default rule in Illinois

2024See Doe A. v. Diocese of Dallas, 234 Ill. 2d 393, 406 (2009) (“Because section 4 of the Statute on Statutes operates as a default standard, it is inapplicable to situations where the legislature has clearly indicated the temporal reach of a statutory amendment.”). -8- ¶ 38 Defendant, however, argues a question remains as to whether a defendant has a right to elect when an amendment is not effective at the time of sentencing but is effective while the case is still pending in the circuit court.

2017Section 4 of the Statute on Statutes “controls by default only where the legislature has not clearly defined the temporal reach of a statute.” Hayashi, 2014 IL 116023 , ¶ 24, 25 N.E.3d 570 (citing Caveney v. Bower, 207 Ill. 2d 82, 92-93 , 797 N.E.2d 596, 601-02 (2003)); Doe A. v. Diocese of Dallas, 234 Ill. 2d 393, 406 , 917 N.E.2d 475, 483 (2009) (section 4 of the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2006)) operates as a default standard only where the legislature has not clearly specified the temporal reach of a statute).

2008However, the vested rights inquiry is now a default rule that need only be considered in the absence of express legislative intent regarding retroactivity." Galloway, 367 Ill.App.3d at 1002 , 306 Ill.Dec. 338 , 857 N.E.2d at 741 (Chapman, J., dissenting) (citing Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill.2d at 38 , 255 Ill.Dec. 482 , 749 N.E.2d at 971 (relying on Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 273 , 114 S.Ct. at 1501 , 128 L.Ed.2d at 257 )).

2008However, the vested rights inquiry is now a default rule that need only be considered in the absence of express legislative intent regarding retroactivity." Galloway, 367 Ill.App.3d at 1002 , 306 Ill.Dec. 338 , 857 N.E.2d at 741 (Chapman, J., dissenting) (citing Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill.2d at 38 , 255 Ill.Dec. 482 , 749 N.E.2d at 971 (relying on Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 273 , 114 S.Ct. at 1501 , 128 L.Ed.2d at 257 )).

2024Ease of argument is not the standard. ‘[T]he question is not whether subsequent legal developments have made counsel’s task easier, but whether at the time of the default the claim was “available” at all.’ ” Id. ¶ 45 (quoting Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537 (1986)). ¶ 83 Simply put, even prior to Miller or Harris, defendant had the tools to construct a claim that his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause because the sentencing judge did not take into account (1) his youth and (2) how his particular neurobiological development affected his maturity and decision-making.

2022Id. ¶¶ 12, 44. ¶ 105 This court acknowledged that Harris and Miller would have made it easier for the defendant to raise his claim, but “[e]ase of argument is not the standard.” Id. ¶¶ 41, 45. “ ‘[T]he question is not whether subsequent legal developments have made counsel’s task easier, but whether at the time of the default the claim was “available” at all.’ ” Id. ¶ 45 (quoting Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537 (1986)); see also Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74 (“Miller’s unavailability prior to 2012 at best deprived defendant of ‘some helpful support’ for his state constitutional law claim, wh

2019Jones, 215 Ill. 2d at 269 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).

2019Jones, 215 Ill. 2d at 269 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).

2018If the legislature did not prescribe the temporal reach of the amended statute, section 4 of the Statute on Statutes ( 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2016) ) supplies the default rule that amendments "that are procedural may be applied retroactively, while those that are substantive may not." Allegis , 223 Ill. 2d at 331 , 307 Ill.Dec. 592 , 860 N.E.2d 246 .

2018If the legislature did not prescribe the temporal reach of the amended statute, section 4 of the Statute on Statutes ( 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2016) ) supplies the default rule that amendments "that are procedural may be applied retroactively, while those that are substantive may not." Allegis , 223 Ill. 2d at 331 , 307 Ill.Dec. 592 , 860 N.E.2d 246 .

2022Alvarez v. Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 28 (quoting People v. Ziobro, 242 Ill. 2d 34, 46 (2011)), stated that “[u]nder section 4, substantive amendments may not be applied retroactively, but ‘procedural law changes will apply to ongoing proceedings.’ ” Our supreme court has also stated that application of the Statute on Statute’s default rule means that the amended statute “would apply retroactively to a pending case, i.e., a case in which the trial court proceedings had begun on the old statute but had not yet been concluded.” Hunter, 2017 IL 121306, ¶ 30 . ¶ 24 In Hunter, the defendant was char

2018Certainly, we were not asked in Howard to consider the retroactivity of a procedural statute where, as here, the case was pending in the appellate court, rather than the trial court, when the statute became effective. ¶ 30 We also observe that our application of section 4 in the Howard case began with this statement of the law: “Under section 4, substantive amendments may not be applied retroactively, but ‘procedural law changes will apply to ongoing proceedings.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Id. (quoting People v. Ziobro, 242 Ill. 2d 34, 46 (2011) (citing section 4 of the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 7

2021See In re Marriage of Heroy, 385 Ill.

2020Heroy, 385 Ill.

2023Rather, it is the benefit recipient’s request of an appeal that is the affirmative step that starts the action. ¶ 51 Defendants rely on Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005), for the proposition that, where the relevant statute does not allocate the burden of proof, the default rule is that the party who initiates the action carries the burden. ¶ 52 Defendants contend that Schaffer supports their position that SNAP overpayment collection procedures implicitly place the burden on the recipient of the benefit, rather than the Department.

2023Id. at 57 . ¶ 53 Defendants maintain that Illinois law follows this default rule, regardless of whether the party initiating the administrative appeal seeking relief from the agency’s action either (1) first claimed and was denied a benefit or privilege or (2) had a government agency revoke or suspend an existing benefit or privilege.

2008App. 3d at 1002 , 857 N.E.2d at 741 (Chapman, J., dissenting) (citing Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill. 2d at 38 , 749 N.E.2d at 971 (relying on Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 273 , 128 L.

2008However, the vested rights inquiry is now a default rule that need only be considered in the absence of express legislative intent regarding retroactivity." Galloway, 367 Ill.App.3d at 1002 , 306 Ill.Dec. 338 , 857 N.E.2d at 741 (Chapman, J., dissenting) (citing Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill.2d at 38 , 255 Ill.Dec. 482 , 749 N.E.2d at 971 (relying on Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 273 , 114 S.Ct. at 1501 , 128 L.Ed.2d at 257 )).

2022Alvarez v. Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 28 (quoting People v. Ziobro, 242 Ill. 2d 34, 46 (2011)), stated that “[u]nder section 4, substantive amendments may not be applied retroactively, but ‘procedural law changes will apply to ongoing proceedings.’ ” Our supreme court has also stated that application of the Statute on Statute’s default rule means that the amended statute “would apply retroactively to a pending case, i.e., a case in which the trial court proceedings had begun on the old statute but had not yet been concluded.” Hunter, 2017 IL 121306, ¶ 30 . ¶ 24 In Hunter, the defendant was char

2018Although we stated in Howard that the amendment to section 5-130(1)(a) of the Act applies to “pending cases” (Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 28 ), we did not elaborate as to what that term means in the context of applying the default rule of section 4 of the Statute on Statutes.

2017Section 4 of the Statute on Statutes “controls by default only where the legislature has not clearly defined the temporal reach of a statute.” Hayashi, 2014 IL 116023 , ¶ 24, 25 N.E.3d 570 (citing Caveney v. Bower, 207 Ill. 2d 82, 92-93 , 797 N.E.2d 596, 601-02 (2003)); Doe A. v. Diocese of Dallas, 234 Ill. 2d 393, 406 , 917 N.E.2d 475, 483 (2009) (section 4 of the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2006)) operates as a default standard only where the legislature has not clearly specified the temporal reach of a statute).

2017Section 4 of the Statute on Statutes “controls by default only where the legislature has not clearly defined the temporal reach of a statute.” Hayashi, 2014 IL 116023 , ¶ 24, 25 N.E.3d 570 (citing Caveney v. Bower, 207 Ill. 2d 82, 92-93 , 797 N.E.2d 596, 601-02 (2003)); Doe A. v. Diocese of Dallas, 234 Ill. 2d 393, 406 , 917 N.E.2d 475, 483 (2009) (section 4 of the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2006)) operates as a default standard only where the legislature has not clearly specified the temporal reach of a statute).

2018The default rule under both section 1635 and Regulation Z requires the creditor to release the security interest in the property and return the monies before the borrower must tender to the creditor. 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (b) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23 (d) (2008); Johnson v. Thomas, 342 Ill.

2018The default rule under both section 1635 and Regulation Z requires the creditor to release the security interest in the property and return the monies before the borrower must tender to the creditor. 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (b) (2012) ; 12 C.F.R. § 226.23 (d) (2008) ; Johnson v. Thomas , 342 Ill.

2003Ed. 2d 334 , 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989) (plurality op.), to determine when, in derogation of the default rule, a new rule should apply retroactively.

2003However, this court has adopted the test the Supreme Court promulgated in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (plurality op.), to determine when, in derogation of the default rule, a new rule should apply retroactively.

2026Berrien argues he was not properly notified of the default hearing as required by Cook County Circuit Court Rule 2.1 (Aug. 21, 2000). ¶ 13 “Due process of law requires that a party be accorded procedural fairness, i.e., given notice and an opportunity to be heard. [Citation.] Parties who have properly appeared in an action are entitled to notice of any impending motions or hearings.” Gredell v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 346 Ill.App.3d 51, 62 (2004).

2026When contempt proceedings do not result in a contempt finding, however, the default rule applies: “ ‘In the absence of statutory authority or an 15 agreement specifically authorizing them, attorney fees and other ordinary expenses of litigation may not be awarded.’ ” Id. (quoting ESG Watts, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 286 Ill.