18 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Palmer v. Hayesgreen2 sentences2022Utah Caselaw Supports Our Interpretation of the Contract’s Default Provision ¶21 In dismissing Seller‘s claims, the district court relied on the court of appeals‘ decision in McKeon v. Crump, a case that examined a default clause identical to the one at issue here.17 In McKeon, the court of appeals determined that ―Utah case law establishes that to pursue specific performance or damages under the . . . default clause, sellers must return the earnest money deposit before filing suit.‖18 In doing so, the court of appeals looked to one of its earlier cases, Palmer v. Hayes,19 in which the court a 2022Utah Caselaw Supports Our Interpretation of the Contract’s Default Provision ¶21 In dismissing Seller‘s claims, the district court relied on the court of appeals‘ decision in McKeon v. Crump, a case that examined a default clause identical to the one at issue here.17 In McKeon, the court of appeals determined that ―Utah case law establishes that to pursue specific performance or damages under the . . . default clause, sellers must return the earnest money deposit before filing suit.‖18 In doing so, the court of appeals looked to one of its earlier cases, Palmer v. Hayes,19 in which the court a | 2 | 3 |
Close v. Blumenthalgreen2 sentences2022Utah Caselaw Supports Our Interpretation of the Contract’s Default Provision ¶21 In dismissing Seller‘s claims, the district court relied on the court of appeals‘ decision in McKeon v. Crump, a case that examined a default clause identical to the one at issue here.17 In McKeon, the court of appeals determined that ―Utah case law establishes that to pursue specific performance or damages under the . . . default clause, sellers must return the earnest money deposit before filing suit.‖18 In doing so, the court of appeals looked to one of its earlier cases, Palmer v. Hayes,19 in which the court a 2022His retention becomes meaningful when he claims the buyer has breached the contract and refuses to go through with it.45 We then held that because ―it [was] obvious that the seller claimed a breach,‖ the seller had exercised the liquidated damages option because he had kept the deposit.46 ¶26 In Close v. Blumenthal,47 decided a few months after McMullin, the buyers entered into an agreement with the seller to purchase a home.48 The buyers paid a $500 earnest money deposit, and the agreement contained the same default clause.49 After the buyers failed to go through with the purchase, the seller | 1 | 3 |
Aspen Acres Association v. Seven Associates, Inc.green2 sentences2011Our case law indicates that the default rule in Utah for the maintenance of private roadways is that, "[albsent any agreement on the question of maintenance of a private way, the burden of upkeep should be distributed between dominant and ser-vient tenements in proportion to their relative use of the road, as nearly as such may be ascertained." Aspen Acres Ass'n v. Seven Assocs., Inc., 29 Utah 2d 303 , 508 P.2d 1179, 1183 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Dansie v. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n, 2004 UT App 149, ¶ 21 , 92 P.3d 162 (ordering the district court to conside 2011Our case law indicates that the default rule in Utah for the maintenance of private roadways is that, "[albsent any agreement on the question of maintenance of a private way, the burden of upkeep should be distributed between dominant and ser-vient tenements in proportion to their relative use of the road, as nearly as such may be ascertained." Aspen Acres Ass'n v. Seven Assocs., Inc., 29 Utah 2d 303 , 508 P.2d 1179, 1183 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Dansie v. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n, 2004 UT App 149, ¶ 21 , 92 P.3d 162 (ordering the district court to conside | 1 | 3 |
Andreasen v. Hansengreen2 sentences2022Utah Caselaw Supports Our Interpretation of the Contract’s Default Provision ¶21 In dismissing Seller‘s claims, the district court relied on the court of appeals‘ decision in McKeon v. Crump, a case that examined a default clause identical to the one at issue here.17 In McKeon, the court of appeals determined that ―Utah case law establishes that to pursue specific performance or damages under the . . . default clause, sellers must return the earnest money deposit before filing suit.‖18 In doing so, the court of appeals looked to one of its earlier cases, Palmer v. Hayes,19 in which the court a 2022That being so, they must be deemed to have kept it for the purpose indicated in the contract, that is, as liquidated damages.‖36 ¶25 We faced a similar factual scenario in McMullin v. Shimmin.37 In that case, the buyers entered into an agreement with the seller to purchase property, and the buyers paid a $100 earnest money deposit.38 The purchase agreement contained a default clause identical to the one at issue in Andreasen.39 The seller sued the buyers for breaching the agreement, seeking specific performance or, in the alternative, damages.40 The seller had never returned or offered to retu | 1 | 2 |
McKeon v. Crumpgreen2 sentences2022Utah Caselaw Supports Our Interpretation of the Contract’s Default Provision ¶21 In dismissing Seller‘s claims, the district court relied on the court of appeals‘ decision in McKeon v. Crump, a case that examined a default clause identical to the one at issue here.17 In McKeon, the court of appeals determined that ―Utah case law establishes that to pursue specific performance or damages under the . . . default clause, sellers must return the earnest money deposit before filing suit.‖18 In doing so, the court of appeals looked to one of its earlier cases, Palmer v. Hayes,19 in which the court a 2022Utah Caselaw Supports Our Interpretation of the Contract’s Default Provision ¶21 In dismissing Seller‘s claims, the district court relied on the court of appeals‘ decision in McKeon v. Crump, a case that examined a default clause identical to the one at issue here.17 In McKeon, the court of appeals determined that ―Utah case law establishes that to pursue specific performance or damages under the . . . default clause, sellers must return the earnest money deposit before filing suit.‖18 In doing so, the court of appeals looked to one of its earlier cases, Palmer v. Hayes,19 in which the court a | 1 | 2 |
McMullin v. Shimmingreen2 sentences2022Utah Caselaw Supports Our Interpretation of the Contract’s Default Provision ¶21 In dismissing Seller‘s claims, the district court relied on the court of appeals‘ decision in McKeon v. Crump, a case that examined a default clause identical to the one at issue here.17 In McKeon, the court of appeals determined that ―Utah case law establishes that to pursue specific performance or damages under the . . . default clause, sellers must return the earnest money deposit before filing suit.‖18 In doing so, the court of appeals looked to one of its earlier cases, Palmer v. Hayes,19 in which the court a 2022That being so, they must be deemed to have kept it for the purpose indicated in the contract, that is, as liquidated damages.‖36 ¶25 We faced a similar factual scenario in McMullin v. Shimmin.37 In that case, the buyers entered into an agreement with the seller to purchase property, and the buyers paid a $100 earnest money deposit.38 The purchase agreement contained a default clause identical to the one at issue in Andreasen.39 The seller sued the buyers for breaching the agreement, seeking specific performance or, in the alternative, damages.40 The seller had never returned or offered to retu | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rettiggreen1 sentence2020See Rettig, 2017 UT 83, ¶¶ 52, 60 (expressing “doubts” about whether a statutory rule of procedural default would withstand scrutiny under article VIII, section 4 of the Utah Constitution but declining to reach the question because it had not been raised); Brown v. Cox, 2017 UT 3 , ¶¶ 17–18, 387 P.3d 1040 (identifying the process the legislature must follow to amend our rules). | 1 | 1 |
Skanchy v. Calcados Ortope SAgreen1 sentence2018See, e.g. , Skanchy v. Calcados Ortope SA , 952 P.2d 1071 , 1074-75 (Utah 1998) (holding that the recipient defendant bears the burden of showing that service was invalid). | 1 | 1 |
Nielsen v. Gold's Gymgreen2 sentences2017See Utah Code Ann. § 48 -2c-601 (LexisNexis 2010) (providing the general rule that “no organizer, member, manager, or employee of a [limited-liability] company is personally liable ... for a debt, obligation, or liability of the company5’). 1 Like the absence of other ancillary provisions, such as arbitration and attorney-fee clauses, the omission of a personal-liability clause does not seem to render the contract “so uncertain that there is no basis for deciding whether the agreement has been kept or broken.” Nielsen, 2003 UT 37, ¶ 12 , 78 P.3d 600 . 2017See Utah Code Ann. § 48 -2c-601 (LexisNexis 2010) (providing the general rule that “no organizer, member, manager, or employee of a [limited-liability] company is personally liable ... for a debt, obligation, or liability of the company5’). 1 Like the absence of other ancillary provisions, such as arbitration and attorney-fee clauses, the omission of a personal-liability clause does not seem to render the contract “so uncertain that there is no basis for deciding whether the agreement has been kept or broken.” Nielsen, 2003 UT 37, ¶ 12 , 78 P.3d 600 . | 1 | 1 |
Dansie v. HI COUNTRY ESTATES HOMEOWNERSgreen2 sentences2011Our case law indicates that the default rule in Utah for the maintenance of private roadways is that, "[albsent any agreement on the question of maintenance of a private way, the burden of upkeep should be distributed between dominant and ser-vient tenements in proportion to their relative use of the road, as nearly as such may be ascertained." Aspen Acres Ass'n v. Seven Assocs., Inc., 29 Utah 2d 303 , 508 P.2d 1179, 1183 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Dansie v. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n, 2004 UT App 149, ¶ 21 , 92 P.3d 162 (ordering the district court to conside 2011Our case law indicates that the default rule in Utah for the maintenance of private roadways is that, "[albsent any agreement on the question of maintenance of a private way, the burden of upkeep should be distributed between dominant and ser-vient tenements in proportion to their relative use of the road, as nearly as such may be ascertained." Aspen Acres Ass'n v. Seven Assocs., Inc., 29 Utah 2d 303 , 508 P.2d 1179, 1183 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Dansie v. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n, 2004 UT App 149, ¶ 21 , 92 P.3d 162 (ordering the district court to conside | 1 | 1 |
Management Services Corp. v. Development Associatesgreen1 sentence2011Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1980) (discussing the relevant "default" under the election of remedies provision of a standard real estate purchase contract as the party's failure to pay purchase price when due); see also Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, ¶ 11 , 990 P.2d 933 (describing default as failure to pay amounts due under an agreement); Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1179 (Utah 1993) (describing a "default" under a real estate purchase agreement as the failure to pay the price due under the contract); Imlay v. Gubler, 77 Utah 547 , 298 P. 383, 384-86 (1931) (describing a party's default | 1 | 1 |
Mahmood v. Rossgreen2 sentences2011Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1980) (discussing the relevant "default" under the election of remedies provision of a standard real estate purchase contract as the party's failure to pay purchase price when due); see also Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, ¶ 11 , 990 P.2d 933 (describing default as failure to pay amounts due under an agreement); Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1179 (Utah 1993) (describing a "default" under a real estate purchase agreement as the failure to pay the price due under the contract); Imlay v. Gubler, 77 Utah 547 , 298 P. 383, 384-86 (1931) (describing a party's default 2011Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1980) (discussing the relevant "default" under the election of remedies provision of a standard real estate purchase contract as the party's failure to pay purchase price when due); see also Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, ¶ 11 , 990 P.2d 933 (describing default as failure to pay amounts due under an agreement); Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1179 (Utah 1993) (describing a "default" under a real estate purchase agreement as the failure to pay the price due under the contract); Imlay v. Gubler, 77 Utah 547 , 298 P. 383, 384-86 (1931) (describing a party's default | 1 | 1 |
Imlay v. Gublergreen2 sentences2011Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1980) (discussing the relevant "default" under the election of remedies provision of a standard real estate purchase contract as the party's failure to pay purchase price when due); see also Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, ¶ 11 , 990 P.2d 933 (describing default as failure to pay amounts due under an agreement); Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1179 (Utah 1993) (describing a "default" under a real estate purchase agreement as the failure to pay the price due under the contract); Imlay v. Gubler, 77 Utah 547 , 298 P. 383, 384-86 (1931) (describing a party's default 2011Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1980) (discussing the relevant "default" under the election of remedies provision of a standard real estate purchase contract as the party's failure to pay purchase price when due); see also Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, ¶ 11 , 990 P.2d 933 (describing default as failure to pay amounts due under an agreement); Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1179 (Utah 1993) (describing a "default" under a real estate purchase agreement as the failure to pay the price due under the contract); Imlay v. Gubler, 77 Utah 547 , 298 P. 383, 384-86 (1931) (describing a party's default | 1 | 1 |
Timm v. Dewsnupgreen1 sentence2011Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1980) (discussing the relevant "default" under the election of remedies provision of a standard real estate purchase contract as the party's failure to pay purchase price when due); see also Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, ¶ 11 , 990 P.2d 933 (describing default as failure to pay amounts due under an agreement); Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1179 (Utah 1993) (describing a "default" under a real estate purchase agreement as the failure to pay the price due under the contract); Imlay v. Gubler, 77 Utah 547 , 298 P. 383, 384-86 (1931) (describing a party's default | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dowding v. Land Funding Limited
green
1 sentence2022Utah Caselaw Supports Our Interpretation of the Contract’s Default Provision ¶21 In dismissing Seller‘s claims, the district court relied on the court of appeals‘ decision in McKeon v. Crump, a case that examined a default clause identical to the one at issue here.17 In McKeon, the court of appeals determined that ―Utah case law establishes that to pursue specific performance or damages under the . . . default clause, sellers must return the earnest money deposit before filing suit.‖18 In doing so, the court of appeals looked to one of its earlier cases, Palmer v. Hayes,19 in which the court a | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Rocky Mountain Hospitality v. Mountain Classic
neutral
2 sentences2022Utah Caselaw Supports Our Interpretation of the Contract’s Default Provision ¶21 In dismissing Seller‘s claims, the district court relied on the court of appeals‘ decision in McKeon v. Crump, a case that examined a default clause identical to the one at issue here.17 In McKeon, the court of appeals determined that ―Utah case law establishes that to pursue specific performance or damages under the . . . default clause, sellers must return the earnest money deposit before filing suit.‖18 In doing so, the court of appeals looked to one of its earlier cases, Palmer v. Hayes,19 in which the court a 2022That being so, they must be deemed to have kept it for the purpose indicated in the contract, that is, as liquidated damages.‖36 ¶25 We faced a similar factual scenario in McMullin v. Shimmin.37 In that case, the buyers entered into an agreement with the seller to purchase property, and the buyers paid a $100 earnest money deposit.38 The purchase agreement contained a default clause identical to the one at issue in Andreasen.39 The seller sued the buyers for breaching the agreement, seeking specific performance or, in the alternative, damages.40 The seller had never returned or offered to retu | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Ellis v. La Val Enterprises
green
1 sentence2022The court determined, as an initial matter, that “the current version of the 20210546-CA 7 2022 UT App 139 Ellis v. La Val Enterprises Limited Partnership Act” applies to govern the parties’ dispute, and not the 1996 statute referenced in the Agreement. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Mind & Motion Utah Investments, LLC v. Celtic Bank Corp.
green
2 sentences2022Utah Caselaw Supports Our Interpretation of the Contract’s Default Provision ¶21 In dismissing Seller‘s claims, the district court relied on the court of appeals‘ decision in McKeon v. Crump, a case that examined a default clause identical to the one at issue here.17 In McKeon, the court of appeals determined that ―Utah case law establishes that to pursue specific performance or damages under the . . . default clause, sellers must return the earnest money deposit before filing suit.‖18 In doing so, the court of appeals looked to one of its earlier cases, Palmer v. Hayes,19 in which the court a 2022Utah Caselaw Supports Our Interpretation of the Contract’s Default Provision ¶21 In dismissing Seller‘s claims, the district court relied on the court of appeals‘ decision in McKeon v. Crump, a case that examined a default clause identical to the one at issue here.17 In McKeon, the court of appeals determined that ―Utah case law establishes that to pursue specific performance or damages under the . . . default clause, sellers must return the earnest money deposit before filing suit.‖18 In doing so, the court of appeals looked to one of its earlier cases, Palmer v. Hayes,19 in which the court a | 1 | 2022–2022 |
In re Adoption of B.B.
green
1 sentence2020The rules of the forum are applied . . . to determine whether an abandonment has taken place.” RESTATEMENT § 22 cmt. e (emphasis added); see also id. (“Under the local law of many states, a child who has attained years of discretion becomes emancipated upon being abandoned by both parents.” (emphasis added)). 18 Cite as: 2020 UT 53 Opinion of the Court ¶36 Second, comment c (the comment governing “[i]llegitimate child[ren]”) must set the default rule in this case because comment e assumes that the child at issue was born in wedlock—it presupposes that the child has taken on the domicile of his | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Brown v. Cox
green
2 sentences2020See Rettig, 2017 UT 83, ¶¶ 52, 60 (expressing “doubts” about whether a statutory rule of procedural default would withstand scrutiny under article VIII, section 4 of the Utah Constitution but declining to reach the question because it had not been raised); Brown v. Cox, 2017 UT 3 , ¶¶ 17–18, 387 P.3d 1040 (identifying the process the legislature must follow to amend our rules). 2020See Rettig, 2017 UT 83, ¶¶ 52, 60 (expressing “doubts” about whether a statutory rule of procedural default would withstand scrutiny under article VIII, section 4 of the Utah Constitution but declining to reach the question because it had not been raised); Brown v. Cox, 2017 UT 3 , ¶¶ 17–18, 387 P.3d 1040 (identifying the process the legislature must follow to amend our rules). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Intershoe, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co.
green
2 sentences2019Co. , 77 N.Y.2d 517 , 569 N.Y.S.2d 333 , 571 N.E.2d 641 , 644 (1991) (enforcing a default rule excluding extrinsic evidence when a writing appears to embody a final agreement). 2019Co. , 77 N.Y.2d 517 , 569 N.Y.S.2d 333 , 571 N.E.2d 641 , 644 (1991) (enforcing a default rule excluding extrinsic evidence when a writing appears to embody a final agreement). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
OLP, L.L.C. v. Burningham
green
2 sentences2018The Old Act allowed limited liability companies, through the articles of organization or an operating agreement, to modify the applicable default rule requiring "the affirmative vote, approval, or consent of members holding 2/3 of the profits interests in the company." Utah Code Ann. § 48 -2c-803(3)(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2010); see also id. § 48-2c-803 (setting forth the default rules for management by members "unless otherwise provided in this chapter, in the articles of organization, or an operating agreement"); OLP, LLC v. Burningham , 2008 UT App 173 , ¶ 18, 185 P.3d 1138 (noting that "the pro 2018The Old Act allowed limited liability companies, through the articles of organization or an operating agreement, to modify the applicable default rule requiring "the affirmative vote, approval, or consent of members holding 2/3 of the profits interests in the company." Utah Code Ann. § 48 -2c-803(3)(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2010); see also id. § 48-2c-803 (setting forth the default rules for management by members "unless otherwise provided in this chapter, in the articles of organization, or an operating agreement"); OLP, LLC v. Burningham , 2008 UT App 173 , ¶ 18, 185 P.3d 1138 (noting that "the pro | 1 | 2018–2018 |
OLP, LLC v. Burningham
green
2 sentences2018The Old Act allowed limited liability companies, through the articles of organization or an operating agreement, to modify the applicable default rule requiring "the affirmative vote, approval, or consent of members holding 2/3 of the profits interests in the company." Utah Code Ann. § 48 -2c-803(3)(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2010); see also id. § 48-2c-803 (setting forth the default rules for management by members "unless otherwise provided in this chapter, in the articles of organization, or an operating agreement"); OLP, LLC v. Burningham , 2008 UT App 173 , ¶ 18, 185 P.3d 1138 (noting that "the pro 2018The Old Act allowed limited liability companies, through the articles of organization or an operating agreement, to modify the applicable default rule requiring "the affirmative vote, approval, or consent of members holding 2/3 of the profits interests in the company." Utah Code Ann. § 48 -2c-803(3)(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2010); see also id. § 48-2c-803 (setting forth the default rules for management by members "unless otherwise provided in this chapter, in the articles of organization, or an operating agreement"); OLP, LLC v. Burningham , 2008 UT App 173 , ¶ 18, 185 P.3d 1138 (noting that "the pro | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Reynolds v. Bickel
green
2 sentences2017Our supreme court has explained that this “statutory language unambiguously sets forth a default rule with two exceptions: Accountants ‘are not liable to persons with whom they are not in privity of contract ... except for’ (1) cases of fraud or intentional misrepresentations or (2) cases where the accountant (a) knew the client intended the third party to rely and (b) the accountant ‘identified in writing to the client’ an intent that the plaintiff rely.” Reynolds v. Bickel, 2013 UT 32, ¶ 11 , 307 P.3d 570 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 58 -26a-602). ¶57 In Reynolds , our supreme court provided gu 2017Our supreme court has explained that this “statutory language unambiguously sets forth a default rule with two exceptions: Accountants ‘are not liable to persons with whom they are not in privity of contract ... except for’ (1) cases of fraud or intentional misrepresentations or (2) cases where the accountant (a) knew the client intended the third party to rely and (b) the accountant ‘identified in writing to the client’ an intent that the plaintiff rely.” Reynolds v. Bickel, 2013 UT 32, ¶ 11 , 307 P.3d 570 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 58 -26a-602). ¶57 In Reynolds , our supreme court provided gu | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Panos v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc.
green
1 sentence2016Because rule 4-103(2) provides that the case is dismissed without prejudice, the court of appeals resolved the apparent conflict between rules 41(b) and 4-103(2) by determining that rule 4-103(2) is the default rule and that “[i]f a trial court wishes to dismiss a case with prejudice for failure to prosecute, the trial court must expressly'indicate that dismissal is with prejudice or pursuant to Rule 41(b).” Panos, 913 P.2d at 365 . ¶14 The problem is that the Panos interpretation of rule 41(b) and rule 4-103 reverses the presumption contained in the plain language of rule 41(b). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Monarrez v. Utah Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences2016WE DECLINE TO APPLY OUR DECISION ONLY PROSPECTIVELY ¶15 The general rule of retroactivity in a civil case is that “the ruling of a feourt *975 is deemed to state the true nature of the law both retrospectively and prospectively.” Monarrez v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 2016 UT 10, ¶ 28 , 368 P.3d 846 (citation omitted). 4 However, we will deviate from the default rule of retroactivity and apply our decision prospectively only when two requirements are met. 2016WE DECLINE TO APPLY OUR DECISION ONLY PROSPECTIVELY ¶15 The general rule of retroactivity in a civil case is that “the ruling of a feourt *975 is deemed to state the true nature of the law both retrospectively and prospectively.” Monarrez v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 2016 UT 10, ¶ 28 , 368 P.3d 846 (citation omitted). 4 However, we will deviate from the default rule of retroactivity and apply our decision prospectively only when two requirements are met. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Central Utah Water Conservancy District v. King
green
2 sentences2014Id. 1 26 ("Under rule 7(£)(2), if neither of the two exceptions to the default rule is present, the prevailing party has fifteen days [from the date of the court's decision] in which to submit a proposed order."). 185 The option of submitting a proposed order with "an initial memorandum" therefore cannot take place after the district court has ruled on the underlying matter. 2014Utah Water Conservancy Dist. v. King, 2013 UT 13, ¶ 26 , 297 P.3d 619 ("[I)f neither of the two exceptions to the default rule is present, the prevailing party has fifteen days in which to submit a proposed order.")). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Butler v. Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
green
1 sentence2014This not only allows the district court and the parties to know whether the default rule 7(f)(2) procedure is necessary, but it also prevents the possibility that a party will fail to realize that a proposed order submitted with a subsequent memorandum triggered the time to appeal a previous ruling (which is precisely what happened in this case under the dissent’s interpretation of rule 7(f)(2)). 14 Cite as: 2014 UT 41 Opinion of the Court ¶37 The dissent also asserts that our construction of interplay between rules 7(f) and 54(b) “undermines the doctrine of merger.” See infra ¶¶ 45–55. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Associated General Contractors v. Board of Oil, Gas & Mining
green
2 sentences2013Here, our analysis is complicated by the statute’s silence with respect to the default standard of review. ¶ 22 In Associated General Contractors v. Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112 , 38 P.3d 291 , the Utah Supreme Court considered a similar issue. 2013Here, our analysis is complicated by the statute’s silence with respect to the default standard of review. ¶ 22 In Associated General Contractors v. Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112 , 38 P.3d 291 , the Utah Supreme Court considered a similar issue. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.