second part test in Georgia

2016If the presumptive prejudice threshold was crossed, the court proceeds to the second part of the framework, applying “a context-focused, four-factor balancing test to determine whether [the defendant] was denied the right to a speedy trial.” Sweatman v. State, 287 Ga. 872, 873 ( 700 SE2d 579 ) (2010).

2016If the presumptive prejudice threshold was crossed, the court proceeds to the second part of the framework, applying “a context-focused, four-factor balancing test to determine whether [the defendant] was denied the right to a speedy trial.” Sweatman v. State, 287 Ga. 872, 873 ( 700 SE2d 579 ) (2010).

2012(Citations omitted.) Wallace v. State, 295 Ga. App. 452, 454 (1) ( 671 SE2d 911 ) (2009).

2012(Citations omitted.) Wallace v. State, 295 Ga. App. 452, 454 (1) ( 671 SE2d 911 ) (2009).

2025See id. (“As to the second part of the test, an error is plain if it is clear or obvious under current law.

2025See id. (“As to the second part of the test, an error is plain if it is clear or obvious under current law.

2020See Jackson, 306 Ga. at 77 .

2020But we need not answer that question, because even assuming that the other acts evidence was improperly admitted, any such evidentiary error was harmless.10 “‘[T]he test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.’” Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. 69, 80 ( 829 SE2d 142 ) (2019) (citation omitted).

2017Id. at 212-213 (2); McNaughton v. State, 290 Ga. 894, 899 (3) (b) ( 725 SE2d 590 ) (2012).

2017Id. at 212-213 (2); McNaughton v. State, 290 Ga. 894, 899 (3) (b) ( 725 SE2d 590 ) (2012).

2014As to the second part of the test, [i]n evaluating the likelihood of misidentification, we look to the totality of the circumstances, including the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. 28 (Citation omitted.) Pullins v. State, 323 Ga. App. 664, 667 (2) ( 747 SE2d 856 ) (2013).

2014As to the second part of the test, [i]n evaluating the likelihood of misidentification, we look to the totality of the circumstances, including the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. 28 (Citation omitted.) Pullins v. State, 323 Ga. App. 664, 667 (2) ( 747 SE2d 856 ) (2013).

2014“As long as the showup was reasonably and fairly conducted at or near the time of the offense, we do not reach the second part of the test.” Young v. State, 272 Ga. App. 304, 311 (4) (a) ( 612 SE2d 118 ) (2005).

2014“As long as the showup was reasonably and fairly conducted at or near the time of the offense, we do not reach the second part of the test.” Young v. State, 272 Ga. App. 304, 311 (4) (a) ( 612 SE2d 118 ) (2005).

2001(Citation omitted.) In the Interest of S. H., 251 Ga. App. at 557 (1) (b).

2001(Citation omitted.) In the Interest of S.H., 251 Ga.App. at 557 (1)(b), 553 S.E.2d 849 .

2018Because the major function of OCGA § 24-4-403 is to "exclud[e] matter of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect," the trial court's decision to exclude evidence under Rule 403 is "an extraordinary remedy which should be used only sparingly." *477 Hood v. State , 299 Ga. 95 , 103, 786 S.E.2d 648 (2016) (quotation marks and citation deleted). 5 Appellant does not dispute that the State satisfied the third part of the OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) test as to both the 1990 and 2003 incidents.

2018Because the major function of OCGA § 24-4-403 is to "exclud[e] matter of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect," the trial court's decision to exclude evidence under Rule 403 is "an extraordinary remedy which should be used only sparingly." *477 Hood v. State , 299 Ga. 95 , 103, 786 S.E.2d 648 (2016) (quotation marks and citation deleted). 5 Appellant does not dispute that the State satisfied the third part of the OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) test as to both the 1990 and 2003 incidents.

2017Id. at 212-213 (2); McNaughton v. State, 290 Ga. 894, 899 (3) (b) ( 725 SE2d 590 ) (2012).

2017Id. at 212- 213 (2); McNaughton v. State, 290 Ga. 894, 899 (3) (b) ( 725 SE2d 590 ) (2012).

2026Rule 403, which governs the second part of the test, provides that “[r]elevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Rule 403 “is designed to exclude matter of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.” Strong, 309 Ga. at 301 (quotation marks omitted).

2025OCGA § 24-7-701(a)(1)-(3). 24 scope of the average juror’s knowledge.” Harris v. State, 279 Ga. 304, 306 (2005).

2025See id. at 463 .

2024If, after excising information regarding unlawfully obtained evidence from the warrant affidavit, the remaining evidence is sufficient to support a finding of probable cause, courts reach the second part of the test, in which they must “determine whether the officer’s decision to obtain 14 a search warrant was ‘prompted by’ what he observed during the illegal entry.” Barron-Soto, 820 F3d at 415 (III) (A) (quoting Noriega, 676 F3d at 1260 (III) (C)); see Murray, 487 U. S. at 543 (III) (same).

2024If, after excising information regarding unlawfully obtained evidence from the warrant affidavit, the remaining evidence is sufficient to support a finding of probable cause, courts reach the second part of the test, in 14 which they must “determine whether the officer’s decision to obtain a search warrant was ‘prompted by’ what he observed during the illegal entry.” Barron-Soto, 820 F3d at 415 (III) (A) (quoting Murray, 487 U.S. at 543 (III)); see Noriega, 676 F3d at 1260 (III) (C) (same).

2024See Kirby v. State, 304 Ga. 472, 480 (4) (819 SE2d 468) (2018) (holding that the second part of the test to admit evidence pursuant to Rule 404 (b) “is governed by” Rule 26 403).

2024See Kirby v. State, 304 Ga. 472, 480 (4) (819 SE2d 468) (2018) (holding that the second part of the test to admit evidence pursuant to Rule 404 (b) “is governed by” Rule 26 403).

2024If, after excising information regarding unlawfully obtained evidence from the warrant affidavit, the remaining evidence is sufficient to support a finding of probable cause, courts reach the second part of the test, in which they must “determine whether the officer’s decision to obtain 14 a search warrant was ‘prompted by’ what he observed during the illegal entry.” Barron-Soto, 820 F3d at 415 (III) (A) (quoting Noriega, 676 F3d at 1260 (III) (C)); see Murray, 487 U. S. at 543 (III) (same).

2024If, after excising information regarding unlawfully obtained evidence from the warrant affidavit, the remaining evidence is sufficient to support a finding of probable cause, courts reach the second part of the test, in 14 which they must “determine whether the officer’s decision to obtain a search warrant was ‘prompted by’ what he observed during the illegal entry.” Barron-Soto, 820 F3d at 415 (III) (A) (quoting Murray, 487 U.S. at 543 (III)); see Noriega, 676 F3d at 1260 (III) (C) (same).

2024If, after excising information regarding unlawfully obtained evidence from the warrant affidavit, the remaining evidence is sufficient to support a finding of probable cause, courts reach the second part of the test, in which they must “determine whether the officer’s decision to obtain 14 a search warrant was ‘prompted by’ what he observed during the illegal entry.” Barron-Soto, 820 F3d at 415 (III) (A) (quoting Noriega, 676 F3d at 1260 (III) (C)); see Murray, 487 U. S. at 543 (III) (same).

2024If, after excising information regarding unlawfully obtained evidence from the warrant affidavit, the remaining evidence is sufficient to support a finding of probable cause, courts reach the second part of the test, in 14 which they must “determine whether the officer’s decision to obtain a search warrant was ‘prompted by’ what he observed during the illegal entry.” Barron-Soto, 820 F3d at 415 (III) (A) (quoting Murray, 487 U.S. at 543 (III)); see Noriega, 676 F3d at 1260 (III) (C) (same).

2023Auld, 309 Ga. at 896 (2) (b).

2023An error cannot be plain where there is no controlling authority on point or if a defendant’s theory requires the extension of precedent.” Early v. State, 313 Ga. 667, 672-673 (2) (b) (872 SE2d 705) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2023An error cannot be plain where there is no controlling authority on point or if a defendant’s theory requires the extension of precedent.” Early v. State, 313 Ga. 667, 672-673 (2) (b) (872 SE2d 705) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2022An error cannot be plain where there is no controlling authority on point” or “if a defendant’s theory requires the extension of precedent.” Id. at 264-266.

2022Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 435-436 (11) ( 349 SE2d 717 ) (1986). 4 When that threshold is crossed, the trial court “proceeds to the second part of the framework, applying a context-focused, four- factor balancing test to determine whether the defendant was denied the right to a speedy trial.” Redding I, 309 Ga. at 129 (3) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2022When that threshold is crossed, the trial court “proceeds to the second part of the framework, applying a context-focused, four- factor balancing test to determine whether the defendant was denied the right to a speedy trial.” Redding I, 309 Ga. at 129 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2022Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 435-436 (11) ( 349 SE2d 717 ) (1986). 4 When that threshold is crossed, the trial court “proceeds to the second part of the framework, applying a context-focused, four- factor balancing test to determine whether the defendant was denied the right to a speedy trial.” Redding I, 309 Ga. at 129 (3) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2022Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 435-436 (11) ( 349 SE2d 717 ) (1986). 4 When that threshold is crossed, the trial court “proceeds to the second part of the framework, applying a context-focused, four- factor balancing test to determine whether the defendant was denied the right to a speedy trial.” Redding I, 309 Ga. at 129 (3) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2021Hood v. State, 309 Ga. 493, 500 (2) ( 847 SE2d 172 ) (2020). (b) The second part of the test is governed by OCGA § 24-4-403.

2021Hood v. State, 309 Ga. 493, 500 (2) ( 847 SE2d 172 ) (2020). (b) The second part of the test is governed by OCGA § 24-4-403.

2020Rule 403 “is designed to exclude matter of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.” McKinney v. State, 307 Ga. 129, 137 ( 834 SE2d 741 ) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2020If the presumptive-prejudice threshold is crossed, as it was in this case, the trial court “proceeds to the second part of the framework, applying a context-focused, four-factor balancing test to determine whether the defendant was denied the right to a speedy trial.” Johnson, 300 Ga. at 257 (3).

2020These four factors are “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for it; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” Id.

2018See Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 69-70 ( 786 SE2d 633 ) (2016). 17 The second part of the test is governed by OCGA § 24-4-403, which says: Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

2018See Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 69-70 ( 786 SE2d 633 ) (2016). 17 The second part of the test is governed by OCGA § 24-4-403, which says: Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

2016See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. 22, 24 ( 709 SE2d 217 ) (2011) (“In assessing the admissibility of similar transaction evidence, the proper focus is on the similarities, not the differences, between the separate act and the crimes in question.”). 11 Evidence is intrinsic “if it is (1) an uncharged offense which arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense, (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime, or (3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.” United States v. Utter, 97 F3d 509, 513 (11th Cir. 1996). 12 Prior

2016See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. 22, 24 ( 709 SE2d 217 ) (2011) (“In assessing the admissibility of similar transaction evidence, the proper focus is on the similarities, not the differences, between the separate act and the crimes in question.”). 11 Evidence is intrinsic “if it is (1) an uncharged offense which arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense, (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime, or (3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.” United States v. Utter, 97 F3d 509, 513 (11th Cir. 1996). 12 Prior

2016See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. 22, 24 ( 709 SE2d 217 ) (2011) (“In assessing the admissibility of similar transaction evidence, the proper focus is on the similarities, not the differences, between the separate act and the crimes in question.”). 11 Evidence is intrinsic “if it is (1) an uncharged offense which arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense, (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime, or (3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.” United States v. Utter, 97 F3d 509, 513 (11th Cir. 1996). 12 Prior