default rule in Connecticut

2012“Pursuant to traditional contract principles, however, the default rule of employment at will can be modified by the agreement of the parties.” Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 234 Conn. 1, 15 , 662 A.2d 89 (1995).

2012“Pursuant to traditional contract principles, however, the default rule of employment at will can be modified by the agreement of the parties.” Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 234 Conn. 1, 15 , 662 A.2d 89 (1995).

2018The question posed ... however, is what the appropriate default rule of law should be where, as here, the parties have not made such an agreement." 4 Id., at 851 , 792 A.2d 819 .

2018We thus explained that "our law would be better served by having the default rule of law embody this policy against economic waste, and by leaving it to the specific agreement of the parties if they wish a different rule to apply to their, or their insurers', relationship." Id.

1999However, in order to prove that the default rule of employment at will has been modified, the plaintiff must prove "by a fair preponderance of the evidence that [the employer] had agreed, either by words or action or conduct, to undertake [some] form of actual contract commitment to [her] under which [she] could not be terminated without just cause." Id. "[U]nder appropriate circumstances, the terms of an employment manual may give rise to an express or implied contract between employer and employee. . . . in the absence of definitive contractual language, the question of whether the parties i

1999However, in order to prove that the default rule of employment at will has been modified, the plaintiff must prove "by a fair preponderance of the evidence that [the employer] had agreed, either by words or action or conduct, to undertake [some] form of actual contract commitment to [her] under which [she] could not be terminated without just cause." Id. "[U]nder appropriate circumstances, the terms of an employment manual may give rise to an express or implied contract between employer and employee. . . . in the absence of definitive contractual language, the question of whether the parties i

1996"A contract implied in fact, like an express contract, depends on actual agreement." D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame High School, 202 Conn. 206 , 211 n. 2, 520 A.2d 217 (1987).

1996"A contract implied in fact, like an express contract, depends on actual agreement." D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame High School, 202 Conn. 206 , 211 n. 2, 520 A.2d 217 (1987).

2026Co. regarding deductibles contradicts Nationwide’s suggested limitation, as we explained that ‘‘the deductible is, in effect, akin to a primary layer of self- Page 17 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL January 6, 2026 16 JANUARY, 2026 353 Conn. 845 Orlando v. Liburd Thus, in Connecticut, the make whole doctrine applies only when (1) the insured’s total loss exceeds the amount paid by his insurer, (2) the available sources of recovery are insufficient to fully compensate both the insured and the insurer, and (3) the insurance policy is silent as to the parties’ intent to depart from the default rule.

2023The abundance of Appellate Court case law is clear that ‘‘a petitioner cannot demonstrate that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying a petition for certification to appeal if the issue raised on appeal was never raised before the court . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Lewis v. Commissioner of Correction, 211 Conn. App. 77, 93 , 271 A.3d 1058 , cert. denied, 343 Conn. 924 , 275 A.3d 1213 , cert. denied sub nom.

2017The distinction between whether Practice Book § 17-32 applies or Practice Book § 17-42 applies is whether a claim for a hearing in damages is filed before, or after, a motion to set aside the default is filed." (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bohonnon Law Firm, LLC v. Baxter , 131 Conn.App. 371 , 380, 27 A.3d 384 , cert. denied, 303 Conn. 902 , 31 A.3d 1177 (2011). 7 In the present case, the defendant filed a motion to set aside the default after the plaintiff already had requested a hearing in damages.

2017The distinction between whether Practice Book § 17-32 applies or Practice Book § 17-42 applies is whether a claim for a hearing in damages is filed before, or after, a motion to set aside the default is filed." (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bohonnon Law Firm, LLC v. Baxter , 131 Conn.App. 371 , 380, 27 A.3d 384 , cert. denied, 303 Conn. 902 , 31 A.3d 1177 (2011). 7 In the present case, the defendant filed a motion to set aside the default after the plaintiff already had requested a hearing in damages.

2017The distinction between whether Practice Book § 17-32 applies or Practice Book § 17-42 applies is whether a claim for a hearing in damages is filed before, or after, a motion to set aside the default is filed." (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bohonnon Law Firm, LLC v. Baxter , 131 Conn.App. 371 , 380, 27 A.3d 384 , cert. denied, 303 Conn. 902 , 31 A.3d 1177 (2011). 7 In the present case, the defendant filed a motion to set aside the default after the plaintiff already had requested a hearing in damages.

2017The distinction between whether Practice Book § 17-32 applies or Practice Book § 17-42 applies is whether a claim for a hearing in damages is filed before, or after, a motion to set aside the default is filed." (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bohonnon Law Firm, LLC v. Baxter , 131 Conn.App. 371 , 380, 27 A.3d 384 , cert. denied, 303 Conn. 902 , 31 A.3d 1177 (2011). 7 In the present case, the defendant filed a motion to set aside the default after the plaintiff already had requested a hearing in damages.

2016In Wasko v. Manella, supra, 269 Conn. at 545 , 849 A.2d 777 , our Supreme Court noted that the two equitable concerns expressed in DiLullo were: "(1) [o]ur strong public policy against economic waste, which would not be served by requiring multiple insurance policies on the same piece of property; and (2) the likely lack of expectations regarding a tenant's obligation to subrogate his landlord's insurer...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) These concerns were not implicated in the circumstances of Wasko ; there, a social houseguest negligently damaged a host's property and subrogation was

2016In Wasko v. Manella, supra, 269 Conn. at 545 , 849 A.2d 777 , our Supreme Court noted that the two equitable concerns expressed in DiLullo were: "(1) [o]ur strong public policy against economic waste, which would not be served by requiring multiple insurance policies on the same piece of property; and (2) the likely lack of expectations regarding a tenant's obligation to subrogate his landlord's insurer...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) These concerns were not implicated in the circumstances of Wasko ; there, a social houseguest negligently damaged a host's property and subrogation was

2012Ed. 2d 434 (1986). “[T]he mere fact that counsel failed to recognize the factual or legal basis for a claim, or failed to raise the claim despite recognizing it, does not constitute cause for a procedural default.” Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 218 Conn. 403, 422 , 589 A.2d 1214 (1991).

2012Ed. 2d 434 (1986). “[T]he mere fact that counsel failed to recognize the factual or legal basis for a claim, or failed to raise the claim despite recognizing it, does not constitute cause for a procedural default.” Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 218 Conn. 403, 422 , 589 A.2d 1214 (1991).

2012Nevertheless, “the question is not whether subsequent legal developments have made counsel’s task easier, but whether at the time of the default the claim was ‘available’ at all.” Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537 , 106 S. Ct. 2661 , 91 L.

2012Nevertheless, “the question is not whether subsequent legal developments have made counsel’s task easier, but whether at the time of the default the claim was ‘available’ at all.” Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537 , 106 S. Ct. 2661 , 91 L.

2011The distinction between whether Practice Book § 17-32 applies or Practice Book § 17-42 applies is whether a claim for a hearing in damages is filed before, or after, a motion to set aside the default is filed.” Snowdon v. Grillo, 114 Conn. App. 131, 138 , 968 A.2d 984 (2009).

2011The distinction between whether Practice Book § 17-32 applies or Practice Book § 17-42 applies is whether a claim for a hearing in damages is filed before, or after, a motion to set aside the default is filed.” Snowdon v. Grillo, 114 Conn. App. 131, 138 , 968 A.2d 984 (2009).

2005Indeed, a claim similar to the one advanced by the plaintiff herein was made but was rejected by the court in Pulvermacher v. Pulvermacher, 166 Conn. 380, 383 , 349 A.2d 836 (1974).

2005Indeed, a claim similar to the one advanced by the plaintiff herein was made but was rejected by the court in Pulvermacher v. Pulvermacher, 166 Conn. 380, 383 , 349 A.2d 836 (1974).

2004Co. v. Omaha Indemnity Co., 943 F.2d 327 , 331 (3d Cir. 1991). 11 The doctrine of functus officio serves as a default rule, and it applies only in the absence of an agreement between the parties to the contrary.

2000The only case cited in support of the default rule by Bromberg and Ribstein is Bailey and Williams v. Westfall, 727 S.W.2d 86 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987).

1996"Absent a statutory warranty or definitive contract language, the determination of what the parties intended to encompass in their contractual commitments is a question of the intention of the parties, and an inference of fact." Coelho v. Posi-Seal International, Inc., 208 Conn. 106 , 113 (1988).

1995The default clause of the termination contract, by definition, makes the detention of money that is due wrongful only after a default notice." Patron v. Konover , 35 Conn. App. 504 , 518-19 (1994).

1991CBT claims and the court finds the case of Christensen v. Cutaia, 211 Conn. 613 (1989) is controlling.