27 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1976–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Anthony Hooks v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2019E.g., id. at 437 ; Hooks v. United States, 208 A.3d 741, 746 (D.C. 2019). 2019E.g., id. at 437 ; Hooks v. United States, 208 A.3d 741, 746 (D.C. 2019). | 3 | 3 |
Green v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2024Accordingly, although “we examine all . . . factors individually and collectively,” Green v. United States, 662 A.2d 1388, 1390 (D.C. 1995), “because the circumstances would likely fall short of constituting reasonable suspicion in the absence of” some sort of suspicious movement, we turn to Mr. Champion’s act of turning while taking off his jacket “first in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.” Jackson, 56 A.3d at 1210 . 2010Notwithstanding our skepticism about the utility of "case matching” under a totality of the circumstances analysis, Umanzor, 803 A.2d at 992 , we note that here the bulge that the officer observed was not present in the otherwise similar situation in In re R.M.C., 719 A.2d 491, 496 (D.C.1998), where we held that there was no reasonable articulable suspicion where suspect was walking "very close to other people," acted nervously, clutched or protected one of his sides, but officer had not received report of criminal activity and "saw no bulge on the suspect” "indicating the possibility of a wea | 2 | 2 |
Missouri v. McNeelygreen2 sentences2024See Glover, 589 U.S. at 386 (explaining that a totality of the circumstances analysis “takes into account . . . the whole picture”); cf. McNeely, 569 U.S. at 158 (describing Wardlow as an example of a “fact-intensive, totality of the circumstances analys[is,] rather than” the application of “categorical rules”). 2022Our decision in this case is consistent with precedent, both from this court and the Supreme Court, reaffirming post-Wardlow “the fact intensive and context-dependent nature of the reasonable suspicion analysis.” Miles, 181 A.3d at 641 (citing Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 158 (2013); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002)); see also In re D.A.D., 763 A.2d 1152 , 1155–56 (D.C. 2000) (examining flight and location of where police were responding to reports of shooting, in conjunction with other facts, in assessing reasonable, articul | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Draytongreen2 sentences2007See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206-07 , 122 S.Ct. 2105 , 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (Court has rejected “the suggestion that police officers must always inform citizens of their right to refuse when seeking permission to conduct a warrantless consent search”; “the Court has repeated that the totality of the circumstances must control, without giving extra weight to the absence of this type of warning”). 2007See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206-07 , 122 S.Ct. 2105 , 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (Court has rejected “the suggestion that police officers must always inform citizens of their right to refuse when seeking permission to conduct a warrantless consent search”; “the Court has repeated that the totality of the circumstances must control, without giving extra weight to the absence of this type of warning”). | 2 | 2 |
Matter of WBWgreen2 sentences2000This analysis "includes evaluation of the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights." Fare, 442 U.S. at 725 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 (citing Butler, supra, 441 U.S. at 373 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 ); see also In re W.B.W., 397 A.2d 143, 145 (D.C.1979); F.D.P., supra, 352 A.2d at 380 . 2000Essentially, in C.L.W., in upholding the determination that the youth knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain silent and to counsel, the court engaged in a totality of the circumstances analysis, consistent with the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Fare, supra. This analysis “includes evaluation of the juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.” Fare, 442 U.S. at 725 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 (citing Butler, | 2 | 2 |
Fare v. Michael C.green2 sentences2015Likewise, “the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis still applies in determining the validity of the waiver and the voluntariness of the statement even though the interrogation involves a juvenile.” In re M.A.C., 761 A.2d 32, 36 (D.C.2000) (citing Fare, 442 U.S. at 725 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 ). ‘“[A]dmis-sions and confessions of juveniles require special caution,’ ” but even with juveniles, “rather than giving overriding importance to any one factor, the court must consider the totality of circumstances surrounding the confession.” See D.A.S., 391 A.2d at 258 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45 , 2015Likewise, “the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis still applies in determining the validity of the waiver and the voluntariness of the statement even though the interrogation involves a juvenile.” In re M.A.C., 761 A.2d 32, 36 (D.C.2000) (citing Fare, 442 U.S. at 725 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 ). ‘“[A]dmis-sions and confessions of juveniles require special caution,’ ” but even with juveniles, “rather than giving overriding importance to any one factor, the court must consider the totality of circumstances surrounding the confession.” See D.A.S., 391 A.2d at 258 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45 , | 1 | 3 |
Umanzor v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2024Further, “although it was dark”—a consideration that often supports reasonable suspicion in a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis— 6:10 p.m. was “not an unusual hour for citizens of this city to be walking the streets.” Compare Curtis v. United States, 349 A.2d 469, 471-72 (D.C. 1975) (making this observation about 7:20 p.m.), with Umanzor v. United States, 803 A.2d 983, 994 (D.C. 2002) (observing that a stop made at 2:45 a.m. was a factor in support of reasonable suspicion). 2010Notwithstanding our skepticism about the utility of "case matching” under a totality of the circumstances analysis, Umanzor, 803 A.2d at 992 , we note that here the bulge that the officer observed was not present in the otherwise similar situation in In re R.M.C., 719 A.2d 491, 496 (D.C.1998), where we held that there was no reasonable articulable suspicion where suspect was walking "very close to other people," acted nervously, clutched or protected one of his sides, but officer had not received report of criminal activity and "saw no bulge on the suspect” "indicating the possibility of a wea | 1 | 2 |
Lewis v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2025See id. (stating generally that “intoxication affects only the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Cordarrell Wilsongreen1 sentence2024Many of the decisions cited by the government and the dissent either fail to apply a totality of the circumstances analysis and conclude defendants’ flight contributed to reasonable suspicion simply because the defendants fled officers in a “high-crime area,” United States v. Wilson, 963 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2020) (concluding, without further analysis, that the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion because of defendant’s “unprovoked, headlong flight from police in a high-crime area”); United States v. Ward, 482 F. App’x 771, 773 (4th Cir. 2012) (concluding, without more, that “office | 1 | 1 |
Perry v. Leekegreen1 sentence2024Indeed, there is every indication that the Second Circuit would not, given its acknowledgement that where a trial court in fact prevents a defendant from speaking with their attorney during an overnight recess, the order violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights, “defies harmless error analysis[,] and requires automatic reversal.” 487 F.3d at 131 . 17 without any showing of prejudice” under the test for plain error) 3; Jackson, 420 A.2d at 1205 (concluding that, having established a Geders violation, an “appellant’s conviction must be set aside regardless of whether prejudice was demonstra | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2024The Court took note of the fact that the officers in that case were part of a caravan “converging on an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking,” and “expected to find a crowd of people in the area, including lookouts and customers,” when they saw an individual in that area “standing next to” 4035 West Van Buren holding an opaque bag who “looked in the direction of the officers and fled.” 12 Id. at 121-22 , see also id. at 124-25 . 12 The dissent highlights this court’s observation in Wilson v. United States that Mr. Wardlow’s possession of an opaque bag “played no part in the [Supreme] Cou | 1 | 1 |
James v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2024While Officer Akhtar’s past experience is relevant, James v. United States, 829 A.2d 963, 968 (D.C. 2003), his suspicions regarding Mr. Champion were “too generalized” to provide reasonable, articulable, particularized suspicion that Mr. Champion was armed and dangerous. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Christopher Wardgreen1 sentence2024Many of the decisions cited by the government and the dissent either fail to apply a totality of the circumstances analysis and conclude defendants’ flight contributed to reasonable suspicion simply because the defendants fled officers in a “high-crime area,” United States v. Wilson, 963 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2020) (concluding, without further analysis, that the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion because of defendant’s “unprovoked, headlong flight from police in a high-crime area”); United States v. Ward, 482 F. App’x 771, 773 (4th Cir. 2012) (concluding, without more, that “office | 1 | 1 |
| Jackson v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Curtis v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lawgreen | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Dominic Jetergreen1 sentence2024Many of the decisions cited by the government and the dissent either fail to apply a totality of the circumstances analysis and conclude defendants’ flight contributed to reasonable suspicion simply because the defendants fled officers in a “high-crime area,” United States v. Wilson, 963 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2020) (concluding, without further analysis, that the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion because of defendant’s “unprovoked, headlong flight from police in a high-crime area”); United States v. Ward, 482 F. App’x 771, 773 (4th Cir. 2012) (concluding, without more, that “office | 1 | 1 |
Kansas v. Glovergreen2 sentences2024We clarify that the focus in a Terry analysis should be on the relevant, nonconclusory details about crime in the location in which a stop is conducted and hold that the weight to be given to such information will turn on its quality and specificity. 18 See Glover, 589 U.S. at 386 (explaining that under a totality of the circumstances analysis “the presence of additional facts might dispel reasonable suspicion”). 52 There is no question that locational evidence about criminal activity presented by the government can be a relevant consideration in a Terry analysis. 2024See Glover, 589 U.S. at 386 (explaining that a totality of the circumstances analysis “takes into account . . . the whole picture”); cf. McNeely, 569 U.S. at 158 (describing Wardlow as an example of a “fact-intensive, totality of the circumstances analys[is,] rather than” the application of “categorical rules”). | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Arvizugreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re DADgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Turnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re TLLgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Donaldson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re MACgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Powell v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re RMCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Clyde A. Charles v. Larry Smith, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, and William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General State of Louisianagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Florida v. Bostick
green
2 sentences2019E.g., id. at 437 ; Hooks v. United States, 208 A.3d 741, 746 (D.C. 2019). 2019E.g., id. at 437 ; Hooks v. United States, 208 A.3d 741, 746 (D.C. 2019). | 3 | 2019–2019 |
Illinois v. Gates
green
2 sentences2007The court did state that the verification of innocent details was “not enough for a Terry stop” in Florida v. J.L., but it was enough in this case because the informant here was not anonymous and because “in this case we have more.” II Appellant contends that the trial court improperly applied the totality of the circumstances test, see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), in denying his motion to suppress evidence because the court failed to consider the credibility and basis of the informant’s asserted knowledge of appellant’s illegal activities. 2007The court did state that the verification of innocent details was “not enough for a Terry stop” in Florida v. J.L., but it was enough in this case because the informant here was not anonymous and because “in this case we have more.” II Appellant contends that the trial court improperly applied the totality of the circumstances test, see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), in denying his motion to suppress evidence because the court failed to consider the credibility and basis of the informant’s asserted knowledge of appellant’s illegal activities. | 3 | 1984–2007 |
Matter of FDP
green
2 sentences2000Essentially, in C.L.W., in upholding the determination that the youth knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain silent and to counsel, the court engaged in a totality of the circumstances analysis, consistent with the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Fare, supra. This analysis “includes evaluation of the juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.” Fare, 442 U.S. at 725 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 (citing Butler, 2000Essentially, in C.L.W., in upholding the determination that the youth knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain silent and to counsel, the court engaged in a totality of the circumstances analysis, consistent with the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Fare, supra. This analysis “includes evaluation of the juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.” Fare, 442 U.S. at 725 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 (citing Butler, | 2 | 2000–2000 |
North Carolina v. Butler
red
2 sentences2000Essentially, in C.L.W., in upholding the determination that the youth knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain silent and to counsel, the court engaged in a totality of the circumstances analysis, consistent with the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Fare, supra. This analysis “includes evaluation of the juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.” Fare, 442 U.S. at 725 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 (citing Butler, 2000Essentially, in C.L.W., in upholding the determination that the youth knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain silent and to counsel, the court engaged in a totality of the circumstances analysis, consistent with the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Fare, supra. This analysis “includes evaluation of the juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.” Fare, 442 U.S. at 725 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 (citing Butler, | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Chambers v. Florida
green
2 sentences1976Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 , 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 , 60 S.Ct. 472 , 84 L.Ed. 716 (1940). [5] Section 16-2311 provides: (a) A person taking a child into custody shall with all reasonable speed (1) release the child to his parent, guardian, or custodian upon a promise to bring the child before the Division when requested by the Division, unless the child's placement in detention or shelter care appears required as provided in section 16-2310; [or] (2) bring the child befo 1976Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 , 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 , 60 S.Ct. 472 , 84 L.Ed. 716 (1940). [5] Section 16-2311 provides: (a) A person taking a child into custody shall with all reasonable speed (1) release the child to his parent, guardian, or custodian upon a promise to bring the child before the Division when requested by the Division, unless the child's placement in detention or shelter care appears required as provided in section 16-2310; [or] (2) bring the child befo | 2 | 1976–1976 |
Jackson v. Denno
green
2 sentences1976Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 , 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 , 60 S.Ct. 472 , 84 L.Ed. 716 (1940). [5] Section 16-2311 provides: (a) A person taking a child into custody shall with all reasonable speed (1) release the child to his parent, guardian, or custodian upon a promise to bring the child before the Division when requested by the Division, unless the child's placement in detention or shelter care appears required as provided in section 16-2310; [or] (2) bring the child befo 1976Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 , 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 , 60 S.Ct. 472 , 84 L.Ed. 716 (1940). [5] Section 16-2311 provides: (a) A person taking a child into custody shall with all reasonable speed (1) release the child to his parent, guardian, or custodian upon a promise to bring the child before the Division when requested by the Division, unless the child's placement in detention or shelter care appears required as provided in section 16-2310; [or] (2) bring the child befo | 2 | 1976–1976 |
Lego v. Twomey
green
2 sentences1976Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 , 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 , 60 S.Ct. 472 , 84 L.Ed. 716 (1940). [5] Section 16-2311 provides: (a) A person taking a child into custody shall with all reasonable speed (1) release the child to his parent, guardian, or custodian upon a promise to bring the child before the Division when requested by the Division, unless the child's placement in detention or shelter care appears required as provided in section 16-2310; [or] (2) bring the child befo 1976Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 , 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 , 60 S.Ct. 472 , 84 L.Ed. 716 (1940). [5] Section 16-2311 provides: (a) A person taking a child into custody shall with all reasonable speed (1) release the child to his parent, guardian, or custodian upon a promise to bring the child before the Division when requested by the Division, unless the child's placement in detention or shelter care appears required as provided in section 16-2310; [or] (2) bring the child befo | 2 | 1976–1976 |
Tursio v. United States
green
1 sentence2026See Harris v. United States, 260 A.3d 663 , 676 (D.C. 2021); Smith, 966 A.2d at 378 ; Tursio v. United States, 634 A.2d 1205 , 1211-12 (D.C. 1993). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Smith v. United States
green
1 sentence2026See Harris v. United States, 260 A.3d 663 , 676 (D.C. 2021); Smith, 966 A.2d at 378 ; Tursio v. United States, 634 A.2d 1205 , 1211-12 (D.C. 1993). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Singleton v. United States
green
1 sentence2026Similarly, we defer to the court’s credibility findings on this point because neither Mr. Williams nor our review of the record identifies any potential “clear error.” See Stringer, 301 A.3d at 1228. 15 analysis and held that, along with other suspicious behavior, the “combination of facts” gave the police reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk the appellant. 998 A.2d at 302 ; but cf. Golden, 248 A.3d at 943, 946 (holding that an alleged bulge on the defendant’s hip had little weight in the totality of the circumstances analysis because the testifying officer “did not link the nondescript bulg | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Kywone D. Pelzer v. United States
green
1 sentence2025The majority also dismisses Ms. Austin’s apparent admission that in her anger, she jumped to conclusions and wrongly accused her nephew of being the person who fired the shots that she heard: Ms. Austin testified that “things shouldn’t have went the way they went,” that her “nephew is a good guy” and had “never done anything to harm” her, and that “I think I spoke too fast and I reacted too fast.” 20 As we explained in Pelzer, evidence that a statement proffered as an excited utterance was inaccurate weighs against its admission under this exception under a totality of the circumstances analys | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Everett Miles v. United States
green
2 sentences2024“There are myriad reasons an innocent person might run away from the police.” Miles, 181 A.3d at 641 . “[A]n individual may be motivated to avoid the police by a natural fear or dislike of authority, a distaste for police officers based upon past experience, a[] . . . fear of police brutality or harassment, a fear of being apprehended as the guilty party, or other legitimate personal reasons.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 2024“There are myriad reasons an innocent person might run away from the police.” Miles, 181 A.3d at 641 . “[A]n individual may be motivated to avoid the police by a natural fear or dislike of authority, a distaste for police officers based upon past experience, a[] . . . fear of police brutality or harassment, a fear of being apprehended as the guilty party, or other legitimate personal reasons.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Illinois v. Wardlow
green
2 sentences2024Instead, the Court reaffirmed that “the determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior,” and conducted a totality of the circumstances analysis to discern if police had “reasonable, particularized suspicion” that Mr. Wardlow was “committing a crime” considering the “relevant contextual considerations.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124-25 . 2024Although the Court upheld the constitutionality of the stop, it declined to adopt a rule that flight alone would provide reasonable articulable suspicion and reaffirmed a totality of the circumstances analysis. 528 U.S. at 124-25 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., Frederick W. McCarthy Charles B. Spadoni, Lisa A. Thiesfield, Ben F. Andrews
green
1 sentence2024Indeed, there is every indication that the Second Circuit would not, given its acknowledgement that where a trial court in fact prevents a defendant from speaking with their attorney during an overnight recess, the order violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights, “defies harmless error analysis[,] and requires automatic reversal.” 487 F.3d at 131 . 17 without any showing of prejudice” under the test for plain error) 3; Jackson, 420 A.2d at 1205 (concluding that, having established a Geders violation, an “appellant’s conviction must be set aside regardless of whether prejudice was demonstra | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Jackson v. United States
green
1 sentence2024Accordingly, although “we examine all . . . factors individually and collectively,” Green v. United States, 662 A.2d 1388, 1390 (D.C. 1995), “because the circumstances would likely fall short of constituting reasonable suspicion in the absence of” some sort of suspicious movement, we turn to Mr. Champion’s act of turning while taking off his jacket “first in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.” Jackson, 56 A.3d at 1210 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Prado Navarette v. California green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| In Re GAULT green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Matter of DAS green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Di Giovanni v. United States green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.