default rule in California

2026“Estrada informs the application of the default rule ‘in a specific context by articulating the reasonable presumption that a legislative act mitigating the punishment for a particular criminal offense is intended to apply to all nonfinal judgments.’ ” (Burgos, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 14.) Estrada does not apply “to statutes that, although arguably lessening punishment in some sense, d[o] not implicate the central rationale behind the Estrada inference.” (Ibid., citing People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 321 .) 7 C.

2026This intent seems obvious, because to hold otherwise would be to conclude that the Legislature was motivated by a desire for vengeance, a conclusion not permitted in view of modern theories of penology.” (Estrada, at p. 745.) Recently, our high court stressed Estrada’s “ ‘ limited role’ ” in interpreting statutes, explaining, “Estrada informs the application of the default rule ‘in a specific context by articulating the reasonable presumption that a legislative act mitigating the punishment for a particular criminal offense is intended to apply to all nonfinal judgments.’ ” (Burgos, supra, 16

2018(See People v. Robbins (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 660 , 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 468 ; People v. Woods (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1080 , 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 318 .) The court in Brown recognized that language in Estrada , if literally or broadly applied, was inconsistent with the principles embodied in section 3. ( Brown, supra , 54 Cal.4th at pp. 324-325, 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 824 , 278 P.3d 1182 .) Accordingly, in Brown , the court expressly limited the scope of Estrada : " Estrada is today properly understood, not as weakening or modifying the default rule of prospective operation codified in section 3, but rather as in

2018(See People v. Robbins (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 660 , 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 468 ; People v. Woods (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1080 , 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 318 .) The court in Brown recognized that language in Estrada , if literally or broadly applied, was inconsistent with the principles embodied in section 3. ( Brown, supra , 54 Cal.4th at pp. 324-325, 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 824 , 278 P.3d 1182 .) Accordingly, in Brown , the court expressly limited the scope of Estrada : " Estrada is today properly understood, not as weakening or modifying the default rule of prospective operation codified in section 3, but rather as in

2016(People v. Shabazz (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 303, 312-313 ; see People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 793 .) “To resolve this very specific retroactivity question, we apply the well-settled rules governing interpretation of voter intent[.]” (People v. Shabazz, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 313 .) “ ‘In interpreting a voter initiative …, we apply the same principles that govern statutory construction. [Citation.] Thus, … “we turn first to the language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning.” [Citation.] … The statutory language must also be construed in the context of 6 the stat

2016(People v. Shabazz (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 303, 312-313 ; see People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 793 .) “To resolve this very specific retroactivity question, we apply the well-settled rules governing interpretation of voter intent[.]” (People v. Shabazz, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 313 .) “ ‘In interpreting a voter initiative …, we apply the same principles that govern statutory construction. [Citation.] Thus, … “we turn first to the language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning.” [Citation.] … The statutory language must also be construed in the context of the statut

2016(People v. Shabazz (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 303, 312-313 ; see People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 793 .) “To resolve this very specific retroactivity question, we apply the well-settled rules governing interpretation of voter intent[.]” (People v. Shabazz, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 313 .) “ ‘In interpreting a voter initiative …, we apply the same principles that govern statutory construction. [Citation.] Thus, … “we turn first to the language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning.” [Citation.] … The statutory language must also be construed in the context of 6 the stat

2016(People v. Shabazz (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 303, 312-313 ; see People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 793 .) “To resolve this very specific retroactivity question, we apply the well-settled rules governing interpretation of voter intent[.]” (People v. Shabazz, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 313 .) “ ‘In interpreting a voter initiative …, we apply the same principles that govern statutory construction. [Citation.] Thus, … “we turn first to the language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning.” [Citation.] … The statutory language must also be construed in the context of 6 the stat

2025But we cannot say that is a result “ ‘clearly supported by public policy.’ ” (Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 781 .) So we will retain the default rule of duty, which our Supreme Court, long ago, said requires manufacturers 5 The last factor discussed in Rowland concerns the availability, cost, or prevalence of insurance in this context.

2024(Ibid.) “Under general negligence principles, of course, a person ordinarily is obligated to exercise due care in his or her own actions so as not to create an unreasonable risk of injury to others, and this legal duty generally is owed to the class of persons who it is reasonably foreseeable may be injured as the result of the actor’s conduct.” (Lugtu v. California Highway Patrol (2001) 26 Cal.4th 703, 716 .) The general duty of due care “includes a duty not to expose others to an unreasonable risk of injury at the hands of third parties . . . .” (Id. at p. 717.) Civil Code section 1714 “esta

2021(Ibid.) In Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740 , the Supreme Court set forth an important qualification to the default presumption against retroactivity.

2021(Ibid.) In Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740 , the Supreme Court set forth an important qualification to the default presumption against retroactivity.

2023(See Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 311 [Estrada informs application of “ ‘the default rule of prospective operation’ ” for statutes].) A new statute is generally not applied retroactively, absent clear direction from the Legislature that it intends retroactivity.

2019In People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314 , the high court emphasized “the limited role Estrada properly plays in our jurisprudence of prospective versus retrospective operation.” (Id. at p. 324.) It explained, “Estrada is today properly understood, not as weakening or modifying the default rule of prospective operation codified in section 3, but rather as informing the rule’s application in a specific context by articulating the reasonable presumption that a legislative act mitigating the punishment for a particular criminal offense is intended to apply to all nonfinal judgments.” (Ibid.) More

2020J. in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication, to allocate the risk of error between the litigants, and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision.” (Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 546 (Wendland); see also In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358 , 369- 373 (conc. opn. of Harlan, J.).) “The default standard of proof in civil cases is the preponderance of the evidence.” (Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 546 , citing Evid.

2020J. in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication, to allocate the risk of error between the litigants, and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision.” (Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 546 (Wendland); see also In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358 , 369- 373 (conc. opn. of Harlan, J.).) “The default standard of proof in civil cases is the preponderance of the evidence.” (Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 546 , citing Evid.

2025(See In re Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 744–748 (Estrada).) When a new or amendatory statute “mitigates punishment and there is no saving clause, the rule is that the [statute] will operate retroactively so that the lighter punishment is imposed.” (Id. at p. 748.) More specifically, “[w]hen new legislation reduces the punishment for an offense, we presume that the legislation applies to all cases not yet final as of the legislation’s effective date.” (People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 673 .) “The Estrada rule rests on the presumption that, in the absence of a savings clause providi

2019In People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857 (Buycks), we examined the extent to which section 1170.18(k) operated retroactively by applying “ ‘the principle [codified in Penal Code section 3] that, “in the absence of an express retroactivity provision, a statute will not be applied retroactively unless it is very clear from extrinsic sources that the [lawmakers] . . . must have intended a retroactive application.” ’ ” (Buycks, at p. 880.) We found it “significant” that “subdivisions (a) and (f) of section 1170.18 both clearly reflect an intent to have full retroactive application, whereas subdivi

2024(Sandee, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 305, fn. 7 .) The objective of the statutes at issue in these decisions, like section 1109, is to enhance the 10 The dissent points out that “the statutory scheme in Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188 did not even implicate the criminal law.” (Dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 13, fn. 5.) But both Civil Code section 3 and Penal Code section 3 contain a default presumption in favor of prospective application. 33 PEOPLE v. BURGOS Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C.

2014Recognizing this in Evangelatos [v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188 ], we declined to follow Estrada’s remarks about section 3 and held that ‘language in Estrada . . . should not be interpreted as modifying this well-established legislatively-mandated principle.’ [Citation.] Accordingly, Estrada is today properly understood, not as weakening or modifying the default rule of prospective operation codified in section 3, but rather as informing the rule’s application in a specific context by articulating the reasonable presumption that a legislative act mitigating the punishment for a partic

2026(Compare Ostling v. Loring (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1731, 1744 (Ostling) with Jackson v. Bank of America (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 375 , 387–389 (Jackson).) In Jackson, the court accepted defendant’s theory that new argument or evidence presented at a default proceeding amounts to a de facto amendment to the complaint because otherwise “new evidence, based on any theory, could be introduced at a default hearing, as long as no formal 3 By defaulting, defendants admitted these facts were true. ( Garber, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 823–824; see also Beeman v. Burling (1990) 216 Cal.App.3d 1586, 1597 .

2026(Compare Ostling v. Loring (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1731, 1744 (Ostling) with Jackson v. Bank of America (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 375 , 387–389 (Jackson).) In Jackson, the court accepted defendant’s theory that new argument or evidence presented at a default proceeding amounts to a de facto amendment to the complaint because otherwise “new evidence, based on any theory, could be introduced at a default hearing, as long as no formal 3 By defaulting, defendants admitted these facts were true. ( Garber, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 823–824; see also Beeman v. Burling (1990) 216 Cal.App.3d 1586, 1597 .

2026(Compare Ostling v. Loring (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1731, 1744 (Ostling) with Jackson v. Bank of America (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 375 , 387–389 (Jackson).) In Jackson, the court accepted defendant’s theory that new argument or evidence presented at a default proceeding amounts to a de facto amendment to the complaint because otherwise “new evidence, based on any theory, could be introduced at a default hearing, as long as no formal 3 By defaulting, defendants admitted these facts were true. ( Garber, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 823–824; see also Beeman v. Burling (1990) 216 Cal.App.3d 1586, 1597 .

2026(Compare Ostling v. Loring (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1731, 1744 (Ostling) with Jackson v. Bank of America (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 375 , 387–389 (Jackson).) In Jackson, the court accepted defendant’s theory that new argument or evidence presented at a default proceeding amounts to a de facto amendment to the complaint because otherwise “new evidence, based on any theory, could be introduced at a default hearing, as long as no formal 3 By defaulting, defendants admitted these facts were true. ( Garber, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 823–824; see also Beeman v. Burling (1990) 216 Cal.App.3d 1586, 1597 .

2026(Compare Ostling v. Loring (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1731, 1744 (Ostling) with Jackson v. Bank of America (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 375 , 387–389 (Jackson).) In Jackson, the court accepted defendant’s theory that new argument or evidence presented at a default proceeding amounts to a de facto amendment to the complaint because otherwise “new evidence, based on any theory, could be introduced at a default hearing, as long as no formal 3 By defaulting, defendants admitted these facts were true. ( Garber, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 823–824; see also Beeman v. Burling (1990) 216 Cal.App.3d 1586, 1597 .

2026(Compare Ostling v. Loring (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1731, 1744 (Ostling) with Jackson v. Bank of America (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 375 , 387–389 (Jackson).) In Jackson, the court accepted defendant’s theory that new argument or evidence presented at a default proceeding amounts to a de facto amendment to the complaint because otherwise “new evidence, based on any theory, could be introduced at a default hearing, as long as no formal 3 By defaulting, defendants admitted these facts were true. ( Garber, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 823–824; see also Beeman v. Burling (1990) 216 Cal.App.3d 1586, 1597 .

2020(Frierson, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 239 [“several Courts of Appeal have properly concluded that ‘[t]he facts upon which the court’s finding of unreasonable risk is based must be proven by the People by a preponderance of the evidence’ ”]; see People v. Jefferson (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 235, 241 [“the proper standard of proof on a dangerousness finding is the default standard of proof by a preponderance of the evidence”].) As the statute makes clear, it is up to the trial court to decide, based on all the evidence presented, whether resentencing would pose an “unreasonable risk of danger to public s

2018This we will not do. ( People v. Hoffman (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1304 , 1311, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 658 ["In construing a measure, we may not undertake to rewrite its unambiguous language"].) Other courts have rejected similar claims in the context of Proposition 36 and Proposition 47. ( People v. Superior Court (Kaulick) (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1279 , 1302-1306, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 856 ( Kaulick ); People v. Jefferson (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 235 , 240-242, 204 Cal.Rptr.3d 583 ( Jefferson ).) 7 The courts in Kaulick and Jefferson concluded, respectively, that the standard of proof to be applied in the second

2017Code, § 3.) "It is well settled that a new statute is presumed to operate prospectively absent an express declaration of retrospectivity or a clear indication that the electorate, or the Legislature, intended *196 otherwise." ( Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282 , 287, 279 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 807 P.2d 434 ( Tapia ).) We also agree with the petition that In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 , 48 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 408 P.2d 948 ( Estrada ), the case that spawned a well-known exception to the default rule of prospectivity, does not apply here.

2017Code, § 3.) "It is well settled that a new statute is presumed to operate prospectively absent an express declaration of retrospectivity or a clear indication that the electorate, or the Legislature, intended *196 otherwise." ( Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282 , 287, 279 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 807 P.2d 434 ( Tapia ).) We also agree with the petition that In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 , 48 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 408 P.2d 948 ( Estrada ), the case that spawned a well-known exception to the default rule of prospectivity, does not apply here.

2017In Brown, the Supreme Court 32. unanimously determined a jail inmate awaiting trial and sentencing should earn credits at the rate in effect when sentenced. ( Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 317–330; Cervantes, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 601 .) Cervantes noted Brown recognized a change in credit- earning ability would affect the length of a prisoner’s time in custody and, in that sense, would have a direct effect on punishment, but nevertheless found Estrada was inapplicable. ( Brown, supra, at pp. 323, 325 ; Cervantes, supra, at p. 601 .) Brown held: “Estrada is today properly understood, not

2017In Brown, the Supreme Court 32. unanimously determined a jail inmate awaiting trial and sentencing should earn credits at the rate in effect when sentenced. ( Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 317–330; Cervantes, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 601 .) Cervantes noted Brown recognized a change in credit- earning ability would affect the length of a prisoner’s time in custody and, in that sense, would have a direct effect on punishment, but nevertheless found Estrada was inapplicable. ( Brown, supra, at pp. 323, 325 ; Cervantes, supra, at p. 601 .) Brown held: “Estrada is today properly understood, not

2023(People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1196 , overruled on other grounds in People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1216 .) “Estrada is . . . properly understood, not as weakening or modifying the default rule of prospective operation codified in section 3, but rather as informing the rule’s application in a specific context . . . .” (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 324 .) Estrada is of no help to defendant because its holding expressly applies only to cases in which the judgment is not final.

2020(People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1196 , overruled on other grounds in People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1216 .) “Estrada is . . . properly understood, not as weakening or modifying the default rule of prospective operation codified in section 3, but rather as informing the rule’s application in a specific context . . . .” (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 324 .) Estrada is of no help to defendant because its holding expressly applies only to cases in which the judgment is not final.

2023(People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1196 , overruled on other grounds in People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1216 .) “Estrada is . . . properly understood, not as weakening or modifying the default rule of prospective operation codified in section 3, but rather as informing the rule’s application in a specific context . . . .” (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 324 .) Estrada is of no help to defendant because its holding expressly applies only to cases in which the judgment is not final.

2020(People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1196 , overruled on other grounds in People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1216 .) “Estrada is . . . properly understood, not as weakening or modifying the default rule of prospective operation codified in section 3, but rather as informing the rule’s application in a specific context . . . .” (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 324 .) Estrada is of no help to defendant because its holding expressly applies only to cases in which the judgment is not final.

2024(Kesner, at p. 1156.) “The ‘general rule’ of duty in California is established by statute.” (Kuciemba v. Victory Woodworks, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 993 , 1016 (Kuciemba).) Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a) “ ‘establishes the default rule that each person has a duty “to exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for the safety of others.” ’ ” (Kuciemba, at p. 1016.) While section 1714 states the general default rule, exceptions can be created by statute or by courts “ ‘only where “clearly supported by public policy.” ’ ” (Kesner, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1143 .) These policy consid

2023(See LeFiell Manufacturing Co. v. Superior Court (2012) 55 Cal.4th 275, 285 [“ ‘A cause of action for loss of consortium is, by its nature, dependent on the existence of a cause of action for tortious injury to a spouse.’ ”]; Burgess v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1073 [“bystander liability is premised upon a defendant’s violation of a duty not to negligently cause emotional distress to people who observe conduct which causes harm to another”].) 19 policy.’ ”5 (Cabral, at p. 771, citing Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 112 .) Notwithstanding the foregoing, Bird contends this rule of g

2018This we will not do. ( People v. Hoffman (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1304 , 1311, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 658 ["In construing a measure, we may not undertake to rewrite its unambiguous language"].) Other courts have rejected similar claims in the context of Proposition 36 and Proposition 47. ( People v. Superior Court (Kaulick) (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1279 , 1302-1306, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 856 ( Kaulick ); People v. Jefferson (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 235 , 240-242, 204 Cal.Rptr.3d 583 ( Jefferson ).) 7 The courts in Kaulick and Jefferson concluded, respectively, that the standard of proof to be applied in the second

2018This we will not do. ( People v. Hoffman (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1304 , 1311, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 658 ["In construing a measure, we may not undertake to rewrite its unambiguous language"].) Other courts have rejected similar claims in the context of Proposition 36 and Proposition 47. ( People v. Superior Court (Kaulick) (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1279 , 1302-1306, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 856 ( Kaulick ); People v. Jefferson (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 235 , 240-242, 204 Cal.Rptr.3d 583 ( Jefferson ).) 7 The courts in Kaulick and Jefferson concluded, respectively, that the standard of proof to be applied in the second

2026(See People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 627 [“Courts look to the Legislature’s intent in order to determine if a law is meant to apply retroactively”].) Here, the legislative history demonstrates the Legislature intended section 730.6 (b)(3) to operate prospectively.

2026(See People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 627 , (Frahs) [“Courts look to the Legislature’s intent in order to determine if a law is meant to apply retroactively”].) In other words, the issue is not whether victim restitution is or is not criminal punishment for constitutional purposes; the issue is what the Legislature intended when it changed the law on victim restitution for minors.

2024The first three factors — the private interest affected, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the government’s interest — are the same. [Citations.] In addition, we may also consider a fourth factor, ‘ “the dignitary interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds, and consequences of the action and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a responsible government official.” ’ ” (Today’s Fresh Start, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 213 ; Cal. Const., art.

2021(Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 213 (Today’s Fresh Start).) Thus, our conclusions applying the multifactor test are the same whether analyzed under the California Constitution or the federal Constitution. 13 exercising its discretion under section 1170(d)(1).

2023As would the Supreme Court, which as discussed has repeatedly instructed that “‘the Rowland factors are evaluated at a relatively broad level of factual generality.’” (Kesner, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1143 ; accord, Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 772 .) “Thus, in applying the Rowland factors, the courts do not ask whether they ‘“support an exception to the general duty of reasonable care on the facts of the particular case before”’ the 13 court, ‘“but whether carving out an entire category of cases from that general duty rule is justified by clear considerations of policy.”’” (T.L. v. City Ambu

2023As would the Supreme Court, which as discussed has repeatedly instructed that “‘the Rowland factors are evaluated at a relatively broad level of factual generality.’” (Kesner, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1143 ; accord, Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 772 .) “Thus, in applying the Rowland factors, the courts do not ask whether they ‘“support an exception to the general duty of reasonable care on the facts of the particular case before”’ the 13 court, ‘“but whether carving out an entire category of cases from that general duty rule is justified by clear considerations of policy.”’” (T.L. v. City Ambu

2023There are many reasons for stating that the arbitration 13 will proceed by particular rules, and doing so does not indicate that the parties’ motivation was to announce who would decide threshold issues of enforceability.” (Ajamian, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 790 .) The Ajamian court continued: “[W]e must be mindful of what the United States Supreme Court has emphasized unflinchingly for decades: notwithstanding the public policy favoring arbitration, arbitration can be imposed only as to issues the parties agreed to arbitrate; given the slim likelihood that the parties actually contemplated

2022Hence silence or ambiguity is not enough." (Gilbert Street Developers, LLC v. La Quinta Homes, LLC (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1191-1192 .) As Ajamian explained: "[W]e must be mindful of what the United States Supreme Court has emphasized unflinchingly for decades: notwithstanding the public policy favoring arbitration, arbitration can be imposed only as to issues the parties agreed 12 to arbitrate; given the slim likelihood that the parties actually contemplated who would determine threshold enforceability issues, as well as the default presumption that such issues would be determined by the

2021(See Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319 [ 47 L.Ed.2d 18 ].) Our high court “adopted the Mathews balancing test as the default framework for analyzing challenges to the sufficiency of proceedings under our own due process clause,” but with the “minor modification” of adding to it consideration of the dignitary interest factor when the rights of natural persons are at stake.

2021(See Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319 [ 47 L.Ed.2d 18 ].) Our high court “adopted the Mathews balancing test as the default framework for analyzing challenges to the sufficiency of proceedings under our own due process clause,” but with the “minor modification” of adding to it consideration of the dignitary interest factor when the rights of natural persons are at stake.