16 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1952–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Clementi v. Clementigreen2 sentences2021See Clementi v. Clementi, 434 N.J. 2019Citing Clementi v. Clementi, 434 N.J. | 2 | 3 |
State v. A.R.green1 sentence2025State v. A.R., 213 N.J. 542, 561 (2013) (quoting State v. Corsaro, 107 N.J. 339, 345 (1987)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Corsarogreen1 sentence2025State v. A.R., 213 N.J. 542, 561 (2013) (quoting State v. Corsaro, 107 N.J. 339, 345 (1987)). | 1 | 1 |
Amratlal C. Bhagat v. Bharat A. Bhagat (068312)green1 sentence2022The judge explained that "[a]ccepting Renaissance's position that it did not assume any liability under the assignment and lease for damages that occurred prior to the 4 As we also noted in Kimball Intern., Inc. v. Northfield Metal Prods. and the Court noted in Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 37 (2014), the doctrine has come under strong criticism from some academics, see Douglas W. | 1 | 1 |
Heimbach v. Muellergreen1 sentence2021"New Jersey's salutary practice has been to allow the trial judge the discretion to require proof of liability at a default hearing." Heimbach v. Mueller, 229 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Fedders Financial Corp. v. Director, Division of Taxationgreen1 sentence2020Because the amendments’ structure, new compact provisions, and legislative history reveal the Legislature’s intent to capture this revenue, I find inapplicable the default rule provided in Fedders Financial Corp. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 96 N.J. 376, 385-86 (1984), which resolves ambiguity in a tax statute, after other efforts to discern legislative intent fail, in favor of the taxpayer. | 1 | 1 |
New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. D.M.J.green1 sentence2019The Division and the law guardian also rely upon In re Guardianship of N.J., 340 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Sullivan v. COVERINGS & INSTALL., INC.green1 sentence2019See Sullivan, 403 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Pasqua v. Councilgreen1 sentence2016See R. 1:10-2; Pasqua v. Council, 186 N.J. 127, 140 (2006) (stating that a parent is subject to criminal contempt proceedings pursuant to Rule 1:10-2 when the "parent fails to abide by a court-ordered child support obligation"). | 1 | 1 |
Reilly v. Perehinysgreen1 sentence1988New Jersey's *21 salutary practice has been to allow the trial judge the discretion to require proof of liability at a default hearing. [2] R. 4:43-2(b); Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276 (1961); Reilly v. Perehinys, 33 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Douglas v. Harrisgreen1 sentence1988New Jersey's *21 salutary practice has been to allow the trial judge the discretion to require proof of liability at a default hearing. [2] R. 4:43-2(b); Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276 (1961); Reilly v. Perehinys, 33 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Emorygreen2 sentences1952On appeal, the Appellate Division expressed its opinion that the plaintiffs “with reason, say that the proofs depict the defendants as employing the “commission’ device with deliberate intent to circumvent the provision of the certificate of incorporation of Teaneck Gardens, Inc., and the contractual commitment as to maximum rents made with the Federal agency”; it nevertheless affirmed the dismissal because of its view that the National Housing Act, by affording to the Administrator a method of procedure in the event of the mortgagor’s default or violation and omitting any specific provision f 1952On appeal, the Appellate Division expressed its opinion that the plaintiffs “with reason, say that the proofs depict the defendants as employing the “commission’ device with deliberate intent to circumvent the provision of the certificate of incorporation of Teaneck Gardens, Inc., and the contractual commitment as to maximum rents made with the Federal agency”; it nevertheless affirmed the dismissal because of its view that the National Housing Act, by affording to the Administrator a method of procedure in the event of the mortgagor’s default or violation and omitting any specific provision f | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Frank Papera v. Pennsylvania Quarried Blueston
green
2 sentences2021"For voluntary dismissals, the default rule is that a plaintiff's first dismissal is without prejudice." Ibid. (citing Fed. 2021"For involuntary dismissals, the default rule is the opposite. 'Unless the dismissal order states otherwise,' it 'operates as an adjudication on the merits' and so . . . is with prejudice." Ibid. (quoting Fed. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Kolczycki v. City of East Orange
green
1 sentence2019In Kolczycki, despite agreeing that the judge did not abuse his discretion in suppressing defenses, we reversed a default judgment because the orders were "without prejudice." 317 N.J. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Midland Funding LLC v. Carl Albern, Jr.
green
1 sentence2019It was, therefore, a mistaken exercise of discretion for the judge to proceed to a default hearing based on alleged discovery misconduct when defendants' pleading was not yet dismissed with prejudice. "[T]he 'strong preference for adjudication on the merits rather than final disposition for procedural reasons, ' demands that the unauthorized ex parte default — and the subsequent judgment based on that default — be vacated . . . ." Midland Funding, 433 N.J. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Palombi v. Palombi
green
1 sentence2018Moreover, none of this information was a "game changer." Palombi, 414 N.J. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Raubar v. Raubar
green
2 sentences2007To deny the plaintiff the relief requested in this particular action would be directly contrary to the policies expressed in Cimiluca, supra, 245 N.J.Super. at 152 , 584 A.2d 823 and Raubar, supra, 315 N.J.Super. at 364 , 718 A.2d 705 . 2007To deny the plaintiff the relief requested in this particular action would be directly contrary to the policies expressed in Cimiluca, supra, 245 N.J.Super. at 152 , 584 A.2d 823 and Raubar, supra, 315 N.J.Super. at 364 , 718 A.2d 705 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Cimiluca v. Cimiluca
green
2 sentences2007To deny the plaintiff the relief requested in this particular action would be directly contrary to the policies expressed in Cimiluca, supra, 245 N.J.Super. at 152 , 584 A.2d 823 and Raubar, supra, 315 N.J.Super. at 364 , 718 A.2d 705 . 2007To deny the plaintiff the relief requested in this particular action would be directly contrary to the policies expressed in Cimiluca, supra, 245 N.J.Super. at 152 , 584 A.2d 823 and Raubar, supra, 315 N.J.Super. at 364 , 718 A.2d 705 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Gustine Uniontown Associates, Ltd. Ex Rel. Gustine Uniontown, Inc. v. Anthony Crane Rental, Inc.
green
1 sentence2007The stated policy of our Supreme Court is to enforce clear contract language. [ Gustine, supra, 892 A. 2d at 839-40 .] The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion in Harbor Court Associates v. Leo A. Daly Co., supra , concluding that under Maryland law the substantial completion clause would be found consistent with that State's judicial policy in favor of freedom of contract: *726 In light of this established judicial commitment to protecting individuals' efforts to structure their own affairs through contract, we cannot conclude that the Maryland Court of Appeals would de | 1 | 2007–2007 |
In Re Roll
green
2 sentences2005That provision contains a default standard permitting the appointment of "any other proper person," if it is established that the appointment of the spouse or heirs will not serve "the best interest of the incompetent of his estate." We opined in In re Roll, 117 N.J.Super. 122 , 283 A. 2d 764 (App.Div.1971), dealing with a predecessor provision, N.J.S.A. 3A:6-36, of like purport, that the statute (and rule) [3] gives a preference to the next of kin as against other persons and that such preference must be recognized unless it is shown to the court's satisfaction that the appointment of next-of 2005That provision contains a default standard permitting the appointment of "any other proper person," if it is established that the appointment of the spouse or heirs will not serve "the best interest of the incompetent of his estate." We opined in In re Roll, 117 N.J.Super. 122 , 283 A. 2d 764 (App.Div.1971), dealing with a predecessor provision, N.J.S.A. 3A:6-36, of like purport, that the statute (and rule) [3] gives a preference to the next of kin as against other persons and that such preference must be recognized unless it is shown to the court's satisfaction that the appointment of next-of | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.