default rule in New York

2025"Law office failure may qualify as a reasonable excuse for a party's default if the claim of such failure is supported by a credible and detailed explanation of the default" ( Sauteanu v BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc. , 210 AD3d 922, 923 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Melendez v John P. Picone, Inc. , 215 AD3d at 665-666 ).

2024"Law office failure may qualify as a reasonable excuse for a party's default if the claim of such failure is supported by a credible and detailed explanation of the default" ( Melendez v John P. Picone, Inc. , 215 AD3d 665, 665-666 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Guilfoyl v Watts , 212 AD3d 785, 786 ; see also CPLR 2005).

2016To the contrary, the record establishes that the notice Family Court mailed to the father was not returned, and that the father had actual knowledge of the hearing (see Matter of Strumpf v Avery, 134 AD3d 1465, 1466 [2015]; see also Matter of Geoffrey Colin D. v Janelle Latoya A., 132 AD3d 438, 438 [2015]).

2016To the contrary, the record establishes that the notice Family Court mailed to the father was not returned, and that the father had actual knowledge of the hearing (see Matter of Strumpf v Avery, 134 AD3d 1465, 1466 [2015]; see also Matter of Geoffrey Colin D. v Janelle Latoya A., 132 AD3d 438, 438 [2015]).

2025"Law office failure may qualify as a reasonable excuse for a party's default if the claim of such failure is supported by a credible and detailed explanation of the default" ( Sauteanu v BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc. , 210 AD3d 922, 923 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Melendez v John P. Picone, Inc. , 215 AD3d at 665-666 ).

2023"Law office failure may qualify as a reasonable excuse for a party's default if the claim of such failure is supported by a credible and detailed explanation of the default" ( Sauteanu v BJ's Wholesale Club, [*2]Inc. , 210 AD3d 922, 923 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2016To the contrary, the record establishes that the notice Family Court mailed to the father was not returned, and that the father had actual knowledge of the hearing (see Matter of Strumpf v Avery, 134 AD3d 1465, 1466 [2015]; see also Matter of Geoffrey Colin D. v Janelle Latoya A., 132 AD3d 438, 438 [2015]).

2016To the contrary, the record establishes that the notice Family Court mailed to the father was not returned, and that the father had actual knowledge of the hearing (see Matter of Strumpf v Avery, 134 AD3d 1465, 1466 [2015]; see also Matter of Geoffrey Colin D. v Janelle Latoya A., 132 AD3d 438, 438 [2015]).

2022This is not a case like Matter of Diamond Waterproofing Sys., Inc. v 55 Liberty Owners Corp. ( 4 NY3d 247, 252-253 [2005]), where the issue was whether the contracting parties had affirmatively demonstrated their intention to displace the default rule under the FAA and have the court, rather than the arbitrator, decide the threshold question of timeliness.

2022This is not a case like Matter of Diamond Waterproofing Sys., Inc. v 55 Liberty Owners Corp. ( 4 NY3d 247, 252-253 [2005]), where the issue was whether the contracting parties had affirmatively demonstrated their intention to displace the default rule under the FAA and have the court, rather than the arbitrator, decide the threshold question of timeliness.

2025"A 'court has discretion to accept law office [*2]failure as a reasonable excuse where that claim is supported by a detailed and credible explanation'" ( Guilfoyl v Watts , 212 AD3d 785, 786 , quoting Bank of Am., N.A. v Murjani , 199 AD3d 630, 631 [citation omitted]; see Ferreira v Singh , 176 AD3d 782 , 784).

2024"Law office failure may qualify as a reasonable excuse for a party's default if the claim of such failure is supported by a credible and detailed explanation of the default" ( Melendez v John P. Picone, Inc. , 215 AD3d 665, 665-666 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Guilfoyl v Watts , 212 AD3d 785, 786 ; see also CPLR 2005).

2026Even assuming that common law may provide a default rule for when a commission is earned in the case of the sale of goods and services, it is well-settled that employers and employees are entirely free to depart from any common law rules and contractually agree that a commission is deemed earned only after downward adjustments for business costs are made (see Pachter v Bernard Hodes Group, Inc., 10 NY3d 609, 617 [2008]).

2025Here, the plaintiff's excuse that the default was the result of the plaintiff substituting counsel prior to the 2017 conference and outgoing counsel not communicating the court's requirements to incoming counsel was conclusory and speculative ( see OneWest Bank, FSB v Singer , 153 AD3d 714, 716).

2025Here, the plaintiff's excuse that the default was the result of the plaintiff substituting counsel prior to the 2017 conference and outgoing counsel not communicating the court's requirements to incoming counsel was conclusory and speculative ( see OneWest Bank, FSB v Singer , 153 AD3d 714, 716 ).

2025"A 'court has discretion to accept law office [*2]failure as a reasonable excuse where that claim is supported by a detailed and credible explanation'" ( Guilfoyl v Watts , 212 AD3d 785, 786 , quoting Bank of Am., N.A. v Murjani , 199 AD3d 630, 631 [citation omitted]; see Ferreira v Singh , 176 AD3d 782 , 784).

2025Moch would have reached an entirely different result: the inability to extinguish a fire because of low water pressure in Moch was easily foreseeable, as the Court noted ( see 247 NY at 163 ).

2025Moch would have reached an entirely different result: the inability to extinguish a fire because of low water pressure in Moch was easily foreseeable, as the Court noted ( see 247 NY at 163).

2025Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has explained that while "prospectivity remains the appropriate default rule," under federal law, "the constitutional impediments to retroactive civil legislation are now modest" ( Landgraf v USI Film Products , 511 US 244, 272 [1994]).

2025Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has explained that while "prospectivity remains the appropriate default rule," under federal law, "the constitutional impediments to retroactive civil legislation are now modest" ( Landgraf v USI Film Products , 511 US 244, 272 [1994]).

2025Setting aside our longstanding rule that foreseeability does not establish a duty, but rather the scope of a duty once established ( see Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. , 27 NY3d 765, 788 [2016]), if foreseeability of harm were the only metric used to establish whether a contracting party assumed a duty to a noncontracting third party, it would swallow the default rule of no duty to third parties to a contract.

2025Setting aside our longstanding rule that foreseeability does not establish a duty, but rather the scope of a duty once established ( see Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. , 27 NY3d 765, 788 [2016]), if foreseeability of harm were the only metric used to establish whether a contracting party assumed a duty to a noncontracting third party, it would swallow the default rule of no duty to third parties to a contract.

2025The default rule with respect to party walls is that "each of the two adjoining owners . . . owns in severalty so much of the wall as stands upon his own lot, each having an easement in the other strip for purposes of the support of his own building." [FN2] ( Sakele Bros., LLC v Safdie , 302 AD2d 20, 25 [1st Dept 2002] [alterations and quotation marks omitted].) Thus, the part of the wall on the 351 Building's side of the line is defendant's "sole property, subject only to [plaintiffs'] easement for the support of [their] building." ( Id. ) The parties are not "tenants in common, each holding

2025The default rule with respect to party walls is that "each of the two adjoining owners . . . owns in severalty so much of the wall as stands upon his own lot, each having an easement in the other strip for purposes of the support of his own building." [FN2] ( Sakele Bros., LLC v Safdie , 302 AD2d 20, 25 [1st Dept 2002] [alterations and quotation marks omitted].) Thus, the part of the wall on the 351 Building's side of the line is defendant's "sole property, subject only to [plaintiffs'] easement for the support of [their] building." ( Id. ) The parties are not "tenants in common, each holding

2025See also Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Harrigan , 179 AD3d 1142, 1144 , 118 N.Y.S.3d 176, 179 (2d Dept. 2020) ("Law office failure may qualify as a reasonable excuse for a party's default provided the claim of such failure is supported by a detailed and credible explanation of the default.

2025See also Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Harrigan , 179 AD3d 1142, 1144 , 118 N.Y.S.3d 176, 179 (2d Dept. 2020) ("Law office failure may qualify as a reasonable excuse for a party's default provided the claim of such failure is supported by a detailed and credible explanation of the default.

2025"Law office failure may qualify as a reasonable excuse for a party's default if the claim of such failure is supported by a credible" and detailed explanation of the default ( id. ; see Deep v City of New York , 183 AD3d 586, 587 ).

2024"Law office failure may qualify as a reasonable excuse for a party's default if the claim of such failure is supported by a credible and detailed explanation of the default" ( Melendez v John P. Picone, Inc. , 215 AD3d at 665-666 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Mandel , 208 AD3d at 669; Jacobson v Val , 206 AD3d 803 , 804).

2021The default rule of CPL 470.20 does not prescribe a rigid, one-size-fits-all approach for remedying sentences infected with illegal concurrent/consecutive directives ( see People v LaSalle , 95 NY2d 827, 829 [2000]).

2021The default rule of CPL 470.20 does not prescribe a rigid, one-size-fits-all approach for remedying sentences infected with illegal concurrent/consecutive directives ( see People v LaSalle , 95 NY2d 827, 829 [2000]).

2017Nevertheless, as assignees of guaranties of performance under the operating agreement, plaintiffs had standing to litigate whether a default under that agreement had occurred, as such a default is a defense against plaintiffs’ exercise of their own rights under the guaranties (see NTL Capital, LLC v Right Track Rec., LLC, 73 AD3d 410, 411 [1st Dept 2010]).

2016Therefore, there was "no regulatory basis on which to deem a workweek that otherwise falls within the domestic services exemption non-exempt because of the performance of some non-exempt work.” ( 848 F Supp 2d at 443 ; see also 29 CFR 780.0 [“Purpose of interpretative bulletins in this part,” which limits that section’s meaning and applicability to the exemption of “certain employees from the minimum wage or overtime pay requirements . . . when employed in agriculture or in certain related activities . . . with respect to agricultural or horticultural commodities”].) The court also held that t

2016Therefore, there was "no regulatory basis on which to deem a workweek that otherwise falls within the domestic services exemption non-exempt because of the performance of some non-exempt work.” ( 848 F Supp 2d at 443 ; see also 29 CFR 780.0 [“Purpose of interpretative bulletins in this part,” which limits that section’s meaning and applicability to the exemption of “certain employees from the minimum wage or overtime pay requirements . . . when employed in agriculture or in certain related activities . . . with respect to agricultural or horticultural commodities”].) The court also held that t

2012The plaintiff established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence as to its authority to take control of Eagle upon Eagle’s default on the notes, by virtue of Eagle’s failure to repay the loans, and its invocation of the default clause (see Petra CRE CDO 2007-1, Ltd. v 160 Jamaica Owners, LLC, 73 AD3d 883, 884 [2010]; Wells Fargo Bank v Das Karla, 71 AD3d 1006 [2010]; Neighborhood Hous.