Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
10 Wyoming opinions name it 1 courts 1988–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wyoming courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Anthony Haire v. Stategreen2 sentences2018See also , *770 Haire v. State , 2017 WY 48 , ¶ 34, 393 P.3d 1304 , 1313 (Wyo. 2017). 2018See also , *770 Haire v. State , 2017 WY 48 , ¶ 34, 393 P.3d 1304 , 1313 (Wyo. 2017). | 1 | 1 |
Peterson v. McMickengreen2 sentences2012The State counters that the district court's comment did not relate to the weight or value of the evidence and, instead, "was the introduction of a limiting instruction to prevent the jury from improperly using the evidence." While we agree with the State that the general tenor of the instruc tion was meant to be a limiting instruction, we find that the district court's comment that the jury would hear that there were child pornography websites on the appellant's computer was a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law. [133] We have expressed that trial judges must "be careful and caut 2012The State counters that the district court's comment did not relate to the weight or value of the evidence and, instead, "was the introduction of a limiting instruction to prevent the jury from improperly using the evidence." While we agree with the State that the general tenor of the instruc tion was meant to be a limiting instruction, we find that the district court's comment that the jury would hear that there were child pornography websites on the appellant's computer was a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law. [133] We have expressed that trial judges must "be careful and caut | 1 | 1 |
Phillips v. Stategreen1 sentence2012The State counters that the district court's comment did not relate to the weight or value of the evidence and, instead, "was the introduction of a limiting instruction to prevent the jury from improperly using the evidence." While we agree with the State that the general tenor of the instruc tion was meant to be a limiting instruction, we find that the district court's comment that the jury would hear that there were child pornography websites on the appellant's computer was a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law. [133] We have expressed that trial judges must "be careful and caut | 1 | 1 |
Urbigkit v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Urbigkit v. State, 2003 WY 57, ¶ 27-28 , 67 P.3d 1207, 1220 (Wyo.2003). [T23] The second part of the test directs us to analyze the relative difficulty or ease encountered by the district court in selecting a jury, taking into account the amount of prejudice which actually appeared during voir dire examination. 2012Urbigkit v. State, 2003 WY 57, ¶ 27-28 , 67 P.3d 1207, 1220 (Wyo.2003). [T23] The second part of the test directs us to analyze the relative difficulty or ease encountered by the district court in selecting a jury, taking into account the amount of prejudice which actually appeared during voir dire examination. | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2003Concessions of guilt (A) STANDARD OF REVIEW [T38] Although we ordinarily adhere to the Strickland test in reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and require a showing of deficient performance coupled with prejudice, there is a narrow class of cases where the "circumstances ... are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 , 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 . 2003Concessions of guilt (A) STANDARD OF REVIEW [T38] Although we ordinarily adhere to the Strickland test in reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and require a showing of deficient performance coupled with prejudice, there is a narrow class of cases where the "circumstances ... are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 , 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wyoming. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Florida v. Royer
green
2 sentences2005“An investigative detention must be temporary, lasting no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, and the scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.” Wood, 106 F.3d at 945 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 , 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325-26 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)). 2005“An investigative detention must be temporary, lasting no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, and the scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.” Wood, 106 F.3d at 945 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 , 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325-26 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)). | 2 | 2004–2005 |
United States v. Terry L. Wood
green
2 sentences2005Secondly, we determine whether the officer’s actions during the detention were “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first instance.” Id.; see also Innis , ¶ 14; Wood, 106 F.3d at 945 . [¶ 19] Here, just as in Campbell , Lindsay did not challenge the reasonableness of the initial stop while before the district court; therefore, we must turn directly to the second part of the analysis — the reasonableness of the detention. 7 In Campbell , ¶ 12, we noted: ... 2004Secondly, we determine whether the officer’s actions during the detention were “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first instance.” Id.; see also Innis, ¶ 14; Wood, 106 F.3d at 945 . [¶ 12] Campbell does not challenge the reasonableness of the initial stop; therefore, we turn directly to the second part of the analysis — the reasonableness of the detention. | 2 | 2004–2005 |
Gabriel R. Drennen v. The State of Wyoming
green
2 sentences2018Turning to the second part of the test-violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law-we note that the instruction given in this case is the exact instruction this Court disapproved of in Drennen v. State , 2013 WY 118 , ¶¶ 37-39, 311 P.3d 116 , 129-30 (Wyo. 2013). 2018Turning to the second part of the test-violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law-we note that the instruction given in this case is the exact instruction this Court disapproved of in Drennen v. State , 2013 WY 118 , ¶¶ 37-39, 311 P.3d 116 , 129-30 (Wyo. 2013). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Hannon v. State
green
2 sentences2013Id. 2013Id. 6 In applying the two-part Daubert analysis, the trial court need not and should not determine the scientific validity of the conclusions offered by an expert witness. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Bunting v. Jamieson
green
1 sentence2004Id. [¶ 69] In applying the two-part Daubert analysis, the trial court need not and should not determine the scientific validity of the conclusions offered by an expert witness. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
United States v. Cronic
green
2 sentences2003Concessions of guilt (A) STANDARD OF REVIEW [T38] Although we ordinarily adhere to the Strickland test in reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and require a showing of deficient performance coupled with prejudice, there is a narrow class of cases where the "circumstances ... are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 , 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 . 2003Concessions of guilt (A) STANDARD OF REVIEW [T38] Although we ordinarily adhere to the Strickland test in reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and require a showing of deficient performance coupled with prejudice, there is a narrow class of cases where the "circumstances ... are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 , 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Whalen v. United States
green
2 sentences1992Whalen, 445 U.S. at 691-92 , 100 S.Ct. at 1437-38 . 1992Whalen, 445 U.S. at 691-92 , 100 S.Ct. at 1437-38 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Simaitis v. Flood
green
2 sentences1988In Simaitis v. Flood, 182 Conn. 24 , 437 A.2d 828 (1980), the Connecticut Supreme Court was faced with a nearly identical situation. 1988In Simaitis v. Flood, 182 Conn. 24 , 437 A.2d 828 (1980), the Connecticut Supreme Court was faced with a nearly identical situation. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.