totality of the circumstances test in Tennessee

2018See State v. Butler, 795 S.W.2d 680, 686 (Tenn. Crim.

2017See State v. Butler, 795 S.W.2d 680, 686 (Tenn. Crim.

2026Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d at 305 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983)). “[U]nder the totality-of-the- circumstances analysis, the informant’s basis of knowledge and veracity or credibility remain highly relevant considerations” but “[r]ather than separate and independent considerations, they ‘should . . . be understood simply as closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the commonsense, practical question whether there is “probable cause” to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place.’” Id. at 308 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 230 ). “[W]hen suppre

2026Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d at 305 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983)). “[U]nder the totality-of-the- circumstances analysis, the informant’s basis of knowledge and veracity or credibility remain highly relevant considerations” but “[r]ather than separate and independent considerations, they ‘should . . . be understood simply as closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the commonsense, practical question whether there is “probable cause” to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place.’” Id. at 308 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 230 ). “[W]hen suppre

2022See State v. Biggs, 211 S.W.3d 744, 749 (Tenn. Crim.

2017See State v. Biggs, 211 S.W.3d 744, 749 (Tenn. Crim.

2026Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d at 305 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983)). “[U]nder the totality-of-the- circumstances analysis, the informant’s basis of knowledge and veracity or credibility remain highly relevant considerations” but “[r]ather than separate and independent considerations, they ‘should . . . be understood simply as closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the commonsense, practical question whether there is “probable cause” to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place.’” Id. at 308 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 230 ). “[W]hen suppre

2025See Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d at 308 (reviewing an affidavit for false statements before applying the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis).

2026In State v. Talley, our supreme court concluded that, using the totality of the circumstances test, the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common area of the condominium complex where he lived despite that he “had a 1/21st ownership interest in the common areas of the building and the front entrance was locked at all times” given that any resident “could grant entry into the common areas.” State v. Talley, 307 S.W.3d 723, 734 (Tenn. 2010).

2024See, e.g., State v. Talley, 307 S.W.3d 723, 730, 734 (Tenn. 2010) (rejecting the defendant’s urges for the Court to adopt a bright-line rule and instead maintaining a totality-of-the-circumstances test).

2026This Court believes that this is a required component of both the implied consent statute and the totality of the circumstances test laid out in State v. Lawrence [ 849 S.W.2d 761 (Tenn. 1993)].

2007Although the Defendant’s sufficiency argument does not concentrate on whether he was driving or in physical control of the vehicle, we find relevant to the sufficiency analysis herein the totality of the circumstances test adopted by our supreme court in State v. Lawrence, 849 S.W.2d 761 (Tenn. 1993).

2024In State v. Callahan, our supreme court held that “juvenile waivers shall be analyzed under a totality-of-the-circumstances test” and that courts should consider the following factors: (1) . . . all circumstances surrounding the interrogation including the juvenile’s age, experience, education, and intelligence; (2) the juvenile’s capacity to understand the Miranda warnings and consequences of the waiver; (3) the juvenile’s familiarity with Miranda warnings or the ability to read and write in the language used to give the warnings; (4) any intoxication; (5) any mental disease, disorder, or ret

2017In State v. Callahan, our supreme court held that “juvenile waivers shall be analyzed under a totality-of-the-circumstances test” and that courts should consider the following factors: (1) consideration of all circumstances surrounding the interrogation including the juvenile’s age, experience, education, and intelligence; (2) the juvenile’s capacity to understand the Miranda warnings and the consequences of the waiver; - 37 - (3) the juvenile’s familiarity with Miranda warnings or the ability to read and write in the language used to give the warnings; (4) any intoxication; (5) any mental dis

2008In State v. Butler, 108 S.W.3d 845, 850 (Tenn. 2003), the Tennessee Supreme Court adopted a totality of the circumstances test for the purpose of determining whether a person was in physical control of a motor vehicle or driving a motor vehicle.

2007Id. at 765 ; see also State v. Butler, 108 S.W.3d 845, 850 (Tenn. 2003).

2015Our supreme court Ahas adopted a totality of the circumstances test for determining whether a seizure has occurred.@ State v. Moats, 403 S.W.3d 170, 182 (Tenn. 2013) (citing Daniel, 12 S.W.3d at 425 ).

2014In State v. Randolph, 74 S.W.3d 330, 36-37 (Tenn. 2002), our supreme court held that the proper analysis of when a person has been seized under article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution is “a totality of the circumstances analysis” such that “‘a seizure implicating constitutional concerns occurs only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to leave.’” Id. (quoting State v. Daniel, 12 S.W.3d 420, 425 (Tenn. 2000)).

2026See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (“[The] totality-of-the-circumstances approach is adequate to determine whether there has been a waiver even where interrogation of juveniles is involved.”); see also Hardaway v. Young, 302 F.3d 757, 764 (7th Cir. 2002) (declining to impose a per se rule that “no child under the age of 16 may . . . make a voluntary confession without a parent or guardian present” because the Fare decision “makes quite clear that all juvenile confessions are to be assessed under the totality of the circumstances standard, and that no one factor will be dispositiv

1998We hold that: (1) neither the Tennessee Constitution nor the United States Constitution requires police officers to inform the defendant that he may be prosecuted as an adult; and (2) juvenile waivers shall be analyzed under a totality-of-the-circumstances test, which requires consideration of factors consistent with those enumerated in Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979).

2022Callahan, 979 S.W.2d at 583 ; State v. Carroll, 36 S.W.3d 854, 864 (Tenn. Crim.

2006The supreme court further stated that “[w]hile courts shall exercise special care in scrutinizing purported waivers by juvenile suspects, no single factor such as mental condition or education should by itself render a confession unconstitutional absent coercive police activity.” Id. “[T]he admissibility of a juvenile’s confession is not dependent upon the presence of his parents at the interrogation.” State v. Carroll, 36 S.W.3d 854, 864 (Tenn. Crim.

2013See generally Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 575 (1998); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); Wayne R.

2000See generally Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 575 , 108 S.Ct. at 1980 ; Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. at 1877; People v. Pancoast, 659 P.2d 1348 (Colo.1982); LaFave § 5.1(a).

2014In State v. Randolph, 74 S.W.3d 330, 36-37 (Tenn. 2002), our supreme court held that the proper analysis of when a person has been seized under article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution is “a totality of the circumstances analysis” such that “‘a seizure implicating constitutional concerns occurs only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to leave.’” Id. (quoting State v. Daniel, 12 S.W.3d 420, 425 (Tenn. 2000)).

2014In State v. Randolph, 74 S.W.3d 330, 36-37 (Tenn. 2002), our supreme court held that the proper analysis of when a person has been seized under article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution is “a totality of the circumstances analysis” such that “‘a seizure implicating constitutional concerns occurs only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to leave.’” Id. (quoting State v. Daniel, 12 S.W.3d 420, 425 (Tenn. 2000)).

2017In Jacumin, this Court refused to follow Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 627 (1983), which adopted a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis for determining whether an affidavit establishes probable cause for a search warrant, and instead embraced, as a matter of Tennessee constitutional law, another test derived from two earlier United States Supreme Court decisions, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).

2017In Jacumin, this Court refused to follow Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 627 (1983), which adopted a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis for determining whether an affidavit establishes probable cause for a search warrant, and instead embraced, as a matter of Tennessee constitutional law, another test derived from two earlier United States Supreme Court decisions, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).

2017In Jacumin, this Court refused to follow Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 627 (1983), which adopted a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis for determining whether an affidavit establishes probable cause for a search warrant, and instead embraced, as a matter of Tennessee constitutional law, another test derived from two earlier United States Supreme Court decisions, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).

2017In Jacumin, this Court refused to follow Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 627 (1983), which adopted a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis for determining whether an affidavit establishes probable cause for a search warrant, and instead embraced, as a matter of Tennessee constitutional law, another test derived from two earlier United States Supreme Court decisions, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).

1996In State v. Morris, 224 Tenn. 437, 443 , 456 S.W.2d 840, 842 (1970), the totality of the circumstances test was found to govern the classification of the interrogation; the critical factors were identified as follows: (1) the nature of the interrogator; (2) the nature of the suspect; (3) the time and place of the interrogation; (4) the nature of the interrogation; and (5) the progress of the investigation at the time of the interrogation.

1996In State v. Morris, 224 Tenn. 437, 443 , 456 S.W.2d 840, 842 (1970), the totality of the circumstances test was found to govern the classification of the interrogation; the critical factors were identified as follows: (1) the nature of the interrogator; (2) the nature of the suspect; (3) the time and place of the interrogation; (4) the nature of the interrogation; and (5) the progress of the investigation at the time of the interrogation.

2020Id.

2007See Cox, 171 S.W.3d at 185 .

2017In United States v. Knights, the United States Supreme Court applied the totality of the circumstances test in determining the constitutionality of the warrantless search of a probationer’s home. 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001).

2017In applying the totality of the circumstances test, the Court characterized the defendant’s probation search condition as a “salient circumstance” and analyzed the reasonableness of the search by balancing “‘the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy [against] the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’” Id. at 118-19 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).

2017In applying the totality of the circumstances test, the Court characterized the defendant’s probation search condition as a “salient circumstance” and analyzed the reasonableness of the search by balancing “‘the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy [against] the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’” Id. at 118-19 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).

2009Applying the totality of the circumstances test, of which the defendant’s probation search condition was “a salient circumstance,” id. at 118 , 122 S.Ct. 587 , the Court analyzed the reasonableness of the search by balancing “ ‘the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy [against] the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’” Id. at 119 , 122 S.Ct. 587 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 , 119 S.Ct. 1297 , 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999)).

2015Our supreme court Ahas adopted a totality of the circumstances test for determining whether a seizure has occurred.@ State v. Moats, 403 S.W.3d 170, 182 (Tenn. 2013) (citing Daniel, 12 S.W.3d at 425 ).

2014Moats, 403 S.W.3d at 182 (citing Daniel, 12 S.W.3d at 424 ).

2026See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (“[The] totality-of-the-circumstances approach is adequate to determine whether there has been a waiver even where interrogation of juveniles is involved.”); see also Hardaway v. Young, 302 F.3d 757, 764 (7th Cir. 2002) (declining to impose a per se rule that “no child under the age of 16 may . . . make a voluntary confession without a parent or guardian present” because the Fare decision “makes quite clear that all juvenile confessions are to be assessed under the totality of the circumstances standard, and that no one factor will be dispositiv

2026See Climer, 400 S.W.3d at 565 .