totality of the circumstances test in Maryland

2026In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983), the Supreme Court of the United States held that the totality of the circumstances test applies for determining probable cause for issuance of a search warrant.

2026In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983), the Supreme Court of the United States adopted the totality of the circumstances test for determining probable cause for issuance of a search warrant.

2002See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at ___ , 122 S.Ct. at 753 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 ; Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 , 120 S.Ct. at 677 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 . *1096 In Arvizu , the Supreme Court also discussed the application of the totality of the circumstances test to otherwise "innocent" conduct, stating: "We think that the approach taken by the Court of Appeals here departs sharply from the teachings of these cases.

2002See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at ___ , 122 S.Ct. at 753 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 ; Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 , 120 S.Ct. at 677 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 . *1096 In Arvizu , the Supreme Court also discussed the application of the totality of the circumstances test to otherwise "innocent" conduct, stating: "We think that the approach taken by the Court of Appeals here departs sharply from the teachings of these cases.

2025When evaluating the reasonableness of the government intrusion against the personal security of the individual, we conduct “a totality of the circumstances analysis, 10 based on the unique facts and circumstances of each case.” McDonnell, 484 Md. at 80 (citing Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 150 (2013)).

2023See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 150 (2013).

2022However, a court may give greater or lesser weight to the innocent reasons for flight based on where the incident occurs, because “[i]t is settled that the nature of the area is a factor in assessing reasonable suspicion.” Holt v. State, 435 Md. 443, 466 , 78 A.3d 415, 428 (2013) (cleaned up).

2022However, a court may give greater or lesser weight to the innocent reasons for flight based on where the incident occurs, because “[i]t is settled that the nature of the area is a factor in assessing reasonable suspicion.” Holt v. State, 435 Md. 443, 466 , 78 A.3d 415, 428 (2013) (cleaned up).

2026In United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981), the Supreme Court explained that the totality of the circumstances test contains two interdependent analytical techniques: The idea that an assessment of the whole picture must yield a particularized suspicion contains two elements, each of which must be present before a stop is permissible.

2010Because the degree of certainty required to support an investigative stop is less than that necessary to establish probable cause, see, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 421-22 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981), it is clear that the presence of a substantial amount of currency is a factor to be weighed in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis here. ....

2019In Potts v. State , 300 Md. 567 , 479 A.2d 1335 (1984), the Court of Appeals determined that the totality of the circumstances analysis set forth in Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), and Massachusetts v. Upton , 466 U.S. 727 , 104 S.Ct. 2085 , 80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984), was, under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 26, the appropriate standard of review of a probable cause determination.

2019In Potts v. State , 300 Md. 567 , 479 A.2d 1335 (1984), the Court of Appeals determined that the totality of the circumstances analysis set forth in Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), and Massachusetts v. Upton , 466 U.S. 727 , 104 S.Ct. 2085 , 80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984), was, under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 26, the appropriate standard of review of a probable cause determination.

2011After quoting from this Court’s opinions in McIntyre v. State, 309 Md. 607 , 526 A.2d 30 (1987) and Jones v. State, 311 Md. 398 , 535 A.2d 471 (1988), the Court of Special Appeals ultimately concluded: In the final analysis, Maryland law currently recognizes that lack of parental involvement is but one factor to be considered in a totality of the circumstances analysis---- In sum, we agree with the trial court that the delay in permitting [Petitioner] to call his mother was permissible under the circumstances, as the efforts to obtain and execute a search warrant for her home were ongoing.

2011After quoting from this Court’s opinions in McIntyre v. State, 309 Md. 607 , 526 A.2d 30 (1987) and Jones v. State, 311 Md. 398 , 535 A.2d 471 (1988), the Court of Special Appeals ultimately concluded: In the final analysis, Maryland law currently recognizes that lack of parental involvement is but one factor to be considered in a totality of the circumstances analysis---- In sum, we agree with the trial court that the delay in permitting [Petitioner] to call his mother was permissible under the circumstances, as the efforts to obtain and execute a search warrant for her home were ongoing.

2026Although we extend great deference to the trial court’s findings of fact on a motion to suppress, we review the trial court’s “legal conclusions de novo, - 14 - making our own independent constitutional evaluation as to whether the officer’s encounter with the defendant was lawful.” Id. at 362 , 174 A.3d at 333 (citing Ferris, 355 Md. at 368 , 735 A.2d at 497 ). “[O]ur plenary review of the record for error requires application of the facts under a totality of the circumstances analysis.” Id. at 363 , 174 A.3d at 333 .

2026Although we extend great deference to the trial court’s findings of fact on a motion to suppress, we review the trial court’s “legal conclusions de novo, - 14 - making our own independent constitutional evaluation as to whether the officer’s encounter with the defendant was lawful.” Id. at 362 , 174 A.3d at 333 (citing Ferris, 355 Md. at 368 , 735 A.2d at 497 ). “[O]ur plenary review of the record for error requires application of the facts under a totality of the circumstances analysis.” Id. at 363 , 174 A.3d at 333 .

2002See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at ___ , 122 S.Ct. at 753 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 ; Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 , 120 S.Ct. at 677 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 . *1096 In Arvizu , the Supreme Court also discussed the application of the totality of the circumstances test to otherwise "innocent" conduct, stating: "We think that the approach taken by the Court of Appeals here departs sharply from the teachings of these cases.

2002See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at ___ , 122 S.Ct. at 753 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 ; Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 , 120 S.Ct. at 677 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 . *1096 In Arvizu , the Supreme Court also discussed the application of the totality of the circumstances test to otherwise "innocent" conduct, stating: "We think that the approach taken by the Court of Appeals here departs sharply from the teachings of these cases.

2011See Williams v. State, 375 Md. 404, 429 , 825 A.2d 1078, 1092 (2003); see also Hof v. State, 337 Md. 581, 596-97 , 655 A.2d 370, 377-78 (1995) (listing additional factors to be considered). *1201 Although a totality of the circumstances analysis is standard practice for determining whether an accused's statement to the police was voluntarily made, not all of the factors that bear on voluntariness are of equal weight; certain factors are "transcendent and decisive." Williams, 375 Md. at 429 , 825 A.2d at 1092 .

2011See Williams v. State, 375 Md. 404, 429 , 825 A.2d 1078, 1092 (2003); see also Hof v. State, 337 Md. 581, 596-97 , 655 A.2d 370, 377-78 (1995) (listing additional factors to be considered). *1201 Although a totality of the circumstances analysis is standard practice for determining whether an accused's statement to the police was voluntarily made, not all of the factors that bear on voluntariness are of equal weight; certain factors are "transcendent and decisive." Williams, 375 Md. at 429 , 825 A.2d at 1092 .

2026Rather than confine its analysis to those factors, the Supreme Court applied the totality-of-the-circumstances framework from Whitfield v. State, 287 Md. 124, 141 (1980), to affirm—notwithstanding the suppression court’s failure to follow the same “formula.” Thomas, 429 Md. at 259-62. 5 “affirm the circuit court’s judgment ‘on any ground adequately shown by the record, even one upon which the circuit court has not relied or one that the parties have not raised.’”) (quoting Monarc Constr., Inc. v. Aris Corp., 188 Md. App. 377, 385 (2009)); Simpson v. State, 121 Md. App. 263, 276 (1998) (citatio

2026Rather than confine its analysis to those factors, the Supreme Court applied the totality-of-the-circumstances framework from Whitfield v. State, 287 Md. 124, 141 (1980), to affirm—notwithstanding the suppression court’s failure to follow the same “formula.” Thomas, 429 Md. at 259-62. 5 “affirm the circuit court’s judgment ‘on any ground adequately shown by the record, even one upon which the circuit court has not relied or one that the parties have not raised.’”) (quoting Monarc Constr., Inc. v. Aris Corp., 188 Md. App. 377, 385 (2009)); Simpson v. State, 121 Md. App. 263, 276 (1998) (citatio

2026Even outside the Terry context, the Supreme Court has recognized that “a gun is an article that is typically and characteristically dangerous . . . and the law reasonably may presume that such an article is always dangerous[.]” McLaughlin v. United States, 476 U.S. 16, 17 (1986); see also Brooks v. State, 314 Md. 585, 591 (1989) (“[A] real gun [is] objectively dangerous.”).

2026Even outside the Terry context, the Supreme Court has recognized that “a gun is an article that is typically and characteristically dangerous . . . and the law reasonably may presume that such an article is always dangerous[.]” McLaughlin v. United States, 476 U.S. 16, 17 (1986); see also Brooks v. State, 314 Md. 585, 591 (1989) (“[A] real gun [is] objectively dangerous.”).

2026Rather than confine its analysis to those factors, the Supreme Court applied the totality-of-the-circumstances framework from Whitfield v. State, 287 Md. 124, 141 (1980), to affirm—notwithstanding the suppression court’s failure to follow the same “formula.” Thomas, 429 Md. at 259-62. 5 “affirm the circuit court’s judgment ‘on any ground adequately shown by the record, even one upon which the circuit court has not relied or one that the parties have not raised.’”) (quoting Monarc Constr., Inc. v. Aris Corp., 188 Md. App. 377, 385 (2009)); Simpson v. State, 121 Md. App. 263, 276 (1998) (citatio

2026Rather than confine its analysis to those factors, the Supreme Court applied the totality-of-the-circumstances framework from Whitfield v. State, 287 Md. 124, 141 (1980), to affirm—notwithstanding the suppression court’s failure to follow the same “formula.” Thomas, 429 Md. at 259-62. 5 “affirm the circuit court’s judgment ‘on any ground adequately shown by the record, even one upon which the circuit court has not relied or one that the parties have not raised.’”) (quoting Monarc Constr., Inc. v. Aris Corp., 188 Md. App. 377, 385 (2009)); Simpson v. State, 121 Md. App. 263, 276 (1998) (citatio

2026Rather than confine its analysis to those factors, the Supreme Court applied the totality-of-the-circumstances framework from Whitfield v. State, 287 Md. 124, 141 (1980), to affirm—notwithstanding the suppression court’s failure to follow the same “formula.” Thomas, 429 Md. at 259-62. 5 “affirm the circuit court’s judgment ‘on any ground adequately shown by the record, even one upon which the circuit court has not relied or one that the parties have not raised.’”) (quoting Monarc Constr., Inc. v. Aris Corp., 188 Md. App. 377, 385 (2009)); Simpson v. State, 121 Md. App. 263, 276 (1998) (citatio

2026Rather than confine its analysis to those factors, the Supreme Court applied the totality-of-the-circumstances framework from Whitfield v. State, 287 Md. 124, 141 (1980), to affirm—notwithstanding the suppression court’s failure to follow the same “formula.” Thomas, 429 Md. at 259-62. 5 “affirm the circuit court’s judgment ‘on any ground adequately shown by the record, even one upon which the circuit court has not relied or one that the parties have not raised.’”) (quoting Monarc Constr., Inc. v. Aris Corp., 188 Md. App. 377, 385 (2009)); Simpson v. State, 121 Md. App. 263, 276 (1998) (citatio

2026Even outside the Terry context, the Supreme Court has recognized that “a gun is an article that is typically and characteristically dangerous . . . and the law reasonably may presume that such an article is always dangerous[.]” McLaughlin v. United States, 476 U.S. 16, 17 (1986); see also Brooks v. State, 314 Md. 585, 591 (1989) (“[A] real gun [is] objectively dangerous.”).

2026Even outside the Terry context, the Supreme Court has recognized that “a gun is an article that is typically and characteristically dangerous . . . and the law reasonably may presume that such an article is always dangerous[.]” McLaughlin v. United States, 476 U.S. 16, 17 (1986); see also Brooks v. State, 314 Md. 585, 591 (1989) (“[A] real gun [is] objectively dangerous.”).

2024Turenne, 258 Md. App. at 246-47.

2024Id. at 249-52 .

2022In the totality of the circumstances assessment, “it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (cleaned up).

2022In the totality of the circumstances assessment, “it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (cleaned up).

2026Although we extend great deference to the trial court’s findings of fact on a motion to suppress, we review the trial court’s “legal conclusions de novo, - 14 - making our own independent constitutional evaluation as to whether the officer’s encounter with the defendant was lawful.” Id. at 362 , 174 A.3d at 333 (citing Ferris, 355 Md. at 368 , 735 A.2d at 497 ). “[O]ur plenary review of the record for error requires application of the facts under a totality of the circumstances analysis.” Id. at 363 , 174 A.3d at 333 .

2026Although we extend great deference to the trial court’s findings of fact on a motion to suppress, we review the trial court’s “legal conclusions de novo, - 14 - making our own independent constitutional evaluation as to whether the officer’s encounter with the defendant was lawful.” Id. at 362 , 174 A.3d at 333 (citing Ferris, 355 Md. at 368 , 735 A.2d at 497 ). “[O]ur plenary review of the record for error requires application of the facts under a totality of the circumstances analysis.” Id. at 363 , 174 A.3d at 333 .

2019In Potts v. State , 300 Md. 567 , 479 A.2d 1335 (1984), the Court of Appeals determined that the totality of the circumstances analysis set forth in Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), and Massachusetts v. Upton , 466 U.S. 727 , 104 S.Ct. 2085 , 80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984), was, under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 26, the appropriate standard of review of a probable cause determination.

2019In Potts v. State , 300 Md. 567 , 479 A.2d 1335 (1984), the Court of Appeals determined that the totality of the circumstances analysis set forth in Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), and Massachusetts v. Upton , 466 U.S. 727 , 104 S.Ct. 2085 , 80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984), was, under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 26, the appropriate standard of review of a probable cause determination.

2016After weighing the different approaches other states had taken to the question, we adopted a totality of the circumstances test to “examine all the circumstances surrounding [the] absence,” an analysis that encompasses these considerations: “the duration of the absence and whether the parties intended the absence to be permanent or temporary, as well as ‘additional circumstances that may be presented in the multiplicity of factual settings in which child custody jurisdictional issues may arise.’ ” Id. at 362 , 92 A.3d 628 (quoting Chick v. Chick, 164 N.C.App. 444, 450 , 596 S.E.2d 303 (2004));

2016After weighing the different approaches other states had taken to the question, we adopted a totality of the circumstances test to “examine all the circumstances surrounding [the] absence,” an analysis that encompasses these considerations: “the duration of the absence and whether the parties intended the absence to be permanent or temporary, as well as ‘additional circumstances that may be presented in the multiplicity of factual settings in which child custody jurisdictional issues may arise.’ ” Id. at 362 , 92 A.3d 628 (quoting Chick v. Chick, 164 N.C.App. 444, 450 , 596 S.E.2d 303 (2004));

2010Maryland non-constitutional law, however, “ ‘requires that “no confession or other significantly incriminating remark allegedly made by an accused be used as evidence against him, unless it first be shown to be free of any coercive barnacles that may have attached by improper means to prevent the expression from being voluntary.” ’ ” Harper, 162 Md.App. at 73 , 873 A.2d 395 (quoting Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275, 307 , 765 A.2d 97 (2001)).

2010Maryland non-constitutional law, however, “ ‘requires that “no confession or other significantly incriminating remark allegedly made by an accused be used as evidence against him, unless it first be shown to be free of any coercive barnacles that may have attached by improper means to prevent the expression from being voluntary.” ’ ” Harper, 162 Md.App. at 73 , 873 A.2d 395 (quoting Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275, 307 , 765 A.2d 97 (2001)).

2004See e.g., Hof v. State, 337 Md. at 596 , 655 A.2d 370 (consideration of whether defendant was presented to commissioner within 24 hours simply one factor when determining voluntariness); Woods, 315 Md. at 613-14 , 556 A.2d 236 (confession admissible even though defendant expressly refused to waive prompt presentment); Lodowski v. State, 307 Md. 233, 254-55 , 513 A.2d 299 (1986) (listing the various factors to be considered in determining voluntariness). [10] In Hiligh , the Court applied the heavy weight standard and affirmed the circuit court's grant of a new trial by way of post conviction r

2004See e.g., Hof v. State, 337 Md. at 596 , 655 A.2d 370 (consideration of whether defendant was presented to commissioner within 24 hours simply one factor when determining voluntariness); Woods, 315 Md. at 613-14 , 556 A.2d 236 (confession admissible even though defendant expressly refused to waive prompt presentment); Lodowski v. State, 307 Md. 233, 254-55 , 513 A.2d 299 (1986) (listing the various factors to be considered in determining voluntariness). [10] In Hiligh , the Court applied the heavy weight standard and affirmed the circuit court's grant of a new trial by way of post conviction r

2026We concluded that, “although the nature of the totality of the circumstances test makes it possible for individually innocuous factors to add up to reasonable suspicion, it is impossible for a combination of wholly innocent factors to combine into a suspicious conglomeration unless there are concrete reasons for such an interpretation.” Cartnail, 359 Md. at 294 , 753 A.2d at 531 (citation modified).

2026We concluded that, “although the nature of the totality of the circumstances test makes it possible for individually innocuous factors to add up to reasonable suspicion, it is impossible for a combination of wholly innocent factors to combine into a suspicious conglomeration unless there are concrete reasons for such an interpretation.” Cartnail, 359 Md. at 294 , 753 A.2d at 531 (citation modified).

2026In Hill, we explained how the totality of the circumstances analysis and the per se rule intersect: Although a totality of the circumstances analysis is standard practice for determining whether an accused’s statement to the police was voluntarily made, not all of the factors that bear on voluntariness are of equal weight; certain factors are “transcendent and decisive.” Williams, 375 Md. at 429 .

2011Although a totality of the circumstances analysis is standard practice for determining whether an accused’s statement to the police was voluntarily made, not all of the factors that bear on voluntariness are of equal weight; certain factors are “transcendent and decisive.” Williams, 375 Md. at 429 , 825 A.2d at 1092 .