totality of the circumstances test in Indiana

1986It should therefore be governed by the totality of the circumstances standard set forth in Neeley v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 588 , 382 N.E.2d 714 .

1986It should therefore be governed by the totality of the circumstances standard set forth in Neeley v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 588 , 382 N.E.2d 714 .

1986Cf. Sherwood v. State (1985), Ind., 485 N.E.2d 97 .

1986Cf. Sherwood v. State (1985), Ind., 485 N.E.2d 97 .

2017This totality-of-the-circumstances test is our “faithful stand-by” to determine reasonableness under our Constitution, Zan-ders, 73 N.E.3d at 186 , and is appropriate for a range of contexts, see Garcia v. State, 47 N.E.3d. 1196, 1199 (Ind. 2016).

2017This totality-of- the-circumstances test is our “faithful stand-by” to determine reasonableness under our Constitution, Zanders, 73 N.E.3d at 186 , and is appropriate for a range of contexts, see Garcia v. State, 47 N.E.3d 1196, 1199 (Ind. 2016).

2012Id.

2012Id.

2012Although Light was of lower intelligence and the police lied to him, the Court held that this was not sufficient evidence to find that Light’s will was overcome, rendering his confession involuntary. 34 In Henry, 738 N.E.2d at 664 , the Court cited Light and its use of the totality-of- the-circumstances test.

2012In Henry, 738 N.E.2d at 664 , the Court cited Light and its use of the totality-of-the-circumstances test.

2011In determining the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver, we examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation to determine whether the suspect’s choice “was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception” and whether the waiver was “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right[s] being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon [them].” Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 ; see also Crain, 736 N.E.2d at 1230 (reviewing totality of the circumstances to ensure that waiver was “not induced by viole

2011In determining the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver, we examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation to determine whether the suspect’s choice “was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception” and whether the waiver was “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right[s] being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon [them].” Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 ; see also Crain, 736 N.E.2d at 1230 (reviewing totality of the circumstances to ensure that waiver was “not induced by viole

2011In determining the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver, we examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation to determine whether the suspect’s choice “was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception” and whether the waiver was “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right[s] being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon [them].” Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 ; see also Crain, 736 N.E.2d at 1230 (reviewing totality of the circumstances to ensure that waiver was “not induced by viole

2011In determining the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver, we examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation to determine whether the suspect’s choice “was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception” and whether the waiver was “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right[s] being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon [them].” Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 ; see also Crain, 736 N.E.2d at 1230 (reviewing totality of the circumstances to ensure that waiver was “not induced by viole

1990Although appellant’s argument is that the tapes were per se excludable because the advisement of rights and his waiver of them do not appear on the tapes, he correctly states that the appropriate standard for evaluating the voluntariness of a waiver of rights is the totality of the circumstances test, citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), and Holleman v. State (1980), 272 Ind. 534 , 400 N.E.2d 123 .

1990Although appellant’s argument is that the tapes were per se excludable because the advisement of rights and his waiver of them do not appear on the tapes, he correctly states that the appropriate standard for evaluating the voluntariness of a waiver of rights is the totality of the circumstances test, citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), and Holleman v. State (1980), 272 Ind. 534 , 400 N.E.2d 123 .

1986The Court then abandoned its two-pronged test established in previous cases, in its place “reaffirmpng] the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed probable cause determinations. [citations omitted.]” Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 , 103 S.Ct. at 2332 , 76 L.Ed.2d at 548 .

1986The Court then abandoned its two-pronged test established in previous cases, in its place “reaffirmpng] the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed probable cause determinations. [citations omitted.]” Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 , 103 S.Ct. at 2332 , 76 L.Ed.2d at 548 .

1986See Jones v. United States, [ 362 U.S. 257 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960)], supra; United States v. Ventresca [ 380 U.S. 102 , 85 S.Ct. 741 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965)] supra; Brinegar v. United States [ 338 U.S. 160 , 69 S.Ct. 1302 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)], supra. The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be f

1986See Jones v. United States, [ 362 U.S. 257 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960)], supra; United States v. Ventresca [ 380 U.S. 102 , 85 S.Ct. 741 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965)] supra; Brinegar v. United States [ 338 U.S. 160 , 69 S.Ct. 1302 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)], supra. The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be f

2020This court affords Article 1, Section 11 “a liberal construction in favor of protecting individuals from unreasonable intrusions on privacy.” Rush v. State, 881 N.E.2d 46, 52 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). [25] There are three non-exclusive factors that we regularly balance in determining whether police conduct was reasonable under the Indiana Constitution: “1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” M.O., 63 N.E.

2020Instead, as noted above, “‘we focus on the actions of the police officer,’ and employ a totality-of-the-circumstances test to evaluate the reasonableness of the officer’s actions.” Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1034 (quoting Duran, 930 N.E.2d at 17 ).

2018Golf Ass'n , 712 N.E.2d 983 (Ind. 1999), Vernon v. Kroger Co. , 712 N.E.2d 976 (Ind. 1999), and Delta Tau Delta v. Johnson , 712 N.E.2d 968 (Ind. 1999), to the extent they applied such test in determining whether a duty was owed under the circumstances of each case. 6 To accept Steak 'n Shake's identification of the broad type of plaintiff and broad type of harm would essentially extend immunity to proprietors for any harm to a patron resulting from acts of a third party, criminal or otherwise, regardless of the circumstances. 7 We recognize that there is a sliding scale in terms of what steps

2018Golf Ass'n , 712 N.E.2d 983 (Ind. 1999), Vernon v. Kroger Co. , 712 N.E.2d 976 (Ind. 1999), and Delta Tau Delta v. Johnson , 712 N.E.2d 968 (Ind. 1999), to the extent they applied such test in determining whether a duty was owed under the circumstances of each case. 6 To accept Steak 'n Shake's identification of the broad type of plaintiff and broad type of harm would essentially extend immunity to proprietors for any harm to a patron resulting from acts of a third party, criminal or otherwise, regardless of the circumstances. 7 We recognize that there is a sliding scale in terms of what steps

2018The Court then adopted the analytical framework for assessing foreseeability in the duty context set forth in Goldsberry v. Grubbs , 672 N.E.2d 475 , 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), in which it was noted that "the foreseeability component of proximate cause requires an evaluation of the facts of the actual occurrence, while the foreseeability component of duty requires a more general analysis of the broad type of plaintiff and harm involved, without regard to the facts of the actual occurrence." Goodwin , 62 N.E.3d at 390 .