second part inquiry in District of Columbia

1993“Only when the statute is ambiguous does the court turn to the second part of the inquiry, which is to determine whether the agency’s decision is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. (citing Chevron, supra, 467 U.S. at 842-43 , 104 S.Ct. at 2781 ).

1993“Only when the statute is ambiguous does the court turn to the second part of the inquiry, which is to determine whether the agency’s decision is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. (citing Chevron, supra, 467 U.S. at 842-43 , 104 S.Ct. at 2781 ).

2024The second part of the test focuses on the relation of the claimant’s work to the employer’s business and also requires consideration of three factors: (a) “the extent to which [the] claimant’s work is a regular part of the employer’s regular work”; (b) “whether [it] is continuous or intermittent”; and (c) “whether [its] duration is sufficient to amount to the hiring of continuing services, as distinguished from contracting for the completion of a particular job.” Gross, 826 A.2d at 396 n.5; see also 5 Larson, supra, § 60.05[2] at 60-10.

2024Jacobson focuses solely on the second part of the inquiry and argues that his “defamation case would likely have prevailed on its merits.” For a public figure like Jacobson to succeed on a claim for defamation, 9 he must prove, among other things, “that the defendant made a false and defamatory statement” about him, and did so with “actual malice.” Mann, 150 A.3d at 1240 -41 (quoting Oparaugo v. Watts, 884 A.2d 63, 76 (D.C. 2005)).

2024“Although several factors are considered under . . . the ‘relative nature of the work’ test, no one factor is dispositive.” Reyes, 48 A.3d at 165 .

2022Under this second part, we ask whether WMATA was engaged in a “discretionary function” that “involve[d] balancing various economic, political, and social considerations.” 3 Aguehounde, 666 A.2d at 448 .

2009Dant, 829 F.2d at 74 .

1997The trial court, therefore, took the approach to due process—failing to find undue suggestivity but suppressing, nonetheless, for unreliability— that we recently held erroneous in United States v. Hunter, 692 A.2d 1370 (D.C.1997).

1997The trial court, therefore, took the approach to due process — failing to find undue suggestivity but suppressing, nonetheless, for unreliability — that we recently held erroneous in United States v. Hunter, 692 A.2d 1370 (D.C.1997).

1993“Only when the statute is ambiguous does the court turn to the second part of the inquiry, which is to determine whether the agency’s decision is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. (citing Chevron, supra, 467 U.S. at 842-43 , 104 S.Ct. at 2781 ).

1993"Only when the statute is ambiguous does the court turn to the second part of the inquiry, which is to determine whether the agency's decision is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id. (citing Chevron, supra, 467 U.S. at 842-43 , 104 S.Ct. at 2781 ).

1987We turn now to the second part of the inquiry: notwithstanding the sugges-tivity of the photo array, “given the ‘totality of the circumstances,’ was the resulting identification reliable nonetheless?” Id. (quoting Patterson, 384 A.2d at 665 ).

1987We turn now to the second part of the inquiry: notwithstanding the sugges-tivity of the photo array, “given the ‘totality of the circumstances,’ was the resulting identification reliable nonetheless?” Id. (quoting Patterson, 384 A.2d at 665 ).

1982The court in Rhone, supra 125 U.S.App.D.C. at 48, 365 F.2d at 981 , stated that “[pjrejudice from joinder of defendants may arise ... where only one defendant testifies and urges the jury to draw an adverse inference from his co-defendant’s silence." (Emphasis added; citations omitted.) Appellant fails to demonstrate that the second part of this test was met. 13 .