44 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1909–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Markelgreen2 sentences2023Restraint of Markel, 154 Wn.2d 262, 274 , 111 P.3d 249 (2005) (“Under this sentencing scheme, a ‘same criminal conduct’ finding is an exception to the default rule that all convictions must count separately.”); State v. Lopez, 142 Wn. 2013Restraint of Market, 154 Wn.2d 262, 274 , 111 P.3d 249 (2005) (“[A] ‘same criminal conduct’ finding is an exception to the default rule that all convictions must count separately. | 2 | 2 |
In re the Personal Restraint of Markelgreen2 sentences2023Restraint of Markel, 154 Wn.2d 262, 274 , 111 P.3d 249 (2005) (“Under this sentencing scheme, a ‘same criminal conduct’ finding is an exception to the default rule that all convictions must count separately.”); State v. Lopez, 142 Wn. 2013Restraint of Market, 154 Wn.2d 262, 274 , 111 P.3d 249 (2005) (“[A] ‘same criminal conduct’ finding is an exception to the default rule that all convictions must count separately. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Dissolution & Winding Up of KeyTronicsgreen2 sentences2015As the Supreme Court of Nebraska observed, applying the RUPA, the indicia of co-ownership, which include profit sharing and loss sharing, “are only that; they are not all necessary to establish a partnership relationship, and no single indicium of co-ownership is either necessary or sufficient to prove co-ownership.” In re Dissolution & Winding Up of KeyTronics, 274 Neb. 936 , 744 N.W.2d 425, 441 (2008). ¶63 In Stuart v. Overland Medical Center, 510 S.W.2d 494, 497-98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974), a court applying the UPA, the predecessor to the RUPA, held that an economic arrangement under which profe 2015As the Supreme Court of Nebraska observed, applying the RUPA, the indicia of co-ownership, which include profit sharing and loss sharing, “are only that; they are not all necessary to establish a partnership relationship, and no single indicium of co-ownership is either necessary or sufficient to prove co-ownership.” In re Dissolution & Winding Up of KeyTronics, 274 Neb. 936 , 744 N.W.2d 425, 441 (2008). ¶63 In Stuart v. Overland Medical Center, 510 S.W.2d 494, 497-98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974), a court applying the UPA, the predecessor to the RUPA, held that an economic arrangement under which profe | 2 | 2 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2010See RCW 5.60.020 (“Every person of sound mind and discretion . . . may be a witness in any action, or proceeding.”); ER 601 (“Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided by statute or by court rule.”); see also State v. Smith, 97 Wn.2d 801, 803 , 650 P.2d 201 (1982) (“Where there has been no such adjudication [of insanity], the burden is on the party opposing the witness to prove incompetence.”). 2010See RCW 5.60.020 (“Every person of sound mind and discretion . . . may be a witness in any action, or proceeding.”); ER 601 (“Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided by statute or by court rule.”); see also State v. Smith, 97 Wn.2d 801, 803 , 650 P.2d 201 (1982) (“Where there has been no such adjudication [of insanity], the burden is on the party opposing the witness to prove incompetence.”). | 2 | 2 |
Commercial Courier Service, Inc. v. Millergreen2 sentences2003See Commercial Courier Serv., Inc. v. Miller, 13 Wash.App. 98, 105-07 , 533 P.2d 852 (1975) (defendant disregarded summons because he thought it was only a bluff). 2003See Commercial Courier Serv., Inc. v. Miller, 13 Wn. | 2 | 2 |
Mahler v. Szucsgreen2 sentences1999See, e.g., Mahler v. Szucs, 135 Wash.2d 398 , 957 P.2d 632 , 966 P.2d 305 (1998); Scott Fetzer Co. v. Weeks, 122 Wash.2d 141 , 859 P.2d 1210 (1993); see, generally, Philip A. Talmadge, Attorney Fees in Washington: Annotated Statutes, Cases and Commentary at 293-97 (Charles P. Siner & Cutler and Nylander eds., rev. ed. 1995). 1999See, e.g., Mahler v. Szucs, 135 Wn.2d 398 , 957 P.2d 632 , 966 P.2d 305 (1998); Scott Fetzer Co. v. Weeks, 122 Wn.2d 141 , 859 P.2d 1210 (1993); see, generally, Philip A. Talmadge, Attorney Pees in Washington: Annotated Statutes, Cases and Commentary at 293-97 (Charles P. Siner ed., rev. ed. 1995). | 2 | 2 |
Spokane Co. v. State Ex Rel. Co. Comrs.green2 sentences1999See, e.g., Mahler v. Szucs, 135 Wash.2d 398 , 957 P.2d 632 , 966 P.2d 305 (1998); Scott Fetzer Co. v. Weeks, 122 Wash.2d 141 , 859 P.2d 1210 (1993); see, generally, Philip A. Talmadge, Attorney Fees in Washington: Annotated Statutes, Cases and Commentary at 293-97 (Charles P. Siner & Cutler and Nylander eds., rev. ed. 1995). 1999See, e.g., Mahler v. Szucs, 135 Wn.2d 398 , 957 P.2d 632 , 966 P.2d 305 (1998); Scott Fetzer Co. v. Weeks, 122 Wn.2d 141 , 859 P.2d 1210 (1993); see, generally, Philip A. Talmadge, Attorney Pees in Washington: Annotated Statutes, Cases and Commentary at 293-97 (Charles P. Siner ed., rev. ed. 1995). | 2 | 2 |
Mahler v. Szucsgreen2 sentences1999See, e.g., Mahler v. Szucs, 135 Wash.2d 398 , 957 P.2d 632 , 966 P.2d 305 (1998); Scott Fetzer Co. v. Weeks, 122 Wash.2d 141 , 859 P.2d 1210 (1993); see, generally, Philip A. Talmadge, Attorney Fees in Washington: Annotated Statutes, Cases and Commentary at 293-97 (Charles P. Siner & Cutler and Nylander eds., rev. ed. 1995). 1999See, e.g., Mahler v. Szucs, 135 Wn.2d 398 , 957 P.2d 632 , 966 P.2d 305 (1998); Scott Fetzer Co. v. Weeks, 122 Wn.2d 141 , 859 P.2d 1210 (1993); see, generally, Philip A. Talmadge, Attorney Pees in Washington: Annotated Statutes, Cases and Commentary at 293-97 (Charles P. Siner ed., rev. ed. 1995). | 2 | 2 |
Tesoro Refining & Marketing Co. v. Department of Revenuegreen2 sentences2024Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 164 Wn.2d 310, 319 , 190 P.3d 28 (2008) (“As a default rule, the word ‘or’ does not mean ‘and’ unless legislative intent clearly indicates to the contrary.”). 2020Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 164 Wn.2d 310, 319 , 190 P.3d 28 (2008) (plurality opinion). | 1 | 2 |
Tesoro Refining & Marketing v. State, Dorgreen2 sentences2024Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 164 Wn.2d 310, 319 , 190 P.3d 28 (2008) (“As a default rule, the word ‘or’ does not mean ‘and’ unless legislative intent clearly indicates to the contrary.”). 2020Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 164 Wn.2d 310, 319 , 190 P.3d 28 (2008) (plurality opinion). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Grantgreen2 sentences2000Id. at 684 . 2000State v. Grant, 89 Wash.2d at 684, 575 P.2d 210 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Lopezgreen1 sentence2023Restraint of Markel, 154 Wn.2d 262, 274 , 111 P.3d 249 (2005) (“Under this sentencing scheme, a ‘same criminal conduct’ finding is an exception to the default rule that all convictions must count separately.”); State v. Lopez, 142 Wn. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lopezgreen1 sentence2023App. 341, 351 , 174 P.3d 1216 (2007) (“In determining a defendant’s offender score under the [SRA], two or more current offenses and prior offenses are presumed to count separately unless the trial court finds that the current offenses encompass the same criminal conduct.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Cox v. Spanglergreen | 1 | 1 |
Cox v. Spanglergreen1 sentence2020See Cox v. Spangler, 141 Wn.2d 431, 446 , 5 P.3d 1265 (2000) (noting that joint liability applies when there is either concert of action or independent torts uniting to cause a single injury). | 1 | 1 |
| Department of Social & Health Services v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Kinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stuart v. Overland Medical Centergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Klettke v. Klettkegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Barksdale v. Peoples Financial Corp. of Alpharettagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Arreche v. Porto Rico Railway, Light & Power Co.
neutral
2 sentences1918In Tacoma Water Supply Co. v. Dumermuth, 51 Wash. 609 , 99 Pac. 741 , the court said: “After the respondents acquired their deed from the state, their obligation to convey and the-obligation on the part of the purchaser, to pay the purchase price became mutual, concurrent and dependent, and neither party could thereafter put the other in default or claim a forfeiture without first tendering performance on his part; and this, whether the contract contained a forfeiture clause or not.” See, also, Mudgett v. Clay, 5 Wash. 103 , 31 Pac. 424 ; Underwood v. Tew, 7 Wash. 297 , 34 Pac. 1100 ; Stein v. 1914Mudgett v. Clay, 5 Wash. 103 , 31 Pac. 424 ; Underwood v. Tew, 7 Wash. 297 , 34 Pac. 1100 ; Stem v. Waddell, 37 Wash. 634 , 80 Pac. 184 ; Melick v. Cross, 62 N. J. | 3 | 1909–1918 |
Stein v. Waddell
neutral
2 sentences1918In Tacoma Water Supply Co. v. Dumermuth, 51 Wash. 609 , 99 Pac. 741 , the court said: “After the respondents acquired their deed from the state, their obligation to convey and the-obligation on the part of the purchaser, to pay the purchase price became mutual, concurrent and dependent, and neither party could thereafter put the other in default or claim a forfeiture without first tendering performance on his part; and this, whether the contract contained a forfeiture clause or not.” See, also, Mudgett v. Clay, 5 Wash. 103 , 31 Pac. 424 ; Underwood v. Tew, 7 Wash. 297 , 34 Pac. 1100 ; Stein v. 1918In Tacoma Water Supply Co. v. Dumermuth, 51 Wash. 609 , 99 Pac. 741 , the court said: “After the respondents acquired their deed from the state, their obligation to convey and the-obligation on the part of the purchaser, to pay the purchase price became mutual, concurrent and dependent, and neither party could thereafter put the other in default or claim a forfeiture without first tendering performance on his part; and this, whether the contract contained a forfeiture clause or not.” See, also, Mudgett v. Clay, 5 Wash. 103 , 31 Pac. 424 ; Underwood v. Tew, 7 Wash. 297 , 34 Pac. 1100 ; Stein v. | 3 | 1909–1918 |
Mudgett v. Clay
neutral
2 sentences1918In Tacoma Water Supply Co. v. Dumermuth, 51 Wash. 609 , 99 Pac. 741 , the court said: “After the respondents acquired their deed from the state, their obligation to convey and the-obligation on the part of the purchaser, to pay the purchase price became mutual, concurrent and dependent, and neither party could thereafter put the other in default or claim a forfeiture without first tendering performance on his part; and this, whether the contract contained a forfeiture clause or not.” See, also, Mudgett v. Clay, 5 Wash. 103 , 31 Pac. 424 ; Underwood v. Tew, 7 Wash. 297 , 34 Pac. 1100 ; Stein v. 1914Mudgett v. Clay, 5 Wash. 103 , 31 Pac. 424 ; Underwood v. Tew, 7 Wash. 297 , 34 Pac. 1100 ; Stem v. Waddell, 37 Wash. 634 , 80 Pac. 184 ; Melick v. Cross, 62 N. J. | 3 | 1909–1918 |
Underwood v. Tew
neutral
2 sentences1918In Tacoma Water Supply Co. v. Dumermuth, 51 Wash. 609 , 99 Pac. 741 , the court said: “After the respondents acquired their deed from the state, their obligation to convey and the-obligation on the part of the purchaser, to pay the purchase price became mutual, concurrent and dependent, and neither party could thereafter put the other in default or claim a forfeiture without first tendering performance on his part; and this, whether the contract contained a forfeiture clause or not.” See, also, Mudgett v. Clay, 5 Wash. 103 , 31 Pac. 424 ; Underwood v. Tew, 7 Wash. 297 , 34 Pac. 1100 ; Stein v. 1918In Tacoma Water Supply Co. v. Dumermuth, 51 Wash. 609 , 99 Pac. 741 , the court said: “After the respondents acquired their deed from the state, their obligation to convey and the-obligation on the part of the purchaser, to pay the purchase price became mutual, concurrent and dependent, and neither party could thereafter put the other in default or claim a forfeiture without first tendering performance on his part; and this, whether the contract contained a forfeiture clause or not.” See, also, Mudgett v. Clay, 5 Wash. 103 , 31 Pac. 424 ; Underwood v. Tew, 7 Wash. 297 , 34 Pac. 1100 ; Stein v. | 3 | 1909–1918 |
Brand v. Department of Labor & Industries
green
2 sentences2009In his concurring opinion in Brand v. Department of Labor & Industries, 139 Wash.2d 659 , 989 P.2d 1111 (1999), Justice Talmadge referred to the lodestar approach as "the default principle" for calculating attorney fees in Washington. 2009In his concurring opinion in Brand v. Department of Labor & Industries, 139 Wn.2d 659 , 989 P.2d 1111 (1999), Justice Talmadge referred to the lodestar approach as “the default principle” for calculating attorney fees in Washington. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson
red
2 sentences2009Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 , 92 S. Ct. 349 , 30 L. 2009Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 , 92 S. Ct. 349 , 30 L. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Brand v. DEPT. OF LABOR & INDUSTRIES
green
2 sentences2009In his concurring opinion in Brand v. Department of Labor & Industries, 139 Wash.2d 659 , 989 P.2d 1111 (1999), Justice Talmadge referred to the lodestar approach as "the default principle" for calculating attorney fees in Washington. 2009In his concurring opinion in Brand v. Department of Labor & Industries, 139 Wn.2d 659 , 989 P.2d 1111 (1999), Justice Talmadge referred to the lodestar approach as “the default principle” for calculating attorney fees in Washington. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
green
2 sentences2008Olympic Forest Prods., Inc., 82 Wash.2d at 422 , 511 P.2d 1002 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 , 70 S.Ct. 652 ). ¶ 17 We disagree with Nightrunners that its status as a foreign business entity entitles it to special notice and explanation. 2008Olympic Forest Prods., Inc., 82 Wn.2d at 422 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 ). ¶17 We disagree with Nightrunners that its status as a foreign business entity entitles it to special notice and explanation. | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Olympic Forest Products, Inc. v. Chaussee Corp.
green
2 sentences2008Olympic Forest Prods., Inc., 82 Wash.2d at 422 , 511 P.2d 1002 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 , 70 S.Ct. 652 ). ¶ 17 We disagree with Nightrunners that its status as a foreign business entity entitles it to special notice and explanation. 2008Olympic Forest Prods., Inc., 82 Wn.2d at 422 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 ). ¶17 We disagree with Nightrunners that its status as a foreign business entity entitles it to special notice and explanation. | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Company
green
2 sentences2002Ford, therefore, falls under the default rule: an employer can discharge an at-will employee for "no cause, good cause or even cause morally wrong without fear of liability." Thompson , 102 Wash.2d at 226 , 685 P.2d 1081 . 2002Ford, therefore, falls under the default rule: an employer can discharge an at-will employee for “no cause, good cause or even cause morally wrong without fear of liability.” Thompson , 102 Wn.2d at 226 . | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Scott Fetzer Co. v. Weeks
green
2 sentences1999See, e.g., Mahler v. Szucs, 135 Wash.2d 398 , 957 P.2d 632 , 966 P.2d 305 (1998); Scott Fetzer Co. v. Weeks, 122 Wash.2d 141 , 859 P.2d 1210 (1993); see, generally, Philip A. Talmadge, Attorney Fees in Washington: Annotated Statutes, Cases and Commentary at 293-97 (Charles P. Siner & Cutler and Nylander eds., rev. ed. 1995). 1999See, e.g., Mahler v. Szucs, 135 Wash.2d 398 , 957 P.2d 632 , 966 P.2d 305 (1998); Scott Fetzer Co. v. Weeks, 122 Wash.2d 141 , 859 P.2d 1210 (1993); see, generally, Philip A. Talmadge, Attorney Fees in Washington: Annotated Statutes, Cases and Commentary at 293-97 (Charles P. Siner & Cutler and Nylander eds., rev. ed. 1995). | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Hayden v. Pataki
green
1 sentence2025In Spector, the Supreme Court applied the clear statement rule to an unambiguous statute, and in Hayden, 449 F.3d at 325 , the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held the rule “does not require courts engaged in statutory interpretation to search for a construction of the statute that will not affect the federal balance, but rather, reveals the canon to be a default rule.” (Emphasis added.) Based on Spector and Hayden, we assume without deciding that the clear statement federalism rule operates as a tool to discern congressional intent and may be applied to an unambiguous statute. 16 Hous. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
DeNoskoff v. Scott
green
1 sentence2024Politoff, 36 Wn. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
National Paint & Coatings Association v. City of Chicago
green
1 sentence2021In similar instances, at least one federal circuit court of appeals has held that Pike “is not the default standard of review for any state or local law that affects interstate commerce.” Park Pet Shop, 872 F.3d at 502 (citing Nat’l Paint, 45 F.3d at 1131 ). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Park Pet Shop, Inc. v. City of Chicago
green
1 sentence2021In similar instances, at least one federal circuit court of appeals has held that Pike “is not the default standard of review for any state or local law that affects interstate commerce.” Park Pet Shop, 872 F.3d at 502 (citing Nat’l Paint, 45 F.3d at 1131 ). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Bowers v. Transamerica Title Insurance
green
1 sentence2020Id. at 597 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Thorndike v. Hesperian Orchards, Inc. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| COSMOPOLITAN ENG. GROUP v. Ondeo Degremont, Inc. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Department of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Cosmopolitan Engineering Group, Inc. v. Ondeo Degremont, Inc. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Johnson v. Cash Store green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Johnson v. Cash Store green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Nast v. Michels green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Seattle-First National Bank v. Tabert green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Little v. King green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Widicus v. Southwestern Electric Cooperative, Inc. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Norton v. Brown green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| O'BRIEN v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Birenbaum v. Option Care, Inc. green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Reynolds v. Insurance Co. of North America neutral | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Brim v. Struthers green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| White v. White green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Yeck v. Department of Labor & Industries neutral | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Christy v. Baiocchi green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Lewis v. Wellard neutral | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Bendon v. Parfit neutral | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Tacoma Water Supply Co. v. Dumermuth neutral | 1 | 1918–1918 |
| Katz v. Hathaway neutral | 1 | 1918–1918 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.