default rule in Iowa

2021The goal is to craft a “punishment that serves the best interests of the child and of society.” Third, the default rule in sentencing a juvenile is that they are not subject to minimum periods of incarceration. 897 N.W.2d at 144 (citations omitted).

2017See State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127, 144 (Iowa 2017) (explaining that while mandatory-minimum sentences for juvenile offenders are not categorically unconstitutional, “the default rule in sentencing a juvenile is that they are not subject to minimum periods of incarceration”).

2020Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 144 (citing Null, 836 N.W.2d at 74 ).

2017See Null, 836 N.W.2d at 74 (“First, the district court must recognize that because ‘children are constitutionally different from adults,’ they ordinarily cannot be held to the same standard of culpability as adults in criminal sentencing.” (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at ___ , 132 S. Ct. at 2464 )).

2025See Marriage of Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d 26 , 35–36 (Iowa 2015).

2025See Marriage of Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d 26 , 35–36 (Iowa 2015).

2017See Null, 836 N.W.2d at 74 (“First, the district court must recognize that because ‘children are constitutionally different from adults,’ they ordinarily cannot be held to the same standard of culpability as adults in criminal sentencing.” (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at ___ , 132 S. Ct. at 2464 )).

2017See Null, 836 N.W.2d at 74 (“First, the district court must recognize that because ‘children are constitutionally different from adults,’ they ordinarily cannot be held to the same standard of culpability as adults in criminal sentencing.” (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at ___ , 132 S. Ct. at 2464 )).

2009In Mortensen, we held that, when an insurance policy is silent with respect to the stacking of multiple UM coverages, section 516A.2(3) provides a default rule that permits the insured “to recover up to the highest policy limit.” 590 N.W.2d at 39 .

2009Id. (stating this amount “shall be paid by the 5We stated in Mortensen that section 516A.2(3) provides a default rule permitting the insured “to recover up to the highest policy limit, with no stacking of coverage.” 590 N.W.2d at 39 (emphasis added).

2018Thus, while spouse survivorship rights may be awarded to ensure the spouse receives a share of the pension plan in the event of the employee spouse's untimely death, we cannot say such an award is "normal and typical." See In re Marriage of Morris , 810 N.W.2d 880 , 887 (Iowa 2012) (noting some courts-but not Iowa courts-have adopted a default rule that dividing retirement benefits includes survivorship benefits).

2015In Morris, our supreme court did not adopt “a default rule by holding that a decree dividing retirement benefits includes survivorship benefits” nor did it refuse “to allow postdissolution orders awarding a former spouse survivorship rights when the decree [did] not expressly contemplate the survivorship benefit.” Id. at 886 (collecting cases from other jurisdictions taking varied approaches).

2026Next, in considering whether the district court abused its discretion in allowing the State to present its untimely expert, we examine four factors: “(1) the party’s reasons for not providing the challenged evidence during discovery; (2) the importance of the evidence; (3) the time needed for the other side to prepare to meet the evidence; and (4) the propriety of granting a continuance.” Lawson v. Kurtzhals, 792 N.W.2d 251, 259 (Iowa 2010) (quoting 27 C.J.S.

2026Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 51, 56, 58 (2005); see also In re N.S., 13 N.W.3d 811 , 822 (Iowa 2024) (applying the ordinary default rule and Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.904(3)(e) to place the burden of proof on the party seeking relief); Pioneer Ctrs.

2025See id.6 Second, plaintiffs rely on Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Board v. Shell Oil Co., 606 N.W.2d 370 (Iowa 2000).

2025For starters, Dierickx’s assumption that an auction is presumed to be without reserve unless the auctioneer says that it is with reserve runs smack into more than 160 years of Iowa precedent and the prevailing view nationally that the default rule is the opposite—an auction bid “is nothing more than an offer on one side, which is not binding on either side until it is assented to.” Swortzell v. Martin, 16 Iowa 519, 527 (1864) (cleaned up); see also Marten, 543 N.W.2d at 443 (“[A]ll auctions are presumed to be with reserve unless they are expressly stated to be without reserve.” (cleaned up)).

2025For starters, Dierickx’s assumption that an auction is presumed to be without reserve unless the auctioneer says that it is with reserve runs smack into more than 160 years of Iowa precedent and the prevailing view nationally that the default rule is the opposite—an auction bid “is nothing more than an offer on one side, which is not binding on either side until it is assented to.” Swortzell v. Martin, 16 Iowa 519, 527 (1864) (cleaned up); see also Marten, 543 N.W.2d at 443 (“[A]ll auctions are presumed to be with reserve unless they are expressly stated to be without reserve.” (cleaned up)).

2024Ultimately, because of “the length of [the parties’] marriage,” the spouse was entitled to be a beneficiary of any preretirement death benefits, but not entitled to be a contingent annuitant “because [she] was sufficiently protected by the other pension provisions.” Id.; see also In re Marriage of Smith, No. 16-0597, 2017 WL 362000 , at *6 n.11 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2017) (awarding spouse the marital share of a pension using the Benson formula but declining to designate her as the surviving spouse because Benson adequately protected her interests).

2024The next year, we again concluded that the Iowa Constitution does not categorically prohibit sentencing juvenile offenders to a minimum term before parole eligibility in State v. Zarate, 908 N.W.2d 831, 846 (Iowa 2018).

2019If a statute appears designed as a punishment measure, the court has gravitated to the technical definition of conviction; but when the statute primarily 2 The State begins its response by recognizing the default rule providing “an amendment to a sentencing statute that reduces the penalty for an offense committed prior to its effective date must be applied if the statute is effective at the time of sentencing.” State v. Trader, 661 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Iowa 2003) (citing State v. Chrisman, 514 N.W.2d 57, 61 (Iowa 1994)); accord Iowa Code § 4.13 (2) (“If the penalty, forfeiture, or punishment for

2019Id.; Schilling v. Iowa Dep’t of Trans., 646 N.W.2d 69, 71 (Iowa 2002) (embracing popular definition of conviction as trigger for license revocation because measure was aimed at public protection rather than punishment).

2019If a statute appears designed as a punishment measure, the court has gravitated to the technical definition of conviction; but when the statute primarily 2 The State begins its response by recognizing the default rule providing “an amendment to a sentencing statute that reduces the penalty for an offense committed prior to its effective date must be applied if the statute is effective at the time of sentencing.” State v. Trader, 661 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Iowa 2003) (citing State v. Chrisman, 514 N.W.2d 57, 61 (Iowa 1994)); accord Iowa Code § 4.13 (2) (“If the penalty, forfeiture, or punishment for

2012See, e.g., Zito v. Zito, 969 P.2d 1144, 1147-48 (Alaska 1998); In re Smith, 148 Cal.App.4th 1115 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 341, 349 (2007); In re Marriage of Payne, 897 P.2d 888, 889 (Colo.App.1995); Conaway v. Conaway, 899 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Mo.Ct.App.1995); Harris v. Harris, 261 Neb. 75 , 621 N.W.2d 491, 498 (2001).

2012See, e.g., Zito v. Zito, 969 P.2d 1144, 1147-48 (Alaska 1998); In re Smith, 148 Cal.App.4th 1115 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 341, 349 (2007); In re Marriage of Payne, 897 P.2d 888, 889 (Colo.App.1995); Conaway v. Conaway, 899 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Mo.Ct.App.1995); Harris v. Harris, 261 Neb. 75 , 621 N.W.2d 491, 498 (2001).

2012See, e.g., Zito v. Zito, 969 P.2d 1144, 1147-48 (Alaska 1998); In re Smith, 148 Cal.App.4th 1115 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 341, 349 (2007); In re Marriage of Payne, 897 P.2d 888, 889 (Colo.App.1995); Conaway v. Conaway, 899 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Mo.Ct.App.1995); Harris v. Harris, 261 Neb. 75 , 621 N.W.2d 491, 498 (2001).

2012See, e.g., Zito v. Zito, 969 P.2d 1144, 1147-48 (Alaska 1998); In re Smith, 148 Cal.App.4th 1115 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 341, 349 (2007); In re Marriage of Payne, 897 P.2d 888, 889 (Colo.App.1995); Conaway v. Conaway, 899 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Mo.Ct.App.1995); Harris v. Harris, 261 Neb. 75 , 621 N.W.2d 491, 498 (2001).

2012See, e.g., Zito v. Zito, 969 P.2d 1144, 1147-48 (Alaska 1998); In re Smith, 148 Cal.App.4th 1115 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 341, 349 (2007); In re Marriage of Payne, 897 P.2d 888, 889 (Colo.App.1995); Conaway v. Conaway, 899 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Mo.Ct.App.1995); Harris v. Harris, 261 Neb. 75 , 621 N.W.2d 491, 498 (2001).

2012See, e.g., Zito v. Zito, 969 P.2d 1144, 1147-48 (Alaska 1998); In re Smith, 148 Cal.App.4th 1115 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 341, 349 (2007); In re Marriage of Payne, 897 P.2d 888, 889 (Colo.App.1995); Conaway v. Conaway, 899 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Mo.Ct.App.1995); Harris v. Harris, 261 Neb. 75 , 621 N.W.2d 491, 498 (2001).

2012See, e.g., Zito v. Zito, 969 P.2d 1144, 1147-48 (Alaska 1998); In re Smith, 148 Cal.App.4th 1115 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 341, 349 (2007); In re Marriage of Payne, 897 P.2d 888, 889 (Colo.App.1995); Conaway v. Conaway, 899 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Mo.Ct.App.1995); Harris v. Harris, 261 Neb. 75 , 621 N.W.2d 491, 498 (2001).

2003See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604 (holding in the absence of a prior agreement concerning disposition, “the relative interests of the parties in using or not using the preembryos must be weighed” by the court).

1985See, e.g., In re Evans, 661 P.2d 171, 174-77 (Alaska 1983) (failure to respond to investigative inquiry constitutes a default under state bar rule and subjects attorney to disciplinary measures); In re Draper, 317 A.2d 106, 108 (Del.Supr.1974) (record of failing to cooperate with the censor committee, an arm of the court, requires severe discipline); Matter of Russell, 424 A.2d 1087, 1088 (D.C.App.1980) (an attorney violates DR 1-102(A)(5) by failing to respond to bar counsel’s inquiries); Matter of Kopp, 402 Mich. 74, 77 , 259 N.W.2d 559, 560 (1977) (failure to answer request for investigatio

1985See, e.g., In re Evans, 661 P.2d 171, 174-77 (Alaska 1983) (failure to respond to investigative inquiry constitutes a default under state bar rule and subjects attorney to disciplinary measures); In re Draper, 317 A.2d 106, 108 (Del.Supr.1974) (record of failing to cooperate with the censor committee, an arm of the court, requires severe discipline); Matter of Russell, 424 A.2d 1087, 1088 (D.C.App.1980) (an attorney violates DR 1-102(A)(5) by failing to respond to bar counsel’s inquiries); Matter of Kopp, 402 Mich. 74, 77 , 259 N.W.2d 559, 560 (1977) (failure to answer request for investigatio

1985See, e.g., In re Evans, 661 P.2d 171, 174-77 (Alaska 1983) (failure to respond to investigative inquiry constitutes a default under state bar rule and subjects attorney to disciplinary measures); In re Draper, 317 A.2d 106, 108 (Del.Supr.1974) (record of failing to cooperate with the censor committee, an arm of the court, requires severe discipline); Matter of Russell, 424 A.2d 1087, 1088 (D.C.App.1980) (an attorney violates DR 1-102(A)(5) by failing to respond to bar counsel’s inquiries); Matter of Kopp, 402 Mich. 74, 77 , 259 N.W.2d 559, 560 (1977) (failure to answer request for investigatio