second part test in Washington

2018Thus we do not even reach the second part of the test, where Bennett would have had to also prove that "defense counsel's deficient representation prejudiced the defendant, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, except for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Studd, 137 Wn.2d at 551 (quoting McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 235 ).

1999Thus we do not even reach the second part of the test, where Bennett would have had to also prove that "defense counsel's deficient representation prejudiced the defendant, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, except for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." McFarland, 127 Wash.2d at 335 , 899 P.2d 1251 (citing Thomas, 109 Wash.2d at 225-26 , 743 P.2d 816 ).

2014The second part of the test, the logic prong, asks "'whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.'" Sublett, 176 Wn.2d at 73 (quoting Press II, 478 U.S. at 8).

2014The trial judge used this downtime to discuss motions in limine in chambers rather than moving jurors in and out of the courtroom multiple times. ¶18 The second part of the test, the logic prong, asks “ ‘whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.’ ” Sublett, 176 Wn.2d at 73 (quoting Press II, 478 U.S. at 8).

1999Thus we do not even reach the second part of the test, where Bennett would have had to also prove that "defense counsel's deficient representation prejudiced the defendant, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, except for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." McFarland, 127 Wash.2d at 335 , 899 P.2d 1251 (citing Thomas, 109 Wash.2d at 225-26 , 743 P.2d 816 ).

1999Thus we do not even reach the second part of the test, where Bennett would have had to also prove that "defense counsel's deficient representation prejudiced the defendant, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, except for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." McFarland, 127 Wash.2d at 335 , 899 P.2d 1251 (citing Thomas, 109 Wash.2d at 225-26 , 743 P.2d 816 ).

2018Grant County Fire, 150 Wn.2d at 802 (internal quotation marks omitted)(quoting Save a Valuable Env't, 89 Wn.2d at 866 ).

2013Grant County II, 150 Wn.2d at 802 (quoting Save a Valuable Env't, 89 Wn.2d at 866 ).

2014Evans, 159 Wn.2d at 409 . ¶26 The facts here are different than in Evans.

2014Evans, 159 Wn.2d at 409 .

2006“If either part of the test is not satisfied, the inquiry need go no further.” State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 78 , 917 P.2d 563 (1996). ¶14 To meet the second part of this test, the appellant must prove that, but for the deficient performance of his counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have differed.

2006"If either part of the test is not satisfied, the inquiry need go no further." State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash.2d 61, 78 , 917 P.2d 563 (1996). ¶ 14 To meet the second part of this test, the appellant must prove that, but for the deficient performance of his counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have differed.

2006“If either part of the test is not satisfied, the inquiry need go no further.” State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 78 , 917 P.2d 563 (1996). ¶14 To meet the second part of this test, the appellant must prove that, but for the deficient performance of his counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have differed.

2006"If either part of the test is not satisfied, the inquiry need go no further." State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash.2d 61, 78 , 917 P.2d 563 (1996). ¶ 14 To meet the second part of this test, the appellant must prove that, but for the deficient performance of his counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have differed.

2005Thus, Harris’ loss of the commercial use of his land coupled with the singling out of only his land for rezoning implicated his constitutional due process rights. ¶10 In Holbrook, Inc. v. Clark County, 112 Wn.

2005Thus, Harris' loss of the commercial use of his land coupled with the singling out of his land only for rezoning implicated his constitutional due process rights. ¶ 10 In Holbrook, Inc. v. Clark County, 112 Wash.App. 354 , 49 P.3d 142 (2002), an Olympia corporation purchased 75 acres of forested land for the purposes of logging and development.

2002Id.

2002Id.

2002The majority answers this question in the affirmative, indicating that the Department of Labor and Industries, through authority delegated to it by the legislature, would not have enacted a regulation requiring periodic rests "`if it did not intend for employees to be able to enforce that right.'" Majority at 261 (emphasis added) (quoting Wingert v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 104 Wash.App. 583, 591-92 , 13 P.3d 677 (2000), review granted, 144 Wash.2d 1009 , 32 P.3d 284 (2001)).

2002The majority answers this question in the affirmative, indicating that the Department of Labor and Industries, through authority delegated to it by the legislature, would not have enacted a regulation requiring periodic rests “ ‘if it did not intend for employees to be able to enforce that right.’ ” Majority at 850 (emphasis added) (quoting Wingert v. Yellow Freight Sys., 104 Wn.

2000Moreover, there is a second part to this inquiry: the police must not act so as to “accelerate the discovery of the evidence in question.” White, 76 Wn.

2000Moreover, there is a second part to this inquiry: the police must not act so as to "accelerate the discovery of the evidence in question." White, 76 Wash.App. at 809 , 888 P.2d 169 .

2000Avundes, 95 Wash. App. at 276 , 976 P.2d 637 .

2000Avundes, 95 Wash. App. at 276 , 976 P.2d 637 .

1993Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 366-67 , 111 L.Ed.2d 292 , 110 S.Ct. 2892 (1990).

1993Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 366-67 , 111 L.Ed.2d 292 , 110 S.Ct. 2892 (1990).

2026If so, the second part of the test requires that “‘the government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.’” Id. (quoting N.Y.

2026State Rifle, 597 U.S. at 24 , 142 S. Ct. 2111 ).

2026“Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under article I, section 7 unless they qualify as specific exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. White, 141 Wn.

2025We move on to the second part of the test only if the challenged state action implicates a state privilege or immunity, and ask “whether there is a ‘reasonable ground’ for granting that privilege or immunity” Martinez-Cuevas, 196 Wn.2d at 519 .

2025Id. 10 No. 39453-1-III State v. Mooneyham “Legal comparability means that the elements of a foreign conviction are substantially similar to the elements of a Washington crime.” State v. Farnsworth, 133 Wn.

2023In the second part of our analysis, we construe some of the factors that must be proved by clear and convincing evidence to overcome the qualified privilege.4 A. THE QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE In Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 97 Wn.2d 148 , 641 P.2d 1180 (1982), our Supreme Court recognized that journalists had a common law privilege with respect to their sources of information.

2023In the second part of our analysis, we construe some of the factors that must be proved by clear and convincing evidence to overcome the qualified privilege.4 A. THE QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE In Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 97 Wn.2d 148 , 641 P.2d 1180 (1982), our Supreme Court recognized that journalists had a common law privilege with respect to their sources of information.

2022Turning to the second part of our test for reviewing an article II, section 37 challenge, we consider “whether ‘a straightforward determination of the scope of rights or duties under the existing statutes [would] be rendered erroneous by the new enactment.’” El Centro de la Raza, 192 Wn.2d at 129 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Manussier, 129 Wn.2d at 663 ).

2021Co., 90 Wn.2d 323 , 330- 31, 582 P.2d 500 (1978).

2021Co., 90 Wn.2d 323 , 330- 31, 582 P.2d 500 (1978).

2020With regard to the second part of the test, our Supreme Court has recognized two types of courtroom closures: First, “‘when the courtroom is completely and purposefully closed to spectators so that no one may enter and no one may leave,’” and second, “where a portion of a trial is held someplace ‘inaccessible’ to spectators.” State v. Love, 183 Wn.2d 598, 606 , 354 P.3d 841 (2015) (quoting State v. Lormor, 172 Wn.2d 85, 93 , 257 P.3d 624 (2011)).

2020With regard to the second part of the test, our Supreme Court has recognized two types of courtroom closures: First, “‘when the courtroom is completely and purposefully closed to spectators so that no one may enter and no one may leave,’” and second, “where a portion of a trial is held someplace ‘inaccessible’ to spectators.” State v. Love, 183 Wn.2d 598, 606 , 354 P.3d 841 (2015) (quoting State v. Lormor, 172 Wn.2d 85, 93 , 257 P.3d 624 (2011)).

2020With regard to the second part of the test, our Supreme Court has recognized two types of courtroom closures: First, “‘when the courtroom is completely and purposefully closed to spectators so that no one may enter and no one may leave,’” and second, “where a portion of a trial is held someplace ‘inaccessible’ to spectators.” State v. Love, 183 Wn.2d 598, 606 , 354 P.3d 841 (2015) (quoting State v. Lormor, 172 Wn.2d 85, 93 , 257 P.3d 624 (2011)).

2020With regard to the second part of the test, our Supreme Court has recognized two types of courtroom closures: First, “‘when the courtroom is completely and purposefully closed to spectators so that no one may enter and no one may leave,’” and second, “where a portion of a trial is held someplace ‘inaccessible’ to spectators.” State v. Love, 183 Wn.2d 598, 606 , 354 P.3d 841 (2015) (quoting State v. Lormor, 172 Wn.2d 85, 93 , 257 P.3d 624 (2011)).

2018Thus we do not even reach the second part of the test, where Bennett would have had to also prove that "defense counsel's deficient representation prejudiced the defendant, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, except for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Studd, 137 Wn.2d at 551 (quoting McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 235 ).

2015New and Independent Consideration The second part of the analysis requires us to determine whether the Severance Agreement is supported by independent consideration, id. at 714 .

2015An agreement will be enforced when collaterally related to an illegal transaction, so long as there is an independent consideration or if the plaintiff does not require the aid of the illegal transaction to make out his case. id.