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82 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2026 15 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Sharpgreen2 sentences2026But the relevant inquiry is not whether Raine's conduct violated the trespass ordinance or any other law. "'The relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is "innocent" or "guilty," but whether a sufficient degree of suspicion attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts. [Citation omitted.] The totality of the circumstances standard precludes a "divide-and- conquer analysis" under which factors that are "readily susceptible to an innocent explanation [are] entitled to 'no weight.'" [Citations omitted.]' Schooler, 308 Kan. at 352 (quoting State v. Sharp, 305 Kan. 1076 , 1081-82, 39 2026Whether the officer's conduct was reasonable is considered in the context of "common sense and ordinary human experience under the totality of the circumstances." 305 Kan. at 1081. "'The totality of the circumstances standard precludes a "divide-and-conquer analysis" under which factors that are "readily susceptible to an innocent explanation [are] entitled to 'no weight.'" United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 , 122 S. Ct. 744 , 151 L. | 6 | 9 |
State v. Schoolergreen2 sentences2021Instead, the court determines whether all the circumstances [objectively] justify the detention." Schooler, 308 Kan. at 352. "'The relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is "innocent" or "guilty," but whether a sufficient degree of suspicion attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts. [Citation omitted.] The totality of the circumstances standard precludes a "divide-and- conquer analysis" under which factors that are "readily susceptible to an innocent explanation [are] entitled to 'no weight.'" [Citations omitted.]'" Schooler, 308 Kan. at 352 (quoting State v. Sharp, 305 Kan 2021Instead, the court determines whether all the circumstances [objectively] justify the detention." Schooler, 308 Kan. at 352. "'The relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is "innocent" or "guilty," but whether a sufficient degree of suspicion attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts. [Citation omitted.] The totality of the circumstances standard precludes a "divide-and- conquer analysis" under which factors that are "readily susceptible to an innocent explanation [are] entitled to 'no weight.'" [Citations omitted.]'" Schooler, 308 Kan. at 352 (quoting State v. Sharp, 305 Kan | 4 | 5 |
State v. McGinnisgreen2 sentences2026As this court explained in State v. McGinnis, 290 Kan. 547, 553 , 233 P.3d 246 (2010), the objective circumstances bearing on whether an encounter is consensual include, among other nonexclusive factors, "an attempt to control the ability to flee." Therefore, when applicable, this factor should be considered as part of the totality-of-the- circumstances inquiry. 2026As this court explained in State v. McGinnis, 290 Kan. 547, 553 , 233 P.3d 246 (2010), the objective circumstances bearing on whether an encounter is consensual include, among other nonexclusive factors, "an attempt to control the ability to flee." Therefore, when applicable, this factor should be considered as part of the totality-of-the- circumstances inquiry. | 3 | 6 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2026See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (noting that the objective standard of reasonable suspicion requires the court to ask whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of seizure or search would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe the search or seizure was appropriate); Jones, 300 Kan. at 645 (an officer is not required to neatly package the reasonable suspicion factors in a single succinct answer; the court is required to consider 'the totality of the circumstances, all facts and inferences, [and] not a select few')." Cash, 313 Kan. at 130. 2025See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (noting that the objective standard of reasonable suspicion requires the court to ask whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of seizure or search would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe the search or seizure was appropriate); Jones, 300 Kan. at 645 (an officer is not required to neatly package the reasonable suspicion factors in a single succinct answer; the court is required to consider 'the totality of the circumstances, all facts and inferences, [and] not a select few')." Cash, 313 Kan. at 130. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Lowerygreen2 sentences2026But the relevant inquiry is not whether Raine's conduct violated the trespass ordinance or any other law. "'The relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is "innocent" or "guilty," but whether a sufficient degree of suspicion attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts. [Citation omitted.] The totality of the circumstances standard precludes a "divide-and- conquer analysis" under which factors that are "readily susceptible to an innocent explanation [are] entitled to 'no weight.'" [Citations omitted.]' Schooler, 308 Kan. at 352 (quoting State v. Sharp, 305 Kan. 1076 , 1081-82, 39 2025See State v. Lowery, 308 Kan. 359 , 366, 420 P.3d 456 (2018) ("The totality of the circumstances standard does not envision a reviewing court pigeonholing each factor as to innocent or suspicious appearances. | 2 | 3 |
In Re KWBgreen2 sentences1998The Missouri Court of Appeals, in In re K.W.B., 500 S.W.2d 275, 281-82 (Mo. App. 1973), rejected application of the totality of the circumstances test and stated: "Our determination that respondent has not proved a valid waiver, however, rests on a more fundamental basis. 1998The Missouri Court of Appeals, in In re K.W.B., 500 S.W.2d 275, 281-82 (Mo. App. 1973), rejected application of the totality of the circumstances test and stated: “Our determination that respondent has not proved a valid waiver, however, rests on a more fundamental basis. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Cashgreen2 sentences2026See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (noting that the objective standard of reasonable suspicion requires the court to ask whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of seizure or search would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe the search or seizure was appropriate); Jones, 300 Kan. at 645 (an officer is not required to neatly package the reasonable suspicion factors in a single succinct answer; the court is required to consider 'the totality of the circumstances, all facts and inferences, [and] not a select few')." Cash, 313 Kan. at 130. 2026But the relevant inquiry is not whether Raine's conduct violated the trespass ordinance or any other law. "'The relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is "innocent" or "guilty," but whether a sufficient degree of suspicion attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts. [Citation omitted.] The totality of the circumstances standard precludes a "divide-and- conquer analysis" under which factors that are "readily susceptible to an innocent explanation [are] entitled to 'no weight.'" [Citations omitted.]' Schooler, 308 Kan. at 352 (quoting State v. Sharp, 305 Kan. 1076 , 1081-82, 39 | 2 | 2 |
George Karnes v. Thomas Skrutski, in His Individual Capacity Edward Kowalski, in His Individual Capacityred2 sentences2020Although the nature of the totality of the circumstances test makes it possible for individually innocuous factors to add up to reasonable suspicion, it is 'impossible for a combination of wholly innocent factors to combine into a suspicious conglomeration unless there are concrete reasons for such an interpretation.'" United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 948 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 496 [3d Cir. 1995]). 1997Although the nature of the totality of the circumstances test makes it possible for individually innocuous factors to add up to reasonable suspicion, it is “impossible for a combination of wholly innocent factors to combine into a suspicious conglomeration unless there are con *1011 crete reasons for such an interpretation.” Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 496 (3d Cir. 1995). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Arvizured2 sentences2026Whether the officer's conduct was reasonable is considered in the context of "common sense and ordinary human experience under the totality of the circumstances." 305 Kan. at 1081. "'The totality of the circumstances standard precludes a "divide-and-conquer analysis" under which factors that are "readily susceptible to an innocent explanation [are] entitled to 'no weight.'" United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 , 122 S. Ct. 744 , 151 L. 2026Whether the officer's conduct was reasonable is considered in the context of "common sense and ordinary human experience under the totality of the circumstances." 305 Kan. at 1081. "'The totality of the circumstances standard precludes a "divide-and-conquer analysis" under which factors that are "readily susceptible to an innocent explanation [are] entitled to 'no weight.'" United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 , 122 S. Ct. 744 , 151 L. | 1 | 11 |
State v. Mattoxgreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., Mattox, 280 Kan. at 487-88 (holding renewed Miranda warning not required after a valid waiver if suspect remained in custody during the elapsed time and the subsequent interrogation took place within a reasonable time, so long as nothing occurred in the interim that would affect suspect's understanding of the original warning); 10 Nguyen, 281 Kan. at 724 (holding Miranda warnings and waiver did not expire over the course of five to eight hours when adult suspect was transported to jail by a different officer to a different location, even though suspect spoke limited English and did 2017State v. Mattox, 280 Kan. 473, 482-83 , 124 P.3d 6 (2005). | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2026When conducting a totality of the circumstances analysis, a court "should not engage in '"assessing each factor or piece of evidence in isolation."'" City of Wichita v. Molitor, 301 Kan. 251, 266 , 314 P.3d 1275 (2015) (quoting United States v. Jones, 701 F.3d 1300, 1315 [10th Cir. 2012]). "[T]he licensee shall have the burden to show that the decision of the agency should be set aside." K.S.A. 8-1020(q). 2026When conducting a totality of the circumstances analysis, a court "should not engage in '"assessing each factor or piece of evidence in isolation."'" City of Wichita v. Molitor, 301 Kan. 251, 266 , 314 P.3d 1275 (2015) (quoting United States v. Jones, 701 F.3d 1300, 1315 [10th Cir. 2012]). "[T]he licensee shall have the burden to show that the decision of the agency should be set aside." K.S.A. 8-1020(q). | 1 | 1 |
District of Columbia v. Wesbygreen1 sentence2026The totality-of-the-circumstances test requires 12 courts to consider "'the whole picture,'" not to engage in an "'excessively technical dissection'" that evaluates each fact in isolation and discards it for failing to independently establish probable cause. 583 U.S. at 60. | 1 | 1 |
Strickert v. Kansas Dept. of Revenuegreen1 sentence2026Whether reasonable suspicion exists is determined under a totality of the circumstances analysis. 58 Kan. App. 2d at 7. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Giang Nguyengreen1 sentence2025See, e.g., Mattox, 280 Kan. at 487-88 (holding renewed Miranda warning not required after a valid waiver if suspect remained in custody during the elapsed time and the subsequent interrogation took place within a reasonable time, so long as nothing occurred in the interim that would affect suspect's understanding of the original warning); 10 Nguyen, 281 Kan. at 724 (holding Miranda warnings and waiver did not expire over the course of five to eight hours when adult suspect was transported to jail by a different officer to a different location, even though suspect spoke limited English and did | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Chapmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Terry L. Woodgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tennessee v. Garnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. DeMarcogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. McNeelygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hicksgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rangel v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hernandez v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Marshallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Tolergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Matsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Illinois v. Gates
green
2 sentences2008Kansas has adopted the totality of the circumstances analysis set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 , 76 L. 2008Kansas has adopted the totality of the circumstances analysis set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 , 76 L. | 9 | 1990–2017 |
State v. Thompson
green
2 sentences2021Ed. 2d 89 (1996), and United States v. Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059 (10th Cir. 1997), our Supreme Court found the totality of the circumstances test only considers objective factors, noting "the law renders the officer's subjective intent irrelevant unless the [defendant] is somehow made aware of the intent." Thompson, 284 Kan. at 805-07 . 2009In reviewing a district court's determination under the totality of the circumstances test, an appellate court reviews the factual underpinnings under a substantial competent evidence standard and reviews the ultimate legal conclusion drawn from these facts, i.e., whether a reasonable person would feel free to refuse any requests or to otherwise terminate the encounter, under a de novo standard. 284 Kan. at 776, 166 P.3d 1015 . | 7 | 2008–2021 |
State v. Coleman
green
2 sentences2026"The totality of the circumstances standard precludes a 'divide-and-conquer analysis' under which factors that are 'readily susceptible to an innocent explanation [are] entitled to "no weight."'" Coleman, 292 Kan. at 818 . 2020The totality of the circumstances standard precludes a "divide-and-conquer analysis" under which factors that are "readily susceptible to an innocent explanation [are] entitled to 'no weight.'" United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 , 122 S. Ct. 744 , 151 L. Ed. 2d 740 (2002).' State v. Coleman, 292 Kan. 813, 817-18 , 257 P.3d 320 (2011). | 3 | 2017–2026 |
State v. Pollman
green
2 sentences2020But in Pollman, the court held that an officer's retention of an identification card is one factor to be considered in applying the totality of the circumstances test, and that factor may, absent offsetting circumstances, mean a reasonable person would not feel free to leave or otherwise terminate an encounter with the officer. 286 Kan. at 889 . 2020In Pollman, we held that an officer's retention of an identification card is one factor to be considered in applying the totality of the circumstances test for whether an interaction was consensual, and, without offsetting circumstances, that factor may mean a reasonable person would not feel free to leave or otherwise terminate an encounter with the officer. 286 Kan. at 889 . | 3 | 2019–2020 |
State v. Bennett
green
2 sentences2022"Turning to Toliver's case, we apply the totality of the circumstances analysis announced in Samson—and acknowledged in [State v. Bennett, 288 Kan. 86, 96 , 200 P.3d 455 (2009)]. 2022"Turning to Toliver's case, we apply the totality of the circumstances analysis announced in Samson—and acknowledged in [State v. Bennett, 288 Kan. 86, 96 , 200 P.3d 455 (2009)]. | 2 | 2018–2022 |
State v. Cruz
green
2 sentences2019"By necessity, if this court must apply a totality of the circumstances test, we must review the entire record and engage in an unlimited review." State v. Cruz , 297 Kan. 1048 , 1074, 307 P.3d 199 (2013). 2019"By necessity, if this court must apply a totality of the circumstances test, we must review the entire record and engage in an unlimited review." State v. Cruz , 297 Kan. 1048 , 1074, 307 P.3d 199 (2013). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Ward
green
2 sentences2013Cf. State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541 , Syl. ¶ 8, 256 P.3d 801 (2011) (harmless error analysis performed de novo), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012). 2013Cf. State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541 , Syl. ¶ 8, 256 P.3d 801 (2011) (harmless error analysis performed de novo), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012). | 2 | 2012–2013 |
State v. Swanigan
green
2 sentences2013Again, the court applied the totality of the circumstances test and relied on the following factors: “(1) the law enforcement officers’ repeated use of false information and evidence, (2) tire combination of tire tactics used by law enforcement, including threats to convey Swanigan’s lack of cooperation to tire county attorney and threatening to charge him with additional robberies unless he confessed, and (3) evidence of the defendant’s low intellect and his susceptibility to anxiety.” Robinson, 293 Kan. at 1019 (citing Swanigan, 279 Kan. at 37-39 ). 2012Applying the totality of the circumstances test in Swanigan , this court found the defendant’s confession involuntary. 279 Kan. at 39 . | 2 | 2012–2013 |
State v. Orr
green
2 sentences1998It may be noted that the recent cases cited by the prosecution involved a 17-year-old defendant, State v. Orr, 262 Kan. 312, 341 , 940 P.2d 42 (1997), and a 14-year-old defendant whose mother was present when he first was questioned, State v. Robinson, 261 Kan. at 866 . 1998It may be noted that the recent cases cited by the prosecution involved a 17-year-old defendant, State v. Orr, 262 Kan. 312, 341 , 940 P.2d 42 (1997), and a 14-year-old defendant whose mother was present when he first was questioned, State v. Robinson, 261 Kan. at 866 . | 2 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Robinson
green
2 sentences1998It may be noted that the recent cases cited by the prosecution involved a 17-year-old defendant, State v. Orr, 262 Kan. 312, 341 , 940 P.2d 42 (1997), and a 14-year-old defendant whose mother was present when he first was questioned, State v. Robinson, 261 Kan. at 866 . 1998It may be noted that the recent cases cited by the prosecution involved a 17-year-old defendant, State v. Orr, 262 Kan. 312, 341 , 940 P.2d 42 (1997), and a 14-year-old defendant whose mother was present when he first was questioned, State v. Robinson, 261 Kan. at 866 . | 2 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Young
green
2 sentences1996In addressing confessions made by juveniles, this court has stated: “In State v. Young, 220 Kan. 541 , 552 P.2d 905 (1976), we adopted a totality of the circumstances test for determining whether the confession of a juvenile is admissible, and held: ‘A confession is not inadmissible merely because the person making it is a juvenile. 1996In addressing confessions made by juveniles, this court has stated: “In State v. Young, 220 Kan. 541 , 552 P.2d 905 (1976), we adopted a totality of the circumstances test for determining whether the confession of a juvenile is admissible, and held: ‘A confession is not inadmissible merely because the person making it is a juvenile. | 2 | 1992–1996 |
City of Wichita v. Molitor
green
2 sentences2026When conducting a totality of the circumstances analysis, a court "should not engage in '"assessing each factor or piece of evidence in isolation."'" City of Wichita v. Molitor, 301 Kan. 251, 266 , 314 P.3d 1275 (2015) (quoting United States v. Jones, 701 F.3d 1300, 1315 [10th Cir. 2012]). "[T]he licensee shall have the burden to show that the decision of the agency should be set aside." K.S.A. 8-1020(q). 2026When conducting a totality of the circumstances analysis, a court "should not engage in '"assessing each factor or piece of evidence in isolation."'" City of Wichita v. Molitor, 301 Kan. 251, 266 , 314 P.3d 1275 (2015) (quoting United States v. Jones, 701 F.3d 1300, 1315 [10th Cir. 2012]). "[T]he licensee shall have the burden to show that the decision of the agency should be set aside." K.S.A. 8-1020(q). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
City of Hutchinson v. Davenport
green
2 sentences2026Galan cites City of Hutchinson v. Davenport, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1097, 1101 , 54 P.3d 532 (2002) to suggest that the odor of alcohol alone is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. 2026Galan cites City of Hutchinson v. Davenport, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1097, 1101 , 54 P.3d 532 (2002) to suggest that the odor of alcohol alone is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Davis
green
2 sentences2025See, e.g., Mattox, 280 Kan. at 487-88 (holding renewed Miranda warning not required after a valid waiver if suspect remained in custody during the elapsed time and the subsequent interrogation took place within a reasonable time, so long as nothing occurred in the interim that would affect suspect's understanding of the original warning); 10 Nguyen, 281 Kan. at 724 (holding Miranda warnings and waiver did not expire over the course of five to eight hours when adult suspect was transported to jail by a different officer to a different location, even though suspect spoke limited English and did 2025See, e.g., Mattox, 280 Kan. at 487-88 (holding renewed Miranda warning not required after a valid waiver if suspect remained in custody during the elapsed time and the subsequent interrogation took place within a reasonable time, so long as nothing occurred in the interim that would affect suspect's understanding of the original warning); 10 Nguyen, 281 Kan. at 724 (holding Miranda warnings and waiver did not expire over the course of five to eight hours when adult suspect was transported to jail by a different officer to a different location, even though suspect spoke limited English and did | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Evans
green
1 sentence2022In Evans, we found probable cause to support a reasonable belief the defendant would not be apprehended unless immediately arrested when the defendant revealed he was from out-of-state, he only was passing through, and he had immediate access to his car. 219 Kan. at 520-22 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| United States v. Anthony E. Anderson green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Stone
green
2 sentences2021Slip op. at 6 (quoting State v. Stone, 291 Kan. 13, 21 , 237 P.3d 1229 [2010], and listing the following relevant circumstances: "'[1] the accused's mental condition; [2] the manner and duration of the interrogation; [3] the ability of the accused to communicate on request with the outside world; [4] the accused's 49 age, intellect, and background; [5] the fairness of the officers in conducting the interrogation; and [6] the accused's fluency with the English language.'"). 2021Slip op. at 6 (quoting State v. Stone, 291 Kan. 13, 21 , 237 P.3d 1229 [2010], and listing the following relevant circumstances: "'[1] the accused's mental condition; [2] the manner and duration of the interrogation; [3] the ability of the accused to communicate on request with the outside world; [4] the accused's 49 age, intellect, and background; [5] the fairness of the officers in conducting the interrogation; and [6] the accused's fluency with the English language.'"). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Glover red | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Arceo-Rojas green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Vontress v. State red | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Tynisa Williams v. City of Cleveland green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Wyoming v. Houghton green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| United States v. Knights green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Sampson v. United States green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| United States v. Edwards green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Samson v. California green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Sanchez-Loredo green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Finkbiner v. Clay County Kansas green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Missouri v. McNeely green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Toumberlin v. Haas green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Fitzgerald red | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Fisher green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Ward v. Kansas green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Robinson green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Cook green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Shively green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Ohio v. Robinette green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Schneckloth v. Bustamonte green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Pitt green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| United States v. Mendenhall green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.