totality of the circumstances test in Rhode Island

2026Rather, these considerations are better understood “in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has guided probable-cause determinations: a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability.” Id. at 233.

2021Rather, the controlling criteria involve a totality of the circumstances test: “The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the - 23 - circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).

2012“It is well settled that, under the totality-of-the-circumstances test, ‘an informant’s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge remain highly relevant.’” State v. King, 693 A.2d 658, 661 (R.I.1997) (quoting State v. Ricci, 472 A.2d 291, 295 (R.I.1984)).

1997It is well settled that, under the totality-of-the-circumstances test, “an informant’s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge remain ‘highly relevant.’ ” Ricci 472 A.2d at 295 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230 , 103 S.Ct. at 2327 , 76 L.Ed.2d at 542 ).

1999We have observed that “the totality-of-the-circumstances test requires consideration of all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation of a juvenile suspect, including the juvenile’s age, experience, education, and intelligence, his or her capacity to understand the Miranda warnings and the consequences of waiver, and the presence of a parent, a guardian, or an interested adult.” Campbell, 691 A.2d at 567 (citing In re Kean, 520 A.2d at 1274-75 ).

1997In Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25 , 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2571-72 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197, 212 (1979), the United States Supreme Court observed that the “determination whether statements obtained during custodial interrogation are admissible against the accused is to be made upon an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation,” and went on to hold that the “totality-of-the-circumstances approach is adequate to determine whether there has been a waiver even where interrogation of juveniles is involved.” This Court first adopted the totality-of-the-circumstances test

1995We recognized this totality-of-the-circumstances test in State v. Pacheco, 481 A.2d 1009, 1020-21 (R.I.1984), in which we dealt to some extent with the reliability of an informant.

1989I THE VALIDITY OF THE SEARCH WARRANT The defendant contends in substance that the affidavit of Detective Mullen did not meet the totality of the circumstances test as set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), as that case has been interpreted by this court in State v. Ricci, 472 A.2d 291 (R.I.1984), and later considered in State v. Pacheco, 481 A.2d 1009 (R.I.1984).

2024See Tavarez, 572 A.2d at 278 (adopting the holding expounded by the United States Supreme Court in Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417 , which held that Terry stops should be subject to a totality review).

1998On the record before us, we discern more than sufficient evidence under the totality of the circumstances test enunciated in State v. Tavarez, 572 A.2d 276, 278 (R.I.1990), to support the trial justice’s finding that detective Lynch’s stop and pat-down frisk of the defendant was justified by reasonable and articulable suspicion.

2024See Tavarez, 572 A.2d at 278 (adopting the holding expounded by the United States Supreme Court in Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417 , which held that Terry stops should be subject to a totality review).

2023See id. at 273 (holding that a court making a reasonable suspicion determination “must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing”) (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18 ).

1997In Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25 , 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2571-72 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197, 212 (1979), the United States Supreme Court observed that the “determination whether statements obtained during custodial interrogation are admissible against the accused is to be made upon an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation,” and went on to hold that the “totality-of-the-circumstances approach is adequate to determine whether there has been a waiver even where interrogation of juveniles is involved.” This Court first adopted the totality-of-the-circumstances test

1997In Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25 , 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2571-72 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197, 212 (1979), the United States Supreme Court observed that the “determination whether statements obtained during custodial interrogation are admissible against the accused is to be made upon an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation,” and went on to hold that the “totality-of-the-circumstances approach is adequate to determine whether there has been a waiver even where interrogation of juveniles is involved.” This Court first adopted the totality-of-the-circumstances test

2011There, this Court observed: “the totality-of-the-circumstances test requires consideration of all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation of a juvenile suspect, including the juvenile’s age, experience, education, and intelligence, his or her capacity to understand the Miranda warnings and the consequences of waiver, and the presence of a parent, a guardian, or an interested adult.” Id. (quoting State v. Campbell 691 A.2d 564, 567 (R.I.1997)).

2003We previously have observed that: “the totality-of-the-circumstances test requires consideration of all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation of a juvenile suspect, including the juvenile’s age, experience, education, and intelligence, his or her capacity to understand the Miranda warnings and the consequences of waiver, and the presence of a parent, a guardian, or an interested adult.” Id. (quoting Camp bell, 691 A.2d at 567 ).

2012“It is well settled that, under the totality-of-the-circumstances test, ‘an informant’s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge remain highly relevant.’” State v. King, 693 A.2d 658, 661 (R.I.1997) (quoting State v. Ricci, 472 A.2d 291, 295 (R.I.1984)).

2007A reviewing court must be cognizant that the issuing judge "applies the totality-of-the-circumstances test and makes a `practical commonsense' evaluation about whether all the facts and circumstances set forth in a particular affidavit, together with all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, establish `a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.'" *Page 5 State v. King , 693 A.2d 658 , 661 (R.I. 1997) (quoting Gates , 462 U.S. at 238 ). "[T]he trial justice should give great deference to the issuing magistrate's determination if i

2011There, this Court observed: “the totality-of-the-circumstances test requires consideration of all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation of a juvenile suspect, including the juvenile’s age, experience, education, and intelligence, his or her capacity to understand the Miranda warnings and the consequences of waiver, and the presence of a parent, a guardian, or an interested adult.” Id. (quoting State v. Campbell 691 A.2d 564, 567 (R.I.1997)).

2007State v. Kryla, 742 A.2d 1178, 1184 (R.I.1999); see also In re Kean, 520 A.2d 1271, 1276 (R.I.1987) (declaring that the voluntariness of a juvenile’s confession is measured by the standard applicable to adult defendants).

2026“Besides evidence of police coercion or intimidation, the totality-of-the-circumstances test * * * require[s] consideration of any evidence that law enforcement officers’ fraud, deceit, trickery or misrepresentation prompted defendant’s acquiescence to the search.” United States v. Vanvliet, 542 F.3d 259, 264 (1st Cir. 2008).

2026Indeed, “the Fourth Amendment may be violated when consent is obtained through a law enforcement officer’s false claim of authority * * *.” Pagán-González v. Moreno, 919 F.3d 582, 596 (1st Cir. 2019).

2023See id. at 273 (holding that a court making a reasonable suspicion determination “must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing”) (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18 ).

2016See id. at 230-31, 233 .

2010Standard of Review and Analytical Process When ruling on a motion to suppress a confession, the trial justice should “admit a confession or a statement against a defendant only if the state can first prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his [or her] constitutional rights expressed in Miranda v. Arizona [ 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)].” State v. Bido, 941 A.2d 822, 835 (R.I.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Taoussi, 973 A.2d 1142, 1146 (R.I.2009); State v. Dennis, 893 A.2d 250

2010Standard of Review and Analytical Process When ruling on a motion to suppress a confession, the trial justice should “admit a confession or a statement against a defendant only if the state can first prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his [or her] constitutional rights expressed in Miranda v. Arizona [ 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)].” State v. Bido, 941 A.2d 822, 835 (R.I.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Taoussi, 973 A.2d 1142, 1146 (R.I.2009); State v. Dennis, 893 A.2d 250

2010Standard of Review and Analytical Process When ruling on a motion to suppress a confession, the trial justice should “admit a confession or a statement against a defendant only if the state can first prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his [or her] constitutional rights expressed in Miranda v. Arizona [ 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)].” State v. Bido, 941 A.2d 822, 835 (R.I.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Taoussi, 973 A.2d 1142, 1146 (R.I.2009); State v. Dennis, 893 A.2d 250

2010Standard of Review and Analytical Process When ruling on a motion to suppress a confession, the trial justice should “admit a confession or a statement against a defendant only if the state can first prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his [or her] constitutional rights expressed in Miranda v. Arizona [ 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)].” State v. Bido, 941 A.2d 822, 835 (R.I.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Taoussi, 973 A.2d 1142, 1146 (R.I.2009); State v. Dennis, 893 A.2d 250

2010Standard of Review and Analytical Process When ruling on a motion to suppress a confession, the trial justice should “admit a confession or a statement against a defendant only if the state can first prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his [or her] constitutional rights expressed in Miranda v. Arizona [ 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)].” State v. Bido, 941 A.2d 822, 835 (R.I.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Taoussi, 973 A.2d 1142, 1146 (R.I.2009); State v. Dennis, 893 A.2d 250

2010Standard of Review and Analytical Process When ruling on a motion to suppress a confession, the trial justice should “admit a confession or a statement against a defendant only if the state can first prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his [or her] constitutional rights expressed in Miranda v. Arizona [ 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)].” State v. Bido, 941 A.2d 822, 835 (R.I.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Taoussi, 973 A.2d 1142, 1146 (R.I.2009); State v. Dennis, 893 A.2d 250

2010Standard of Review and Analytical Process When ruling on a motion to suppress a confession, the trial justice should “admit a confession or a statement against a defendant only if the state can first prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his [or her] constitutional rights expressed in Miranda v. Arizona [ 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)].” State v. Bido, 941 A.2d 822, 835 (R.I.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Taoussi, 973 A.2d 1142, 1146 (R.I.2009); State v. Dennis, 893 A.2d 250

2005State v. Rodriguez, 822 A.2d 894, 900 (R.I.2003).

2003Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 237 , 108 S.Ct. at 550 , 98 L.Ed.2d at 577 ; see also Early, 537 U.S. at -, 123 S.Ct. at 365 , 154 L.Ed.2d at 270 .

2003Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 237 , 108 S.Ct. at 550 , 98 L.Ed.2d at 577 ; see also Early, 537 U.S. at -, 123 S.Ct. at 365 , 154 L.Ed.2d at 270 .