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11 South Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1985–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Roso v. Henninggreen2 sentences2024Undoubtedly, “[a] default judgment is an extreme remedy, and should only be granted when ‘the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.’” Roso v. Henning, 1997 S.D. 82 , ¶ 8, 566 N.W.2d 136, 140 (citation omitted). 2024Undoubtedly, “[a] default judgment is an extreme remedy, and should only be granted when ‘the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.’” Roso v. Henning, 1997 S.D. 82 , ¶ 8, 566 N.W.2d 136, 140 (citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Walter Motor Truck Co. v. State Ex Rel. Department of Transportationgreen2 sentences1997An example of such a negotiated clause is a default provision. [¶ 21] We addressed the issue of whether a default clause in a contract was a void penalty in Heikkila v. Carver, wherein we stated: Whether a forfeiture provision in a contract is an enforceable liquidated damage provision or an unenforceable penalty is a question of law for the trial court to determine “based upon a consideration of the instrument as a whole, the situation of the parties, the subject matter of the contract, the circumstances surrounding its execution, and other factors.” 378 N.W.2d 214, 216 (S.D.1985) (quoting Pr 1997An example of such a negotiated clause is a default provision. [¶ 21] We addressed the issue of whether a default clause in a contract was a void penalty in Heikkila v. Carver, wherein we stated: Whether a forfeiture provision in a contract is an enforceable liquidated damage provision or an unenforceable penalty is a question of law for the trial court to determine “based upon a consideration of the instrument as a whole, the situation of the parties, the subject matter of the contract, the circumstances surrounding its execution, and other factors.” 378 N.W.2d 214, 216 (S.D.1985) (quoting Pr | 2 | 2 |
Prentice v. Classengreen2 sentences1997An example of such a negotiated clause is a default provision. [¶ 21] We addressed the issue of whether a default clause in a contract was a void penalty in Heikkila v. Carver, wherein we stated: Whether a forfeiture provision in a contract is an enforceable liquidated damage provision or an unenforceable penalty is a question of law for the trial court to determine “based upon a consideration of the instrument as a whole, the situation of the parties, the subject matter of the contract, the circumstances surrounding its execution, and other factors.” 378 N.W.2d 214, 216 (S.D.1985) (quoting Pr 1997An example of such a negotiated clause is a default provision. [¶ 21] We addressed the issue of whether a default clause in a contract was a void penalty in Heikkila v. Carver, wherein we stated: Whether a forfeiture provision in a contract is an enforceable liquidated damage provision or an unenforceable penalty is a question of law for the trial court to determine “based upon a consideration of the instrument as a whole, the situation of the parties, the subject matter of the contract, the circumstances surrounding its execution, and other factors.” 378 N.W.2d 214, 216 (S.D.1985) (quoting Pr | 1 | 3 |
Heidary v. Yadollahigreen2 sentences2014Accord Bloch v. Bentfield, 1 Ariz.App. 412 , 403 P.2d 559, 564 (1965) ("When a case is regularly called for trial, the trial may proceed although one party does not appear and this is not a hearing as by default.”); Heidary v. Yadollahi, 99 Cal.App.4th 857 , 121 Cal. Rptr.2d 695, 699 (2002) (holding: (1) that where a defendant who previously answered does not appear for trial, a plaintiff's only remedy is to make a motion with the court to continue with that trial; (2) that entry of default is not authorized; and (3) that the hearing held "under such circumstances is uncontested as distinguish 2014Accord Bloch v. Bentfield, 1 Ariz.App. 412 , 403 P.2d 559, 564 (1965) ("When a case is regularly called for trial, the trial may proceed although one party does not appear and this is not a hearing as by default.”); Heidary v. Yadollahi, 99 Cal.App.4th 857 , 121 Cal. Rptr.2d 695, 699 (2002) (holding: (1) that where a defendant who previously answered does not appear for trial, a plaintiff's only remedy is to make a motion with the court to continue with that trial; (2) that entry of default is not authorized; and (3) that the hearing held "under such circumstances is uncontested as distinguish | 1 | 1 |
Bloch v. Bentfieldgreen2 sentences2014Accord Bloch v. Bentfield, 1 Ariz.App. 412 , 403 P.2d 559, 564 (1965) ("When a case is regularly called for trial, the trial may proceed although one party does not appear and this is not a hearing as by default.”); Heidary v. Yadollahi, 99 Cal.App.4th 857 , 121 Cal. Rptr.2d 695, 699 (2002) (holding: (1) that where a defendant who previously answered does not appear for trial, a plaintiff's only remedy is to make a motion with the court to continue with that trial; (2) that entry of default is not authorized; and (3) that the hearing held "under such circumstances is uncontested as distinguish 2014Accord Bloch v. Bentfield, 1 Ariz.App. 412 , 403 P.2d 559, 564 (1965) ("When a case is regularly called for trial, the trial may proceed although one party does not appear and this is not a hearing as by default.”); Heidary v. Yadollahi, 99 Cal.App.4th 857 , 121 Cal. Rptr.2d 695, 699 (2002) (holding: (1) that where a defendant who previously answered does not appear for trial, a plaintiff's only remedy is to make a motion with the court to continue with that trial; (2) that entry of default is not authorized; and (3) that the hearing held "under such circumstances is uncontested as distinguish | 1 | 1 |
Ohio Valley Radiology Associates, Inc. v. Ohio Valley Hospital Ass'ngreen2 sentences2014Ass’n, 28 Ohio St.3d 118 , 502 N.E.2d 599, 603 (1986) ("[W]hen a party who has filed a responsive pleading ... fails to appear for trial, no default within the meaning of Civ. 2014Ass’n, 28 Ohio St.3d 118 , 502 N.E.2d 599, 603 (1986) ("[W]hen a party who has filed a responsive pleading ... fails to appear for trial, no default within the meaning of Civ. | 1 | 1 |
Warden v. Lambgreen2 sentences2014Accord Bloch v. Bentfield, 1 Ariz.App. 412 , 403 P.2d 559, 564 (1965) ("When a case is regularly called for trial, the trial may proceed although one party does not appear and this is not a hearing as by default.”); Heidary v. Yadollahi, 99 Cal.App.4th 857 , 121 Cal. Rptr.2d 695, 699 (2002) (holding: (1) that where a defendant who previously answered does not appear for trial, a plaintiff's only remedy is to make a motion with the court to continue with that trial; (2) that entry of default is not authorized; and (3) that the hearing held "under such circumstances is uncontested as distinguish 2014Accord Bloch v. Bentfield, 1 Ariz.App. 412 , 403 P.2d 559, 564 (1965) ("When a case is regularly called for trial, the trial may proceed although one party does not appear and this is not a hearing as by default.”); Heidary v. Yadollahi, 99 Cal.App.4th 857 , 121 Cal. Rptr.2d 695, 699 (2002) (holding: (1) that where a defendant who previously answered does not appear for trial, a plaintiff's only remedy is to make a motion with the court to continue with that trial; (2) that entry of default is not authorized; and (3) that the hearing held "under such circumstances is uncontested as distinguish | 1 | 1 |
Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. Heitzgreen1 sentence2007Thus, the essential elements of the bargained-for exchange remain[ed] intact.” 200 F.Supp.2d at 1020 (citation omitted); see also Lincoln Benefit, 468 F.Supp.2d at 1069 . [¶ 25.] Furthermore, the Hanson court held that the statute “only created a default rule.” 200 F.Supp.2d at 1020. | 1 | 1 |
Cotton v. Manninggreen2 sentences2007See Cotton v. Manning, 1999 SD 128, ¶ 16 , 600 N.W.2d 585, 588 . 2007See Cotton v. Manning, 1999 SD 128, ¶ 16 , 600 N.W.2d 585, 588 . | 1 | 1 |
Heikkila v. Carvergreen2 sentences1997An example of such a negotiated clause is a default provision. [¶ 21] We addressed the issue of whether a default clause in a contract was a void penalty in Heikkila v. Carver, wherein we stated: Whether a forfeiture provision in a contract is an enforceable liquidated damage provision or an unenforceable penalty is a question of law for the trial court to determine “based upon a consideration of the instrument as a whole, the situation of the parties, the subject matter of the contract, the circumstances surrounding its execution, and other factors.” 378 N.W.2d 214, 216 (S.D.1985) (quoting Pr 1997An example of such a negotiated clause is a default provision. [¶ 21] We addressed the issue of whether a default clause in a contract was a void penalty in Heikkila v. Carver, wherein we stated: Whether a forfeiture provision in a contract is an enforceable liquidated damage provision or an unenforceable penalty is a question of law for the trial court to determine “based upon a consideration of the instrument as a whole, the situation of the parties, the subject matter of the contract, the circumstances surrounding its execution, and other factors.” 378 N.W.2d 214, 216 (S.D.1985) (quoting Pr | 1 | 1 |
Safari, Inc. v. Verdoorngreen2 sentences1997An example of such a negotiated clause is a default provision. [¶ 21] We addressed the issue of whether a default clause in a contract was a void penalty in Heikkila v. Carver, wherein we stated: Whether a forfeiture provision in a contract is an enforceable liquidated damage provision or an unenforceable penalty is a question of law for the trial court to determine “based upon a consideration of the instrument as a whole, the situation of the parties, the subject matter of the contract, the circumstances surrounding its execution, and other factors.” 378 N.W.2d 214, 216 (S.D.1985) (quoting Pr 1997An example of such a negotiated clause is a default provision. [¶ 21] We addressed the issue of whether a default clause in a contract was a void penalty in Heikkila v. Carver, wherein we stated: Whether a forfeiture provision in a contract is an enforceable liquidated damage provision or an unenforceable penalty is a question of law for the trial court to determine “based upon a consideration of the instrument as a whole, the situation of the parties, the subject matter of the contract, the circumstances surrounding its execution, and other factors.” 378 N.W.2d 214, 216 (S.D.1985) (quoting Pr | 1 | 1 |
Middleton v. Klinglergreen1 sentence1988In Middleton , we expressed: “ ‘Where ... there is no limitation in the contract which makes the remedies enumerated therein exclusive, a party is entitled to the remedies thus specified, or he may at his election pursue any other remedy which the law affords.’ ” 410 N.W.2d at 186 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
green
1 sentence2002In its most recent case, Tahoe- Sienna, the Court reaffirmed the case-specific analysis of Penn Central as the default procedure. “[T]he categorical rule in Lucas was carved out for the ‘extraordinary case’ in which a regulation permanently deprives property of all value; the default rule remains that, in the regulatory takings context, we require a more fact-specific inquiry.” - U.S. at -, 122 S.Ct. at 1484 , 152 L.Ed.2d at-(emphasis added). [¶ 26.] In the case before us, neither of the Lucas exceptions applies: there was never any question of the State’s physically invading SDDS’s property, | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Erickson v. Bennett
green
2 sentences1993In Erickson v. Bennett, 409 N.W.2d 884 (Minn.App.1987), the insurance company received a copy of the summons and complaint but had only one day's oral notice of the default hearing. 1993Paul should have the right to dispute the questions which make it liable on its contract and should not be penalized when it was put on notice of the default hearing in an untimely manner Id. at 887 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.