totality of the circumstances test in Florida

2021Under the totality of the circumstances test, the proper analysis [for determining whether an affidavit provides the necessary probable cause to support issuance of a search warrant] is whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, "there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." 4 State v. Loredo, 129 So. 3d 1188, 1191 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).

2019Both factors—quantity and quality—are considered in the ‘totality of the circumstances—the whole picture,’ . . . that 8 must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (reaffirming the use of “the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed probable cause determinations.”).

2010To determine whether an instruction error “vitiated the ‘validity of the trial,’ courts conduct a totality of the circumstances analysis.” Croom v. State, 36 So.3d 707, 709 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (quoting Garzon v. State, 980 So.2d 1038, 1043 (Fla.2008)).

2010Use of “and/or” Language in Jury Instructions Prior to 2008, the Florida Supreme Court had not applied the above funda *710 mental error analysis in a case where an un-objeeted to jury instruction was challenged for containing the phrase “and/or.” In the 2008 case of Garzon v. State, the Court entered an opinion holding: (1) the issue of whether use of the conjunction “and/or” in a jury instruction constitutes fundamental error differs in scope from Delva/Reed issues 1 ; therefore, (2) courts must conduct a totality of the circumstances analysis to determine whether it was fundamental error fo

2009See Caldwell v. State, 985 So.2d 602, 606 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (applying a totality-of-the-circumstances test to the issue of whether law enforcement's conduct amounted to "a show of authority that would have caused a reasonable person to believe that he was not free to terminate the encounter"). [A] "citizen encounter becomes an investigatory... stop[ ] once an officer shows authority in a manner that restrains the defendant's freedom of movement such that a reasonable person would feel compelled to comply." Parsons v. State, 825 So.2d 406, 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).

2009See Caldwell v. State, 985 So.2d 602, 606 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (applying a totality-of-the-circumstances test to the issue of whether law enforcement’s conduct amounted to “a show of authority that would have caused a reasonable person to believe that he was not free to terminate the encounter”). [A] “citizen encounter becomes an investigatory ... stop[ ] once an officer shows authority in a manner that restrains the defendant’s freedom of movement such that a reasonable person would feel compelled to comply.” Parsons v. State, 825 So.2d 406, 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).

2009State v. Peterson, 739 So.2d 561, 564 (Fla.1999) (citing Gates); State v. Butler, 655 So.2d 1123, 1125 (Fla.1995) (citing Gates).

2003After reviewing this record, we conclude that, based on the totality of the circumstances test as discussed in State v. Butler, 655 So.2d 1123 (Fla.1995), the State failed to show that law enforcement had probable cause to justify the arrest and subsequent search of Martel.

2025See Garzon v. State, 980 So. 2d 1038, 1043 (Fla. 2008) (holding “the Fourth District was correct in examining the totality of the record to determine if the “and/or” instruction met the exacting requirements of fundamental instruction error”); see also Hunter v. State, 8 So. 3d 1052 (Fla. 2008); and see Victorino v. State, 23 So. 3d 87 (Fla. 2009).

2010See Garzon v. State, 980 So.2d 1038, 1043 (Fla.2008) (holding “the Fourth District was correct in examining the totality of the record to determine if the “and/or” instruction met the exacting requirements of fundamental instruction error”); see also Hunter v. State, 8 So.3d 1052 (Fla.2008); and see Victorino v. State, 23 So.3d 87 (Fla.2009).

2021"The affidavit must state that the affiant has personal knowledge of the confidential informant's veracity or the affidavit must contain sufficient independent corroborating evidence." Id. (quoting Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792, 806 (Fla. 2002)).

2014“The affidavit must state that the affiant has personal knowledge of the confidential informant’s veracity or the affidavit must contain sufficient independent corroborating evidence.” Pagan v. State, 830 So.2d 792, 806 (Fla.2002).

2009In short, an investigatory stop occurs when a "reasonable person would not feel free to leave." Hrezo v. State, 780 So.2d 194, 195 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

2009In short, an investigatory stop occurs when a “reasonable person would not feel free to leave.” Hrezo v. State, 780 So.2d 194, 195 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

2009See Caldwell v. State, 985 So.2d 602, 606 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (applying a totality-of-the-circumstances test to the issue of whether law enforcement's conduct amounted to "a show of authority that would have caused a reasonable person to believe that he was not free to terminate the encounter"). [A] "citizen encounter becomes an investigatory... stop[ ] once an officer shows authority in a manner that restrains the defendant's freedom of movement such that a reasonable person would feel compelled to comply." Parsons v. State, 825 So.2d 406, 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).

2009See Caldwell v. State, 985 So.2d 602, 606 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (applying a totality-of-the-circumstances test to the issue of whether law enforcement’s conduct amounted to “a show of authority that would have caused a reasonable person to believe that he was not free to terminate the encounter”). [A] “citizen encounter becomes an investigatory ... stop[ ] once an officer shows authority in a manner that restrains the defendant’s freedom of movement such that a reasonable person would feel compelled to comply.” Parsons v. State, 825 So.2d 406, 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).

2007United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 , 122 S.Ct. 2105 , 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (holding that totality of the circumstances means not giving extra weight to any one specific factor); State v. Colitto, 929 So.2d 654, 660 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (en banc) (Farmer, J., dissenting) (citing Drayton and other cases for the proposition that no single factor is dispositive to totality of circumstances).

2007United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 , 122 S.Ct. 2105 , 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (holding that totality of the circumstances means not giving extra weight to any one specific factor); State v. Colitto, 929 So.2d 654, 660 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (en banc) (Farmer, J., dissenting) (citing Drayton and other cases for the proposition that no single factor is dispositive to totality of circumstances).

2022Applying a totality of the circumstances test, the Court held that a “warrantless search of [the probationer’s home], supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of probation, was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 122 .

2005Compare United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 , 122 S.Ct. 587 , 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001) (applying a totality of the circumstances test, the Court held that a warrantless search conducted by a law enforcement officer, supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a consented-to condition of probation which allowed both law enforcement and probation officers to conduct a warrantless search, was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and evidence seized during such a search could properly be admitted in a prosecution on new criminal char

2007United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 , 122 S.Ct. 2105 , 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (holding that totality of the circumstances means not giving extra weight to any one specific factor); State v. Colitto, 929 So.2d 654, 660 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (en banc) (Farmer, J., dissenting) (citing Drayton and other cases for the proposition that no single factor is dispositive to totality of circumstances).

2007United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 , 122 S.Ct. 2105 , 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (holding that totality of the circumstances means not giving extra weight to any one specific factor); State v. Colitto, 929 So.2d 654, 660 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (en banc) (Farmer, J., dissenting) (citing Drayton and other cases for the proposition that no single factor is dispositive to totality of circumstances).

2024Id. at 214-15 (“[I]f the accused initiates further - 10 - conversation, is reminded of his rights, and knowingly and voluntarily waives those rights, any incriminating statements made during this conversation may be properly admitted.” (citing Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045-46 )).

2018Bradshaw , 462 U.S. at 1046 , 103 S.Ct. 2830 ("[T]he next inquiry was 'whether a valid waiver of the right to counsel and the right to silence had occurred, that is, whether the purported waiver was knowing and intelligent and found to be so under the totality of the circumstances ....' " (quoting Edwards , 451 U.S. at 486 n.9, 101 S.Ct. 1880 ) (emphasis added) ). 8 And, as explained below, this Court did not reach a different conclusion in Welch .

2007See Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 94-95 , 105 S.Ct. 490 , 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (citing Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 ; Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979)). [12] However, when a suspect invokes his right to remain silent, the Supreme Court applies a less stringent totality-of-the-circumstances test.

2007See Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 94-95 , 105 S.Ct. 490 , 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (citing Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 ; Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979)). [12] However, when a suspect invokes his right to remain silent, the Supreme Court applies a less stringent totality-of-the-circumstances test.

1989In Jones v. United States, 362 US, [257] at 269, [ 80 S.Ct. 725, at 735 , 4 L.Ed.2d 697 ] we held that an affidavit relying on hearsay "is not to be deemed insufficient on that score, so long as a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay is presented." We went on to say that even in making a warrantless arrest an officer "may rely upon information received through an informant, rather than upon his direct observations, so long as the informant's statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters within the officer's knowledge." Ibid.

1989In Jones v. United States, 362 US, [257] at 269, [ 80 S.Ct. 725, at 735 , 4 L.Ed.2d 697 ] we held that an affidavit relying on hearsay "is not to be deemed insufficient on that score, so long as a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay is presented." We went on to say that even in making a warrantless arrest an officer "may rely upon information received through an informant, rather than upon his direct observations, so long as the informant's statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters within the officer's knowledge." Ibid.

2025In dissenting, Justice Canady wrote about "the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion." Id. at 432 (Canady, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).

2025In State v. Teamer, 151 So. 3d 421, 427-28 (Fla. 2014), the Florida Supreme Court majority held that an officer who initiated a Terry9 traffic stop based solely on the inconsistency between the color of a car versus what color came up in motor vehicle registration records was not "reasonable" in a totality of the circumstances analysis, and therefore evidence of the seizure of marijuana from the driver should have been suppressed.

2025In dissenting, Justice Canady wrote about "the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion." Id. at 432 (Canady, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).

2024Federal courts apply a totality of the circumstances test to determine whether the party has a substantial privacy right that outweighs the 3 “customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.” Frank, 951 F.2d at 323 (quoting Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 1981)).

2024Id. at 214-15 (“[I]f the accused initiates further - 10 - conversation, is reminded of his rights, and knowingly and voluntarily waives those rights, any incriminating statements made during this conversation may be properly admitted.” (citing Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045-46 )).

2023See State v. Baez, 894 So. 2d 115, 117 (Fla. 2004) (stating that “the totality of the circumstances controls in cases involving the Fourth Amendment”).