totality of the circumstances test in Iowa

2022“If the district court finds the evidentiary test does not require exclusion, it should [] employ the totality-of-the-circumstances test to ensure the State has met its burden of establishing that defendant's confession was voluntary.” Madsen, 813 N.W.2d at 726 n.1.

2021As we further explained in State v. Madsen, “[i]f application of the evidentiary test requires suppression of the confession, the district court need not also apply a totality-of-the-circumstances test.” 813 N.W.2d at 726 n.1.

2024See State v. Bishop, 387 N.W.2d 554, 557 (Iowa 1986) (stating “[t]he informant’s veracity and basis of knowledge are no longer separate and distinct considerations” since Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), which “rejected the former two-pronged test for determining probable cause . . . in favor of a totality of the circumstances analysis”).

2022The United States Supreme Court has stated that reasonable suspicion must be based on “articulable” facts and more than “ ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch” ’ of criminal activity.”75 The Court has said that reasonable suspicion is a “fluid concept,” and one that is “not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”76 Further, in evaluating reasonable suspicion, the United States Supreme Court has directed courts to consider the totality of the circumstances.77 As students of legal history know, the totality-of-the-circumstances test was considered a failur

2017See Baldon, 829 N.W.2d at 797–98; Pals, 805 N.W.2d at 782–83.

2017See Baldon, 829 N.W.2d at 797–98; Pals, 805 N.W.2d at 782–83.

2018See Davis, 679 N.W.2d at 656 (“We use the totality of the circumstances standard . . . to determine whether probable cause has been established for the issuance of a search warrant.”).

2016We do so by using “the totality of the circumstances standard.” State v. Davis, 679 N.W.2d 651, 656 (Iowa 2004).

2022The United States Supreme Court has stated that reasonable suspicion must be based on “articulable” facts and more than “ ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch” ’ of criminal activity.”75 The Court has said that reasonable suspicion is a “fluid concept,” and one that is “not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”76 Further, in evaluating reasonable suspicion, the United States Supreme Court has directed courts to consider the totality of the circumstances.77 As students of legal history know, the totality-of-the-circumstances test was considered a failur

2016As noted by the majority, the United States Supreme Court has established a totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine if a person is in custody or if freedom is deprived “in any significant way.” 4 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 , 86 S. Ct. at 1612 , 16 L.

2023State v. Hauge, 973 N.W.2d 453 , 468 (Iowa 2022) (alterations and emphasis in original) (quoting State v. Lane, 726 N.W.2d 371, 378 (Iowa 2007)).

2022Lane, 726 N.W.2d at 378 (quoting Va Lerie, 424 F.3d at 709 ) (alterations in original).

2022The United States Supreme Court has stated that reasonable suspicion must be based on “articulable” facts and more than “ ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch” ’ of criminal activity.”75 The Court has said that reasonable suspicion is a “fluid concept,” and one that is “not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”76 Further, in evaluating reasonable suspicion, the United States Supreme Court has directed courts to consider the totality of the circumstances.77 As students of legal history know, the totality-of-the-circumstances test was considered a failur

2022Additionally, Schneckloth itself requires courts to “carefully scrutinize[]” the conditions that led to the consent in determining whether the consent was voluntary. 412 U.S. at 248 .

2022This appears to derive from the language in Robinette that “the totality of the circumstances must clearly demonstrate that a reasonable person would believe that he or she had the freedom to refuse to answer further questions and could in fact leave,” 685 N.E.2d at 771 (emphasis added), perhaps giving the Pals majority the impression that the Ohio Supreme Court applied a more heightened totality-of-the-circumstances analysis than the Supreme Court in Schneckloth.

2022But the Ohio Supreme Court cited Schneckloth for that principle and made clear in Robinette that the Ohio Constitution’s search and seizure 28 provision “affords protections that are coextensive with those provided by the Fourth Amendment” and “the totality-of-the circumstances test is controlling in an unlawful detention to determine whether permission to search a vehicle is voluntary.” Id.

2020“We do not, however, make an independent determination of probable cause; we merely decide whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed.” State v. Gogg, 561 N.W.2d 360, 363 (Iowa 1997).

2020“The test for probable cause is ‘whether a person of reasonable prudence would believe a crime was committed on the premises to be searched or evidence of a crime could be located there.’” Id. (quoting Gogg, 561 N.W.2d at 363 ).

2025See White v. State, 5 N.W.3d 315 , 324 (Iowa 2024) (noting Iowa courts review hostile work environment claims under a totality-of-the-circumstances test); cf. Wetzel, 901 F.3d at 862 (analyzing a harassment claim under the FHA based on the totality of the circumstances).

2024See State v. Bishop, 387 N.W.2d 554, 557 (Iowa 1986) (stating “[t]he informant’s veracity and basis of knowledge are no longer separate and distinct considerations” since Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), which “rejected the former two-pronged test for determining probable cause . . . in favor of a totality of the circumstances analysis”).

2022We also applied a totality-of-the-circumstances test a few months later in Lowe, reiterating, “The question of voluntariness requires the consideration of many factors, although no one factor itself may be determinative.” 812 N.W.2d at 572 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).

2022“Though it is ‘our role as a court of last resort . . . to occasionally reexamine our prior decisions, we must undertake this weighty task only for the most cogent reasons and with the greatest caution.’ ” Brown, 930 N.W.2d at 854 (omission in original) (quoting Kiesau v. Bantz, 686 N.W.2d 164, 180 (Iowa 2004) (Cady, J., dissenting), overruled on other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott Int’l Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699 , 708 n.3 (Iowa 2016)).

2022The United States Supreme Court has stated that reasonable suspicion must be based on “articulable” facts and more than “ ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch” ’ of criminal activity.”75 The Court has said that reasonable suspicion is a “fluid concept,” and one that is “not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”76 Further, in evaluating reasonable suspicion, the United States Supreme Court has directed courts to consider the totality of the circumstances.77 As students of legal history know, the totality-of-the-circumstances test was considered a failur

2022The United States Supreme Court has stated that reasonable suspicion must be based on “articulable” facts and more than “ ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch” ’ of criminal activity.”75 The Court has said that reasonable suspicion is a “fluid concept,” and one that is “not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”76 Further, in evaluating reasonable suspicion, the United States Supreme Court has directed courts to consider the totality of the circumstances.77 As students of legal history know, the totality-of-the-circumstances test was considered a failur

2022“Though it is ‘our role as a court of last resort . . . to occasionally reexamine our prior decisions, we must undertake this weighty task only for the most cogent reasons and with the greatest caution.’ ” Brown, 930 N.W.2d at 854 (omission in original) (quoting Kiesau v. Bantz, 686 N.W.2d 164, 180 (Iowa 2004) (Cady, J., dissenting), overruled on other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott Int’l Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699 , 708 n.3 (Iowa 2016)).

2022See McIver, 858 N.W.2d at 703 .

2020See Howard, 825 N.W.2d at 39 (“We recently declined the State’s invitation to abandon our common law evidentiary rule on promissory leniency in favor a totality-of-the- circumstances test.”).

2020“The test ‘is whether the language used amounts to an inducement which is likely to cause the subject to make a false confession.’” Id. at 40 (citation omitted).

2020See Howard, 509 N.W.2d at 767 .

2016See id. at 567 (finding legitimate expectation of privacy based on rental of room in a house, absence of family relationship between homeowner and tenant, and “exclusive possession and control” of room).

2016The United States Supreme Court has held that “a significantly corroborated anonymous tip is sufficient for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.” State v. McNeal, 867 N.W.2d 91, 101 (2015) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331 (1990)).

2016The United States Supreme Court has held that “a significantly corroborated anonymous tip is sufficient for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.” State v. McNeal, 867 N.W.2d 91, 101 (2015) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331 (1990)).

2015See Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93, 98-99 (W.

2015See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 , 120 S.Ct. 2326, 2336 , 147 L.Ed.2d 405, 420 (2000) (noting that the totality of the circumstances test for voluntariness “is more difficult ... for law enforcement officers to conform to, and for courts to apply in a consistent manner”); Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 Calif.

2015See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 , 120 S.Ct. 2326, 2336 , 147 L.Ed.2d 405, 420 (2000) (noting that the totality of the circumstances test for voluntariness “is more difficult ... for law enforcement officers to conform to, and for courts to apply in a consistent manner”); Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 Calif.