default rule in Alaska

2016See Perry Homes, 258 S.W.3d at 588 . 10 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2012). -7- 7141 defense under § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (the savings clause), which calls for the application of state law.11 Citibank argues that waiver arises under § 3 (the default clause), which calls for the application of federal law.12 When it enacted the Federal Arbitration Act, “Congress intended to establish a uniform federal law over contracts which fall within its scope.”13 Thus, “if the Arbitration Act is deemed applicable, federal law applies in construing and enforcing an arbitration clause, even in those cases i

2016See Perry Homes, 258 S.W.3d at 588 . 10 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2012). -7- 7141 defense under § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (the savings clause), which calls for the application of state law.11 Citibank argues that waiver arises under § 3 (the default clause), which calls for the application of federal law.12 When it enacted the Federal Arbitration Act, “Congress intended to establish a uniform federal law over contracts which fall within its scope.”13 Thus, “if the Arbitration Act is deemed applicable, federal law applies in construing and enforcing an arbitration clause, even in those cases i

2016See Perry Homes, 258 S.W.3d at 588 . 10 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2012). -7- 7141 defense under § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (the savings clause), which calls for the application of state law.11 Citibank argues that waiver arises under § 3 (the default clause), which calls for the application of federal law.12 When it enacted the Federal Arbitration Act, “Congress intended to establish a uniform federal law over contracts which fall within its scope.”13 Thus, “if the Arbitration Act is deemed applicable, federal law applies in construing and enforcing an arbitration clause, even in those cases i

2016See Perry Homes, 258 S.W.3d at 588 . 10 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2012). -7- 7141 defense under § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (the savings clause), which calls for the application of state law.11 Citibank argues that waiver arises under § 3 (the default clause), which calls for the application of federal law.12 When it enacted the Federal Arbitration Act, “Congress intended to establish a uniform federal law over contracts which fall within its scope.”13 Thus, “if the Arbitration Act is deemed applicable, federal law applies in construing and enforcing an arbitration clause, even in those cases i

2016Many federal courts apply federal law while using default and waiver language interchangeably, and state courts generally apply state law while using waiver language only.19 According to one commentator, “There is general agreement among the circuit courts that the term ‘default’ in Section 3 should, under appropriate circumstances, be read to include waiver of the right to arbitrate by participation in litigation.”20 In many cases there is little 16 Under § 3, the court must apply federal law because “if the Arbitration Act is deemed applicable, federal law applies in construing and enforcing

2016Many federal courts apply federal law while using default and waiver language interchangeably, and state courts generally apply state law while using waiver language only.19 According to one commentator, “There is general agreement among the circuit courts that the term ‘default’ in Section 3 should, under appropriate circumstances, be read to include waiver of the right to arbitrate by participation in litigation.”20 In many cases there is little 16 Under § 3, the court must apply federal law because “if the Arbitration Act is deemed applicable, federal law applies in construing and enforcing

2025But we need not decide that issue because the Aurora Park operating agreement does not even purport to change the definition of an “interim distribution.” Section 5 of Article IX of the operating agreement provides: From time to time, the Manager shall determine in his sole and absolute judgment to what extent, if any, the Company’s cash on hand exceeds the current and anticipated needs, 29 AS 10.50.295. 30 Id. 31 Duffus v. Baker, 513 P.3d 264, 272 (Alaska 2022) (“Alaska laws give an LLC flexibility to deviate from the default requirement of paying each member an equal share of distributions,

2024She argues 1 Chena Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C. v. Bridges, 502 P.3d 951 , 957 (Alaska 2022) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting Williams v. Williams, 252 P.3d 998, 1004 (Alaska 2011)). 2 Schindler v. Schindler, 474 P.3d 648 , 648 n.2 (Alaska 2020) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting Gunn v. Gunn, 367 P.3d 1146, 1150 (Alaska 2016)). 3 Wright v. Shorten, 964 P.2d 441, 443 (Alaska 1998) (quoting Balchen v. Balchen, 566 P.2d 1324 , 1328 n.11 (Alaska 1977)). 4 Alaska R.

2024She argues 1 Chena Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C. v. Bridges, 502 P.3d 951 , 957 (Alaska 2022) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting Williams v. Williams, 252 P.3d 998, 1004 (Alaska 2011)). 2 Schindler v. Schindler, 474 P.3d 648 , 648 n.2 (Alaska 2020) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting Gunn v. Gunn, 367 P.3d 1146, 1150 (Alaska 2016)). 3 Wright v. Shorten, 964 P.2d 441, 443 (Alaska 1998) (quoting Balchen v. Balchen, 566 P.2d 1324 , 1328 n.11 (Alaska 1977)). 4 Alaska R.

2024She argues 1 Chena Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C. v. Bridges, 502 P.3d 951 , 957 (Alaska 2022) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting Williams v. Williams, 252 P.3d 998, 1004 (Alaska 2011)). 2 Schindler v. Schindler, 474 P.3d 648 , 648 n.2 (Alaska 2020) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting Gunn v. Gunn, 367 P.3d 1146, 1150 (Alaska 2016)). 3 Wright v. Shorten, 964 P.2d 441, 443 (Alaska 1998) (quoting Balchen v. Balchen, 566 P.2d 1324 , 1328 n.11 (Alaska 1977)). 4 Alaska R.

2024Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs. v. Cissy A., 513 P.3d 999, 1012 (Alaska 2022). 38 Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 81 Fed.

2022Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36 (1989)). 43 Id. at 38,830 . 44 Id. 45 467 P.3d 1091, 1099 (Alaska 2020). 46 Id. -21- 7604 of the child for that treatment.47 We held that “[t]he superior court carefully, thoughtfully, and correctly determined that [cultural] knowledge . . . was unnecessary” because the child’s removal was based on her need for intensive inpatient medical treatment, not “because of any specific living conditions at her mother’s home that might implicate cultural biases.”48 We thus emphasized that the exception to the default rule requiring cultural expert t

2022Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36 (1989)). 43 Id. at 38,830 . 44 Id. 45 467 P.3d 1091, 1099 (Alaska 2020). 46 Id. -21- 7604 of the child for that treatment.47 We held that “[t]he superior court carefully, thoughtfully, and correctly determined that [cultural] knowledge . . . was unnecessary” because the child’s removal was based on her need for intensive inpatient medical treatment, not “because of any specific living conditions at her mother’s home that might implicate cultural biases.”48 We thus emphasized that the exception to the default rule requiring cultural expert t

2022Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs., 175 P.3d 1222, 1227 (Alaska 2008) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)). 8 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35. 9 Dennis O. v. Stephanie O., 393 P.3d 401, 405-06 (Alaska 2017) (quoting Jerry B. v. Sally B., 377 P.3d 916, 924-25 (Alaska 2016)). 10 Third Presiding Judges’ Statewide COVID-19 Pandemic Administrative Order (May 29, 2020); Alaska Supreme Court Order No. 1957 (March 19, 2020) (permitting presiding judge to issue orders requiring telephonic or video appearances). 11 AS 33.30.081(f) (permitting court to order an incarcerated person’s transpo

2022Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs., 175 P.3d 1222, 1227 (Alaska 2008) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)). 8 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35. 9 Dennis O. v. Stephanie O., 393 P.3d 401, 405-06 (Alaska 2017) (quoting Jerry B. v. Sally B., 377 P.3d 916, 924-25 (Alaska 2016)). 10 Third Presiding Judges’ Statewide COVID-19 Pandemic Administrative Order (May 29, 2020); Alaska Supreme Court Order No. 1957 (March 19, 2020) (permitting presiding judge to issue orders requiring telephonic or video appearances). 11 AS 33.30.081(f) (permitting court to order an incarcerated person’s transpo

2022Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs., 175 P.3d 1222, 1227 (Alaska 2008) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)). 8 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35. 9 Dennis O. v. Stephanie O., 393 P.3d 401, 405-06 (Alaska 2017) (quoting Jerry B. v. Sally B., 377 P.3d 916, 924-25 (Alaska 2016)). 10 Third Presiding Judges’ Statewide COVID-19 Pandemic Administrative Order (May 29, 2020); Alaska Supreme Court Order No. 1957 (March 19, 2020) (permitting presiding judge to issue orders requiring telephonic or video appearances). 11 AS 33.30.081(f) (permitting court to order an incarcerated person’s transpo

2022Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs., 175 P.3d 1222, 1227 (Alaska 2008) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)). 8 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35. 9 Dennis O. v. Stephanie O., 393 P.3d 401, 405-06 (Alaska 2017) (quoting Jerry B. v. Sally B., 377 P.3d 916, 924-25 (Alaska 2016)). 10 Third Presiding Judges’ Statewide COVID-19 Pandemic Administrative Order (May 29, 2020); Alaska Supreme Court Order No. 1957 (March 19, 2020) (permitting presiding judge to issue orders requiring telephonic or video appearances). 11 AS 33.30.081(f) (permitting court to order an incarcerated person’s transpo

2022The scope of cases in which cultural expert testimony need not be presented is “very limited.”39 The BIA’s choice of the word “should” indicates that, as a default rule, the need for cultural expert testimony is to be presumed.40 The BIA in its 37 467 P.3d at 1098-99 , 1098 n.29. 38 BIA Commentary, supra note 19, at 38,829-30. 39 In re April S., 467 P.3d at 1099 . 40 See Should, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (Angus Stevenson & Christine A. Lindberg eds., 3d ed. 2010) (describing that “should” is “used to indicate obligation, duty, or correctness”). -20- 7604 commentary affirmed that cultural

2022The scope of cases in which cultural expert testimony need not be presented is “very limited.”39 The BIA’s choice of the word “should” indicates that, as a default rule, the need for cultural expert testimony is to be presumed.40 The BIA in its 37 467 P.3d at 1098-99 , 1098 n.29. 38 BIA Commentary, supra note 19, at 38,829-30. 39 In re April S., 467 P.3d at 1099 . 40 See Should, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (Angus Stevenson & Christine A. Lindberg eds., 3d ed. 2010) (describing that “should” is “used to indicate obligation, duty, or correctness”). -20- 7604 commentary affirmed that cultural

2017Trial courts have broad discretion in accounting for post-separation mortgage payments and allocating changes in home equity.5 In dividing marital or 3 Berry v. Berry, 978 P.2d 93, 95 (Alaska 1999). 4 Id. 5 See Beal v. Beal, 209 P.3d 1012, 1023 (Alaska 2009) (“When fashioning (continued...) -4- 1656 domestic partnership property, trial courts should ordinarily value the property “as close as practicable to the date of trial.”6 This rule “advances the interests of accuracy and fairness.”7 Although special circumstances may justify the adoption of a different property value,8 we have held that b

2017Trial courts have broad discretion in accounting for post-separation mortgage payments and allocating changes in home equity.5 In dividing marital or 3 Berry v. Berry, 978 P.2d 93, 95 (Alaska 1999). 4 Id. 5 See Beal v. Beal, 209 P.3d 1012, 1023 (Alaska 2009) (“When fashioning (continued...) -4- 1656 domestic partnership property, trial courts should ordinarily value the property “as close as practicable to the date of trial.”6 This rule “advances the interests of accuracy and fairness.”7 Although special circumstances may justify the adoption of a different property value,8 we have held that b

2017Trial courts have broad discretion in accounting for post-separation mortgage payments and allocating changes in home equity.5 In dividing marital or 3 Berry v. Berry, 978 P.2d 93, 95 (Alaska 1999). 4 Id. 5 See Beal v. Beal, 209 P.3d 1012, 1023 (Alaska 2009) (“When fashioning (continued...) -4- 1656 domestic partnership property, trial courts should ordinarily value the property “as close as practicable to the date of trial.”6 This rule “advances the interests of accuracy and fairness.”7 Although special circumstances may justify the adoption of a different property value,8 we have held that b