a factual dispute." In re Mackenzie, 877 A.2d at 684 (quoting Owens, 838 A.2d at 891 n. 3). | 2 | 2006–2007 |
Owens v. Silvia
green
2 sentences2007To be admissible, the expert opinion must be "sufficiently tied to the facts of the case [such] that it will aid the [fact-finder] in resolving a factual dispute." In re Mackenzie C. , 877 A.2d at 684 (quoting Owens , 838 A.2d at 891 n. 3). 2006To be admissible, the expert opinion must be "sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the [fact-finder] in resolving a factual dispute." In re Mackenzie, 877 A.2d at 684 (quoting Owens, 838 A.2d at 891 n. 3). | 2 | 2006–2007 |
Brennan v. Vose
green
2 sentences2004See Hazard, 797 A.2d at 464 ; Brennan, 764 A.2d at 173 . 2002See Hazard, 797 A.2d at 464 ; Brennan, 764 A.2d at 173 . | 2 | 2002–2004 |
State v. Quinlan
green
1 sentence2014When deciding whether the expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable, “no single factor invariably will be determinative.” Quinlan, 921 A.2d at 109 (quoting State v. Casas, 900 A.2d 1120, 1129-30 (R.I.2006)); see Rakas, 439 U.S. at 152 , 99 S.Ct. 421 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Briggs
green
1 sentence2014“Usually, the second part of the test, i.e., whether the asserted expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable, is the most disputed.” Briggs, 756 A.2d at 741 (quoting Commonwealth v. Krisco Corp., 421 Mass. 37 , 653 N.E.2d 579, 582 (1995)). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Neil v. Biggers
green
2 sentences2008Assessing whether Melusky’s identification of defendant was independently reliable requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances, and, in particular, “the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.” State v. Parker, 472 A.2d 1206, 1209 (R.I.1984) (quoting Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199 , 93 S.Ct. 375 ). 2008Assessing whether Melusky’s identification of defendant was independently reliable requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances, and, in particular, “the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.” State v. Parker, 472 A.2d 1206, 1209 (R.I.1984) (quoting Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199 , 93 S.Ct. 375 ). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Bleau v. Wall
green
2 sentences2005Bleau v. Wall, 808 A.2d 637 , 642 (R.I. 2002) The standard consists of a two-part test. `The first part is a four-prong inquiry that requires that the evidence be (1) newly discovered since trial, (2) not discoverable prior to trial with the exercise of due diligence, (3) not merely cumulative or impeaching but rather material to the issue upon which it is admissible, [and] (4) of the type that would probably change the verdict at trial.' [citations omitted] For the second part of the inquiry, the hearing justice must exercise his or her discretion and determine whether the newly discovered ev 2005Bleau v. Wall, 808 A.2d 637 , 642 (R.I. 2002) The standard consists of a two-part test. `The first part is a four-prong inquiry that requires that the evidence be (1) newly discovered since trial, (2) not discoverable prior to trial with the exercise of due diligence, (3) not merely cumulative or impeaching but rather material to the issue upon which it is admissible, [and] (4) of the type that would probably change the verdict at trial.' [citations omitted] For the second part of the inquiry, the hearing justice must exercise his or her discretion and determine whether the newly discovered ev | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Bourque v. Dettore
green
1 sentence1992In the second part of our analysis of the constitutionality of the legislative delegation in § 39-1-30, “we examine the specificity of the functions delegated, the standards accompanying the delegation, and the safeguards against administrative abuse.” Bourque, 589 A.2d at 818 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Barbato v. Epstein
green
2 sentences1984Roberts v. Wills, 108 R.I. 586, 588 , 277 A.2d 754, 757 (1971); Barbato v. Epstein, 97 R.I. at 193 , 196 A.2d at 837 . 1984Roberts v. Wills, 108 R.I. 586, 588 , 277 A.2d 754, 757 (1971); Barbato v. Epstein, 97 R.I. at 193 , 196 A.2d at 837 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.