default hearing in Wyoming

2022Noonan, ¶ 8, 122 P.3d at 966 (reversing because “[t]hat did not happen in this case”). 6 [¶31] In Brush v. Davis, 2013 WY 161 , 315 P.3d 648 (Wyo. 2013), the district court did precisely what Noonan contemplates in a default situation where both parties attend the default hearing.

2013Noonan, ¶ 8, 122 P.3d at 966 , recognized that it may be difficult to obtain the statutory financial affidavit from a defaulting party, but directed the district court to "obtain sufficient financial evidence of both parties' income to make factual determinations, and to comply with the presumptive child support guidelines." In this case, Mother appeared at the default hearing and the district court ordered her to submit a financial affidavit, which she did not do.

2022Noonan, ¶ 8, 122 P.3d at 966 (reversing because “[t]hat did not happen in this case”). 6 [¶31] In Brush v. Davis, 2013 WY 161 , 315 P.3d 648 (Wyo. 2013), the district court did precisely what Noonan contemplates in a default situation where both parties attend the default hearing.

2022Noonan, ¶ 8, 122 P.3d at 966 (reversing because “[t]hat did not happen in this case”). 6 [¶31] In Brush v. Davis, 2013 WY 161 , 315 P.3d 648 (Wyo. 2013), the district court did precisely what Noonan contemplates in a default situation where both parties attend the default hearing.

2025State Bar v. Crawford-Fink, 2018 WY 130 , ¶ 24, 430 P.3d 323, 332 (Wyo. 2018) (finding an attorney violated Rule 1.3 by failing to obtain complete information about the parties’ assets and liabilities prior to the default hearing, failing to meet with her client to discuss what information would be required for the hearing so the client could obtain that information, preparing a decree that contained erroneous information, and failing to act with reasonable diligence to correct those errors and get the matter concluded); Hinckley, 2022 WY 18 , ¶¶ 25–26, 80, 503 P.3d at 599, 613 (finding a pros

2021Id., ¶¶ 16, 30-35, 361 P.3d at 313, 316-17 . [¶26] We concluded the district court should have held a default hearing, but the error did not render the judgment void.

2021Id., ¶ 34, 361 P.3d at 317 (quoting Spitzer, 777 P.2d at 593 ). [¶27] The salient holding of Linch is the district court cannot enter a form of judgment provided by the non-defaulting party in a divorce action without holding a default hearing to determine the proper relief.

2020See Multiple Resort Ownership Plan, ¶ 24, 45 P.3d at 655 (“The burden, however, is upon those seeking more than mere nominal damages to prove their damages.”).

2016“Whether a trial court violated a litigant’s right to due process presents a question of law that we.review de novo.” Rosty v. Skaj, 2012 WY 28, ¶ 16 , 272 P.3d 947, 953 (Wyo. 2012).

2016“Whether a trial court violated a litigant’s right to due process presents a question of law that we.review de novo.” Rosty v. Skaj, 2012 WY 28, ¶ 16 , 272 P.3d 947, 953 (Wyo. 2012).

2002See also Angus Hunt Ranch, Inc. v. REB, Inc 577 P.2d 645, 650 (Wyo.1978). [¶ 9] The Contract provided, in applicable part: 27.

2002Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 612 P.2d 463, 465 (Wyo.1980) and cases cited therein) our appellate obligation in cases of this sort is to interpret and construe the contract as a matter of law in order to shed light on the intention and understanding of the parties.