default rule in Colorado

1987People v. Rice, 708 P.2d 785 , 786 n. 2 (Colo.1985). 2 In People v. Richards, No. 87SA152, slip op.

1987The hearing board requested the presentation of additional evidence and a supplemental hearing in accordance with the procedure outlined in footnote 2 in People v. Rice, 708 P.2d 785 , 786 n. 2 (Colo.1985). 1 II.

2026See § 2-4-202, C.R.S. 2025; Ficarra, 849 P.2d at 11 . ¶ 24 The Attorney General disagrees, arguing that because the murder occurred in 1988, the relevant “transaction” occurred before 2012.

2025However, because we determine the court erred by entering the default whether the hearing was properly noticed or not, we decline to address this contention. 3 ¶9 The Colorado Children’s Code does not independently “authorize entry of a default judgment against a parent for failing to appear at the adjudicatory hearing.” K.J.B., ¶ 25, 342 P.3d at 601 .

2024But all that case holds (besides the since-overruled holding that the doctrine of ne exeat4 does not by itself create a right of custody, see Abbott, 560 U.S. at 10 ) is that patria potestas is a default doctrine and hence does not override those rights actually addressed by a valid custody agreement between the parents.

2024“To give effect to the supreme court’s default rule, deference to a postconviction court’s factual finding by application of the clearly erroneous standard is warranted only when the factfinding was made using accepted procedures and 5 when the record clearly establishes the fact.” Id. at ¶ 27, 428 P.3d at 697 .

2024So the Promissory Note does not allow the Holder to reallocate pre- default payment to collection costs or fees, nor does it allow the Holder to apply the default clause to subject the entire principal to an increased interest rate when some of the principal and interest has already been paid.7 To conclude otherwise would render the Promissory Note’s repeated references to “unpaid” or “outstanding” principal meaningless, see Cook, 229 P.3d at 1061 , and leads to absurd and unintended results, see Quarky, ¶ 11. 7 In Weston v. T & T, LLC, 271 P.3d 552, 560-61 (Colo. App. 2011), a division of thi

2024So the Promissory Note does not allow the Holder to reallocate pre- default payment to collection costs or fees, nor does it allow the Holder to apply the default clause to subject the entire principal to an increased interest rate when some of the principal and interest has already been paid.7 To conclude otherwise would render the Promissory Note’s repeated references to “unpaid” or “outstanding” principal meaningless, see Cook, 229 P.3d at 1061 , and leads to absurd and unintended results, see Quarky, ¶ 11. 7 In Weston v. T & T, LLC, 271 P.3d 552, 560-61 (Colo. App. 2011), a division of thi

2024Gonzalez, 311 F.3d at 954 .

2024If a party fails to exhaust available administrative remedies, the court lacks jurisdiction to hear the action.1 Id. (citing State v. Golden’s Concrete Co., 962 P.2d 919, 923 (Colo. 1988)). ¶ 47 Requiring administrative exhaustion serves several laudable goals.

2016These cases do not carry the weight that Marshall seeks to place on them. ¶ 20 In Naylor, 101 Colo. at 39 , 70 P.2d at 352 , the supreme court recognized that the default rale for assigning the burden of proof is which party would prevail if “no evidence at all were given, the burden being of course on the adverse party.” According to Marshall, if his may/shall argument fails, then because the Charter is silent on who bears the burden of proof, the default rule applies.

2016These cases do not carry the weight that Marshall seeks to place on them. ¶ 20 In Naylor, 101 Colo. at 39 , 70 P.2d at 352 , the supreme court recognized that the default rale for assigning the burden of proof is which party would prevail if “no evidence at all were given, the burden being of course on the adverse party.” According to Marshall, if his may/shall argument fails, then because the Charter is silent on who bears the burden of proof, the default rule applies.

2009See Sterling Colo. Beef v. Baca, 699 P.2d 1347 (Colo.App.1985) (commenting on the default rule); Bellendir v. Keger, 648 P.2d 645 (Colo.1982) (rejecting the argument that the workers' compensation statute violated due process and equal protection because it did not adjust awards for inflation); Lytile v. State Comp.

2009See Sterling Colo. Beef v. Baca, 699 P.2d 1347 (Colo.App.1985) (commenting on the default rule); Bellendir v. Kezer, 648 P.2d 645 (Colo.1982) (rejecting the argument that the workers' compensation statute violated due process and equal protection because it did not adjust awards for inflation); Lyttle v. State Comp.

1974Upon payment of all withdrawal fees and costs plus an additional thirty-five dollars public trustees' costs... all proceedings for foreclosure shall terminate." (emphasis added) This statute represents a legislative expansion of equitable principles espoused by Justice Cardozo in his dissent in Graf v. Hope Building Corp., 254 N.Y. 1 , 171 N.E. 884 , and applied by courts to relieve debtors of the strict requirements of timely payments under the terms of a mortgage.

1974Upon payment of all withdrawal fees and costs plus an additional thirty-five dollars public trustees' costs... all proceedings for foreclosure shall terminate." (emphasis added) This statute represents a legislative expansion of equitable principles espoused by Justice Cardozo in his dissent in Graf v. Hope Building Corp., 254 N.Y. 1 , 171 N.E. 884 , and applied by courts to relieve debtors of the strict requirements of timely payments under the terms of a mortgage.