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7 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 2006–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Durham v. Prudential Insurance Co. of Americagreen1 sentence2022Co. of Am., 236 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1147 (C.D. | 1 | 1 |
cluster 736946green1 sentence2022As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, charging a defendant with an 8 attempted crime "involve[s] a degree of uncertainty regarding the defendant's purpose to commit the underlying crime—an uncertainty that is not present in the case of a principal who actually commits the crime." United States v. Sayetsitty, 107 F.3d 1405, 1412 (9th Cir. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
Chester Lee Wicker v. O.L. McCotter Director, Texas Department of Correctionsgreen1 sentence2022See Wicker v. McCotter, 798 F.2d 155, 157-58 [5th Cir. 1986]."); see also Yong v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 1116 , 1119 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) (The default rule [at least in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals] is that "once a federal circuit court issues a decision, the district courts within that circuit are bound to follow it and have no authority to await a ruling by the Supreme Court before applying the circuit court's decision as binding authority."); Durham v. Prudential Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Hoeun Yong v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,opiniongreen1 sentence2022See Wicker v. McCotter, 798 F.2d 155, 157-58 [5th Cir. 1986]."); see also Yong v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 1116 , 1119 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) (The default rule [at least in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals] is that "once a federal circuit court issues a decision, the district courts within that circuit are bound to follow it and have no authority to await a ruling by the Supreme Court before applying the circuit court's decision as binding authority."); Durham v. Prudential Ins. | 1 | 1 |
City of Haven v. Gregggreen2 sentences2018See Cochran v. Kansas Dept. of Agriculture , 291 Kan. 898 , 906, 249 P.3d 434 (2011) (" '[C]ourts presume the legislature acts with knowledge of existing statutory and case law when it enacts legislation.' "); City of Haven v. Gregg , 244 Kan. 117 , 122, 766 P.2d 143 (1988) ("In Kansas, the common law remains in force, unless modified by constitutional amendment, statutory law, or judicial decision."). 2018See Cochran v. Kansas Dept. of Agriculture , 291 Kan. 898 , 906, 249 P.3d 434 (2011) (" '[C]ourts presume the legislature acts with knowledge of existing statutory and case law when it enacts legislation.' "); City of Haven v. Gregg , 244 Kan. 117 , 122, 766 P.2d 143 (1988) ("In Kansas, the common law remains in force, unless modified by constitutional amendment, statutory law, or judicial decision."). | 1 | 1 |
Cochran v. Stategreen2 sentences2018See Cochran v. Kansas Dept. of Agriculture , 291 Kan. 898 , 906, 249 P.3d 434 (2011) (" '[C]ourts presume the legislature acts with knowledge of existing statutory and case law when it enacts legislation.' "); City of Haven v. Gregg , 244 Kan. 117 , 122, 766 P.2d 143 (1988) ("In Kansas, the common law remains in force, unless modified by constitutional amendment, statutory law, or judicial decision."). 2018See Cochran v. Kansas Dept. of Agriculture , 291 Kan. 898 , 906, 249 P.3d 434 (2011) (" '[C]ourts presume the legislature acts with knowledge of existing statutory and case law when it enacts legislation.' "); City of Haven v. Gregg , 244 Kan. 117 , 122, 766 P.2d 143 (1988) ("In Kansas, the common law remains in force, unless modified by constitutional amendment, statutory law, or judicial decision."). | 1 | 1 |
Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology and the Software Link, Incgreen2 sentences2006Treating the shrinkwrap license as a “written confirmation containing additional terms,” the Step-Saver court concluded that continuing with the contract after receiving the shrinkwrap license was not sufficient to establish an express assent to the new or additional terms contained in the shrinkwrap license. 939 F.2d at 98, 105-06 . *373 Because the plaintiff never expressly agreed to the additional terms contained in the shrinkwrap license, the terms did not become part of the parties’ agreement. 939 F.2d at 106 . 2006Treating the shrinkwrap license as a “written confirmation containing additional terms,” the Step-Saver court concluded that continuing with the contract after receiving the shrinkwrap license was not sufficient to establish an express assent to the new or additional terms contained in the shrinkwrap license. 939 F.2d at 98, 105-06 . *373 Because the plaintiff never expressly agreed to the additional terms contained in the shrinkwrap license, the terms did not become part of the parties’ agreement. 939 F.2d at 106 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Mora
green
2 sentences2026The statute "requires the State to prove the defendant had the specific intent to commit the intended crime, even if that crime would not require specific intent as a completed crime." State v. Mora, 315 Kan. 537 , 543, 509 P.3d 1201 (2022). 2025Attempt is a specific-intent crime, and when the statute defining the intended crime does not include attempt as a means of violating that statute, K.S.A. 21-5301(a) functions as a default rule, which "requires the State to prove the defendant had the specific intent to commit the intended crime, even if that crime would not require specific intent as a completed crime." State v. Mora, 315 Kan. 537 , 543, 509 P.3d 1201 (2022). | 2 | 2025–2026 |
State v. Horn
green
1 sentence2022This results in K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5301(a) operating as a default rule in situations where "the statute defining a crime does not include an attempt as a means of violating that criminal statute." Horn, 288 Kan. 690 , Syl. ¶ 2. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Lackey
green
1 sentence2017App. 2d 257, 264-65 , 246 P.3d 998 , rev. denied 292 Kan. 968 (2011), impose a default rule that cannot be reconciled with the language of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6811 and the legislative intent for scoring convictions from other jurisdictions. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.