9 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1978–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Terminix International Co. LP v. Palmer Ranch Ltd. Partnershipgreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Terminix Int’l Co LP v. Palmer Ranch Ltd P’Ship, 432 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing www.adr.org as the source in identifying and quoting specific AAA rules incorporated into the parties’ arbitration agreement for purposes of ascertaining whether parties had clearly and unmistakably agreed that the arbitrator should decide validity of arbitration clause). ¶64 Where an arbitration agreement incorporates rules conferring authority upon an arbitrator to decide gateway questions, courts have found clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties have contracted around the defau 2016See, e.g., Terminix Int’l Co LP v. Palmer Ranch LtD P’Ship, 432 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing www.adr.org as the source in identifying and quoting specific AAA rules incorporated into the parties’ arbitration agreement for purposes of ascertaining whether parties had clearly and unmistakably agreed that the arbitrator should decide validity of arbitration clause). ¶64 Where an arbitration agreement incorporates rules conferring authority upon an arbitrator to decide gateway questions, courts have found clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties have contracted around the defau | 1 | 1 |
U.S. Nutraceuticals, LLC v. Cyanotech Corporationgreen2 sentences2016See U.S. Nutraceuticals, LLC v. Cyanotech Corp., 769 F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2014) (“When the parties incorporated into the 2007 contract the rules of the Association, they clearly and unmistakably contracted to submit questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator.”). 2016See U.S. Nutraceuticals, LLC v. Cyanotech Corp., 769 F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2014) (“When the parties incorporated into the 2007 contract the rules of the Association, they clearly and unmistakably contracted to submit questions of arbitrability to an 6 Global’s reference cite to the current AAA Consumer Arbitration rules is at p. 39 of their Opening Brief; Global sets forth R-7 at p. 15 of their Opening Brief. 31 arbitrator.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wandell v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1978The language of the second part of the default clause could become operative only in the event that the seller elected to declare a forfeiture. “ A forfeiture was not declared; hence [the seller] was free to treat the contract as in full force and recover [either] the amount of the installments then due,” Wandell v. Johnson, 71 Mont. at 79 , 227 P. at 61 , or, by the terms of this contract, the total amount yet to be paid. 1978The language of the second part of the default clause could become operative only in the event that the seller elected to declare a forfeiture. “ A forfeiture was not declared; hence [the seller] was free to treat the contract as in full force and recover [either] the amount of the installments then due,” Wandell v. Johnson, 71 Mont. at 79 , 227 P. at 61 , or, by the terms of this contract, the total amount yet to be paid. | 2 | 1978–1979 |
White v. Jewett
green
2 sentences1979The following language from the contract at issue in White v. Jewett (1938), 106 Mont. 416 , 78 P.2d 85 , language almost identical with that found in the default clause under consideration here, was deemed to be an example of “a usual clause” of acceleration: “ * * * then the whole of said payments and interest shall, at the election of said first party become immediately due and payable Rader v. Taylor (1958), 134 Mont. 419, 431 , 333 P.2d 480, 488 .) The purchasers are given a sixty-day period in which they may redeem themselves. 1979The following language from the contract at issue in White v. Jewett (1938), 106 Mont. 416 , 78 P.2d 85 , language almost identical with that found in the default clause under consideration here, was deemed to be an example of “a usual clause” of acceleration: “ * * * then the whole of said payments and interest shall, at the election of said first party become immediately due and payable Rader v. Taylor (1958), 134 Mont. 419, 431 , 333 P.2d 480, 488 .) The purchasers are given a sixty-day period in which they may redeem themselves. | 2 | 1978–1979 |
Rader v. Taylor
neutral
2 sentences1979The following language from the contract at issue in White v. Jewett (1938), 106 Mont. 416 , 78 P.2d 85 , language almost identical with that found in the default clause under consideration here, was deemed to be an example of “a usual clause” of acceleration: “ * * * then the whole of said payments and interest shall, at the election of said first party become immediately due and payable Rader v. Taylor (1958), 134 Mont. 419, 431 , 333 P.2d 480, 488 .) The purchasers are given a sixty-day period in which they may redeem themselves. 1979The following language from the contract at issue in White v. Jewett (1938), 106 Mont. 416 , 78 P.2d 85 , language almost identical with that found in the default clause under consideration here, was deemed to be an example of “a usual clause” of acceleration: “ * * * then the whole of said payments and interest shall, at the election of said first party become immediately due and payable Rader v. Taylor (1958), 134 Mont. 419, 431 , 333 P.2d 480, 488 .) The purchasers are given a sixty-day period in which they may redeem themselves. | 2 | 1978–1979 |
Members Insurance Co. v. Branscum
green
2 sentences2015Branscum, 803 S.W.2d at 466 .2 ¶117 We adopt a new rule today that arguably conflicts with our prior jurisprudence and departs from our traditionally strict interpretation of insurance contracts. 2015Branscum, 803 S.W.2d at 466 . 2 ¶117 We adopt a new rule today that arguably conflicts with our prior jurisprudence and departs from our traditionally strict interpretation of insurance contracts. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Grizzly Security Armored Express, Inc. v. Armored Group, LLC
neutral
2 sentences2011Armored Express, Inc., v. The Armored Group, LLC, 2009 MT 396 , 353 Mont. 399 , 220 P.3d 661 , in the current appeal. 2011Armored Express, Inc., v. The Armored Group, LLC, 2009 MT 396 , 353 Mont. 399 , 220 P.3d 661 , in the current appeal. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Berger
green
2 sentences2004“We are required to avoid any statutory interpretation that renders any sections of the statute superfluous and does not give effect to all the words used.” State v. Berger (1993), 259 Mont. 364, 367 , 856 P.2d 552, 554 . 2004“We are required to avoid any statutory interpretation that renders any sections of the statute superfluous and does not give effect to all the words used.” State v. Berger (1993), 259 Mont. 364, 367 , 856 P.2d 552, 554 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Bailey v. Lilly
neutral
2 sentences1995Bailey v. Lilly (1983), 205 Mont. 35 , 667 P.2d 933 . 1995Bailey v. Lilly (1983), 205 Mont. 35 , 667 P.2d 933 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Boles v. Simonton
neutral
2 sentences1991In Boles v. Simonton (1990), 242 Mont. 394 , 791 P.2d 755 , the malpractice claimed was omission of a savings clause in a default clause in a contract for deed. 1991In Boles v. Simonton (1990), 242 Mont. 394 , 791 P.2d 755 , the malpractice claimed was omission of a savings clause in a default clause in a contract for deed. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Mildred Martin v. United States
green
1 sentence1982Martin v. United States (9th Cir. 1981), 649 F.2d 701 ; United States Fidelity v. Newman (9th Cir. 1981), 656 F.2d 457 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
United States Fidelity And Guaranty Company v. Earl E. Newman
green
1 sentence1982Martin v. United States (9th Cir. 1981), 649 F.2d 701 ; United States Fidelity v. Newman (9th Cir. 1981), 656 F.2d 457 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.