default rule in North Carolina

2018The default rule will control unless a more specific statute restricts jurisdiction in the particular class of cases at issue." Id. at 25, 789 S.E.2d at 642 .

2016See Thomsen, _ N.C. at _, 789 S.E.2d at 642 . (recognizing N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(c) “creates a default rule that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review a lower court judgment by writ of certiorari”); Stubbs, 368 N.C. at 44 , 770 S.E.2d at 76 (recognizing that Rule 21 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure cannot take away jurisdiction given to the Court of Appeals by N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(c)).

2026Cf. Harwood, 243 N.C. App. at 430 , 777 S.E.2d at 120 (“We first note that the fact that the 2009 trial court made both omissions five times strongly suggests that the trial court did not make a mistake but rather intended for defendant’s probation to run concurrently with his incarceration, as this is the default rule under N.C. Gen.

2026Cf. Harwood, 243 N.C. App. at 430 , 777 S.E.2d at 120 (“We first note that the fact that the 2009 trial court made both omissions five times strongly suggests that the trial court did not make a mistake but rather intended for defendant’s probation to run concurrently with his incarceration, as this is the default rule under N.C. Gen.

2025(Hearing Tr., at 43.) Cir. 1982) “[A]n owner should not be deemed to have relinquished the right to sell his own property through his own efforts except by clear and unequivocal language in the contract.”); Foltz v. Begnoche, 222 Kan. 383, 388 (1977) (“Additionally, we are persuaded that an ‘exclusive right to sell,’ by its very nature should be created only by clear and unambiguous language.”). 52.

2025As “our precedent is clear that a prima facie showing by defendant is an important step in a Batson analysis,” Tucker, 385 N.C. at 488, and “it is error for a trial court to require a step two explanation in the absence of a prima facie showing by defendant,” id., the default rule is that step one is not moot, and cases holding thusly simply reflect that the defendant has failed to demonstrate circumstances sufficient to apply the mootness exception.

2025As “our precedent is clear that a prima facie showing by defendant is an important step in a Batson analysis,” Tucker, 385 N.C. at 488, and “it is error for a trial court to require a step two explanation in the absence of a prima facie showing by defendant,” id., the default rule is that step one is not moot, and cases holding thusly simply reflect that the defendant has failed to demonstrate circumstances sufficient to apply the mootness exception.

2023See Marino, 131 A.3d at 343 fn.19 (the “right to indemnification or advancement under a corporate bylaw vests at the occurrence of the act or omission that is the subject of the . . . action, suit or proceeding unless the bylaw expressly provides otherwise”). 32.

2023Put differently, “if a person serves as a director and makes a decision, and if that person would be entitled to receive advancements in litigation over that decision while serving as a director, then that person’s rights to advancements ‘shall . . . continue’ after that person ‘has ceased to be a director.’ ” Marino, 131 A.3d at 338 ; see also 1 David A. Drexler et al., Delaware Corporation Law and Practice § 16.04, at 16–23 (Supp. 2012) (“under the current default rule, the right to advancement vests at the time of the act or omission giving rise to such right”). 31.

2016See Boudreau v. Baughman, 322 N.C. 331, 335 , 340 368 S.E.2d 849, 854, 857 (1988) (noting that “procedural rights are determined by lex fori, the law of the forum,” and that “[o]rdinary statutes of limitation are clearly procedural”). {30} Both North Carolina law and Delaware law apply a three-year statute of limitations to a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim.

2016See Boudreau v. Baughman, 322 N.C. 331, 335 , 340 368 S.E.2d 849, 854, 857 (1988) (noting that “procedural rights are determined by lex fori, the law of the forum,” and that “[o]rdinary statutes of limitation are clearly procedural”). {30} Both North Carolina law and Delaware law apply a three-year statute of limitations to a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim.

2016See Thomsen, _ N.C. at _, 789 S.E.2d at 642 . (recognizing N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(c) “creates a default rule that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review a lower court judgment by writ of certiorari”); Stubbs, 368 N.C. at 44 , 770 S.E.2d at 76 (recognizing that Rule 21 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure cannot take away jurisdiction given to the Court of Appeals by N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(c)).

2016See Thomsen, _ N.C. at _, 789 S.E.2d at 642 . (recognizing N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(c) “creates a default rule that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review a lower court judgment by writ of certiorari”); Stubbs, 368 N.C. at 44 , 770 S.E.2d at 76 (recognizing that Rule 21 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure cannot take away jurisdiction given to the Court of Appeals by N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(c)).

2000App. 111, 115 , 365 S.E.2d 170, 172 (1988) (movant must provide “three days’ [written] notice of the default hearing”).