default rule in Oregon

2026King, 361 Or at 658-59 .

2017For the reasons explained below, we conclude that, in the absence of a statutory rule specifically addressing the Cite as 361 Or 646 (2017) 657 issue, a contractual default rule or “gap-filler” is required when (1) the victim’s death is reasonably foreseeable to the prosecutor and (2) the plea agreement does not address the subject of reprosecution in the event of the victim’s death and arose from negotiations that also did not address that subject.

2025Torres-Lopez, 373 Or at 837 .

2025Torres-Lopez, 373 Or at 837 .

2017In Kamin v. Kuhnau, 232 Or 139, 143-44 , 374 P2d 912 (1962), the plaintiff inventor paid the defendant to use his machine shop to develop his ideas for a new garbage truck packer, and the defendant subsequently manufactured a number of the developed units for the plaintiff before announcing that he would manufacture garbage truck bodies in competition with the plaintiff.

2017In Kamin v. Kuhnau, 232 Or 139, 143-44 , 374 P2d 912 (1962), the plaintiff inventor paid the defendant to use his machine shop to develop his ideas for a new garbage truck packer, and the defendant subsequently manufactured a number of the developed units for the plaintiff before announcing that he would manufacture garbage truck bodies in competition with the plaintiff.

2017In Browne & Co. v. John P. Sharkey Co., 58 Or 480, 482 , 115 P 156 (1911), for example, when a contract was silent as to the time of performance, this court applied a default rule that performance must be completed within reasonable time.

2017In Browne & Co. v. John P. Sharkey Co., 58 Or 480, 482 , 115 P 156 (1911), for example, when a contract was silent as to the time of performance, this court applied a default rule that performance must be completed within reasonable time.

2012The United States Supreme Court has “also emphasized the corollary to § 61(a)’s broad construction, namely, the default rule of statutory interpretation that exclusions from income must be narrowly construed.” Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Schleier, 515 US 323, 328 , 115 S Ct 2159 , 132 L Ed 2d 294 (1995) (quoting Burke, 504 US at 248 , 112 S Ct at 1867 ) (internal quotations omitted) (superseded on other grounds by statute, The Small Business Protection Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-188 §1605, 110 Stat 1838).

2012The United States Supreme Court has “also emphasized the corollary to § 61(a)’s broad construction, namely, the default rule of statutory interpretation that exclusions from income must be narrowly construed.” Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Schleier, 515 US 323, 328 , 115 S Ct 2159 , 132 L Ed 2d 294 (1995) (quoting Burke, 504 US at 248 , 112 S Ct at 1867 ) (internal quotations omitted) (superseded on other grounds by statute, The Small Business Protection Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-188 §1605, 110 Stat 1838).

2012The United States Supreme Court has “also emphasized the corollary to § 61(a)’s broad construction, namely, the default rule of statutory interpretation that exclusions from income must be narrowly construed.” Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Schleier, 515 US 323, 328 , 115 S Ct 2159 , 132 L Ed 2d 294 (1995) (quoting Burke, 504 US at 248 , 112 S Ct at 1867 ) (internal quotations omitted) (superseded on other grounds by statute, The Small Business Protection Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-188 §1605, 110 Stat 1838).

2012The United States Supreme Court has “also emphasized the corollary to § 61(a)’s broad construction, namely, the default rule of statutory interpretation that exclusions from income must be narrowly construed.” Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Schleier, 515 US 323, 328 , 115 S Ct 2159 , 132 L Ed 2d 294 (1995) (quoting Burke, 504 US at 248 , 112 S Ct at 1867 ) (internal quotations omitted) (superseded on other grounds by statute, The Small Business Protection Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-188 §1605, 110 Stat 1838).

2022Here, no one in the field made a considered judgment that exigencies justified a departure from McNeely’s 1 Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 588 US ___ , 139 S Ct 2525, 2531 , 204 L Ed 2d 1040 (2019), establishes a different rule for blood draws from a driver in a drunk-driving case who is unconscious: “[W]hen a driver is unconscious, the general rule is that a warrant is not needed.” Although the state typically bears the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement applies, Mitchell appears to have altered that rule in the case of unconscious drivers, establishing a default rule allo

2022Here, no one in the field made a considered judgment that exigencies justified a departure from McNeely’s 1 Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 588 US ___ , 139 S Ct 2525, 2531 , 204 L Ed 2d 1040 (2019), establishes a different rule for blood draws from a driver in a drunk-driving case who is unconscious: “[W]hen a driver is unconscious, the general rule is that a warrant is not needed.” Although the state typically bears the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement applies, Mitchell appears to have altered that rule in the case of unconscious drivers, establishing a default rule allo

2022As the lead opinion acknowledges, the 1971 Legislative Assembly enacted the general culpability statutes, now codified at ORS 161.085 to 161.125, to provide “a uniform statutory scheme for determining which elements of an offense require which culpable mental states.” 370 Or at 142 (Flynn, J., lead opinion) (citing Owen, 369 Or at 295 ).

2018Brush and Brush , 279 Or.

2018The taxpayer argued the department had not carried that burden.22 On the issue for the 1965 and 1966 years, the Supreme Court characterized the argument of the tax- payers as having been that “combined reporting is contrary to the apportionment set out in the statute.” The Supreme Court then stated: 20 Note that in this regard the parties in Coca Cola stood in positions parallel to those the parties in this case occupy—agreement by both as to apportionment but differing views on some version of combined reporting. 21 In 1965, Oregon adopted ORS 314.670, which provided: “If the allocation and a

2018The taxpayer argued the department had not carried that burden.22 On the issue for the 1965 and 1966 years, the Supreme Court characterized the argument of the tax- payers as having been that “combined reporting is contrary to the apportionment set out in the statute.” The Supreme Court then stated: 20 Note that in this regard the parties in Coca Cola stood in positions parallel to those the parties in this case occupy—agreement by both as to apportionment but differing views on some version of combined reporting. 21 In 1965, Oregon adopted ORS 314.670, which provided: “If the allocation and a

2007Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 1015 , 112 S Ct 2886 , 120 L Ed 2d 798 (1992). 4 As the Court more recently explained, “the categorical rule in Lucas was carved out for the ‘extraordinary case’ in which a regulation permanently deprives property of all value; the default rule remains that, in the regulatory takings context, we require a more fact specific inquiry.” Tahoe-Sierra P. Council v. TRPA, 535 US 302, 333 , 122 S Ct 1465 , 152 L Ed 2d 517 (2002).

2007Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 1015 , 112 S Ct 2886 , 120 L Ed 2d 798 (1992). 4 As the Court more recently explained, “the categorical rule in Lucas was carved out for the ‘extraordinary case’ in which a regulation permanently deprives property of all value; the default rule remains that, in the regulatory takings context, we require a more fact specific inquiry.” Tahoe-Sierra P. Council v. TRPA, 535 US 302, 333 , 122 S Ct 1465 , 152 L Ed 2d 517 (2002).

2007Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 1015 , 112 S Ct 2886 , 120 L Ed 2d 798 (1992). 4 As the Court more recently explained, “the categorical rule in Lucas was carved out for the ‘extraordinary case’ in which a regulation permanently deprives property of all value; the default rule remains that, in the regulatory takings context, we require a more fact specific inquiry.” Tahoe-Sierra P. Council v. TRPA, 535 US 302, 333 , 122 S Ct 1465 , 152 L Ed 2d 517 (2002).

2007Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 1015 , 112 S Ct 2886 , 120 L Ed 2d 798 (1992). 4 As the Court more recently explained, “the categorical rule in Lucas was carved out for the ‘extraordinary case’ in which a regulation permanently deprives property of all value; the default rule remains that, in the regulatory takings context, we require a more fact specific inquiry.” Tahoe-Sierra P. Council v. TRPA, 535 US 302, 333 , 122 S Ct 1465 , 152 L Ed 2d 517 (2002).

2006Absent such a term, the default standard for terminating a county employee or sheriffs deputy is “at will.” See ORS 204.601; ORS 204.635; Graves v. Arnado, 307 Or 358, 362 , 768 P2d 910 (1989).

2006Absent such a term, the default standard for terminating a county employee or sheriffs deputy is “at will.” See ORS 204.601; ORS 204.635; Graves v. Arnado, 307 Or 358, 362 , 768 P2d 910 (1989).

1998In construing a contract, we apply the test set out in Yogman v. Parrott, 325 Or 358 , 937 P2d 1019 (1997).

1998In construing a contract, we apply the test set out in Yogman v. Parrott, 325 Or 358 , 937 P2d 1019 (1997).

1977As this court’s decision in Norton et ux v. Van Voorst et ux, 191 Or 577 , 231 P2d 947 (1951), indicates, even if the default clause did not provide an automatic right to strict foreclosure upon plaintiff’s default in their obligation to pay the taxes, plaintiffs’ vendor would still have had a right to the remedy of strict foreclosure upon giving notice of his intention to invoke that remedy and providing a reasonable opportunity to cure the breach.

1977As this court’s decision in Norton et ux v. Van Voorst et ux, 191 Or 577 , 231 P2d 947 (1951), indicates, even if the default clause did not provide an automatic right to strict foreclosure upon plaintiff’s default in their obligation to pay the taxes, plaintiffs’ vendor would still have had a right to the remedy of strict foreclosure upon giving notice of his intention to invoke that remedy and providing a reasonable opportunity to cure the breach.

1923Not as a basis of decision but as a criticism on pleading that may or may not be helpful in case of further litigation, the writer makes the following suggestions: It is well settled that in declaring upon such a contract seeking to recover damages for its breach, the plaintiff must allege full performance or readiness and ability to perform on Ms part, so far as permitted by the defendant, before he can put the latter in default and claim damages as for the breach of the stipulation: Davis Lumber Company v. Coats Lumber Company, supra, citing Catlin v. Jones, 48 Or. 158 ( 85 Pac. 515 ); Longf

1923Not as a basis of decision but as a criticism on pleading that may or may not be helpful in case of further litigation, the writer makes the following suggestions: It is well settled that in declaring upon such a contract seeking to recover damages for its breach, the plaintiff must allege full performance or readiness and ability to perform on Ms part, so far as permitted by the defendant, before he can put the latter in default and claim damages as for the breach of the stipulation: Davis Lumber Company v. Coats Lumber Company, supra, citing Catlin v. Jones, 48 Or. 158 ( 85 Pac. 515 ); Longf

1923Not as a basis of decision but as a criticism on pleading that may or may not be helpful in case of further litigation, the writer makes the following suggestions: It is well settled that in declaring upon such a contract seeking to recover damages for its breach, the plaintiff must allege full performance or readiness and ability to perform on Ms part, so far as permitted by the defendant, before he can put the latter in default and claim damages as for the breach of the stipulation: Davis Lumber Company v. Coats Lumber Company, supra, citing Catlin v. Jones, 48 Or. 158 ( 85 Pac. 515 ); Longf

1923Not as a basis of decision but as a criticism on pleading that may or may not be helpful in case of further litigation, the writer makes the following suggestions: It is well settled that in declaring upon such a contract seeking to recover damages for its breach, the plaintiff must allege full performance or readiness and ability to perform on Ms part, so far as permitted by the defendant, before he can put the latter in default and claim damages as for the breach of the stipulation: Davis Lumber Company v. Coats Lumber Company, supra, citing Catlin v. Jones, 48 Or. 158 ( 85 Pac. 515 ); Longf